Composition
14. The membership of a Parliamentary Commission
of Inquiry is an important factor in establishing the credibility
of an inquiry. Lord Hurd told us that the composition of an inquiry
is highly significant, particularly if it is not to be discredited
for acting in a partisan manner. He cited the 1912-13 Marconi
inquiry, into allegations of corruption concerning the construction
of wireless telegraph stations, as a warning. The Marconi inquiry
had originally brought parliamentary inquiries into disrepute
because it had allowed partisan considerations to dominate, with
members eventually voting along party lines.[12]
15. One of the key decisions would be the appointment
of an inquiry chair, which in turn would depend on the type of
inquiry being conducted and its purpose. In relation to an inquiry
into Iraq, our witnesses expressed a variety of opinions about
the sort of person that would be suitable as an inquiry chair.
Lord Owen believed that it should be a parliamentarian rather
than a judge or a civil servant, since a political figure could
be expected to understand the political dimensions and nuances
of such an inquiry. More generally, both Lord Owen and Sir Menzies
Campbell expressed the view that the inquiry chair should be of
sufficient standing to resist the inquiry being manipulated or
undermined by the Governmentthis being particularly important
for a parliamentary inquiry that seeks to hold the Executive to
account.[13]
16. The Government by Inquiry Report envisaged
a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry comprising parliamentarians
from both Houses as well as others with relevant expertise from
outside Parliament.[14]
Lord Hurd observed that for inquiries where sensitive security
and intelligence material were to be considered (such as an Iraq
inquiry), members could be made Privy Counsellors in order for
them to see evidence on Privy Council terms.[15]
This occurred during Lord Butler's inquiry into the intelligence
on weapons of mass destruction leading up to the invasion of Iraq.
In effect, an inquiry could take the form of a Committee of Privy
Counsellors that is appointed by Parliament rather than
by the Government. Lord Butler gave evidence to our predecessor
Committee that his inquiry could have been a parliamentary inquiry,
given its membership (four of the five inquiry members were parliamentarians:
two were Members of Parliament and another two were Members of
the House of Lords).[16]
17. We believe that decisions about the membership
and chairmanship of a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry should
be taken carefully in order to avoid the inquiry being undermined
by partisanship or political concerns. To operate effectively,
a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry should consist of a Committee
of Privy Counsellors appointed by Parliament. Individuals could
be made Privy Counsellors in order to serve on an inquiry of this
nature. Members should be drawn from both Houses of Parliament,
with external members appointed where appropriate for their specialist
expertise.
Operation and powers
18. Under normal circumstances, we would expect
a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry to sit in public due to
the need to hold the Government to account and ensure public confidence
in the proceedings. Our witnesses agreed, however, that some topicssuch
as the Iraq warmight warrant inquiries sitting in private
some of the time due to the sensitivity of the evidence being
considered. Lord Owen, reflecting on his experience of having
given evidence to the Franks Commission on the Falklands war,
said "
there is no doubt, in my view, that at that particular
timewe were still hostile to Argentinathere were
a lot of things that I would not have been able to say if it had
been in public".[17]
A Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry should, therefore, be able
to hear and consider evidence in private as necessary in order
to, as Adam Price put it, "get us closer to the truth".[18]
19. The effectiveness of a Parliamentary Commission
of Inquiry would also depend, in part, on its powers. The Foreign
Affairs Committee reported in 2004 that its inquiry into the decision
to go to war in Iraq had been hampered by problems in gaining
access to witnesses and documents. That Committee concluded that,
in relation to its particular experience, the powers of select
committees to send for persons, papers and records "
are,
in practice, unenforceable in relation to the Executive".[19]
Adam Price suggested to us that in addition to the powers enjoyed
by select committees, a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry would
require further powers including the ability to grant witnesses
immunity from disciplinary proceedings.[20]
Lord Owen concurred that existing select committee procedures
are unlikely to be sufficient, but that the "almost unique"
status of a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry could be expected
to work in its favour in terms of how the inquiry would operate.[21]
20. The operation of a Parliamentary Commission
of Inquiry would depend, in part, on the nature of the inquiry
and those conducting it. Some inquiries, such as an inquiry into
the Iraq war, might need to sit in private when sensitive material
is being considered. We believe this should occur only as necessary,
balanced against the requirement to operate in public in order
to secure accountability and ensure public confidence. Any Parliamentary
Commission of Inquiry would also need enforceable powers to summon
witnesses and to access papers and other relevant evidence of
its choosing (including classified government material) in order
to do its job effectively.
9 Q 40 [Lord Hurd] Back
10
Q 23 Back
11
Government by Inquiry, para 222 Back
12
Q 10 [Lord Hurd] Back
13
Q 17 [Lord Owen, Sir Menzies Campbell] Back
14
Government by Inquiry, paras 214-215 Back
15
Q 10 [Lord Hurd] Back
16
Government by Inquiry, para 215 Back
17
Q 8 Back
18
Q 9 [Mr Price] Back
19
Foreign Affairs Committee, First Special Report of Session 2003-04,
Implications for the Work of the House and its Committees of
the Government's Lack of Co-operation with the Foreign Affairs
Committee's Inquiry into The Decision to go to War in Iraq,
HC 440, para 13 Back
20
Q 9 [Mr Price] Back
21
Q 23 Back