Select Committee on Public Administration Ninth Report


3  Practical considerations for a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry

Instigation

10.  Our witnesses agreed that it would be difficult to set up a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry—whether into Iraq, or into another issue—because of party loyalism and whipped votes in the House of Commons. In all but the most extraordinary of circumstances, the governing party would be able to prevent any inquiry it did not want to see by using its majority to defeat any vote to set one up. This is particularly likely to be the case where an inquiry is politically inconvenient or embarrassing to the Government. Lord Hurd noted that "…it is precisely the role of the party and the strength of that role which is inhibiting the House of Commons from doing what in the 19th Century it did almost as a matter of course".[9]

11.  Lord Owen suggested to us that it was important for a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry to be voted on by both Houses of Parliament, as this would increase its legitimacy and make it difficult to resist other than on purely political grounds. He also believed that the device of having a parliamentary inquiry should be used for only the most important matters. This would set it apart from day-to-day political skirmishing and make it more likely that a consensus could be built around the need for an inquiry. He told us:

    …I do believe that what you are discussing [the idea of a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry] is a completely novel procedure to be very exceptionally undertaken…I think it would be quite important to ring fence it by making it almost unique, and I think it would carry more conviction in that way.[10]

12.  Accordingly, the Government by Inquiry Report suggested a filtering procedure to help ensure that only serious and worthwhile proposals for a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry were entertained. That Report recommended that the Liaison Committee receive and consider proposals for parliamentary inquiries. The proposals that the Liaison Committee decided did warrant serious consideration could be reported to the House, and a resolution to set up an inquiry could then be put to a parliamentary vote.[11]

13.  Some kind of sifting mechanism for deciding on the validity of proposals for Parliamentary Commissions of Inquiry is required, whether that be the involvement of the Liaison Committee or some other procedure. Successful inquiry proposals would then need to be debated in the House in order for Parliament to vote on whether to establish a particular inquiry. We believe that the bar for inviting the House to consider instigating a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry should be set fairly low, so that proposals for an inquiry can be made without hindrance. The bar for securing a full debate in the House on setting up the inquiry should, however, be set fairly high, in order to ensure that only serious proposals are put to the House. A debate to set up an inquiry should not require Government support to take place, but a majority of the House would need to vote in favour of the inquiry for it to be established. We invite the Procedure Committee to design a mechanism for establishing Parliamentary Commissions of Inquiry with these requirements in mind. Our invitation is also open to the House of Lords.

Composition

14.  The membership of a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry is an important factor in establishing the credibility of an inquiry. Lord Hurd told us that the composition of an inquiry is highly significant, particularly if it is not to be discredited for acting in a partisan manner. He cited the 1912-13 Marconi inquiry, into allegations of corruption concerning the construction of wireless telegraph stations, as a warning. The Marconi inquiry had originally brought parliamentary inquiries into disrepute because it had allowed partisan considerations to dominate, with members eventually voting along party lines.[12]

15.  One of the key decisions would be the appointment of an inquiry chair, which in turn would depend on the type of inquiry being conducted and its purpose. In relation to an inquiry into Iraq, our witnesses expressed a variety of opinions about the sort of person that would be suitable as an inquiry chair. Lord Owen believed that it should be a parliamentarian rather than a judge or a civil servant, since a political figure could be expected to understand the political dimensions and nuances of such an inquiry. More generally, both Lord Owen and Sir Menzies Campbell expressed the view that the inquiry chair should be of sufficient standing to resist the inquiry being manipulated or undermined by the Government—this being particularly important for a parliamentary inquiry that seeks to hold the Executive to account.[13]

16.  The Government by Inquiry Report envisaged a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry comprising parliamentarians from both Houses as well as others with relevant expertise from outside Parliament.[14] Lord Hurd observed that for inquiries where sensitive security and intelligence material were to be considered (such as an Iraq inquiry), members could be made Privy Counsellors in order for them to see evidence on Privy Council terms.[15] This occurred during Lord Butler's inquiry into the intelligence on weapons of mass destruction leading up to the invasion of Iraq. In effect, an inquiry could take the form of a Committee of Privy Counsellors that is appointed by Parliament rather than by the Government. Lord Butler gave evidence to our predecessor Committee that his inquiry could have been a parliamentary inquiry, given its membership (four of the five inquiry members were parliamentarians: two were Members of Parliament and another two were Members of the House of Lords).[16]

17.  We believe that decisions about the membership and chairmanship of a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry should be taken carefully in order to avoid the inquiry being undermined by partisanship or political concerns. To operate effectively, a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry should consist of a Committee of Privy Counsellors appointed by Parliament. Individuals could be made Privy Counsellors in order to serve on an inquiry of this nature. Members should be drawn from both Houses of Parliament, with external members appointed where appropriate for their specialist expertise.

Operation and powers

18.  Under normal circumstances, we would expect a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry to sit in public due to the need to hold the Government to account and ensure public confidence in the proceedings. Our witnesses agreed, however, that some topics—such as the Iraq war—might warrant inquiries sitting in private some of the time due to the sensitivity of the evidence being considered. Lord Owen, reflecting on his experience of having given evidence to the Franks Commission on the Falklands war, said "…there is no doubt, in my view, that at that particular time—we were still hostile to Argentina—there were a lot of things that I would not have been able to say if it had been in public".[17] A Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry should, therefore, be able to hear and consider evidence in private as necessary in order to, as Adam Price put it, "get us closer to the truth".[18]

19.  The effectiveness of a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry would also depend, in part, on its powers. The Foreign Affairs Committee reported in 2004 that its inquiry into the decision to go to war in Iraq had been hampered by problems in gaining access to witnesses and documents. That Committee concluded that, in relation to its particular experience, the powers of select committees to send for persons, papers and records "…are, in practice, unenforceable in relation to the Executive".[19] Adam Price suggested to us that in addition to the powers enjoyed by select committees, a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry would require further powers including the ability to grant witnesses immunity from disciplinary proceedings.[20] Lord Owen concurred that existing select committee procedures are unlikely to be sufficient, but that the "almost unique" status of a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry could be expected to work in its favour in terms of how the inquiry would operate.[21]

20.  The operation of a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry would depend, in part, on the nature of the inquiry and those conducting it. Some inquiries, such as an inquiry into the Iraq war, might need to sit in private when sensitive material is being considered. We believe this should occur only as necessary, balanced against the requirement to operate in public in order to secure accountability and ensure public confidence. Any Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry would also need enforceable powers to summon witnesses and to access papers and other relevant evidence of its choosing (including classified government material) in order to do its job effectively.


9   Q 40 [Lord Hurd] Back

10   Q 23 Back

11   Government by Inquiry, para 222 Back

12   Q 10 [Lord Hurd] Back

13   Q 17 [Lord Owen, Sir Menzies Campbell] Back

14   Government by Inquiry, paras 214-215 Back

15   Q 10 [Lord Hurd] Back

16   Government by Inquiry, para 215 Back

17   Q 8 Back

18   Q 9 [Mr Price] Back

19   Foreign Affairs Committee, First Special Report of Session 2003-04, Implications for the Work of the House and its Committees of the Government's Lack of Co-operation with the Foreign Affairs Committee's Inquiry into The Decision to go to War in Iraq, HC 440, para 13 Back

20   Q 9 [Mr Price] Back

21   Q 23 Back


 
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Prepared 29 May 2008