Conclusions and recommendations
1. Our exploration of calls for an inquiry into the Iraq war indicates that there is still a need—unmet since an earlier investigation by this Committee—for Parliament to be able to initiate and conduct inquiries of its own. Inquiries with the imprimatur of Parliament would have the legitimacy to ensure that the Executive could be held to account effectively. Select committees do an excellent job of holding the Government to account in their particular spheres of operation. We believe, however, that there needs to be a broader parliamentary mechanism for establishing inquiries into matters of the highest significance and greatest public concern. We therefore repeat the recommendation made by our predecessor Committee that Parliament should be able to set up a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry whenever it wishes to investigate important matters of this nature that involve the scrutiny of government actions.
(Paragraph 9)
2. We believe that the bar for inviting the House to consider instigating a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry should be set fairly low, so that proposals for an inquiry can be made without hindrance. The bar for securing a full debate in the House on setting up the inquiry should, however, be set fairly high, in order to ensure that only serious proposals are put to the House. A debate to set up an inquiry should not require Government support to take place, but a majority of the House would need to vote in favour of the inquiry for it to be established. We invite the Procedure Committee to design a mechanism for establishing Parliamentary Commissions of Inquiry with these requirements in mind. Our invitation is also open to the House of Lords.
(Paragraph 13)
3. We believe that decisions about the membership and chairmanship of a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry should be taken carefully in order to avoid the inquiry being undermined by partisanship or political concerns. To operate effectively, a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry should consist of a Committee of Privy Counsellors appointed by Parliament. Individuals could be made Privy Counsellors in order to serve on an inquiry of this nature. Members should be drawn from both Houses of Parliament, with external members appointed where appropriate for their specialist expertise.
(Paragraph 17)
4. The operation of a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry would depend, in part, on the nature of the inquiry and those conducting it. Some inquiries, such as an inquiry into the Iraq war, might need to sit in private when sensitive material is being considered. We believe this should occur only as necessary, balanced against the requirement to operate in public in order to secure accountability and ensure public confidence. Any Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry would also need enforceable powers to summon witnesses and to access papers and other relevant evidence of its choosing (including classified government material) in order to do its job effectively.
(Paragraph 20)
5. It is Parliament's responsibility to hold the Executive to account for its actions. Part of this involves investigating and inquiring into important matters of public concern. For example, there have been many calls for an Iraq inquiry, and the Government has clearly been reluctant to set up an inquiry of its own in the foreseeable future. Yet Parliament has not succeeded in establishing its own inquiry into the Government's actions on Iraq, even though it is the most significant issue of public concern in recent times. This signifies a fundamental problem in our current constitutional arrangements. In the past, Parliament has initiated investigations into matters as momentous as Iraq, and has been expected to do so. In relation to Iraq, the Government has conceded the principle of an inquiry. We have proposed a mechanism—the establishment of Parliamentary Commissions of Inquiry—for Parliament to instigate inquiries of its own. It is now up to Parliament to take that initiative.
(Paragraph 21)
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