Select Committee on International Development Written Evidence


Further memorandum from Transparency International (UK)

  1.  See Appendix 1 for background on Transparency International (UK) and its work in the defence sector.

BACKGROUND

  2.  Transparency International (UK) submitted written evidence to the "Quadripartite Committee" in December 2007, in advance of the Committee's inquiry into export controls (17 January 2008).

  3.  Transparency International (UK) welcomes the Quadripartite Committee's receptiveness to our proposals, as put by the Committee to the Secretary of State Des Browne on 17 January. Transparency International (UK) is disappointed with the Secretary of State's response.

  4.  Transparency International (UK) is pleased to have this opportunity to present to the Quadripartite Committee. Our submission consists of the following:

    —    Clarifications in response to the Secretary of State's objections to our "Al Salaam" contract monitoring proposals (as outlined on 17 January).

    —    Other proposals to enhance anti-corruption controls in the UK, building on the recommendations of the last Strategic Export Controls Review of 2007.

ENHANCED MONITORING OF AL SALAM CONTRACT: SECRETARY OF STATE'S COMMENTS

  5.  The Quadripartite Committee made proposals to Secretary of State for Defence Des Browne on January 17, based on the last TI (UK) submission,[3] for enhanced monitoring of the new Al Salam contract. In the transcript of the proceedings the issue of corruption in arms deals with Saudi Arabia comes up in Questions 15 to 27, principally Q26. The Secretary of State was not supportive of pursuing the TI (UK) proposal. His main objections were:

    (a)  "There is a perfectly good, independent body in the NAO that reports to Parliament that does this job, why do we need another one?"

    (b)  "The fundamental problem is that this is a government-to-government contract. The Saudi Government's view—and we respect this—is that the financial arrangements in relation to such contracting are confidential."

    (c)  "This is a perfectly proper contract in which there is no impropriety associated with this negotiation at all."

  6.  Transparency International (UK) believes the Secretary of State is underestimating the damage that has been done to the UK's previously good reputation in anti-corruption by the fall-out from Al Yamamah. Large UK companies, many of whom have worked hard at putting in place a good anti-bribery practice, tell us how dismayed they are by the negative perception of UK companies overseas. There is now an opportunity to restore the UK's reputation by making the new Al Salam contract fully transparent and an exemplar of good practice.

  7.  TI (UK)'s response to the Secretary of State's objections are as follows:

    —    NAO: The NAO is a very competent body. However, its report on the Al Yamamah contract was never published. If the public is to have any confidence this time, it is vital that the NAO's views should be published.

    —    Government-to-Government contract: This does not need to be an insurmountable barrier. There will be a body of opinion in Saudi Arabia that will welcome higher confidence in the integrity of this contract, given the damage and embarrassment caused by "Al Yamamah". There is no reason why both Governments cannot agree on measures to show Al Salam is a "perfectly proper contract". This will require a degree of independent verification. We urge the Committee to impress upon the Government the importance of working pro-actively with their Saudi counterparts to agree such measures.

EXPORT LICENCING

  8.  As a requirement for the granting of an export licence, companies should be required to adhere to strict anti-corruption measures, including:

    —    publication of the names of intermediaries and advisers utilised by UK defence companies, and publication of all fees paid to them and the services they provide;

    —    commitment to undertaking face to face due diligence before appointing an agent, adviser or other intermediary, and on a regular basis thereafter, eg annually or biannually;

    —    a requirement that subsidiaries and joint ventures observe the same high standards of due diligence required in the UK;

    —    formal monitoring of any "offset" arrangements in connection with defence deals. Because of their opacity, offsets are vulnerable to bribery and corruption. TI(UK) is happy to provide more details on this subject; and

    —    a register of brokers: TI (UK) welcomes the Quadripartite Committee's recommendation that the Government "follow best practice to establish a register of arms brokers". Registered brokers should be required to disclose to all payments made to them for publication by the central registry. Further, TI (UK) proposes the obligatory vetting of registered brokers by an agency such as TRACE International,[4] a non-profit membership association specialising in anti-bribery due diligence reviews and compliance training.

  9.  Post-hoc checking: The present export control system is based on a strong set of criteria in advance of approval of the export. There is very little scrutiny of exports after shipment, and virtually no data to confirm whether or not shipments have proceeded as stated. The issues uncovered by the AQ Khan saga show how the lack of post-hoc checking can lead to a dangerous complacency about export controls. TI (UK) recommends that the Government initiate a system of more rigorous post-hoc checking of arms exports. We also recommend that the Government champions this for incorporation in the proposed Arms Trade Treaty. Post-hoc checking of a random sample of arms exports once completed would help to identify weak spots, act as a deterrent for those intent on flouting controls, and provide much needed data on the extent of diversion. Post-hoc checking should be conducted by a properly resourced and mandated team, which should aim to:

    —    assess whether the export reached the intended recipient;

    —    scrutinise all payments associated with the export, in particular those made through third parties; and

    —    assess whether enhanced anti-corruption procedures were adopted once red flags had been raised.

INTERNATIONAL ARMS TRADE TREATY

  10.  TI (UK) welcomes the Quadripartite committee's recommendation that "the Government press for the inclusion of provisions in the arms trade treaty to promote good governance and combat bribery and corruption in arms transfers".

  11.  Corruption greases the circumvention of export controls. Anti-corruption principles and measures therefore should constitute a central part of the export control regime. This would correct one of the major weaknesses of the EU Code on Arms Exports (the Code treats anti-corruption as a footnote rather than a central "principle").

  12.  TI (UK) proposes that the Government makes the case for the proposed anti-corruption provisions to require presentation by exporting companies of rigorous contract-specific no-bribery warranties, best practice compliance systems, as well as a system for initiating enhanced controls when "red flags" are raised in relation to the proposed recipient. A template system is presented in Appendix 2.

  13.  The Treaty should require the provision of detailed, comprehensive, and publicly available information on the supply and receipt of exports—in particular the value of the exports and the entities involved. Such data should be collected and hosted centrally by the UN. States that do not provide timely and complete data should be debarred from future transfers for an appropriate period of time.

DESO

  14.  DESO's incorporation into BERR presents the Government with an opportunity to enhance its anti-corruption safeguards. As a requirement for DESO support, companies should be required to adhere to strict anti-corruption measures. TI (UK) looks forward to continued engagement with BERR in this respect.

March 2008








3   "A litmus test of the Government's commitment to fighting bribery will be the conditions surrounding the new "Al Salam" contract for the sale of military aircraft and related services to Saudi Arabia. It is greatly in the interests of both Governments to show beyond doubt that the new contract is consistent with current recognised standards of corporate and public integrity. Transparency International (UK) would like to learn what proposals the Secretary of State may have for restoring confidence in these major transactions. Transparency International (UK) believes a powerful, visible way to do this would be to set up a body comprised of respected institutions from both countries that would monitor the financial, equipment and associated support areas during the whole life of the contract. This would be set up by the two Governments to demonstrate their commitment to showing that the contract is consistent with recognized standards of corporate integrity. We believe that such a positive initiative will improve the image of the UK and Saudi Arabia after the Al Yamamah saga and go a long way towards restoring faith in the UK's anti-corruption efforts. Transparency International (UK) has written to the Prime Minister, the former Secretary of State for Trade & Industry, the Secretary of State for Defence, and the Head of the FCO Middle East Desk, commending this proposal to them, and would be happy to discuss this matter further with Secretary of State for Defence." Back

4   www.TRACEInternational.org Back


 
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