Memorandum from Amnesty International
UK, the Omega Research Foundation and Saferworld
INTRODUCTION
1. The following submission from Amnesty
International, the Omega Research Foundation and Saferworld to
the Committees on Arms Export Controls (CAEC) focuses on the ongoing
review of the Export Control Act (ECA). In this submission we
address the issue of military, security and police end-use controls
raised in the recent 2007 Review of export controls: Government's
initial response to the public consultation (Initial Response).
There are, however, other issues discussed in the Initial Response
not addressed in this submission that its authors are pursuing
in other contexts, eg arms brokering, controlling subsidiaries
and licensed production agreements.
2. The submission then looks at two other
issues that the authors believe the Government should be addressing
as part of this review process, but which the Government regards
as outside its Terms of Reference. These are:
3. The submission should be read in conjunction
with the March 2008 submission from the wider UK Working Group
on Arms, which also focuses on the review of the ECA as well as
other issues.
MILITARY, SECURITY
AND POLICE
END-USE
CONTROLS AND
THE GOVERNMENT'S
INITIAL RESPONSE
4. While a system of controlling goods contained
within specific military and dual-use lists is the cornerstone
of most transfer control systems, Amnesty International, the Omega
Research Foundation and Saferworld believe that the ultimate purpose
of transfer controls should be to prevent certain types of activity
or consequences, rather than simply to control particular technologies.
Given the trend toward globalisation and the increasing importance
of dual-use and civilian off-the-shelf (COTS) goods in the development
and manufacture of modern weapons systems, there is a clear risk
that over time more and more goods critical to the operation of
these systems will bypass the licensing system on the grounds
that they do not fall within the definitions or specification
of the control lists. In such circumstances, end-use catch-all
controls can help avoid loopholes whereby items not included on
control lists are beyond regulatory reach.
5. Our organisations have provided examples
in recent years where uncontrolled UK-made parts and components
for military and security equipment—and in some cases finished
goods—have been used in regions of instability and by human
rights abusers. The components and systems in question are not
generic, exchangeable nuts and bolts, but specialised electronic
subsystems; complex mechanical parts; and even complete vehicles
and surveillance systems, including:
— Land Rover vehicles and knocked-down
vehicle kits used as internal security vehicles in Sudan,[36]
and as military vehicles in the Andijan massacre in Uzbekistan.[37]
— Electronic processing units vital
to US-made Predator UAVs, used in extra-judicial executions in
Pakistan.[38]
6 While we recognise the challenges of
extending controls in the area, some licensing authorities have
incorporated elements of military end-use into their regulatory
regimes.
7. For example, Germany has developed the
"Einzeleingriff" or "single action" catch-all
clause, whereby the transfer of an unlisted item can in principle
be refused. The Einzeleingriff has been applied to non-listed
communication equipment to a country under UN arms embargo, where
it was believed the equipment would be used for internal repression.
As the equipment had no military end-use (ie no use in the development
of or incorporation into weapons), the catch-all clause under
the Dual-Use Regulation did not apply. This approach has considerable
advantage as it does not establish an obligatory licensing requirement
for industry, while at the same time it allows the authorities
to prevent suspicious transfers in specific cases.
8. In Belgium, a military end-use catch-all
clause has been included in the transfer controls regime of the
Flanders region. This catch-all clause provides a licensing requirement
for the export or transit of equipment intended to support military
actions. This requirement includes related components, software,
technology, machinery etc. One such case includes the integration
of visualisation screens, which are non-controlled items, to be
exported for integration into controlled items such as fighter
jets and military vehicles. Other types of goods which require
a licence under the catch-all include airport lighting systems,
software and other non-licensable components for vehicles, planes
and ships.
— The Government should ensure it
has sufficient powers under the ECA to control any non-listed
item it believes poses relevant serious concerns around military,
security or police end-use.
9. We are pleased that the ongoing ECA review
has been extended to allow further discussion regarding these
areas. In this submission, we identify a range of options that
could be contemplated as part of this review. These should be
regarded as illustrative of the types of changes that should be
considered, and not as an exhaustive list.
10. At the most comprehensive level, components
intended for controlled goods should themselves be controlled,
regardless of the intrinsic military or security specifications
of the components themselves. Indeed, it is already the clear
intention of the Military List to control unspecified components
for controlled goods, under the "components therefor"
sections of each Military List category. One way of achieving
end-use-type provisions would be to simply amend the Military
List and remove the phrase "specially designed or adapted".
As a starting point, end-use provisions could be applied to all
components destined for items within specific Military List categories
where proliferation concerns were most acute, such as small arms
and light weapons, ammunition, other munitions, artillery systems,
rockets and missiles, attack aircraft and helicopters and military
vehicles.
— The Government should consider whether
any non-controlled component destined for incorporation into items
specified on the Military List should itself require a licence,
if:
— the exporter has been informed by
a competent authority that such goods are or may be intended,
in their entirety or in part, for a controlled item on the Military
List; or
— the exporter has knowledge, or grounds
for suspecting, that such goods are or may be intended, in their
entirety or in part, to be used for a controlled item on the Military
List, unless the exporter has made all reasonable enquiries as
to their proposed use and is satisfied that they will not be so
used.
11. Amnesty International, the Omega Research
Foundation and Saferworld recognise that such comprehensive controls
would place new burdens on industry. We are keen to work with
Government and industry to ensure these burdens remain reasonable,
perhaps through new OGLs for non-sensitive destinations, which
could cover some generic electronic and mechanical components.
12. As an interim step, where there has
been specific evidence of the use of non-listed items in the commission
of human rights violations, then these items should be brought
within the licensing system at the earliest opportunity. For example
there have been frequent reports of military utility and transport
vehicles which are not in themselves of a licensable specification
(although are often subsequently adapted for military use with
armouring, gun mounts and other military fittings), but which
have nevertheless played a central support and logistics role
for forces involved in serious and persistent human rights violations.[39]
— The Government should consider amending
the ML6 category of the Military List to cover "utility and
transport vehicles supplied for military, security or police use",
including those supplied as complete items or in kit form; and
the ML10 category to cover "utility and transport aircraft
supplied for military, security or police use".[40]
13. Specific catch-all controls should at
a minimum be applied to components and technology for all items
currently restricted or prohibited. End-use controls already operate
in relation to items or technology that "are or may be intended
| for use in connection with the development, production, handling,
operation, maintenance, storage, detection, identification or
dissemination of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices or the development, production, maintenance
or storage of missiles capable of delivering such weapons."[41]
According to the Initial Response, end-use controls will be extended
to cover items restricted due to their use for torture. In light
of the Government's intention to move certain types of cluster
munitions into a `restricted' category essentially subject to
an export ban, similar catch-all end-use controls should be placed
on any components and technologies known by the exporter or the
government to be intended for the production, use or delivery
of such cluster munitions.
— The Government should consider applying
catch-all end-use controls to components and technology for all
prohibited/specially restricted goods, including cluster bombs
and their delivery systems
14. The EC Dual-Use Regulation (1334/2000)
already provides for controls on unlisted items, intended for
export to an embargoed destination, which the exporter has been
informed are intended for incorporation into a controlled item.
Non-controlled items intended for use by non-military security
or police forces are currently excluded from this control. For
example, Land Rover vehicles were legally supplied during 2006
to the Sudanese Ministry of Interior, whose police forces had
reportedly carried out previous armed attacks in Darfur using
similar utility vehicles.[42]
Under the current regime, policing equipment such as handcuffs
and non-controlled police surveillance equipment could likewise
be exported freely from the UK to destinations such as Myanmar
or Zimbabwe. Such transfers are in many cases as potentially damaging
to security and human rights as those for strictly "military"
use.
— The Government should consider expanding
the "embargoed destinations" catch-all to cover unlisted
items which the exporter has been informed are intended for a
military, security or police end-use
OTHER ISSUES
FOR CONSIDERATION
AS PART
OF THE
ECA REVIEW
15. In addition to the issues addressed
in the Initial Response, Amnesty International, the Omega Research
Foundation and Saferworld believe the Government should be using
the opportunity of the ECA review process to undertake a more
comprehensive review of the UK transfer control regime. Other
issues that we believe merit further examination include enforcement
and post-export controls.
ENFORCEMENT
16. Amnesty International, the Omega Research
Foundation and Saferworld have longstanding concerns that insufficient
resources are being allocated to implementing transfer controls,
thus undermining the ability of the controls to be properly enforced.
There are also concerns about lack of action to enforce controls
even where credible evidence comes to light that companies or
individuals are in breach.
17. To our knowledge there have been nine
reported prosecutions since 2000 under the ECA; virtually all
have been for relatively minor (and on occasion procedural) offences,
and subject to relatively small penalties.[43]
This is in contrast to the 504 detected breaches of arms export
controls (export seizures and unlicensed exports referred to HMRC
by DTI/BERR Compliance Officers) reported in answer to a Parliamentary
Question in March 2006.[44]
Willingness to investigate, prosecute and penalise
breaches of the ECA
18. In several cases authorities have failed
to launch or pursue prosecutions when there would appear to be
strong grounds for doing so. Previous submissions made by the
UKWG[45]
to the Quadripartite Committee have detailed cases involving UK
companies in the brokering of arms to embargoed Sudan; the transportation
of arms to the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo; and companies
breaching export controls by promoting electro-shock weaponry
at UK arms and security exhibitions and on websites, or offering
to supply banned items. As far as Amnesty International, the Omega
Research Foundation or Saferworld are aware, none of these companies
or individuals has been prosecuted under the ECA.[46]
19. This apparent reluctance to investigate
breaches of export controls and to impose sufficiently-deterring
penalties contrasts with the approach in the USA, where for example
the ITT Corporation was criminally convicted and fined US$100
million for illegally sending classified night-vision technology
used in military operations to China and Singapore and setting
up a front company to escape detection.[47]
By contrast, in 2007 a UK company, Avocado Research Chemicals
Ltd, was found to have unlawfully exported two controlled chemicals—100g
of 2-diisopropylaminoethyl chloride hydrochloride, a possible
precursor to VX gas, and 10g of hafnium, which can be used in
the production of nuclear fuel rods—to a broker in Egypt
(a non-signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention). The company
was fined just £600 (plus £100 costs).[48]
20. To date, the only significant custodial
sentence imposed has been through the successful prosecution of
John Knight of Endeavour Resources Ltd, who in November 2007 was
sentenced to four years in prison for the illegal sale of 130
MPT 9 machine guns from Iran to Kuwait without the necessary trade
control licence.[49]14
A licence for the deal was refused on two separate occasions by
the ECO on the basis of concerns over the authenticity of the
stated end-user and the likely subsequent risk of illicit diversion.
As the first successful enforcement under the 2004 trade controls,
this is an extremely significant and welcome development. However,
evidence emerging from the court case hearings raises serious
concerns about the effectiveness of the licensing and enforcement
regime, and willingness of the DTI/BERR to pursue clear breaches
of the ECA.
21. Firstly, it emerged that Mr Knight was
registered to use an OGTCL in 2004, and intended to continue using
it after his prosecution:
Mr Shay (defence lawyer in Regina vs John
Knight, Blackfriars Crown Court, 23 Nov 2007): "He [John
Knight] was in possession of an open, general licence. That licence
permitted him to broker deals between certain countries ... He
is at the moment still, by the way, in possession of that open
licence. He wishes to continue in his career". (emphasis
added)[50]
22. Evidence provided to the Quadripartite
Committee in 2007 confirms that companies are not "deregistered"
from OGLs even if found to be in breach of export controls[51],
and indeed there appears to be no provision within the terms of
OGLs for barring users in this way. Despite evidence being presented
that Mr Knight had attempted to supply military equipment to embargoed
Sudan without authorisation in 2004 (see below, paragraphs 24-25),
he was able to register to use the OGCTL. And despite being convicted
and imprisoned in 2007 for unauthorised small arms trafficking,
including the wilful abuse of the licensing system and providing
false and fraudulent documents to HMRC, there is no power to remove
or revoke the eligibility of Mr Knight (or other similar unscrupulous
traders) from using such open licences.
— No OGLs should be available for use
by entities found to be in serious breach of the terms of such
licences, or found guilty of arms export offences. OGLs should
require authorisation by ECO staff prior to use. Such authorisation
should not be automatic: issues such as registrants' prior export
record should be considered prior to their registration. If they
are found to have misused open or individual licences in the past,
they should be required to apply for individual licences.
23. Secondly, documentary evidence has previously
been presented by NGOs, both privately to the Government and publicly
to the Quadripartite Committee, on undesirable activities by Mr
Knight. For example, a UK newspaper reported in September 2004
that it had obtained documents showing that Mr Knight had been
involved in negotiations for arms deals to supply £2.25 million
worth of arms to Sudan.[52]
Sudan has been subject to an arms embargo since 1994. The documents,
which have been seen by Amnesty International and other researchers,
were made available to the Government in November 2004.
24. Documents included a series of End-Use
Certificates (EUCs) dated and stamped after March 2004, when the
new trade controls came into effect. EUCs were ostensibly issued
by Sudan's Military Industry Corporation to Knight's company Endeavour
Resources UK Ltd to negotiate for the supply of multiple rocket
launchers, main battle tanks, armoured personnel carriers, armoured
fighting vehicles, field guns, and pistols from factories based
in the Ukraine and Brazil. In answers to parliamentary questions,
despite the existence of such strong documentary evidence, the
Government stated that it believed there was insufficient evidence
to investigate the matter further. While denying supplying military
equipment, Mr Knight admitted to a Sunday newspaper to supplying
Antonov transport planes[53]
and non-licensable items, and to conducting negotiations over
possible arms transfers to the Sudan government: When questioned
why he was prepared to deal with military contracts with Sudan
when it was clear it was not a reputable regime, Mr Knight is
reported to have said:
"Nor was Hitler, but people were supplying
him with stuff. He was the biggest tyrant of the lot ... I was
involved in negotiations with them|.What you've got to remember
is that, until the law was introduced, it was not illegal ..."[54]
25. One might assume that Mr Knight's clear
intention to trade with an embargoed destination (Sudan) would
raise serious doubts about his suitability as a reputable arms
broker. Yet according to his defence lawyer, the ECO continued
to award trade control licences to Mr Knight, at least one of
which is identifiable in the Government's annual reports on Strategic
Export Controls. Details of these licences also emerged during
the recent court case. According to Mr Knight's defence team,
in 2005 he was awarded one licence to broker military equipment
from Iran to Botswana[55]
and another to broker SALW from Brazil to Kuwait (despite Brazil
having been one of the sources of weapons listed on Mr Knight's
Sudanese EUCs).[56]
— Given previous documentary evidence
and concerns about Mr Knight's trading relationship with Brazil,
Ukraine and Sudan, and in light of evidence available to the HMRC
prosecution team surrounding the trading relationships with Mr
Knight's Kuwait based agent, Al Boury, and his Iranian supplier
Tusa Overseas Ltd, Amnesty International, the Omega Research Foundation
and Saferworld recommend that the CAEC seek to analyse these licences,
including the equipment contained within them and the specified
end-users, and to investigate the circumstances by which they
were granted.
26. Finally, it was also revealed that the
ECO were aware that Mr Knight had been in breach of export controls
long before being arrested for the Iran-Kuwait deal, yet declined
for some time to take action. It should be stressed again that
Mr Knight had applied for trade control licences on two occasions.
It was revealed at the first application that Mr Knight had already
started to negotiate the deal before the licence was granted,
notwithstanding the fact that under the trade control legislation
of 2004 a licence is required in order to be permitted to undertake
such negotiations. Internal email correspondence from the ECO
at the time, cited in Mr Knight's trial, stated that:
"We appreciate that there may have been
a breach of the controls and that arrangements have progressed
during the application process, but would not see this as a cause
for action on its own."[57]
27. Thus despite evidence that a known control
offence had been committed by a trader previously known to have
negotiated deals with an embargoed country, a permissive attitude
towards such transgressions appears to have prevailed within the
ECO at that time. Given the seriousness of the subsequent trafficking
for which he was imprisoned, and the published reports about Mr
Knight's previous dealings with Sudan, it seems extraordinary
that the ECO chose to let this pass unchallenged.
Resources for enforcement
28. The low ratio of prosecutions to detected
breaches of the ECA strongly indicates the need for more effective
resourcing—both institutional and legal—to enforce
UK transfer controls. In particular, it would seem there is a
need for greater integration of licensing evidence with the investigation
of export control breaches. In the John Knight case, ECO officers
continued to issue a broker with trade control licences to supply
arms from a country (Brazil) from which he had previously attempted
to supply an embargoed regime (Sudan), and apparently overlooked
evidence arising from Knight's final licence application of a
possible breach of the ECA. In other areas there has been some
benefit from the creation of single compliance agencies, such
as the Financial Services Authority, the Serious Fraud Office
and the recently created Serious and Organised Crime Agency.
— The Government should initiate a
viability study into the creation of a single regulatory agency,
drawing together the personnel, experience and authority of the
ECO and the controlled-goods section of HMRC to create a unified
organisation for the compliance and enforcement of export controls.
This would assist in the implementation, detection, investigation
and prosecution of offences under the ECA.
CIVIL PENALTIES
29. One of the main difficulties for a successful
criminal prosecution is that the burden of proof is extremely
high; the prosecutor is required to disprove all possible defences.
In cases involving exports of controlled goods, given the opacity
and complexity of many such deals, establishing the evidence sufficient
to meet this burden of proof is often very difficult, especially
when offences are committed overseas or involve non-UK actors.
30. In 2006 the Quadripartite Committee
recommended that the ECA review "examine whether the evidential
tests and requirements in the export control legislation are impeding
the prosecution of breaches of the controls on strategic exports
and whether the Revenue and Customs departments need greater powers
to compel questions to be answered and documents produced when
investigating alleged breaches of strategic export controls."[58]
31. There is nothing in the Initial Response
to suggest the Government has seriously considered this recommendation.
Nevertheless, we support the Committee in its stance on this issue
and would further urge that the review process consider the possibility
of amending section 7 of the ECA to include civil penalties as
well as the current criminal sanctions. Civil penalties would
create a lesser test for prosecutors and therefore enable a greater
number of breaches to be successfully prosecuted, creating stronger
deterrent against transgressing the export control regime. While
civil penalties may not provide scope for imprisonment, they would
enable the courts to levy stringent fines on corporations and
individuals who breach the export regulations. This would create
an incentive for compliance from those who would stand to lose
financially and would generate a more cooperative stance from
companies under investigation.
POST-EXPORT
CONTROL
32. The UK licensing regime is premised
on concentrating resources at the licensing assessment stage,
rather than on tracking delivery or attempting to apply post-export
controls. Amnesty International, the Omega Research Foundation
and Saferworld support the use of a rigorous pre-licensing process,
but believe that in addition more should be done during the later
stages of the arms transfer life-cycle in order to minimise the
risk that UK-sourced controlled goods will be misused or diverted
and to guarantee that the licensing authority is acting with due
diligence. In particular, we urge the Government to include a
"no-export without permission" condition in end-use
certifications and/or transfer licences, and to reserve the right
to carry out end-use monitoring where concerns arise (so as to
maximise the impact of any "no re-export" conditions).
33. EU NGOs have prepared a report which
examines end-use and post-export controls in use in EU Member
States.[59]
While illustrative rather than exhaustive, this report identifies
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Poland,
Romania, Spain and Sweden as all using re-export controls to differing
degrees. The report reveals that practice in this area varies
across the EU, but all these states listed above go further in
this area than does the UK, for example by requiring delivery
verification and by making licences contingent upon a "no
re-export without permission" commitment from the recipient.
34. Provision for end-use monitoring by
EU Member States is more limited, although Sweden includes a clause
in all licences whereby the recipient commits to make facilities
available for on-site end-use inspections by Swedish authorities.[60]
The US includes significant provision for post-export monitoring
within its end-use control systems, the most well known of which
is the State Department `Blue Lantern' programme.[61]
35. While we recommend that the UK transfer
control regime should contain all these elements, this submission
concentrates on the issue of re-export conditionality.
36. We are not suggesting that diversion
or misuse of UK-sourced equipment or technology is an everyday
occurrence, however previous submissions and reports from the
UKWG and its members have highlighted problematic cases.[62]
And recent examples of transfers and potential transfers of military
equipment from India to Myanmar can be used to directly consider
the impact of post-export conditionality.
37. In February 2006 it was reported by
The Hindu that the Indian Government was in negotiations
to sell BN-2 "Defender" Islander maritime-patrol aircraft,
originally supplied by the UK, to Myanmar. It is understood that
the UK Government made representations to the Indian Government
opposing the transfer but, according to The Hindu, the
Indian Defence Ministry was unmoved in the absence of a resale
clause in the contract. An unnamed senior naval officer was quoted
as saying "we should tell [the UK] where to get off."[63]28
According to Janes Defence Weekly, a second set of two aircraft
have since been transferred.[64]
In March 2007, when questioned by the Quadripartite Committee
about the first transfer, the then Foreign Secretary, Margaret
Beckett, admitted that with the benefit of hindsight, a ban on
re-export "might have been desirable" and that "if
a similar export took place today one would consider" putting
such a clause in place.[65]
38. By way of contrast, EU NGOs revealed
in July 2007 that India was, according to newspaper reports, planning
to transfer a type of military helicopter (the Advanced Light
Helicopter—ALH) to Myanmar. Variants of the ALH contained
technology, parts or munitions supplied from five EU Member States
(Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the UK) and by a foreign
subsidiary of a Swedish company.[66]
The six EU states involved all placed different levels of restrictions
on re-export. These ranged from Italy, which as a matter of routine
requires end-use certificates to include a contractual obligation
by the purchasing country not to re-export military goods without
the prior authorisation of the Italian authorities, to the UK,
with no restrictions.
39. As a consequence of the NGO report,
EU Member States made representations to the Indian Government
opposing any such transfers. The contrast with the case of the
Defender aircraft is an interesting one, as the Indian Government
has since given assurances that the ALH is not to be transferred
to Myanmar. There is little doubt that the "no re-export
without permission" conditions used by a number of Member
States put them in a stronger position in discussions with India.
40. Where evidence comes to light that recipients
have refused to honour their end-use obligations, it is critical
that the UK tightens its transfer policies to those recipients.
This would involve refusing transfers to the same end-user (or,
depending on circumstances, involving the same intermediaries)
and revocation of existing licences until such time as the UK
Government were confident that the misuse or diversion would not
be repeated.
41. Another example of the importance of
post-export controls concerns Turkey and Sudan. It was reported
in mid-2007 and again in January 2008 that a Turkish military
delegation visiting Khartoum held talks with the Sudanese army
regarding future military cooperation between the two states.[67]
The talks allegedly addressed cooperation between the two countries
in areas of military industrialisation, transfer of military technology,
training and the provision of military services.[68]
Sudan has been under an EU embargo since 1994. Given the significant
relationship between some EU Member States and Turkey, in terms
not only of arms transfers but also arms-production co-operation,
these reports underscore the need to ensure that Member States
do all they can to control the downstream supply of items produced
elsewhere as a result of the transfer from the EU of controlled
goods and production capacity.
42. Increasing globalisation, particularly
in the context of an emerging tier of sophisticated arms producers
that do not necessarily enjoy the transfer control culture shared
by "North Western" states, gives greater urgency to
the need to more effectively address post-transfer issues. Others
do this routinely, and a then Foreign Secretary has admitted its
potential utility. Given the increasingly important role that
the UK plays in the supply of technology, components and subsystems
for third-country production, it is unclear why the UK Government
is so reluctant to address this.
The Government should:
— Introduce a system of post-export
controls, including more specific contractual limitations on end-use
and re-export, and provision for end-use monitoring
— Work with others to develop a forgery-proof
internationally standardised end-user and delivery-verification
certification process
— Provide details to the CAEC regarding
the number of end-user checks carried out by overseas posts each
year, the number of physical post-export checks undertaken and
the reasons for them
March 2008
36 "Sudan: Arms continuing to fuel serious human
rights violations in Darfur", Amnesty International, (AFR
54/019/2007). Back
37
Memorandum from the UK Working Group on Arms to Quadripartite
Committee, 2005-06 session. Back
38
Memorandum from the UK Working Group on Arms to Quadripartite
Committee, 2006-07 session. Back
39
For example, Chinese "Dong Feng" and "First Automobile
Works" trucks were widely used by Myanmar security forces
on the streets of Yangon in September 2007 to move security forces
around the city and detain protestors ("Myanmar needs a comprehensive
international arms embargo", Amnesty International (ASA 16/014/2007),
28 September 2007), while Antonov transport aircraft were used
in bombing raids in southern Sudan during 2007 ("Sudan: New
photographs show further breach of UN arms embargo on Darfur",
Amnesty International Press Release, 24 August 2007). Back
40
As evidence comes to light, other items, for example such as specialist
surveillance equipment with a military, security or police end-use,
should also be added to the appropriate lists. Back
41
Council Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 setting up a Community regime
for the control of exports of dual-use items and technology (the
Dual-Use Regulation), Article 4.1, 22 June 2000, http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file8989.pdf. Back
42
"Sudan: Arms continuing to fuel serious human rights violations
in Darfur", Amnesty International, (AFR 54/019/2007). Back
43
UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2005; UK Strategic
Export Controls Annual Report 2006; "Fine and compound penalty
for exporting without a licence", BERR Press Release, 27
July 2007; Regina vs John Knight at Blackfriars Crown Court, 23
November 2007. In addition to these nine successful prosecutions,
there have also reportedly been compound penalties levied in lieu
of criminal proceedings on three companies for export control
breaches. Back
44
Parliamentary Question posed by John Bercow MP, Hansard, 22 March
2006, Column 427W. Back
45
The UK Working Group on Arms comprises Amnesty International UK,
the Omega Research Foundation, Oxfam GB and Saferworld. Back
46
In June 2007 one of these companies was found guilty of illegally
possessing a weapon classified under Section 5 of the Firearms
Act 1968 but was not prosecuted for trade control offences, despite
video and photographic evidence of such an offence being provided
to the West Midlands police. See "Salesman's torch plan to
smuggle stun guns: exclusive", Sunday Mercury (UK),
10 June 2007. Back
47
"Asia, DOJ fines ITT $100M for illegal exports", AFX
International Focus, 27 March 2007, as cited by CNN Money.com. Back
48
Government News Network, 27 July 2007. Back
49
`Arms dealer jailed for 4 years', ECO website, 26 November 2007,
http://www.berr.gov.uk/europeandtrade/strategic-export-control/licensing-rating/licences/ogels/trade-controls/page42597.html. Back
50
15 Court transcript proceedings, Regina vs John Knight before
Judge Powles, Blackfriars Court, 23 November 2007. Back
51
Further memorandum from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to
the Quadripartite Committee, February 2007. Back
52
"Briton supplies arms to Sudan", Sunday Times,
5 September 2004; and "Sudan Arming the perpetrators of grave
abuses in Darfur", Amnesty International Report, November
2004. Back
53
It is possible that these planes are "specially modified
for military use", and thus constituted controlled goods
whose transfer also required a trade control licence. The relevant
EUCs list An-26 transport aircraft, which have "provision
for chaff/flare dispensers pylon-mounted on each side of lower
fuselage below wings" and "provision for bomb rack on
fuselage below each wingroot trailing-edge", according to
the standard reference work, Jane's All the World's Aircraft
(1998-9, p. 490). It is unclear whether this capacity is the result
of a mechanical modification or the aircraft reportedly provided
by Mr Knight were thus modified. Back
54
"British arms dealer defends attempts to supply Sudan",
Gethin Chamberlain, The Scotsman, 18 November 2004, http://www.scotsman.com/world/British-arms-dealer-defends-attempts.2581092.jp. Back
55
UK Strategic Exports Report, 4th Quarter 2005, lists a SITCL issued
for "Small Arms Ammunition" from Iran to Botswana, the
only such licence reported since 2004. Back
56
Court transcript proceedings, Regina vs John Knight before Judge
Powles, Blackfriars Court, 23 November 2007. Back
57
Ibid. Back
58
Quad Committee Joint Report 2005-06, recommendation 50. Back
59
"Submission to COARM on harmonisation among EU Member States
on end-use and post-export controls", EU NGOs, forthcoming. Back
60
Sweden's National Report to the UN ODA on the implementation of
the UN PoA, 2005, http://disarmament.un.org/cab/salw-nationalreports.html.
Although such checks are rare (due to capacity constraints), post-delivery
checks have been carried out by Sweden in, for example, Singapore
and the Baltic states (Saferworld correspondence with Swedish
arms export control expert, January 2008). Back
61
The UKWG has included information on "Blue Lantern"
in previous submissions (see, for example, "Submission to
the UK Quadripartite Select Committee", UK Working Group
on Arms, January 2006, p. 8, http://www.saferworld.org.uk/images/pubdocs/060117-UKWG-QSC-Submission.doc).
For more on this programme, see "Submission to COARM on harmonisation
among EU Member States on end-use and post-export controls",
EU NGOs, pp. 12-13, forthcoming. Back
62
See, for example, the "change options not specifically identified"
section of the UKWG submission to the UK Government 2007 review
of the Export Control Act, 28 September 2007, http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file42914.doc. Back
63
"Curbs apply only to aircraft spares: UK", Sandeep Dikshit,
The Hindu, 04 February 2006, http://www.hindu.com/2006/02/04/stories/2006020403311300.htm. Back
64
"Indian arms sales to Myanmar remain under scrutiny",
Rahul Bedi, Janes Defence Weekly, 16 January 2008, http://www.janes.com/news/security/capabilities/jdw/jdw080111_1_n.shtml. Back
65
Quadripartite Select Committee oral evidence from Margaret Beckett,
15 March 2007, Q. 232, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmquad/117/117.pdf. Back
66
"Indian helicopters for Myanmar: making a mockery of embargoes?",
a report by EU NGOs, July 2007, http://www.saferworld.org.uk/publications.php/270/indian_helicopters_for_myanmar_. Back
67
EU Council Decision 94/165/CFSP. Back
68
"Sudan, Turkey to discuss ways to boost military cooperation",
Sudan Tribune, 11 January 2008. Back
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