Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1
- 19)
THURSDAY 17 JANUARY 2008
RT HON
DES BROWNE
MP, MR DESMOND
BOWEN AND
MR TONY
PAWSON
Q1 Chairman: Good afternoon. Secretary
of State, welcome. It is the first time we have invited the MoD
to give evidence to this Committee. In the past we have had evidence
from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, from DfID[1]
and the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform
(formerly DTI)[2]
clearly because of their major roles in this field in terms of
policy and export control matters. Obviously the MoD is also deeply
involved in export control policy and therefore we are very grateful
to have the opportunity to have yourself and your officials here
with us this afternoon. Perhaps first of all, Secretary of State,
may I invite you to introduce your officials for the record?
Des Browne: Thank you very much;
we are pleased to be here. The MoD does quite an important advisory
role in relation to the export licensing process. On my left I
have Desmond Bowen who is Policy Director from the MoD and on
my right I have Tony Pawson who is the Head of Defence Export
Services.
Q2 Chairman: Secretary of State,
the MoD seems to have two roles in the arms export control field.
On the one hand the MoD has a promotional role in promoting UK
defence exports, but at the same time it has a regulatory function
in ensuring that licences are only granted for arms exports if
they meet the criteria. How do you separate that promotional role
from the regulatory function at the MoD?
Des Browne: I do not want to start
off with a semantic point but I carefully used the word "advisory"
in the introduction. We do have an advisory role as part of the
overall regulatory function but we do not hold the regulatory
function in this process; we advise in relation to it. However,
we do recognise that potential conflict and we take great care
to ensure that the part that we play in the process of export
licensing is separated from export promotion. Apart from anything
else, in the Department the Minister for Defence Equipment and
Support is responsible for export promotion issues and the Minister
for the Armed Forces is responsible for the export control issues.
The promotion staff are not in any way involved at all in the
licensing process. The head of the service may wish to go into
the detail of that for you but we take great care to ensure that
the unit that gives input to DBERR[3]
in relation to its decision making does not comprise anybody—there
is no commonality at all—involved in supporting export internationally.
Q3 Chairman: So the individuals concerned
with the two functions are quite separate.
Des Browne: They are. Perhaps
Tony can explain in more detail so you know exactly how this works
in practice.
Mr Pawson: As well as the export
promotion staff not being involved in the licensing process, those
involved in the export licence process are not involved in the
promotion. Secondly, it is a secretariat function which means
involving all the relevant parts of the Ministry of Defence who
do not report up the same chain of command. For example, from
the equipment capability point of view, we need to protect our
own UK capability when we are exporting something so there is
a branch that looks at that. What about our technology issues?
There is a branch that looks at that. What about protection of
classified information? There is a branch that looks at that.
What about security of our equipment if it is exported overseas?
What sort of security arrangements have we got with the foreign
governments of countries concerned so we have some reassurance
on that? What about potential diversion? In terms of staff we
have the DIS[4]
which looks at these matters. What is the end use? What is the
technical assessment of what this capability we are proposing
to export will do for the operations of the armed forces of the
country concerned? Will that change the regional balance? What
about defence bilateral relations? That is another branch of the
Ministry of Defence. The specialists: there is WMD,[5]
there is Aldermaston, there is DSTL[6]
in Porton Down for chemicals, there is the CESG[7]
on cryptographic equipment. All these various branches are brought
together and advice provided to ministers.
Q4 Chairman: As I understand it there
are particular criteria that you focus upon, obviously criterion
5 (national security), criterion 7 (consequence of diversion),
there are particular criteria in the code. Does that mean that
the MoD leaves other criteria to other departments? For example,
criterion 2 (risk of use of arms for internal repression), do
you leave that to the Foreign Office? Does the Foreign Office
do internal repression or does the MoD do internal repression?
Des Browne: I would not like to
speak for the Foreign Office, but we certainly do not do it! It
was helpful that Tony was as comprehensive as he was and he was
probably more comprehensive than you might have wanted immediately,
but I think he listed the range of particular skills and the knowledge
base that we have in the MoD that informs one or other of these
eight criteria. Clearly we have particular knowledge in relation
to 4, 5 and 7 and people look to us because we have that knowledge
base, particularly informed comment in relation to 4, 5 and 7
but also, given the substantial experience that our armed forces
have across the world—particularly in the second part of
the 20th century and the 21st century but even earlier than that—we
have a knowledge base that gives us information about how particular
pieces of equipment can be used, particularly about the usage
and whether or not that usage would generate a contravention of
any of the other criteria or enact and bring into play any of
the other five criteria. Of course if we had a view we would make
that known. On occasions I am sure—although I cannot think
of a specific example because I do not do this at that level—that
people may come and ask us if we have a suspicion or a concern
that this piece of equipment is being used in a certain way and
they want advice.
Q5 Mr Borrow: Moving onto the Form
680 process obviously there is classified equipment which exporters
wish to demonstrate or sell overseas. The process is that they
will need clearance from the MoD; the Form 680 is filled in from
the MoD and they deal with it before it goes to DBERR where the
Export Control Organisation then deals with it. Is there a technical
reason why the whole of that process could not be led by the Export
Control Organisation in DBERR, why it needs to go through your
Department because the existence of a Form 680 from your Department
does not necessarily mean it then gets a licence to be exported?
Des Browne: I think that is right,
although in shorthand terms my understanding of the inference
of the successful application of a Form 680 is that it has more
relevance to the process going forward. If you are refused a Form
680 then you have a fairly clear idea that you are pretty unlikely
to get an export licence so it forms a process in that way. It
does of course have the advantage that at a very early stage in
the process quite a lot of the considerations that apply to export
licensing are applied and people, having gone over that course
and distance, are in a much better position to apply for an export
licence if the negotiations get there. The nub of your question
really is whether this is a function of licensing which we have
the regulatory role but where properly the regulatory role lies
with DBERR. I think the answer to that lies in the historical
basis of these two different processes. One is about licensing,
permitting the actual export of equipment or controlled goods.
The other is about allowing people to use what would be classified—not
only classified, it extends beyond information which is classified—essentially
getting permission to use what would be classified information,
and subject to the Official Secrets Act, to get an assessment
of the defence implications of doing that at an early stage in
the negotiations. This is a defence related assessment of classified
information which is subject to the Official Secrets Act. It becomes
later a part of the process of export licensing but that is why
we do it, because we have the knowledge base and we know the consequences
of the sharing of this information, about the control of access
by customer governments to information and equipment which is
subject to security classification. It is just a common sense
process I think which has grown up which allows people to share
a level of knowledge that allows negotiations and discussions
to take place about potential sales.
Q6 Mr Borrow: Your view would be
that we need to keep the process of deciding whether it is in
the UK's interest for this bit of kit to be exported, in the sense
that it is classified information in the hands of foreigners,
separate from the consideration as to whether or not this bit
of kit should be with country A who could use it in a bad way,
which is essentially what the export control regime is all about.
Des Browne: I think I am just
explaining why I think this has grown up and I think the reason
why it has grown up is that the Form 680 derives from the Official
Secrets Act and not from the export control legislation. The reason
we do it is because it is considered entirely appropriate and
I agree with them, that we are the people who can ensure that
we do not lead to the UK revealing more than we would wish to
about our defence capabilities in the early stages of the negotiations
of potential contracts. It does have the advantage, as I say,
that people get a degree of comfort about that, being able to
get through that process successfully, about the later stages
of export licensing. Again that is encouraging and it is a kind
of tester I think. Of course we do not apply all of the criteria
to a Form 680; we have a particular consideration and that is
about defence secrets.[8]
Q7 Chairman: You say the situation
has grown up historically, but would you have any objection to
DBERR running the F680 process?
Des Browne: We will continue—for
example, when UKTI[9]
take over the functions of DESO[10]
with the new group that they have created—to inform the
process of export licensing in the way in which we currently do.
We will keep those people in the MoD; we will keep them separate
from the people who transfer. We will keep that expertise so as
far as criteria 4, 5 and 7 are concerned we are the repository
of most of that and we will continue to do that. I will have to
keep things under review, but I do not see us changing this process
to such an extent that anybody would take the view that another
department that did not have the support that we can give in the
Ministry of Defence to the people who make this decision, the
knowledge base—it is about the protection of classified
information in relation to defence capability and its effect on
our defence capability. With all due respect to DBERR I do not
think they have the expertise to be able to make that decision.
Mr Pawson: I would like to add
the point that although, as the Secretary of State has said, there
are negotiations that take place in the early stage of the promotion
process in relation to the Form 680, it does not constitute a
commitment to actually issuing a licence. The fact that this process
is independent of the DBERR licensing process actually reinforces
the independence and integrity of that decision and that process.
Q8 Sir John Stanley: Secretary of
State, as you are aware at the end of the war in the Lebanon in
2006 there was a 72-hour window between the passing of the United
Nations Security Council resolution for a ceasefire and that ceasefire
coming into effect. In that period the Israelis dropped a larger
number of cluster munitions in that 72-hour period than has ever
been recorded. You will also be well aware that that has resulted
in a significant number of subsequent civilian deaths and maimings.
The Committee, as you know, in its previous report very much welcomed
the Government's decision to phase out dumb cluster munitions,
but those of us who have been—I went with a group in the
Foreign Affairs Committee to the Southern Lebanon—and have
talked to the UN mine clearance personnel trying to remove these
cluster munitions, have been very struck by the fact that not
only do dumb cluster munitions have a significant failure rate
(in other words do not detonate on impact) but we were surprised
to discover that so-called smart cluster munitions also have a
significant failure rate of up to approximately 10%. Given the
fact that it is the Government's stated policy to stop the use
of cluster munitions which in the Government's words "cause
unacceptable harm to civilians", do you not agree that the
Government should be seeking to phase out as soon as possible
the use of smart cluster munitions as well?
Des Browne: I made the decision
in March of last year to phase out two of the four cluster munitions
that we had, to discontinue their use and to destroy them; they
are now destroyed.[11]
We have taken the lead internationally in the context both of
the CCW[12]
and the Oslo negotiations. In the process of delivering that commitment
we have destroyed those two munitions.[13]
We still have two other munitions that are a cause of discussion.
This whole process is bedevilled of course by a lack of clarity
as to what is a cluster munition. There is no agreement internationally
as to the definition of a cluster munition, never mind one that
does unacceptable harm and parties are left to make their own
view about that. In the absence of an international agreement
on this which we strive for because we would like to see all cluster
munitions phased out across the world, but I have responsibilities
to balance military effectiveness and capability—including
the very important imperative that I have to protect those forces
whom I deploy into very difficult environments—with the
humanitarian issues and concerns and I think it is important that
people understand that I was able to make the decision that I
made because the military advice, which I accepted, was that the
purpose for which we had those munitions was able to be met in
terms of military effectiveness and military protection—including
force protection—by developments in other munitions. We
strive to develop munitions which can replace those munitions
that we have that some others define as dumb or smart cluster
munitions; we make that differential ourselves because that has
become a term of discussion. I think what I am saying is that
I agree with you that we should have that ambition and I do have
that ambition and our government does have that ambition, but
subject to that very difficult balance between the military capability
which we need for effectiveness, particularly for the protection
of our forces, and these very obvious humanitarian considerations,
some of which manifested themselves in Southern Lebanon in that
72-hour period. Can I also say that I am well aware of the work
that the Norwegians did in that area and the conclusions they
came to about the remnants of those weapons being used. We have
ourselves, as I am sure you know because you have a great interest
in this area, done some other work and the advice that I received
from that work is that the weapon that we hold has a failure rate
of 1%[14].
I know there is some dispute but that is part of the problem and
that is part of why these processes—the CCW process and
the Oslo process—are so important because I think we have
to deal with these issues about definitions, about the evidential
phase, about decisions that need to be made. The short answer
to your question is yes because I think you asked me if I share
that ambition and I do share that ambition.
Q9 Sir John Stanley: I am very glad
that you have highlighted what I personally believe is the key
issue here which is the failure rate. Do you agree that the use
of cluster bombs which have a significant failure rate is the
equivalent of sowing anti-personnel landmines which the Government
has, by treaty, now said that it would not use? The equivalent
way of doing it is by sowing cluster bombs that do not detonate
on impact. Could I ask you, Secretary of State, if it is the case
that in the UK we have the failure rate of smart cluster munitions
down to 1%—if that is the case—do you see any technological,
near-term prospects of achieving what I am sure you want to see
and others would wish to see as well, cluster munitions which
actually do achieve the desired objective which is a 100% success
rate in terms of detonation on impact and not be left lying around
in the bushes, the fields and the hedges, around people's houses
and gardens where they are a permanent risk to civilians?
Des Browne: I share that ambition.
Personally—although I believe I speak for the Government
on this—I share the broader ambition of being able to do
with anything that could be classed as a cluster munition what
we were able to do with the two munitions that we have removed
from our armoury and destroyed,[15]
and that is replace them with weaponry which provides the capability
that cluster munitions presently do but without them being of
that design.
Q10 Linda Gilroy: I think most people
would find it difficult to understand what you mean when you say
that they are needed for force protection. Can you say something
to the Committee about that? Also, can you give some sort of idea
of what the position is as regards other countries using such
munitions, dumb and otherwise?
Des Browne: Can I just say first
of all that we do not deploy these munitions into any theatre
of operations that we are presently engaged in. We neither deploy
them in Iraq nor Afghanistan. They are not, in our view, appropriate
or necessary for either of those two operational environments.[16]
However, they are appropriate in certain circumstances when you
seek to take out either a number of armoured vehicles or alternatively
a dispersed force in a particular area. So they are an area weapon
and presently they are part of our capability should we be faced
with that sort of challenge either to win the battle—which
is what we would seek to do in war—or alternatively to protect
our forces from that threat. The alternative, if we took them
out, would be that we would have to bomb quite extensively the
area and that risks a significant degree of collateral or civilian
damage if we were to deploy a large amount of force over a large
area in order to achieve the same objective. The bottom line is
that I take very seriously—as do the military in the United
Kingdom—and all previous governments have our obligation
only to have and use weapons that conform with international humanitarian
law. Weapons require not to be indiscriminate, careless or negligent;
to the extent that they are then we have to be able to make the
balance and all of this is a balance. I have tried to articulate
that balance and by our actions and decisions shown how we can
affect it.
Q11 Robert Key: I believe I know
where the Secretary of State's heart lies and I wish to encourage
him. I think he would agree that no manufacturer of any arms can
guarantee that it will be 100% accurate or successful at any one
time. I think he would agree that even within the military there
is controversy about the effectiveness and the appropriateness
of using these weapons. However, I would say that in our democracy
where politicians tell the military what to do, the time has come
to tell the military to find an alternative to these weapons.
Would you agree, Secretary of State, by saying what the Ministry
of Defence says in your response to our report that cluster munitions
include those that cause unacceptable harm to civilians, implies
that you are prepared to accept acceptable harm to civilians?
What is "acceptable harm"? How many children out of
every 10 is it acceptable to kill? Forgive me, Chairman, getting
emotional; I should declare my interest here. On 13 May 1955 I
was on Swanage Beach playing with my friends and a British World
War II anti-personnel mine exploded; five out of the seven of
us were killed, two of us survived. Was that acceptable? If six
out of seven had been killed and I had a 50% chance of survival,
would that have been acceptable? It would not have been to me,
and that is one reason why I am on this Committee incidentally.
I really do think that the time has come to realise that people
in this country will accept our military and support our military
but there does come a point when they say—and they have
the right to say—"We do not think that form of munition
is acceptable".
Des Browne: I fully respect and
have engaged with those who very strongly hold that view and I
enormously—having now heard this part of your life which
I was not aware of, Mr Key—respect your views in this regard;
you are informed by an experience that none of the rest of us
have had. This Committee's evidence should not be left with the
impression that the military are not seeking alternatives to these
weapons. That is the state of mind of our military and that is
the state of mind of our ministers. We are seeking alternatives
to those weapons. There is an unhelpful vocabulary in relation
to these weapons in terms of definition, in terms of phraseology,
which is difficult to define unless you define it by reference—as
I do—to international humanitarian law. I am very conscious
of my responsibility in this regard. I can only reiterate that
I have in government taken certain steps; I have an ambition to
be able to take other steps. There will of course continue to
be a debate in the military and this is a very healthy position;
the use of vehicles, the use of all sorts of weaponry, about tactics,
about concepts. The debate goes on. There is a settled view in
the military in relation to the need for this capability presently.
My view is that I need to keep it in our armoury presently for
the eventuality that I may have to deploy forces into certain
circumstances; presently we are not doing that.
Q12 John Battle: If I could switch
the focus to the arms fairs and in particular the presence of
China at arms fairs because since Tiananmen Square back in 1989
there has been an EU embargo that we are signed up to yet there
have been reports—I think in 2005 and 2007—that China
was actually present at arms fairs, at the DSEi[17]
arms fair in London. This Committee published a report in 2006
expressing its dismay to learn about the Chinese military delegation
visiting the arms fair; there has been another visit since. The
response of the Government to that report was to reaffirm that
the embargo should stay in place. Does the Chinese presence at
an arms fair undermine the embargo and our commitment to the current
embargo?
Des Browne: I do not think it
does. I was very aware in my preparation for this hearing and
I know this is an issue that was raised with my predecessor not
in an evidence session but in correspondence. He gave, I thought,
a clear explanation as to why it was appropriate in the circumstances
to invite China. All invitations, of course, to these exhibitions
are made in the context that people know that it does not mean
that the goods on display are being promoted with a licence for
export to them. There is still the export licensing process; if
they are controlled goods they will need to go through the export
licensing process. The Chinese knew, when they were coming, that
that was the case. The second point I make is that the EU embargo
is not a complete embargo; it is partial in scope. There was equipment
on display which British companies could easily have sold appropriately
to the Chinese which did not come within the scope of the arms
embargo. The final point I want to make to you is that we took
the view and still take the view that engagement with the Chinese
in this regard is important despite the fact that there is an
arms embargo and if we can sustain the embargo and have engagement
with them then that is appropriate. At the time and since then
we have been encouraging the Chinese to play a part in peacekeeping
operations and they are now playing a part in peacekeeping operations
across the world. I believe they have troops in the Lebanon making
a very important contribution. I return in a sense to the question:
is the suggestion that these troops should not be armed because
of the embargo? I do no think anybody believes it is.
Q13 John Battle: I would broaden
out the question and say, could you then tell me what factors
in a broader sense—China or other countries—determine
whether the MoD sponsors a delegation, not just that they are
allowed to come but we sponsor the delegation? Is it the size
of their market? Are the abuses of human rights taken into account
in determining whether the Government should sponsor their presence
at an arms fair? That is the question I would really like answering.
Des Browne: Of course they are.
Like all of our relationships with China (indeed, as I speak,
I think the Prime Minister may well still be sitting on the tarmac
at Heathrow Airport trying to take off to fly to Beijing) I do
not think anybody seriously believes that we should not have relationships.
If we can have a relationship in this area—bilateral defence
discussions, discussions in relation to human rights issues among
others, encouragement for the Chinese Government to play a part
for example in peace keeping operations—and offer the opportunity
in the context of what we believe is a perfectly appropriate environment
to buy the sort of support equipment they might need to do that,
as long as it is not in contravention of the arms embargo, then
that is an entirely appropriate thing to do.
Q14 John Battle: That is the question.
I was the Foreign Minister in 2001 when the Chinese Premier came
to Britain; we stopped them participating in the arms fair in
2000 and 2001 on human rights grounds and we still kept a conversation
open with them. I visited China myself as a minister and so did
the Foreign Secretary at the time and I think I am just pressing
to find out about the criteria. At what stages do you rule that
progress on human rights has not been sufficient to sponsor any
country—not just China—to be present at the arms fair?
Do you think sufficient progress has been made?
Des Browne: Since I did not come
armed with criteria and I do not want to answer this off the top
of my head. I will give this some reflection and write to the
Committee in more detail in response to this because it is a legitimate
question.[18]
To answer generally, we have a significant interest to ensure
that the Beijing Olympics, for example, are safe because we will
have a lot of our citizens not just competing but also being present
at Beijing when those Olympics are taking place. It would not
be in our national interests in my view and in the interests of
our citizens to deny the security forces of China the wherewithal
to ensure that that was the case. It would be against our national
interests. Circumstances change and I think that is indicative
of the sort of factor that might apply in the balance and you
just have to look at them on a case-by-case basis. Without wishing
to reduce this to simplicity—in fact complicating it—I
would say that you also have to look at it year on year. Circumstances
change and progress in terms of human rights will be a factor
but it will not be the decisive factor if there are other considerations
such as, for example, the likelihood that we would need to make
a contribution to helping the Beijing Olympics and making them
successful.
Q15 Mr Hamilton: Secretary of State,
can I move us to another part of the world, to Saudi Arabia. Since
2003 this Committee has received quite a number of allegations
concerning corruption in arms sales to that country. Some of those
allegations go back to the 1970s, as I am sure you will be aware.
Every time we put those allegations to the Ministry of Defence
they have been refuted, but for the record, as this is the first
time you have given evidence to the Quadripartite Committee, can
I ask what your response is to the allegations that since the
1970s British civil servants have been aware of, connived at and
have facilitated defence exports tainted with corruption to Saudi
Arabia.
Des Browne: If I may be very precise,
given that you are giving me the opportunity to do this orally
for the first time, as our memoranda of 2006 and 2007 said, the
position regarding allegations of bribery remain the same as was
set out in 2003 and that is that they are totally unfounded.
Q16 Mr Hamilton: Thank you for that
very clear statement. As you know legislation has been introduced
over the years which has made it completely illegal for any corrupt
practices to take place and for some sort of extraterritoriality.
The allegations that have been made to this Committee took place
over 30 years and the Government has actually defended all those
allegations going way back to the 1960s. The responses have not
relied upon Part 12 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security
Act 2001. That statute provided extraterritorial reach, as I have
said, in respect of acts of bribery by UK citizens overseas but
the MoD said that for many years prior to the introduction of
the 2001 Act UK civil servants were already subject to extraterritorial
jurisdiction for criminal offences if all the elements of the
offence were committed overseas by virtue of the Criminal Justice
Act of 1948. The implications that we drew were that if a civil
servant was engaged in corruption overseas he or she would have
been prosecuted under the 1948 Act. Is that a correct construction
to put on the MoD's position?
Des Browne: I am grateful to the
Chair in particular and The Daily Telegraph for giving
me notice of these questions since about October of last year
and, given that I have had some notice of this line of questioning
which has been promised to me for some six months now or thereabouts,
I have done a fair amount of enquiry into this. I will endeavour
to help the Committee as much as I can within certain constraints.
My understanding, from the enquiries that I have made and the
advice I have received, is that Section 31 of the Criminal Justice
Act 1948 creates just that jurisdiction. So far as public officials
were concerned in terms of activity abroad we did not need to
wait until 2001 until there was a jurisdiction including activities
beyond the shores of the United Kingdom. The answer to your question
is that for a prosecution there needs to be a complaint, evidence
and an investigation. I am not aware of any complaint and investigation
that took place in relation to the 1948 Act so if you draw the
inference that the absence of a prosecution meant that there was
no breach of it, then you are entitled to do that. I am not suggesting
that to you. I do not know if, at any time between the 1970s and
now, somebody made a complaint. I don't know. Can I also say to
you, just for completeness' sake, that my understanding—and
I accept this advice—is in law that this extraterritoriality,
this jurisdiction went beyond the public servants and in fact
there was in the common law such a jurisdiction relating to people
who were not public servants. If that is any help, that is what
I understand the position to be.
Q17 Mr Hamilton: That is very helpful.
From what you said earlier one might assume that if no-one has
been prosecuted then there has been no evidence of corruption,
or none that you knew of, no accusations that you knew of.
Des Browne: That is what I took
from the nature of your question. That may well be an entirely
appropriate inference to draw but I am not asking you to draw
it. If the Committee chooses to draw it then that is a matter
for them. Part of the problem in this area of questioning is of
course that my state of knowledge is going to be impeded by the
limited degree of knowledge that I can have of things that happened
30 years ago.
Q18 Mr Hamilton: I quite understand
that. However, can I just put to you that an alternative explanation
to the fact that there has been no prosecution because there has
been no evidence is that no-one has actually been looking for
that evidence of corruption or indeed that no-one within the MoD
was interested in mounting a prosecution under the 1948 Act. What
would you have to say to that?
Des Browne: My answer to that
would be, given the documentation which I think we are about to
come and look at that and the fact that my attention has been
drawn to it, is that that documentation supports an interpretation
that in fact the officials who are being sometimes maligned I
think inappropriately were in fact making sure that there was
not a breach of the 1948 Act or indeed a contravention of the
1976 Directive. They were actually acting overtly in a very honest,
straightforward and non-corrupt way.
Q19 Chairman: Secretary of State,
I would like to come onto 1976, but before I do that, as you will
know on 16 June 2006 the former Defence Secretary, Lord Gilmour,
in a previous administration on Newsnight specifically
stated that Britain bribed senior Saudi officials to secure arms
contracts. He said, "You either got the business and bribed
or you did not bribe and did not get the business". Does
this mean, therefore, that the former Secretary of State for Defence
clearly had misunderstood how his department was operating?
Des Browne: I do not think I am
in a position to comment on the comments of other people since
I have no knowledge of the factual basis that underpinned that.
I can only answer questions from where I am, as the Secretary
of State with responsibility for this area of policy now and some
responsibilities in relation to contracts with Saudi Arabia and
the state of my knowledge. I do not seek to draw any of these
conclusions in relation to what former ministers may say. Indeed,
people are open to have the views that they have quite clearly
in this society and assume they are informed by their knowledge
base. I am much more interested in the facts than I am the conclusions.
1 The Department for International Development Back
2
The Department of Trade and Industry Back
3
The Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Back
4
Defence Intelligence Staff Back
5
Weapons of Mass Destruction Back
6
The Defence Science and Technology Laboratory Back
7
Communications Electronics Security Group Back
8
Note by witness: All criteria are applied during the F680
process, although the principle MOD concern at this early stage
is the release of classified information to potential customers. Back
9
UK Trade and Investment Back
10
The Defence Export Services Organisation Back
11
Note by witness: Those cluster munitions that the Government
withdrew from service last year are in the process of being destroyed.
This will take several years to accomplish. Back
12
UN Convention on Conventional Weapons Back
13
Note by witness: See footnote 11. Back
14
Note by witness: The failure rate of the weapon is 2%-this
is on public record. Back
15
Note by witness: See footnote 14. Back
16
Note by witness: The deployment of specific weapons depends
on the nature of the military mission and the operational environment.
Currently, cluster munitions are not deployed by UK forces in
Iraq or Afghanistan. Back
17
Defence Systems and Equipment International Back
18
Ev 45 Back
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