Conclusions and recommendations
The Question of responsibility
1. We
agree that the Scotland Office and all those involved in planning
and organising elections in Scotland should now focus on how to
strengthen electoral procedures for future years, rather than
on assigning blame for what went wrong on 3 May. This is not to
deny that there were failings on the part of individuals and institutions.
We do not believe that 'no-one was to blame' for the problems.
Rather, lines of accountability were so fragmented and confused
that no one person could be held solely responsible. (Paragraph
12)
Role of the Scotland Office
2. It
is clear to us that there were significant delays in Ministerial
decision making in the run up to the 2007 Scottish Parliament
elections. It may be that these delays were the result of a desire
to allow the consultation process to run its full course. Nevertheless,
Ministers in the Scotland Office must realise that excessive delays
will have serious consequences for the smooth running of an election.
It is highly likely that many of the problems of 3 May 2007 would
not have arisen had the legislation been put in place sooner,
allowing for proper testing and contingency planning of the practical
aspects of election organisation. (Paragraph 17)
The Elections Steering Group
3. The
lack of a clear decision-making structure for the Elections Steering
Group was a key failure of the preparations for the 2007 elections
to the Scottish Parliament. The benefits of consultation had been
demonstrated by the experience of previous elections. Nevertheless,
the desire to take account of as many views as possible should
not prevent structures being established to draw the consultation
process to a timely conclusion. (Paragraph 23)
Future responsibility for elections to the Scottish
Parliament
4. We
do not consider that overall responsibility for elections to the
Scottish Parliament should be transferred to the Scottish Executive.
This is not necessary in order for elections to proceed smoothly
in future. However, there may be a case for organisational changes
'on the ground' in Scotland, including reformed structures of
accountability. In this context, the proposal to establish a Chief
Returning Officer for Scotland as a single point of accountability
deserves further consideration. (Paragraph 26)
Role of the Electoral Commission
5. We
were not satisfied with the quality of the VoteScotland information
campaign. In future, better information campaigns need to be run,
particularly when there are changes to electoral procedures. (Paragraph
32)
6. We conclude that
the communication process between the Scotland Office and the
Electoral Commission was not effective. Failures on the part of
the Electoral Commission meant that warning signs were not acted
on. We are particularly disappointed that the Electoral Commission
did not raise concerns about the level of spoiled ballots in the
pilot study. There is little value in establishing an independent
Electoral Commission if it fails to act robustly to warn Government
of potential problems with the electoral system. It is difficult
to see the Electoral Commission as having added any value to this
entire process. (Paragraph 35)
7. The status of the
Electoral Commission, combining an external auditing role with
active participation in organisational aspects of electoral procedure
is in need of review. In particular, the Committee would see advantage
to some participation, albeit as a minority, of nominees from
political parties. This has now been recognised by a number of
observers, including the Committee on Standards in Public Life.
As part of this review, the Government should give consideration
to the proposal to appoint a Chief Returning Officer for Scotland
and the allocation of responsibility for:
- the provision of legal advice;
- the development of electoral policy;
- commissioning research;
- the provision of guidance to returning officers;
- compliance and the regulation of political parties;
- monitoring and auditing functions; and
- operational roles (including voter information
and awareness programmes). (Paragraph 36)
8. It
is unlikely that all of the factors leading up to the 3 May problems
are unique to Scotland. (Paragraph 37)
The combined ballot paper
9. We
agree that, on the next occasion, separate ballot papers must
be provided for the election of constituency and regional MSPs.
However, we note that the suggestion to combine the ballot papers
stemmed from a desire to highlight the importance of the regional
vote, which is sometimes perceived as having secondary status.
The return to separate ballot papers leaves this issue unaddressed.
It may be that there are better ways to highlight the significance
of the regional vote, for example, through central voter information
campaigns as well as the campaigns run by the political parties
themselves. (Paragraph 44)
Contingency planning
10. There
was a shocking lack of accountability for the decision to alter
the ballot papers in the Glasgow and Lothians regions to accommodate
a larger than expected number of candidates. We are concerned
that we have never received a satisfactory explanation for this
decision. The lack of robust contingency plans for eventualities
such as this was in part due to the successive delays in ministerial
decision-making. Delays of this nature (even if they are well-intentioned,
for example, to allow for consultation) should not be allowed
to jeopardise the integrity of the electoral process (Paragraph
48)
Party descriptions
11. We
support further research into a new format for ballot papers,
particularly the questions of candidate order and the use of party
descriptions in addition to registered party names. Any change
would need to be subject to extensive testing. It may be that
moving away from alphabetical order in favour of a lottery system
would increase the potential for confusion. (Paragraph 52)
Secrecy of the ballot
12. The
secrecy of the ballot is of prime importance in a democratic society.
To jeopardise it simply because of the demands of an electronic
counting system is perverse. We strongly support the measures
to ensure the secrecy of the ballot outlined in the Gould Report.
(Paragraph 54)
E-counting
13. There
has been a severe loss of confidence in e-counting. The experience
of its use in the Scottish Parliament and local government elections
revealed a fundamental lack of transparency. The checks and balances
of a manual system must be retained. Candidates and observers
must have access to ballot papers in order to ensure that procedures
are followed correctly and that recounts can be asked for. Until
these problems are resolved, we do not support the use of e-counting
for future elections. (Paragraph 60)
Overnight counting
14. We
are confident that the next Scottish Parliamentary elections,
decoupled from the local government ballot, can be counted manually
on the night without risk to the system. Future arrangements for
counting should be considered as part of the research into counting
systems that we have recommended earlier in this Report. (Paragraph
63)
Postal voting
15. No
voter should receive their postal vote so late that there is no
realistic possibility of returning it in time to be counted. In
2007, understandable confusion was caused by the fact that the
instructions did not match the ballot paper. These problems must
not be repeated. We support further research into the use of advanced
voting in person which may have advantages in terms of increasing
turnout as well as reducing costs and bureaucracy. In addition,
there should be a restriction on eligibility for postal votes.
(Paragraph 67)
'Decoupling' the elections
16. The
decision to 'decouple' the dates of the Scottish Parliament and
local government elections appears to offer a simple way to eliminate
the complexity of holding a combined election. In principle, we
believe that two or more votes in different elections or referenda
should not be held on the same day. (Paragraph 73)
A Chief Returning Officer for Scotland
17. We
also have concerns about voter registration. In many cases, electoral
registers are outdated. This needs to be a priority for returning
officers. If a Chief Returning Officer were to be appointed, he
or she might be well placed to intervene to improve this situation.
(Paragraph 75)
18. The proposal to
establish a Chief Returning Officer for Scotland deserves further
consideration, both in terms of its potential benefits for Scotland
and in its implications for the way in which elections are run
across the UK. What is important is that there should be a clear
line of accountability for each aspect of election planning and
organisation. It may be possible to achieve this by strengthening
and realigning one of the existing bodies, rather than creating
a new post. (Paragraph 80)
Returning Officers
19.
We recommend that further consultation should take place with
electoral officials in Scotland before implementing any proposals
affecting the status of returning officers. (Paragraph 83)
Electoral legislation
20. We
welcome the undertaking from the Scotland Office that no new electoral
legislation will be introduced in the six months prior to an election.
This should go some way towards providing a more certain framework
for election planning. We also welcome Ministers' acceptance of
the need for consolidation of electoral law. However, we are not
convinced that current plans go far enough. The Scotland Office
needs to co-ordinate its activities with other government departments
(in particular, the Ministry of Justice) as part of a wider project
to overhaul UK electoral law. (Paragraph 87)
Putting the voter's interests first
21. We
were deeply concerned by the events of 3 May. Bureaucratic delay
cannot be allowed to undermine Scotland's long democratic tradition.
We agree with Mr Gould that the voter should be placed at the
heart of the electoral process. This may seem an obvious statement,
but it was the failure to consider the voter's perspective that
led to many of the problems of the 3 May elections in Scotland.
We are pleased to note the Minister's statement that "putting
ordinary voters front and centre of this has got to be the motif
for moving this process on" and we expect the Scotland Office
to act accordingly. (Paragraph 88)
22. The independent
review of the Scottish elections needs to be seen as an opportunity
to restore fully the integrity of the electoral process, and not
to bring about a 'quick fix' by accepting only the simplest and
least controversial recommendations. Although some proposals can
be implemented immediately, others will require significant further
research. Throughout our inquiry, witnesses have indicated that
the problems underlying the 3 May experience are unlikely to be
unique to Scotland. The Scotland Office therefore needs to co-ordinate
its action with other government departments as well as bodies
such as the Electoral Commission and local electoral officials
to ensure that the integrity of the UK's complex electoral landscape
is restored. (Paragraph 89)
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