Memorandum from International Container
Hubs Ltd (ICHL) (TS 43)
PORT SECURITY AND THE NORTH EUROPEAN CONTAINER
TRANSHIPMENT HUB, SCAPA FLOW ORKNEY
INTRODUCTION
In container transhipment, security is the maintenance
of freedom from hazard, natural, accidental or deliberate, that
results in a loss of function. The function of the North European
Container Transhipment Hub in Scapa Flow, Orkney is the optimization
of overall and individual component efficiency in the Intercontinental
and North European Container Shipping Industry, to promote North
European, Russian, UK, Scottish and Orcadian market competitiveness;
thereby to further develop world trade to the benefit of all and
to provide gainful employment and a secure economic future which
will reverse depopulation in Orkney and the North of Scotland,
by means of a profitable, sustainable and environmentally beneficial
container transhipment facility in Scapa Flow, Orkney.
Efficient function maximises benefit to trade
with minimum cost to, or actual benefit for the Environment. This
is achieved by (i) Scapa Flow's strategic location which minimises
transport system fuel burn and achieves maximal return on energy
expended, (ii) Scapa Flow's secure site with (iii) all-weather
access, (iv) deep water and (v) next-generation container transhipment,
handling, storage, processing, packaging and distribution facilities,
including intermodal transfer to air freight for high-value, overnight
delivery to anywhere in Europe. (vi) All-electric operation to
minimise emissions and (vii) provide the flexibility to use renewable
energy however, wherever and whenever possible.
Freedom from sub-optimal function is Reliability.
Reliability is the first requirement of a port. Security is an
essential component of Reliability.
THREATS TO
PORT SECURITY
The hazards that challenge Port Security may
be natural, accidental or deliberate. They include (i) Environmental:
silting, weather, wind and wave (including tsunami). Secure design
and operation to work with rather than against Nature, minimises
hazard from and to the environment, uses naturally deep water
rather than continuous dredging and strategic situation to reduce
cost, fuel consumption and emissions. (ii) Biological agents.
(iii) Economics: including markets, competitiveness and the overall
UK Energy Requirement. Security covers security of energy supply,
its source, generation, transmission and waste products—heat,
light, sound and emissions. Scapa Flow is surrounded by Europe's
richest renewable energy resources (wind, wave and tide), backed
by one of the UK's likely next-generation nuclear power plants
at Dounreay. (iv) Human factors: error in design, materials, construction,
maintenance or operation. (v) Sabotage: deliberate, wilful terrorist
or criminal damage to Hub and its function.
HAZARD DELIVERY
Hazard is delivered by (i) the environmental
elements, silting and weather; (ii) contamination (biological,
toxic or radio-active) of containers, contents, hulls, ballast,
fuel, victuals, fresh or foul water, waste and debris; (iii) human
error in design, construction, materials or operation, (iv) fuels
or the lack thereof, energy and emissions—by the port, its
users and neighbours; (v) concealment of stowaway humans, animals,
plants, bacteriological, toxic, explosive or radioactive materials
and devices in or on shipping, containers, Hub components and
systems, approaches or environs; (vi) personnel: visiting crew,
port and Hub staff, delivery employees, visitors, the general
public, intruders. (vii) Other. Against these threats, Port Security
is achieved by design and practice, surveillance and anticipation
backed by intelligent review. Static, passive security, like static
defence, is guaranteed to fail as hazard is not only constant
but ever-developing.
THE PRESENT
SITUATION
The perceived principal present threat is from
an intelligent, homicidally psychopathic minority whose wealth
enables them to explore any and every avenue that attracts their
malign attention—if, as and when they please. To this extent,
time, surprise and initiative lie with the psychopaths. Latter
day Assassins, they will be defeated by the for-sight, intelligence
and vigilance of the decent folk, who are their intended victims.
For the latter boredom and over-confidence are equal enemies.
Ports have to maintain constant vigilance as attackers can chose
means and method, time and target. Intelligence, local community
support and surveillance are essential elements in Security, where
pattern recognition cannot be relied upon against clever murderers
unconstrained by time.
In reality, as great threats to British Transport
and Ports as attacks and sabotage, are (i) a reduction in Britain's
energy supply, now the UK is again a net energy importer; (ii)
the possible collapse of Middle East markets and (iii) the potential
closure of the Suez Canal.
Sweden recognises the threat, to oil and gas
supplies and is committed to an "oil-less" future. Should
uncertainty of Russian oil and gas supplies be couple with Middle
Eastern chaos, Britain's economic survival would depend on being
an "all-electric state", drawing power from every available
source. Consideration of transport and port security, as well
as the UK's economic survival, must address this contingency.
An embargo on Middle East Trade would leave
Britain and Europe depending on Russian, Indian, Asian and North
American markets in which to pay their way. Closure of Suez would
compound this and accelerate the trend to ever-larger and more
fuel efficient container ships with which to maintain world trade,
leap-frogging the Middle East as before the construction of the
Suez Canal and the introduction of Middle East oil. Fossil fuel
restrictions and/or the closure of Suez would require a single,
deep water, fast turn-round North European transhipment facility,
in practice Scapa Flow, to achieve the necessary economy to maintain
intercontinental trade. Essential in the embargo scenario, these
considerations are just as important for current shipping and
markets, when developing UK ports, transport and security policy.
Ports are key segments in international supply
chains. As bottlenecks they are easy targets. The magnitude of
an individual port's exposure to hazard is its vulnerability.
Port congestion in a busy milieu (eg South-East England and the
Low Countries), up a long estuary (such as the Thames, Elbe or
Scheldt) enhances vulnerability by orders of magnitude. Britain
faced famine three times in the last 90 years, in 1915-18, 1940-44
and 1950. Now with a larger population, more dependent on imported
food and material, the potential for starvation in Britain is
a fact of life. Only shipping, port reliability and flexible access
to world markets stand between the UK's import dependency and
disaster. Ports are open invitations to the psychopathic 10% of
all populations; to the homicidal psychopathic 1% who direct them
and to the suicidally-deluded homicidal psychopathic 0.1% who
are their willing dupes. But though the most publicised threat,
terrorism is only a part of the port security spectrum.
HAZARD MANAGEMENT
1. Biological
As an European Import Control Point/Border Inspection
Post, the constant threat posed by natural biological agents and
toxic substances requires continuous local surveillance, as is
already present practice in Scapa Flow. In the detection and neutralization
of aberrant organisms and hazardous materials., local initiative
is backed by Porton expertise. This covers recognised hazards
as well as novel infective agents and substances as they are demonstrated.
The Hub's further care is for contamination of food, water and
supplies as well as for noxious inhalation from atmosphere or
air conditioning. This is avoided by the wide separation between
industrial and container operations which is available in Scapa
Flow.
2. Physical
The geography of Scapa Flow provides deep water
and wave protection. The tsunami risk is for a surge of 1.5m with
at least 20 minutes' warning. All-weather operation requires all-weather
port access and a transhipment facility designed to reduces wind
speed in the transhipment area to below the crane limiting 30mph.
Lightening strike attenuation is routine, while earthquake-free
design (such as the ScapaSystem) is mandatory. Meteor-strike threatens
all ports while aircrash, fire by accident or arson, explosion
whether spontaneous or deliberate in containers, shipping, fuel,
power, neighbouring installations (such as Canvey Island) and
communications are standard design considerations. Electro-magnetic
interference, either natural, as with solar flares interrupting
satellite-based systems, or deliberate satellite, aerial, terrestrial
or sub-marine jamming of port communication, command and control
functions are avoided by primary port design. Radiation, whether
delivered by laser-based or nuclear devices, dirty bombs or site
involvement by environmental contamination, threatens all ports.
Vulnerability increases with congestion, complexity and density
of population.
3. Operational
Collision and/or grounding, whether accidental
or deliberate, are more likely and more devastating the more complicated,
confined and congested the site (as in recent Hamburg, Antwerp,
Keil Canal and Suez Canal incidents demonstrate). In Scapa there
is space for security. Computer virus, hacking and electro-magnetic
interference of the communication, command and control functions
of automated ports requires intelligent design and the facility
for manual reversion to the staff who provide the intellectual
flexibility and demand coordination which are essential for commercial
success. Sabotage of key elements to produce logistic dislocation
is countered by design, strategic site, threat detection and neutralization
together with the availability of multiple alternative operational
strategies, as provided by Scapa Flow. Explosion in containers,
fuel, victuals, foul water, ships, vehicles, above and underwater
structures are avoided by design and practice to counter concealed
devices, suicidal delivery, underwater or aerial projectiles.
Contamination of fuel, water, stores and services, including air
conditioning are prevented by strategic location, site design,
secure supply, suspicion, surveillance and practice.
4. Psychological
All staff are vulnerable to manipulation, as
demonstrated in Northern Ireland. Here psychology can be turned
against the psychopaths. The lessons learned over the last 93
years are available to be exploited against new threats.
5. Market Perception
A strength of shipping and a vulnerability of
ports is shipping's ability to switch instantly and easily between
ports. Threat and actual or perceived vulnerability can prompt
an immediate shift to other regional ports, from the UK to the
Continent or vice versa. To turn this vulnerability to advantage,
the UK, North Europe and global trade requires an alternative
northern deep-water (greater than or equal to 20m draught) transhipment
hub to Rotterdam. To Rotterdam because the Rotterdam authorities
guarantee that European taxpayers will dredge, build and maintain
a 20m draught facility in this terrorist's dream site, confined,
congested and packed about by every hazard and opportunity for
mischief. Rotterdam's present pre-eminence and the restricted
draught of all other North European ports makes alternative transhipment
in Scapa Flow a strategic, economic and security imperative.
MESSAGE FOR
THE SELECT
COMMITTEE
1. The Strategic Threat to UK port,
shipping and supply security has to be addressed. The potential
closure of the Suez Canal, fossil fuel shortages and, for the
UK, the vital necessity to maintain North American-European-Russian-Far
East intercontinental trade means that as in 1967-75, future security
will ultimately be guaranteed by large, fuel-efficient container
ships able to exploit the Cape Route around Good Hope. These greater
than or equal to 12,500 teu ships will need naturally deep, reliable,
secure, economically advantageous, strategically-placed 20-metre
draught harbour and transhipment facilities in Europe, where they
can be turned round and returned to the ocean within 24-hours.
The one place where this can be provided is by the ScapaSystem
in Scapa Flow. Scapa Flow is essential if vulnerable Rotterdam
is to be artificially extended, dredged to and maintained at 20m
draught. Leaving Europe dependent on constant dredging of vulnerable
sites will turn North Europe into an intercontinental backwater,
when in Scapa Flow North Europe has the natural answer to next
generation shipping, present security concerns and the need to
reduce fossil fuel consumption while increasing UK and North European
competitiveness.
2. The Ecological Dimension: As
well as the savings Scapa Flow provides in fuel and emissions
for intercontinental shipping, to further reduce fossil fuel consumption,
short sea fast feeder container ships will deliver containers
direct from Scapa to the UK's local ports, that is by sea to within
50 miles of everywhere in Britain. Lorries and drivers can then
be employed where they are irreplaceable and most profitable—in
local delivery within 50 miles of each local port. A 50-mile radius
also means that electric vehicles can once again be deployed in
the road transport sector. Maximum utilization of electric-powered
transport will leave some North-South and East-West traffic flows
uncovered. This is best addressed by the integration of a 5th
transport modality, the SSMC Simplified Suspended Monorail System,
with road, rail, air and short sea services. It will further reduce
the UK's dependence on fossil fuels, minimise pollution and carbon
emissions and enable maximum use to be made of renewable energy
by providing both a convenient market and means of distribution
to support the present Grid. The SSMS overhead design, flexibility
and small "footprint" means that it can be rolled out
through Britain with minimum local disruption. With the SSMS delivering
directly to city malls which provide retail, storage and distribution
facilities, the malls in their turn will support on-line shopping
and electric lorry delivery to delivery ports in every household.
The 20% of the population who are unlikely to use the Web would
be supported by electric lorry delivery to their corner shops.
In this way the oil-powered motor car would be reduced to a residual
necessity for a rural few.
This vision of a low-emission, all-electric
Britain, secure in its ability to provide its own energy requirements,
is feasible, practical, facilitated by the Scapa Flow Hub and
makes best use of existing infrastructure with minimum disturbance
as well as ensuring the ability of the British economy to thrive.
3. International Collaboration:
In Scapa Flow, the United States' need for a forward safe gateway
and secure portal, for US Eastern Seaboard intercontinental trade,
can be integrated seamlessly with the UK and North Europe's global
container traffic security requirements.
4. Local Security: Cover for terrorists
may be physical or psychopathic/psychological (as Michael Collins
demonstrated). Security has to be built in, not applied later.
Scapa Flow's secure status has been demonstrated over the last
98 years. Over the last 30-years this has included a major international
oil installation and pipeline. Scapa Flow has the space to accommodate
both container and oil-related activities without compromising
either, the environment, local amenity, renewable power generation
or tourism. Hazard is most easily hidden, attacks made and threat
least easily detected in heavily populated areas, such as South
East England or the Low Countries. Long, slow-speed approaches
through narrow channels provide perfect targets. Positioning a
Buncefield next to a container terminal up a confined river estuary
as proposed for London Gateway provides the perfect target ambience.
Simplicity, flexibility and ruthless originality
of thought, often backed by limitless means are the hallmarks
of successful 21st century terrorism. Flexibility, originality,
intelligence, persistence and lateral thinking, community support
and common sense are keys to successful counter-terrorism. What
defence is prepared for rarely happens: psychopaths hate to be
hurt. At Scapa, geography provides natural defences against most
threats. To Scapa's natural and economic advantages is added Security
by Design; active counter-espionage; the "what if ..."
anticipation of those on the spot, who are aware to the threat
to their own lives and livelihood; the intelligent support of
the local community to provide sensible suspicion and surveillance;
together with a confidential reporting service that is awake to
the possibility of its own manipulation.
5. Security Development can be considered
as a series of steps:
Step 1: Chose a secure strategy for successful
defence—flexibility and dispersal at environmentally and
economically advantageous secure sites, of which Scapa Flow is
the best European example. If the European taxpayer is to dredge
Rotterdam, Scapa Flow becomes mandatory. With two 20m draught
alternatives, one secure and shipping's ability to switch profitably
to Scapa Flow and the ScapaSystem's ability to handle acute demand,
ports lose their attraction as targets for spectacular terrorist
coups, to the benefit of all North Europe's ports.
Step 2: Build in Security as an integral component
of the port specification, as in Scapa Flow.
Step 3: Engage staff interested in their own
and the global supply chain's defence (as in 1914-18, the many
IRA campaigns, 1939-45 and the Cold War).
Step 4: Maintain local surveillance and intelligence,
with local community support and interest in security and the
possibility of sleepers.
Step 5: Prepare for and practice responses to
worst case scenarios while continuously considering and rehearsing
new scenarios.
Step 6: Discrete, world-wide surveillance, learning
from the experience and practice of others. It is here that pattern
recognition reveals attack rehearsal and development.
Step 7: Reward success, in confidence if necessary
and failure ruthlessly, in public (eg Churchill's actions following
the Royal Oak and Thetis disasters).
February 2006
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