Memorandum from Eurotunnel (TS 46)
INTRODUCTION
1. Eurotunnel—description
Eurotunnel is the privately-funded Anglo/French
concessionaire, which designed, built and now operates the Channel
Tunnel. The tunnel system links the rail and motorway networks
of the United Kingdom and France. The system comprises three tunnels,
each of approximately 50 kilometers in length and running under
the English Channel between terminals in Folkestone, Kent and
Coquelles, France.
Two single-track rail tunnels are used for truck
and passenger shuttle trains and for Eurostar trains and freight
trains. The third tunnel which is a road way laying for most its
length between the two rail tunnels is designed to provide a safe
means of evacuation (the safe "haven") and is used for
maintenance purposes.
Juxtaposed frontier controls and security clearance
take place at the departure terminal, avoiding the need for such
systematic controls on arrival.
The capacity of the tunnel is expressed in standard
paths per hour in each direction. The signalling system currently
permits 20 standard paths per hour in each direction. Ten of these
paths are assigned to Eurotunnel's Shuttle Services, and 10 to
train operators.
Eurotunnel operates a fleet of 16 truck shuttles
and nine passenger shuttles. Truck Shuttle Services currently
provide a maximum of six departures in each direction at peak
times. Each freight shuttle can carry up to 30 trucks. Passenger
shuttles carry cars, campervans, caravans, coaches, motorcycles
and trailers and currently provide a maximum of four departures
in each direction at peak times. Each passenger shuttle can carry
up to 120 cars and 12 coaches or 180 cars.
Under the Railway Usage Contract (RUC) half
of all Channel Tunnel capacity is given to train operators. This
includes Eurostar, which operates high-speed passenger-only services
which connect London and Ashford with Calais, Lille, Paris, and
Brussels. La Societe Nationale des Chemins de Fer (SNCF) and English,
Welsh & Scottish Railways (EWS) operate international rail
freight services.
Eurostar is jointly owned by Eurostar (UK) Limited,
SNCF and SNCB. There are a minimum of 14 Eurostar daily departures
in each direction between London and Paris and seven daily departures
in each direction between London and Brussels.
During 2005 the Eurotunnel system transported:
1,308,786 trucks, 2,047,166 cars, 77,267 coaches.
In addition, 7,454,497 Eurostar passengers were
transported as well as 1.6 million tons of merchandise (SNCF,
EWS).
2. The Eurotunnel Debt
Eurotunnel currently has debts of £6.3
billion, which date from the construction phase. Traffic levels
have never reached those forecast at the outset and therefore
the group is unable to meet repayments on this debt. In November
2006 the Minimum Usage Contribution from the railway operators
comes to an end with the loss of c £70 million per annum
revenue. In early 2007 the first major repayments of debt principal
become due. Without a consensual financial restructuring, Eurotunnel
will be unable to meet its contractual obligations from early
in 2007.
Since July 2005, Eurotunnel has engaged its
creditors in talks aimed at achieving a consensual financial restructuring
that will allow the Company to meet its obligations and develop
its services in the future. A first "waiver" period
ended on 31 January 2006 with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding
between Eurotunnel and an Ad Hoc Committee representing more than
50% of the total debt. A second waiver period came to an end on
31 March 2006, by which time other creditors had formed a committee
representing a large majority of junior and subordinated debt
holders. A third waiver period is currently in place, allowing
Eurotunnel to negotiate, for the first time, with all the creditors
together. This waiver ends on 12 July 2006 but has a review point
in mid May by which time Eurotunnel hopes to have achieved significant
progress towards a financial restructuring.
THE INITIAL
DESIGN OF
EUROTUNNEL
3. Having been designed and built during
an era of terrorism, Eurotunnel had the advantage of being able
to incorporate suitable countermeasures into every phase of the
construction and commissioning. The Eurotunnel scheme was authorised
following a competition involving three other rival projects.
In their "Invitation to Promoters", dated April 1985,
the two governments required promoters to prepare a separate confidential
report, detailing how they would counter the threat of terrorism
and sabotage. In its White Paper ("The Channel Fixed Link")
dated 6 February 1986, the UK Government said that one of the
reasons the Eurotunnel system had been selected was that it was
the least susceptible to sabotage.
4. The Treaty of Canterbury signed on 12
February 1986 and the Concession Agreement dated 14 March 1986
authorised the bi-national Company Eurotunnel to operate the Channel
Tunnel Fixed Link which comprises the tunnels and the French and
British terminals.
5. In compliance with Article 5 (3) of the
Treaty of Canterbury concerning the construction and operation
of a Channel Fixed link and with Clause 23.1 of the Concession
Agreement in respect of the security of the Fixed Link, Eurotunnel
submitted a Global Security Report to the Joint Principals. This
document is also a response to the joint Government letter of
14 February 1989 which sets out the general principles which the
Governments wished to see in the Channel Fixed Link arrangements.
It details the security measures to be taken by the appointed
authorities to ensure the safety and security of individuals,
installation and assets, as well as the commercial integrity of
the enterprise. The submission by the Channel Tunnel Group to
obtain the Channel Fixed Link Concession identified threats which
might have to be considered during the period of the Concession
like destruction or very severe damage by a very large explosive
charge, terrorist acts with smaller explosive devices, hijacking
or hostage taking, disruption of the services by hoaxes, interruption
of the services by demonstrations. The Joint Principals considered
that threats to be taken into account were: intrusion onto the
site (peripheral or in depth), introduction of weapons, sabotage,
placing of an explosive device, attacks against the installations,
attacks against persons, bomb alerts, internal complicity or negligence.
Reappraisal of the threat changed the original concept and careful
consideration was given to assessing the likelihood of such a
threat materialising under various conditions. As a consequence,
Eurotunnel was asked to have at its disposal for the UK site,
in accordance with English law and practice and the legal requirements
stated above, a security force capable of carrying out the security
functions needed to provide a satisfactory security cover for
the day-to-day operations to a level which will provide an effective
deterrent. This force should undertake the following tasks: security
controls and supervision, access controls on the sites, manning
of static control and check points operation of mobile patrols,
security checks on tourist and freight traffic, operation of explosive
detection equipment and X Ray screening. A list of systems and
equipment including CCTV, fence alarms, perimeter security systems
were proposed.
6. Eurotunnel believes that it has complied
fully with, and in fact has gone beyond all the security requirements
of both governments.
REGULATION OF
EUROTUNNEL SECURITY
7. In the UK, the Secretary of State for
Transport, in exercise of his powers under Articles 11 and 12
of the Channel Tunnel (Security) Order 1994, conferred under section
11 of the Channel Tunnel Act 1987, requires that the "concessionaire
Eurotunnel" be responsible for security on a day-to-day basis
for the Eurotunnel site.
8. An Inter Governmental Commission (IGC)
has been created to supervise, on behalf of the governments, all
matters connected with the Channel Tunnel, including questions
relating to security and safety. Specific Security Committees
(national and bi-national) have been established to oversee the
security arrangements for the tunnel system. They include representatives
of the relevant Administrations and the Transport System Operators.
9. In conformity with the Treaty and the
Concession Agreement, the governments have appointed specific
"Competent Authorities" responsible for the security
of the Channel Tunnel Fixed Link. In the UK:
— TRANSEC (the Department for Transport's
Security organisation) prescribes the arrangements necessary for
site security and for security checks on tunnel users, contractors
and visitors. Under TRANSEC's authority and supervision, Eurotunnel
implements these measures. TRANSEC in turn regularly inspects
and audits the security arrangements.
— Notices and directions issued from
time to time by TRANSEC define and refine the security arrangements
required of Eurotunnel.
— The Eurotunnel Security Department
liaises with the UK Authorities and implements the necessary measures
to enable Eurotunnel to respect the security obligations imposed
by TRANSEC.
— Kent Police is present on site and
carries out Police functions and provides support to the frontier
controls.
10. Since the start of the operation of
the Eurotunnel Fixed Link in 1994, security measures defined by
the Governments have been both implemented and financed by Eurotunnel.
For example, Eurotunnel has provided Ionscan,
Under Vehicle Video Systems (UVVS), Access Control Systems, CCTV
and the Euroscan (X-Ray) security systems with a global cost of
approximately £19 million.
Each Year the employment of security personnel
costs approximately £7 million. In addition Eurotunnel has
financed the measures needed to counteract the illegal immigrant
phenomenon in France costing £4.2 million, to protect the
site against illegal intrusions.
In 2001-02 Eurotunnel considerably reinforced
the French site with CCTV, Passive Millimetric Wave Imaging (PMMW)
and extra fencing at a cost of £2.7 million.
11. In compliance with the Government and
industry policy for the border agencies and industry to work closely
together, the Multi Agency Threat and Risk Assessment (MATRA)
was implemented on the UK terminal in 2005 in order to analyse
the remaining vulnerabilities, to respond to changing requirements
and to implement a clear method of response to the new risk (Please
see attached Annexe).
12. Safety and security have always been
and remain Eurotunnel's primary operating principles, taking priority
over financial and commercial considerations.
ASSESSMENT OF
SECURITY EFFECTIVENESS
13. Eurotunnel security measures are constantly
assessed to refine and improve them, in particular by means of
Internal Audit, and external reporting to and feedback from the
various bodies referred to above.
14. The annual bi-national emergency exercise
("BINAT"), organised by the two governments in turn,
tests emergency response in extreme situations. Each year Eurotunnel
halts commercial operations to test its procedures for dealing
with different crisis situations. This year an exercise was organised
to test reactions in the case of a chemical attack in the Tunnel.
Following this exercise a working group has been established,
comprising representatives from Eurotunnel as well as the French
and UK Authorities in order to develop the procedures for managing
new types of threat, such as chemical, biological or nuclear attack
(CBRN).
15. Personnel are currently being trained
and made aware of the new threats being presented by CBRN and
possible attacks on the tunnel's computer systems.
16. Action Plans incorporating recommendations
from audits and projects aimed at reinforcing the periphery protection
of the site and dealing with equipment which has become obsolete
since its implementation in 1994, have been put in place in liaison
with TRANSEC and Kent Police.
CONCLUSIONS
17. The equipment and facilities required
by the British Government, and financed and put in place by Eurotunnel,
have required very substantial investment. Such investment in
security is unprecedented in a private transport company. In addition
to the measures originally put in place, Eurotunnel has continued
to invest in new security measures—enhancement of the Euroscan
facility and the development, with Qinetic of PMMW, for example—to
keep pace both with the emerging threat of global terrorism and
the growth in tunnel traffic.
18. In addition, Eurotunnel does not impose
a security tax on customers as do the sea and ports operators.
19. Eurotunnel has put in place all the
various measures to combat terrorism, as required by the Government
and as identified by internal auditing and other procedures.
20. Eurotunnel has therefore provided and
financed security over and above what is customarily required.
21. Continuing to absorb fully these security
costs is an additional obstacle to Eurotunnel in reaching a consensual
financial restructuring agreement with its creditors.
Annex
MATRA (MULTI-AGENCY
THREAT & RISK
ASSESSMENT)
The current protective security arrangements
for the Channel Tunnel are designed to be sustainable, proportionate
and responsive to any particular terrorist threat. They seek to
protect private and commercial passengers, their vehicles, and
site personnel against criminal and terrorist acts; they also
cover rolling stock and infrastructure.
The security arrangements are generated from
the Directions set by TRANSEC who are responsible for monitoring
their effectiveness, and they are implemented and paid for by
Eurotunnel.
Kent Police (Channel Tunnel Police Unit—CTPU)
are responsible for policing the Eurotunnel terminal and have
a significant counter-terrorism operational role and response
capability.
H M Customs Revenue and Excise and HM Immigration
Service run their own separate security operations on site.
MATRA is a process designed to manage risk,
by identifying and bringing together all those who have an interest
in security at a site ("security stakeholders") and
who are seeking collaborative working.
The MATRA methodology takes a given threat,
assessed as capable of being carried out, and seeks to identify
all potential vulnerabilities in a site's operation arising from
both criminal and terrorist activity—from shop-lifting to
hijacking. The product of threat and vulnerability to that threat
is risk:
Threat x Vulnerability = RISK
The result of listing all the threats and attendant
vulnerabilities of a site has a "risk register". By
providing a methodology for examining the vulnerability of the
site to each and every threat and assessing the effectiveness
of physical and procedural methods for reducing that vulnerability,
the MATRA process actively manages the mitigation of those risks
to safety and security.
The risk register is based on risk to the site,
not on the scope of responsibility of each security stakeholder.
It is used as a basis for prioritisation and action planning and
identifies lead stakeholders—those who are best placed to
tackle the risk. The likelihood of a risk being ignored by two
adjacent stakeholders is minimised. The process improves efficiency
of resource usage by eliminating duplication of effort: And tactical
plans and resources are aligned to an informed set of standard
operating procedures based on the likelihood of a vulnerability
being exploited.
MATRA was developed jointly by the Department
for Transport and the Home Office in response to the safety and
security environment of airports.
Following an IGC meeting on 20 July 2004, the
Kent Constabulary and Eurotunnel commenced preliminary work to
assess the applicability of the principles of MATRA to the Channel
Tunnel operation at the Cheriton site. A number of development
group meetings were undertaken by the Strategic Research and Planning
Unit of Kent Police (SB) and Eurotunnel managers. The work has
been reviewed at several meetings, and the project is now being
piloted for the final application at Eurotunnel.
May 2006
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