Memorandum from the Association of Chief
Police Officers (ACPO) (TS 48)
The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO)
is an independent, professionally led strategic body. In the public
interest and, in equal and active partnership with Government
and the Association of Police Authorities, ACPO leads and coordinates
the direction and development of the police service in England,
Wales and Northern Ireland. In times of national need ACPO, on
behalf of all chief officers, coordinates the strategic policing
response.
The Association supports the philosophy of strong
local policing, and believes that must be maintained within the
tripartite framework of policing which brings together the local
Chief Constable, the local Police Authority and the Home Secretary.
But the nature of modern crime, with an increasingly international
dimension, and the ever present need to use public resources to
best effect, places a voluntary duty on forces to work together,
employing common policies, strategies and methods wherever possible.
ACPO's members are police officers who hold
the rank of Chief Constable, Deputy Chief Constable or Assistant
Chief Constable, or their equivalents, in the 44 forces of England,
Wales and Northern Ireland, national police agencies and certain
other forces in the UK, the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands,
and certain senior non-police staff. There are presently 280 members
of ACPO.
ACPO has 11 established business areas; Crime,
Finance and Resources, General Policing, Information management,
Performance management, Workforce modernisation, Race and diversity,
Presidential business, Terrorism and Allied Matters, Roads policing
and Criminal justice.
As you are aware, I hold the Terrorism and Allied
Matters (TAM) portfolio for transport security. The aim of my
role is to ensure that the policing of the transport infrastructure
is sufficient to meet the current threat and ensure the safety
of its users and workers. This is a role I have performed since
May 2005. Prior to my appointment there was no overall lead for
transport security within ACPO (TAM).
The horrifying series of events that took place
on 11 September 2001 starkly illustrated the callous and indiscriminate
tactics that those following an unrelenting extremist view are
willing to utilise to further their cause. This threat has not
abated and since that date there has been a proliferation of major
terrorist attacks on the transport infrastructure with a common
theme of inflicting mass casualties. On 7 July 2005, London suffered
what is believed to be a co-ordinated al-Qaeda inspired attack,
perpetrated by deadly and determined attackers or "suicide
bombers". Four bombs exploded in three underground stations
and on a double-decker bus during the morning rush hour, resulting
in 52 deaths and more than 700 injuries.
It is against this background that robust and
effective policing must be maintained to pursue those wishing
to undertake such odious acts and to protect the people and the
transport infrastructure they seek to attack.
When I first took responsibility for the transport
portfolio, I consulted with colleagues who have key responsibilities
within the various transport sectors and identified a number of
key issues impacting on policing and security. The following is
a summary of the key issues identified and action taken to date.
1. AVIATION
Airports and aircraft have been a common target
feature in many terrorist attacks over the years. This threat
has not diminished and is likely to be an enduring one. The police,
working alongside others, have a vital role to undertake in the
provision of security and public safety at airports.
In consultation with the UK Airports Police
Commanders Group and the office of the National Co-ordinator of
Ports Policing several key areas of airport policing have been
identified which require review and improvement. The following
are the main areas of concern:
(a) The designation of Airports and the appropriate
level of police resources at airports.
(b) The funding of airport policing.
(c) The Multi Agency Threat and Risk Assessment
(MATRA) process.
As you will be aware the Department for Transport
(DfT) are currently conducting an independent review into the
policing of airports. ACPO have produced a written submission
to the review team dated March 2006, each of the above areas have
been fully explored within that submission. The following gives
a brief summary of the views and recommendations of ACPO as detailed
within the submission. (A copy of the full submission can be supplied
to the committee if required).
Designation of Airports
The concept of airport "designation"
was created over 30 years ago in response to a series of terrorist
atrocities involving civil aviation. Legislation enabled the Secretary
of State for Transport to "designate" an airport and
thereby reassign policing responsibilities from individual airport
constabularies to the local home office service.
A responsibility was placed on the airport operator,
through agreements, to pay police authorities for the services
of the police, their accommodation and facilities. As a result
of this legislation, nine UK airports were "designated";
Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted, Aberdeen, Prestwick, Edinburgh, Glasgow,
Birmingham and Manchester.
A number of working parties have considered
the issue of designation over the years, most recently Sir John
Wheeler in 2002. He was able to make a number of recommendations
as a result of the work he conducted. ACPO agreed with all of
the recommendations, particularly that a formula for calculating
airport-policing levels was necessary. Sir John stated in his
report, "The present distinction between designated and non-designated
airports lacks credibility. It reflects decisions taken a long
time ago, on an ad-hoc basis, and its fundamentals have since
not been revisited.
Many non-designated airports have seen a rapid
expansion in passenger throughputs without a commensurate rise
in airport policing. Even at the nine airports, which became designated
in the 1970s, the development of the police operation has not
kept abreast of proliferating growth in civil aviation and the
terrorist threat. There needs to be more clarity on a means of
identifying which airports require an embedded police presence,
with the whole process being placed on a more rational basis".
To address this issue, ACPO have produced an
objective scoring system to identify airports that need such a
dedicated policing operation. The areas assessed are based on
those recommended by Sir John Wheeler and provide a more objective
basis to the consideration of designation. The resultant score,
when applying this process, will indicate whether there is a need
for a permanent police presence at an airport.
Following on from this, is a framework document
that allows for an objective assessment of the police resources
that a particular airport will require, should the resultant score
indicate the need for a full-time police presence. As a basis
for determining police numbers, airport policing has been categorised
into four generic areas namely; protective security, public safety,
criminal investigation and general policing.
Funding
Another fundamental principal on which ACPO
are in agreement is that of the provision of funding. At the time
of the 1974 legislation the Home Secretary made it clear that
the financial burden of airport policing should not rest with
council taxpayers, a point reinforced in Sir John Wheeler's review
of 2002 and the position of ACPO today. The chair of ACPO (TAM)
has previously made it clear that UK police forces are opposed
to sharing costs and reiterated the previously established principle
that there should be no additional expense charged to the council
taxpayer. ACPO suggests a passenger levy to pay for police costs
presents a more flexible, sustainable approach to the provision
of airport policing in the 21st century.
Multi Agency Threat and Risk Assessment (MATRA)
The MATRA process is a key component that shapes
airport strategic assessments. The production of MATRA registers
at each airport has brought a diligent consideration of each threat
by all contributors to aviation security. ACPO fully support the
concept of multi agency risk registers as the best method of identifying
risk and remedial measures.
The MATRA process alone is not suitable for
determining police levels, however. It has no formulaic provision
to do this and additionally does not identify other policing requirements
such as those relating to general policing and civil contingencies
planning.
Furthermore, whereas ACPO are in full accord
with the principals of MATRA, there exist some concerns with regard
to its application. ACPO consider it lacks dynamism, accountability
and resilience. It suffers from a lack of investment and has a
bias towards cost saving at the expense of security improvements.
Additionally it is reliant on best practices as opposed to mandatory
regulation, which has led to piecemeal implementation. There is
too much focus on process and too little emphasis on outcomes.
There is also an absence of benchmarking to compare and contrast
progress at different airports.
There are concerns that too many security improvements
are incident-driven as opposed to being strategically identified
and managed by the MATRA process. ACPO's view is that for MATRA
to be effective, it should be put on a legislative footing to
establish clear statements of accountability and responsibility
on a similar basis as the Crime and Disorder Act. It should also
be subject to independent inspection.
ACPO's vision for the future funding for airports
policing is to use the suggested ACPO framework document, informed
by the national JTAC threat assessment of aviation and a local
threat assessment, which is in turn informed by the MATRA process.
This process would be compliant with the National Intelligence
Model (NIM) and will ensure that the airport has an appropriate
level of resources required to maintain safety and security given
the current threats to each individual airport. ACPO would welcome
Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabularies (HMIC) and the DfT
to conduct regular inspections of airport policing commands to
ensure that the process has been applied fairly and accurately.
We would expect to make the process available
to the industry for scrutiny thereby ensuring that the process
is fully transparent and hopefully demystifying the issues surrounding
funding.
2. RAIL NETWORK
In response to the terrorist attacks on the
Madrid railway in 2004 and the London underground and a bus in
July 2005, a great deal of work has been done to improve the security
of the rail network. The British Transport Police (BTP) are the
national police force for the railways providing a policing service
to rail operators, their staff and passengers throughout England,
Wales and Scotland. As you would expect BTP is the lead force
in developing strategies and technologies to protect the rail
infrastructure from terrorism. The main aim of my portfolio is
to ensure that the level of security of the rail network is appropriate
and effective in light of the Madrid and London attacks.
The BTP have led on the target hardening of
the network and have specific teams dedicated to this area of
work such as Crime Reduction Advisors, Architectural Liaison Officers
and Counter Terrorism Security Advisors. When considering any
development of rail termini Network Rail and the Train Operating
Companies should consult with BTP in the very early stages of
planning. A recent example of a target hardening strategy is Operation
Shield, which involves the deployment of electronic scanners staffed
by Police Officers in uniform working in partnership with Community
Support Officers and Revenue Inspectors at railway stations. The
electronic scanners are similar to those deployed at airports
and other controlled zones designed to detect weapons being carried
by passengers. The operation is intelligence-led and focuses on
areas of the network where violent crime is more prevalent. Initial
results have been encouraging.
The size of the rail network compared to the
number of resources which the BTP have to police it requires all
forces to support the BTP at times of heightened terrorist threat.
The focus of this support has, in the main, been joint patrolling
of rail termini and key vulnerable sections of the infrastructure
ie bridges, stations and track.
The last 12 months have seen a review of the
national manual of police tactical options known as Operation
Rainbow. This operation involves the deployment of a number of
both armed and unarmed tactics, which are used by all police forces
nationally in response to a terrorist incident or a rise in the
threat level. A number of these tactics are designed to protect
key vulnerable locations such as railway stations, other passenger
termini and vulnerable points within the infrastructure. Six tactics
have been specifically developed in partnership with the BTP and
involve the local police force supporting BTP with both armed
and unarmed officers. The tactics are however resource intensive
and if as in July 2005 the general threat level is at its highest,
some of the smaller forces may find it difficult to maintain that
level of support for lengthy periods.
3. ROAD NETWORKS
The policing of the roads network is in itself
a most challenging and varied area of police business. The ACPO
lead for roads policing is my colleague Meredydd Hughes, Chief
Constable of South Yorkshire police.
There are several key areas of roads policing
which contribute to the overall counter terrorism strategy. To
coordinate this area of roads policing work C C Hughes has appointed
ACC Adam Briggs of Cleveland Police as the counter terrorism roads
policing coordinator. The main aims of this portfolio are:
(a) Improving the security of High Consequence
Dangerous Goods (HCDG) transported by road.
(b) Co-ordinate the protection of vulnerable
parts of the road infrastructure and the public who use it.
(c) Make the best use of technology to protect
against terrorism and detect offences.
Transportation of HCDG
In response to terrorist attacks around the
world, the United Nations agreed proposals to enhance the security
of transporting dangerous goods. These proposals were published
in the 13th revised edition of the UN Model Regulations in December
2003. The international bodies responsible for the international
carriage of dangerous goods by road and rail agreed to adopt these
Model Regulations, with some small changes that were relevant
to their particular modes of transport. These have been included
in the European Agreement concerning the International Agreement
of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR) and the Regulations concerning
the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail (RID).
The European Commission adopted the new road
and rail security measures in December 2004 which meant that all
25 Member States were required to implement these measures by
July 2005. These new security measures apply to all dangerous
goods. The requirements are split into two levels: a general level
applicable to the carriage of all dangerous goods and a higher
level for the carriage of high consequence dangerous goods. These
are defined as those which have the potential for misuse in a
terrorist incident and which may, as a result, produce serious
consequences such as mass casualties or mass destruction.
The measures for road and rail have been introduced
into law through the Carriage of Dangerous Goods and Use of Transportable
Pressure Equipment (Amendment) Regulations 2005 and supported
by a comprehensive set of guidance.
A great deal of work is being jointly undertaken
by the Police, the Vehicle Operator Service Agency (VOSA), Department
for Transport (DfT), the Highways agencies and other regulatory
bodies who form the Industry Advisory Group for the security of
dangerous goods by road and rail to enforce the ADR regulations
and in turn maintain the security of HCDG. Some examples of this
work are:
— Operation Mermaid—a
road safety initiative conducted by the police with partner agencies
including VOSA, Highways Agency, Her Majesty's Revenue & Customs,
the Environment Agency and the Department for Work and Pensions.
Operation Mermaid is run regularly by forces around the UK. The
operation as well as enforcing the ADR regulations also has a
counter terrorism element to it ie disrupting terrorist funding/smuggling,
raising awareness of drivers to the terrorist threat, providing
public reassurance and intelligence gathering. An example of a
national/European Operation Mermaid day which took place on Thursday
16 January 2006, with 32 police forces from around the UK taking
part, police officers from other countries took part in the operation
in this country for the first time and officers from the UK also
worked in France, Belgium and Holland. This proved particularly
successful in one incident in North Wales when a Polish police
officer was able to converse with a polish driver who was arrested.
The offender was later taken to court, convicted and fined. The
Polish officer was also able to act as a witness. I believe that
this sends a clear message to those who may consider targeting
HCDG whilst in transit on the UK roads.
— Security of HCDG—VOSA
Inspectors have been trained to assess the security of premises
used by hauliers and other transport companies licensed to hold
and transport HCDG. The Inspectors and force Counter Terrorism
Security Advisors (CTSA) are in the process of conducting joint
visits to such premises ensuring that the premises are secure.
Where improvement is required the site management are given written
survey reports detailing what is required. A key part of this
strategy is raising the awareness of the companies and their employees
to the potential threat posed to the materials they transport.
This is done by briefing the staff directly and using awareness
materials produced by the DfT.
— Protecting the road infrastructure—As
mentioned above Operation Rainbow tactical options have been developed
to counter the terrorist threat. Several of the Rainbow tactics
have been developed to protect the roads infrastructure. The nature
of these tactics include the checking of vulnerable key locations
ie bridges, tunnels and interchanges, highly visible patrolling
of main arterial routes in and out of City centres and main towns
using both armed and unarmed resources. The police are supported
by our partners in these tactics eg the Highways Agency visiting
and checking vulnerable locations.
— Trojan vehicles—Terrorist
attacks around the world have often featured the use of stolen
or cloned emergency vehicles to facilitate the delivery of a Vehicle
Bourne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) to a protected target.
Assessments by intelligence experts have recognised that this
may be a tactic which terrorists could seek to employ in Europe
and the UK. To reduce the risk of this happening officers from
the National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) have taken
the national lead on raising the awareness of senior management
of all the emergency services and the military. NaCTSO have produced
detailed guidance and advice to the services which will when implemented
increase the security of genuine emergency vehicles. NaCTSO have
also gained the co-operation of the vehicle equipment industry
to regulate the sale of emergency vehicle equipment such as light
bars and vehicle liveries limiting the availability to authorised
and genuine customers. The team have also raised the awareness
and gained the cooperation of others who legitimately own emergency
vehicles such as film/TV prop companies and enthusiasts clubs.
4. USING TECHNOLOGY
TO PROTECT
AGAINST TERRORISM
The police and our partner agencies at the Home
Office Scientific Development Branch (HOSDB), Transport Research
Laboratory (TRL) and the National Security Advice Centre (NSAC)
are constantly seeking to develop existing and identify new technologies
and equipment to counter the terrorist threat to all modes of
transport. It is generally recognised that we in the UK are world
leaders in this regard. Some examples of this work are:
— Automatic Number Plate Recognition
(ANPR) —The British Police Service are world leaders
in the application of Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR)
technology, a technology that was itself invented in the United
Kingdom. ANPR technology in its first 20 years was largely restricted
to counter terrorism purposes, there has been significant development
in the use of ANPR in a wider policing environment in recent years.
NPR is unique in its ability to impact positively
in an intelligence led and proactive basis on every key area of
police business, including levels 1-3 Criminality and counter
terrorism.
The ACPO/Police Standards Unit pilot projects
(Laser 1 & 2) have evidenced the ability of ANPR to produce
significant increases in overall arrest rates and Offences Brought
to Justice compared to conventional policing methods, through
the use of dedicated ANPR.
ANPR systems are both static and portable and
have been in place or deployed at key parts of the transport infrastructure
eg motorways, busy arterial routes, sea ports, rail termini and
airports for many years. We are seeking to increase the number
of ANPR systems with the support of our partners to cover all
ports through which vehicles pass.
— Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)
—The impact that CCTV has had on preventing and detecting
crime and disorder has been subject of much debate over the past
few years. The value of CCTV following the attacks in July 2005
was clear for all to see. Without the evidence contained in the
footage on both the 7th and 21st attacks the police task of identifying
and apprehending the offenders would have been much more difficult
and protracted. The police aim is to increase the coverage of
CCTV systems around the entire transport infrastructure and to
improve the quality of the images recorded. The installation and
maintenance of the equipment is only one small part of this strategy,
as to be effective it requires trained staff to monitor the images
and an appropriate resource to respond to incidents captured.
This is work that my colleagues and I at ACPO and all other police
and partner agency bodies are striving to address. A significant
issue in the ports environment which needs to be overcome is who
should be responsible for the cost of implementation, upgrade
and maintenance of CCTV systems.
— Temporary and permanent vehicle
barriers—As stated above the use of VBIED's has been
a prominent feature of terrorist attacks around the world. This
coupled with the a deadly and determined attacker or "suicide
bomber" at the wheel of a VBIED has proved a difficult attack
Modus Operandi (MO) to mitigate, when the aim is to drive the
VBIED into a vulnerable or protected site. To counter this attack
MO the HOSDB, TRL and the vehicle barrier industry have developed
a range of tried and tested permanent and temporary vehicle barriers
which will stop a vehicle up to the size 7.5 tonnes travelling
at 50 mph. The permanent barriers are being installed at several
vulnerable and protected sites around the UK. A large stock of
temporary barriers, which can be deployed in a relatively short
time, has been purchased by the Home Office as a National Barrier
Asset (NBA). The NBA is primarily for the use of police forces
which host political party conferences and has been deployed several
times eg G8 summit at Gleneagles and Labour party conferences
at Brighton and Manchester.
— Emergency vehicle identification
technology—The HOSDB, TRL and NSAC are currently working
on technical solutions to reduce the threat of "Trojan"
vehicles as outlined above.
5. SECURING THE
UK BORDERS
There is currently strong political desire and
support to improve the security of the UK's borders. The United
Kingdom Immigration Service (UKIS) and the police have launched
a Joint Borders Operations Centre (JBOC) project which receives
advance passenger information from airlines servicing 10 of the
busiest key routes into the UK. This information is then used
to compare against UKIS, police and other agency data both in
the UK and in Europe to identify persons who are either wanted
for offences or who may pose a threat to the UK. There is a significant
financial burden to the relevant partners to maintain this project.
The office of the National Coordinator of Ports Policing is leading
on this project on behalf of ACPO (TAM). A 10 year delivery plan
is currently in development.
This work has raised a debate around whether
there is a case for the establishment of a Single Border Agency
(SBA), which may prove to be more effective than the current group
of bodies ie UKIS, HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and the police,
in ensuring the long term security of the UK's borders.
6. SUMMARY
Since my appointment as ACPO (TAM) lead for
transport security I have been reassured by the level of commitment
and dedication of the police service and our key partners to ensure
the safety of our transport systems. ACPO welcomes the DfT independent
review into airport policing and supports its stated aims and
objectives, which it considers both relevant and timely. Aviation
as an industry is developing and expanding at an unprecedented
rate. Arrangements for the delivery of sustained, enduring and
robust ground-patrolling regimes however, have not kept pace.
Nonetheless, the threat from terror, if you
encompass all its forms, will not be eliminated. We are going
to have manifestations of terror in various pockets of conflict
and that will be enduring. The realistic mission for those of
us who are operationally engaged in counter-terrorism is to seek
to eliminate the capacity for international terrorists to perpetrate
attacks on the scale of 9/11. In terms of those groups who have
the capacity and intent to conduct such attacks, or who aspire
to do so, their unequivocal intention is to cause mass murder.
Their objective being to mount simultaneous spectacular events,
which have traditionally had a focus on the transport sector.
That threat continues.
7. CONCLUSION
There is still a great deal to do, for example,
in understanding the nature of the threat and the methodology
of international terrorism. Secondly, getting skilled people in
the right numbers in the right places. Thirdly, securing an appropriate
level of funding for the resources and finally applying the benefits
of modern technologies. All those areas need to be pursued vigorously.
Although much has been achieved, remorseless effort is essential
to maintain defences and protect our transport systems and the
public who use them.
June 2006
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