Memorandum from Ascent Aviation Security
Ltd (TS 52)
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 For several decades, Governments and
the aviation industry have needed to take account of the activities
of those who seek to undermine the freedom of those who wish to
travel, along with the need for the aviation industry to operate
successfully in a commercial and highly competitive environment.
1.2 Although the security regime in place
in the UK has been extended over the years to include checked
baggage, cargo, catering, etc the main impact of the recent changes
has almost inevitably been in the highly visible area of passenger
and cabin baggage security.
1.3 Whilst most of the historical forms
of threat remain, events over the last few years have resulted
in a requirement for changes to be made to the countermeasures
in place. Dealing with these threats effectively, reinforces the
need to investigate and where practical, introduce new technology
and procedures that will enable the screening experience to be
effective and acceptable, without creating a negative impact on
security, customer service and airport facilities.
1.4 This memorandum will therefore focus
on passenger and cabin baggage security, and endeavour to highlight
some of what are considered to be the main issues and suggest
potential solutions for consideration.
2. THE CURRENT
PROCESS
2.1 Whilst the types of threat have changed
over the years, the key screening technologies have remained largely
the same. Although X-ray equipment currently used produces high
quality images for interpretation, the effectiveness of this form
of screening is heavily dependant on the quality of the operator.
2.2 Since the introduction of X-ray equipment,
the task of the operator has steadily become more complex and
more difficult. This is a result of a need to look for additional
items that may pose a threat to the security of an aircraft.
2.3 In the late 1970's operators were tasked
with looking for items used in hijack, ie firearms, grenades,
weapons, etc. This has gradually been extended to include:
— Improvised Explosive Devices (IED's).
— Increasingly sophisticated lED components.
— Extensive list of prohibited items,
including small scissors, nail files, etc.
In addition to this growing list, airlines have
also asked that operators check for the presence of dangerous
goods. The process has not been helped by passengers being encouraged
to carry more, larger, bags in the aircraft cabin.
2.4 Whilst it is understood that measures
need to change to reflect new t eats, the trend has been for items
to be added to the list and rarely have we seen items removed.
For example, it could be argued that the restrictions placed on
the carriage of sharp items properly reflected the threat of suicide
hijack. However, aircraft doors have since been reinforced to
prevent an attack like those carried out in the USA on 11 September,
2001. Nevertheless, the restrictions on sharp items remain in
place.
2.5 The screening of people is still primarily
achieved by the use of metal detection equipment. The changing
threat has required large numbers of people, often selected at
random to, in addition, be searched by hand.
3. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
3.1 The philosophy of applying the same
level of screening to everyone has served us well for many years.
However, those who seek to attack civil aviation are very aware
of the advantages and limitations of the technology and processes
used.
3.2 The emergence of new technologies could
present a real opportunity for the screening process to incorporate
the use a range of equipment. This would create an uncertainty
in relation to how individuals would be screened and the technology
that would be used to do this. There would also be a deterrent
value resulting from the availability of a variety of screening
methods.
3.3 Although new technologies are considered
to potentially play a significant role in improving the effectiveness
of screening, there are limitations associated with their deployment.
Many technologies are slow, large and expensive, often making
their widespread use impossible to achieve.
3.4 To enable better technology to become
part of the screening process, it is considered that passengers
should be subjected to differing forms of screening, via reasoned,
or random, selection.
3.5 It is suggested that individuals selected
for higher levels of screening could be identified by the use
of a technique known as "Human Behaviour Pattern Recognition".
This must not be confused with "Passenger Profiling",
which is an entirely different process.
3.6 Human Behaviour Pattern Recognition
involves the observation of the way in which people behave and
interact with others, ie family, colleagues, staff, etc and has
been used successfully by law enforcement agencies for many years.
3.7 Implementation of this technique would
allow the majority of people to be screened quickly, using existing
technology, whilst providing the opportunity to focus on those
who give cause for concern, as there would be a range of equipment
and more time available.
4. FUNDING
4.1 The UK Government policy continues to
not accept the security standards applied overseas. Although a
European Regulation has been in place since the beginning of 2002,
the additional measures required by the UK have made the concept
of harmonisation difficult to achieve.
4.2 UK airports compete with airports in
Europe that do not have to provide the additional measures, or
incur the associated costs, This places the UK industry at a competitive
disadvantage. Consequently, the costs of these additional measures
should be met directly by Government.
5. CONCLUSIONS
5.1 The effectiveness of the aviation security
regime in the UK, relies heavily on the co-operation, patience
and understanding of the travelling public. Historically, this
has not been an issue, but there is growing evidence that many
passengers no longer understand the reasons for the queues, inconvenience
and delays being experienced. In simple terms, we are losing the
"hearts and minds" of many of those directly affected.
5.2 Consideration needs to be given to reviewing
the screening processes for passengers and cabin baggage, in order
that a more effective, targeted solution, may be found.
December 2006
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