Examination of Witnesses (Questions 120-139)
SIR IAN
MCALLISTER,
MR IAIN
COUCHER, MR
SIMON KIRBY
AND MR
THOMAS M MCCARTHY
23 JANUARY 2008
Q120 (23.01.08) Clive Efford: Can
I clarify this? When were Virgin first contacted by anyone to
inform them that there was a likelihood of a delay?
Mr Coucher: First of all, Virgin
and Network Rail and the train operators share an integrated control
centre in Birmingham, so they are constantly aware of what is
going on because they get exactly the same information for running
trains. They are in the same office. The first time that we notified
the train operators to create contingency plans for a possible
overrun was after the conference call on Sunday, 30th December
at 12 noon.
Q121 (23.01.08) Clive Efford: So
they would not have been aware of Mr Kirby's meeting on 27th?
Mr Coucher: No, because at that
point in time we genuinely believed that we could still complete
the work in time for the overrun. The first thing we did when
we realised that there may be an overrun was to speak to Virgin
and London Midland to advise them to put in place contingency
plans for the possibility of an overrun.
Q122 (23.01.08) Clive Efford: At
any time prior to the work starting, to the blockade starting,
or whilst the work was going on prior to 30th, did Virgin raise
any concerns about the possibility of delay?
Mr Coucher: There were constant
project meetings. I met with Tony Collins and the Virgin team
the week before the start of the work when we were talking about
the possibility of extra days. There was a constant dialogue between
Network Rail and—
Q123 (23.01.08) Clive Efford: I think
the answer is yes or no? Did they raise any concerns about the
possibility of delay?
Mr Coucher: Yes.
Q124 (23.01.08) Clive Efford: Prior
to 30 December?
Mr Coucher: Before we even started
the work, they wanted to be assured that we could get in there
and get out and do the work, and that is the normal standard.
We always take all of our customers through the work we are going
to be doing so that they are aware of what we are doing.
Q125 (23.01.08) Clive Efford: So
there were nothing other than the normal concerns for a train
operating company in this particular set of projects and they
did not express specific concerns to say that you will never get
this work done on time?
Mr Coucher: No. There were no
new circumstances. Of course whenever we do a piece of work like
this there are always risks that we may not complete the work
on time. We cannot afford the luxury of padding our possession
simply to protect ourselves from an overrun. We knew that this
was tight but we also knew that if we did not do this work over
the Christmas period we would not deliver the December 2008 timetable
upgrade. If we did not proceed, that was the rest of the work
programme for the rest of the year.
Q126 (23.01.08) Clive Efford: Sir
Ian, you seem a bit irrelevant in this. What are your role and
responsibilities?
Sir Ian McAllister: There is a
complete separation of responsibilities between the non-executive
Chairman and the executive. The executive are responsible for
operating the company and I am responsible for managing the board
and reporting on our performance to our members. The board holds
the executive management of the company to account.
Q127 (23.01.08) Clive Efford: What
is your role in all this?
Sir Ian McAllister: I have no
operational role whatsoever.
Q128 (23.01.08) Clive Efford: In
terms of your appearance before this committee, what have you
got to say to us about the situation that occurred over the New
Year and Christmas?
Sir Ian McAllister: I think the
situation was a very difficult one. It should not have happened.
I expected and I was assured and I accept that the necessary mitigation
measures were in place well before the blockade took place. It
was in fact a discussion that we held with the board in December.
We were not expecting an overrun. When the overrun occurred, then
it is the operating responsibility to sort it out as quickly as
possible.
Q129 (23.01.08) Clive Efford: When
did your phone first ring in your office at home?
Sir Ian McAllister: My phone first
started to ring on 31 December.
Q130 (23.01.08) Clive Efford: When
you were referring to the situation changing hourly, in your answers
to the Chairman earlier on, what were you referring to?
Sir Ian McAllister: I was referring
to the changing situation with regard to the likelihood of a recovery
taking place. In the initial stages, the recovery was not forecast
to be three days; it was forecast that there would perhaps be
a seven to eight hours overrun. That was bad in itself but the
situation developed as the time went on.
Q131 (23.01.08) Clive Efford: We
have a situation here where Network Rail potentially is exposed
to quite a substantial fine for what has gone on. Is that right?
Sir Ian McAllister: Yes.
Q132 (23.01.08) Clive Efford: Where
is your responsibility in that and do you feel that you have been
well served in the information that has been provided to you about
the ongoing situation at the time?
Sir Ian McAllister: The situation
was changing very, very rapidly indeed. As I said earlier, the
principal objectives we had were, first of all, to get the problem
sorted out as quickly as possible. Iain and I discussed it. He
took on that responsibility and Simon started to get additional
resources into the Rugby area. The second part of the issue was
to ensure that the information provided to passengers was as comprehensive
and as accurate as it could be. That was why Robin Gisby was doing
that because he was hard-wired into Simon and therefore knew exactly
what the situation was that was up to date. These are very fast-moving
situations as they develop. As I mentioned earlier, I was first
advised of the Liverpool Street issue on the morning that Liverpool
Street should have returned to work and in the same conversation
Robin advised me that the restoration of the lines would start
from around, if I recall, noon to 2 o'clock that afternoon as
the InterCity trains were coming into Liverpool Street and the
whole station would be back in operation for the evening peak.
So it was a very quick situation.
Q133 (23.01.08) Clive Efford: Everything
was fast-moving but the trains! On the inquiry into what has gone
on there are gaps in what is in Network Rail's evidence to us.
They seem to have found conclusions about the supply of engineers
and the fact that you need to have a bank of engineers available,
particularly at public holidays, but there are not any conclusions.
We are a month on. You are a multi-million pound operation. You
are one of the biggest public organisations—you are certainly
one of the biggest in transport—and yet a month on you have
not come to any conclusions. Have you been sleeping on the job?
I am asking Sir Ian because I think this is a responsibly of the
board of Network Rail.
Sir Ian McAllister: The board
has asked for a full report on what has happened. That report
will be provided by the executive team.
Q134 (23.01.08) Clive Efford: Do
you think it is timely? Do you think you have been working—
Sir Ian McAllister: I think they
are going as fast as they possibly can. As Iain was saying, we
discussed this at length at the board meeting last week but what
we had was a preliminary report rather than a complete report.
It does take time to get to the bottom of these issues. You have
suggested that certain payments were being made by contractors.
That will have to be investigated. These things do take time.
Q135 (23.01.08) Mr Martlew: Can I
take you back to the board meeting in December, Sir Ian? The plans
for Rugby, the plans for Liverpool Street and all the other plans
for the work over the bank holiday were presented to the board,
were they not?
Sir Ian McAllister: No, they were
not. The issue there was that at the time the company had asked
for an additional day to do the work at Rugby. Virgin had objected
to that and had applied to the Office of Rail Regulation for a
ruling on whether or not that extra day should be given. The Office
of Rail Regulation agreed that that day should be given. The board
were advised of all the necessary details supporting that and
at the same time the executive team have all these major reviews
that take place to determine whether there is a go/no go decision.
Ian sought assurances from the various companies that the blockades
would take place and the work would be delivered.
Q136 (23.01.08) Mr Martlew: At any
point was the board told of all the works that were going to go
on over this period?
Sir Ian McAllister: The board
was aware of all of those, but the board does not get a regular
schedule of every single possession that is taking place because
there are about 100,000 possessions a year. What the board is
looking for is assurance on certain issues. At a December meeting,
or rather shortly after a December meeting, I asked for a paper
to be presented to the January board that was going to look at
the whole of the possessions on the West Coast Main Line throughout
the whole of 2008 and what the appropriate risks were to the delivery
of the December 2008 timetable. That paper was overtaken by events
over Christmas.
Q137 (23.01.08) Mr Martlew: I am
sorry, Sir Ian, I have probably not explained myself very well.
It is becoming apparent that Network Rail had overstretched itself
throughout the rail network over this period. Did your board sanction
that work at any point?
Mr Coucher: Can I just add—
Q138 (23.01.08) Chairman: No, I think
the Chairman was being asked. Mr Coucher, we would be delighted
to talk to you in a moment.
Sir Ian McAllister: The answer
to the question is: no, the board did not go through every single
possession and review the work.
Q139 (23.01.08) Chairman: You did
not think it was surprising that you were only told four hours
before the services were resumed? You told us that you were given
the information then.
Ian McAllister: That was Liverpool
Street. The information about the overrun, as I recall, only occurred
around 2 o'clock in the morning of that day. I was called first
thing in the morning and told that there was going to be an overrun.
It was very late-running information.
Chairman: A lot of it was late-running,
yes.
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