Select Committee on Transport Written Evidence


Memorandum from the Railfreight Interchange Investment Group (RIIG) (FT 12)

  The Railfreight Interchange Group (RIIG), a consortium of leading property developers (Burford, Helios, Kilbride, ProLogis and Shell) seeking to facilitate modal shift for freight traffic, through creation of Strategic Rail Freight Interchanges.

  1.  The arrival of the new administration in 1997 was followed by a number of major policy proposals by Government, not least the publication of Sustainable Distribution—A Strategy in 1999. For the first time, Government acknowledged the importance of the distribution industry to the wider UK economy and international trade, recognised that distribution is a significant sector of the economy in its own right, and applauded the UK distribution industry as being one of the most efficient in the world.

  2.  Sustainable Distribution also set out the commercial, operational and environmental challenges facing the industry and its customers, and proposed a raft of strategic initiatives to improve the sustainability of the industry in the post-Kyoto global economy.

  3.  Included in these initiatives were proposals to encourage greater modal shift of freight traffic from road to rail through transport and planning policy, and to develop a national policy on major freight interchanges, which recognised not only the importance of such facilities in distribution, but also the difficulty in securing their development.

  4.  Alongside Sustainable Distribution, the creation by the new administration of the Strategic Rail Authority finally saw a Government champion for rail freight, which was prepared to engage with industry, liaise with other Government departments and agencies and create an overall strategy for achieving rail freight growth.

  5.  As major suppliers of distribution facilities across Europe, we felt as others in the industry did at the time, that Government had finally woken up to distribution.

  6.  Yet in the years that followed this pioneering strategy document, much of the positive proposals have become watered-down or dissolved completely. The constant departmental changes over this time (DTp, DETR, DTLR, DfT) and the rise and fall of the SRA, reflects the Government's struggle in recent years to deal with distribution issues in particular, and their inter-relationship with transport and land-use planning in general.

  7.   In responding to the Transport Committee's examination of how successfully the Department is fulfilling its responsibility to facilitate free movement of goods while limiting harmful impacts, our fundamental concern remains the lack of co-ordination between Government departments on freight matters, not only between DCLG and DfT but also with others such as BERR or DEFRA.

  8.  In terms of specific responses to the questions raised by the Transport Committee, we make the following observations:

A.   Is the Department's investment in logistics programmes—including the Sustainable Distribution Fund—good value for money and meeting the objectives?

  9.  Sustainable Distribution noted that the distribution industry accounts for nearly 10% of GDP and was valued in 1999 at £55 billion per annum. It also acknowledged the dominance of road haulage in distribution and its associated environmental impacts. The Eddington Report has since further highlighted the various impacts to UK plc and society of this dependence on road-based distribution, and how urgent action is needed in the transport sector to address inter alia increasing road congestion and climate change.

  10.  Against this background, an annual budget allocation for DfT of £31 million for freight programmes is woefully inadequate against the scale of distribution activity in the UK and the challenges that both Government and industry are seeking to respond to. To further set this in context, the Department's annual budget allocation represents the amount that a developer might typically spend on infrastructure costs for a single distribution development.

  11.  This lack of resources is reflected in other areas of the Department's work, where the proposed budget of £200 million for creation of a Strategic Freight Network (announced in the recent Rail White Paper), is again less than the total amount that a developer would typically invest in a single Strategic Rail Freight Interchange. We would welcome the Transport Committee's views on how the DfT's budget compares with those of other Western economies.

  12.   Whilst the Department is to be applauded for its work in trying to promote best practice in the freight industry and for using its limited resources to help promote sustainable distribution where it can (eg modal shift grants), the lack of an integrated freight strategy for DfT, or any real integration between Departments on development of freight policy, means that current efforts do little more than scratch the surface.

  13.  In parallel, and of equal frustration, is the inability of the private sector to commit investment in new distribution infrastructure, due to the vagaries of the planning process, which in some cases run counter to the objectives of transport policy.

B.   International distribution patterns involving air freight increase carbon dioxide by up to 30 times that of sea transport—what more can be done to promote modal shift from road and air freight to inland waterway, shipping and rail? How can the Government encourage and incentivise further efficiency improvements?

  14.  In creating conditions favourable to alternative modes to road haulage, there is a balance to be struck between "push" and "pull" incentives, whether by on the one hand increasing the relative costs of road haulage (eg road pricing, fuel duty, driver hour restrictions) and/or by reducing the relative costs of other modes (eg rail access charges, longer/bigger freight trains).

  15.  We maintain constant dialogue with major distribution operators and their customers, such as leading retailers, as well as with the rail and ports industry. Their undoubted desire to increase use of rail is not constrained by lack of freight grants, more by a lack of capability, whether for freight train paths, train length or loading gauge, or by a lack of suitable interchange facilities. Getting the customers closer to the rail network, to remove the intermediate road haulage and double-handling which exists at present, is seen as far more important than securing subsidies to mask otherwise inefficient operations.

  16.  Therefore, instead of "tinkering around the edges" with a constrained budget for promoting modal shift, our preference would be for the Department to focus on creating a suitable strategic network capability for other modes such as rail, which could then link mainland Europe and major ports of entry with inland interchanges.

  17.  As noted earlier, the allocation of £200 million to the Department to create a Strategic Freight Network simply will not provide the required network capability required by industry to achieve a step-change in modal shift to rail, whether in capacity, train length or loading gauge.

  18.  Furthermore, the Department is constrained in its ability to help the private sector make its own contribution, in terms of developing a network of ports and major inland interchanges to connect to this Strategic Freight Network. We have over £2 billion ready to commit to new interchanges, but the considerable costs, lead time and risks which we face through the planning system means that this investment is itself being constrained and delayed. If Government is serious in its policy objectives for rail freight, we would greatly welcome the Department being given greater responsibility and authority to support new private-sector port and interchange development.

C.   Air freight in the South-East is forecast to grow from 2.2 million tonnes a year in 2003 to 14 million tonnes by 2030. Has the Department adequately planned for the capacity and access implications of this very significant growth? How will transport networks need to adjust to serve the growing air freight market?

  19.  It is unclear how far the Department has looked to rail as an alternative to air transport in the intra-European and domestic context, or as a complementary mode of transport to link in with global air freight to and from major UK airports. In recent years rail has provided express freight services able to operate at speeds of up to 110 mph, and the French postal service operates its own dedicated fleet of high-speed freight trains, derived from TGV technology, at speeds of up to 170 mph.

  20.  We have yet to identify any signs of interest or vision from the Department in developing better integrated air-rail connectivity for freight. Indeed, the failure of the proposed major rail freight interchange at Colnbrook to secure planning permission in 2001 (the "LIFE" scheme) is in stark contrast to the subsequent permission given to Heathrow Terminal 5 and the World Cargo Centre, the latter entirely without any provision for the level of rail freight access that LIFE was seeking to provide.

  21.   Should the Department have more responsibility for planning and delivering integrated infrastructure which might promote "free movement of goods"? How is this to be balanced with the Department's other commitments? What should be the priorities for the Transport Innovation Fund productivity stream?

  22.  Creation of a strategic infrastructure network for freight would, in our view, achieve a greater step-change in modal shift, than the current fragmented approach towards Government support for capital investment and operating subsidies.

  23.  We believe that the Department should be given more responsibility to not only develop an integrated, over-arching strategy for freight infrastructure, but then to drive its implementation through Government delivery agencies (eg the Highways Agency and Network Rail), and to support private sector investment in complementary infrastructure, whether in new ports, interchanges, toll roads or railway lines.

  24.  The Department should be tasked with co-ordinating with other Departments and agencies (not least DCLG) to ensure that such a strategic freight network, whether funded by public and/or private sectors, is acknowledged across Departments as being of national importance within transport and planning policy, to help speed up implementation and investment.

  25.  In terms of the Department's other commitments, we believe that creation of a national, multimodal strategic freight network should take priority over initiatives such as freight grants, and if necessary transfer funding from such programmes. In this regard, the Transport Innovation Fund (TIF) has been a welcome source of funding for new rail freight infrastructure projects, and could be used as the focus for investment in this strategic freight network.

D.   How successfully has the Government influenced European negotiations regarding freight operations? How could the Government help to ensure a level playing field between UK and overseas freight companies?

  26.  There is no apparent evidence that the Government has had a significant influence on European freight operations, in particular to secure full interoperability with the mainland European rail network. Despite being one of Europe's largest economies, the UK rail network remains unable to carry high-cube swap bodies and piggyback trailers that can be carried across the rest of the mainland, due to the height (rather than width) restrictions of the UK rail loading gauge.

  27.  Again there is no evidence that the Government has sought to engage with or seek support from the European Commission to address this obstacle, which would permit a step-change in rail's addressable market. Instead, the UK has sought a derogation from European standards on railway interoperability, impacting on modal shift and connectivity with the mainland, placing the UK at a continued disadvantage for trade and inward investment.

E.   How effective are the Freight Quality Partnerships in improving the local experience of freight and deliveries? Are the restrictions on night-time deliveries still appropriate? What impact would weakening the restrictions have on quality of life and other factors?

  28.  We believe that suitably resourced and managed, FQPs can help bridge the gap between public and private sectors, in promoting greater understanding of respective roles and constraints and achieving joint solutions. Indeed our major interchange projects include specific provision to contribute to local FQPs, in some cases beyond their existing budget allocations, to help integrate these new schemes into the local environment and achieve their objectives to promote sustainable distribution.

  29.  In terms of night-time deliveries, we believe it is time for a more pragmatic view, which not only reflects the improvements in vehicle technology, but also the significant benefits to distribution in particular, and the road network in general, which could be achieved by allowing more out-of-hours deliveries, particularly for premises with delivery facilities suitably screened from residential property. We believe it should be possible to achieve a balance between the type of vehicles permitted to deliver at night (eg smaller/low-noise/alternative-fuelled) and the hours and locations when such vehicles could operate.

F.   How can the road safety record of haulage vehicles be improved?

  30.  Whilst we have no particular strength of opinion on this issue, suffice to say that improved enforcement (particularly on foreign vehicles) and training measures would help in this regard.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

  31.  Whilst Sustainable Distribution represented a laudable attempt by Government to move towards an integrated freight strategy, a new strategy is needed, which builds on Sustainable Distribution, addresses the issues raised by the recent Stern, Barker and Eddington reviews, and co-ordinates within and between Departments, to provide a clear vision and implementation strategy.

  32.  This new integrated approach should create a partnership between Government and industry, where Government provides leadership with a clear vision and direction for freight transport, backed by a properly-funded strategic national transport infrastructure network, to which industry can then respond by providing suitable access to this network through interchange facilities, and exploiting the opportunities for new multimodal transport services between these nodes across the national network.

October 2007





 
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