Memorandum from the Office of Rail Regulation
(ORR) (PPP 06)
1. This memorandum sets out our role and
responsibilities as the independent safety and economic regulator
of Britain's railways in matters relevant to the Committee's inquiry
into the performance of London Underground, including whether
safe operation has been affected by the introduction of the public-private
partnerships (PPP).
THE ROLE
OF ORR
2. We are the integrated safety and economic
regulator for the railway industry. This includes the health and
safety of the travelling public as well as those who work on the
railways. We have very limited economic regulatory functions in
respect of London Underground Ltd (LUL), other than as competition
authority under UK and European competition law, and this memorandum
concentrates on our health and safety responsibilities.
3. The rail division of the Health and Safety
Executive (HM Railway Inspectorate (HMRI) and rail safety policy)
and the economic regulator of the mainline railway merged in April
2006 when the Railways Act 2005 transferred responsibility for
railway safety from HSC/E to ORR. We administer and enforce the
Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 and regulations made under
it, such as the Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems (Safety)
Regulations 2006 (ROGS), and provide the railway industry with
advice and guidance on health and safety issues.
4. ROGS replaced several sets of safety
regulations including the Railway (Safety Case) Regulations 2000.
Duty holders no longer have to submit a detailed safety case to
us. Instead, ROGS require most transport operators to obtain from
us a safety certificate (to run train services) or safety authorisation
(to manage infrastructure).
5. To obtain a certificate or authorisation,
an operator must provide evidence that their safety management
system is capable of ensuring their operation is safe. This includes
evidence about how the duty holder: sets and meets safety standards
and targets; assesses and controls all types of risk (including
new risk); ensures the competence of staff under their control,
including contractors; and investigates and learns from accidents
and incidents.
SAFETY CERTIFICATE
AND AUTHORISATION
FOR LONDON
UNDERGROUND LIMITED
(LUL)
6. On 15 March 2007, ORR awarded London
Underground Limited (LUL) a safety certificate and safety authorisation.
(LUL requires both because it also manages the infrastructure
it operates on.) The award of a safety certificate and authorisation
does not guarantee safety, but indicates that ORR is satisfied
that an effective safety management system is in place. ORR seeks
further assurance that the operator's safety management system
remains effective through a programme of inspection.
7. Responsibility for adhering to the terms
of the certificate and authorisation, and therefore maintaining
safety, rests with the duty holder (in this case, LUL). Under
ROGS, LUL's contractors (for example, the infrastructure companies
or "Infracos") must co-operate with LUL in a way that
allows LUL to meet the terms of its certificate and authorisation.
8. Duty holders are required to update their
safety certificate and/or authorisation to ensure that it continues
to be capable of ensuring safe operation. They must do this every
five years or if a substantial change to operations that would
affect safety is made. So, at the latest, LUL will need to obtain
an updated certificate and authorisation by 14 March 2012.
SAFETY ON
THE LUL NETWORK
UNDER PPP
9. LUL continues to provide good levels
of passenger and worker safety. As with all railways, there is
the potential for derailments and other serious incidents.
Derailments
10. Our inspectors have investigated four
train derailments on the running lines since the introduction
of the PPP in early 2003. In our view the PPP had no relevance
to any of these incidents. (A fifth, at Mile End in July 2007,
is still under investigation.) The derailments at Hammersmith
in 2003 and 2004 related to track and train maintenance respectively.
The derailments at Camden Town (2003) and White City (2004) related
to the design and replacement of points. The number and causes
of derailments appears to have been unaffected by the introduction
of the PPP.
Signals passed at danger (SPADs)
11. SPADs on LUL are regarded as low risk
due to the mechanical train protection systems that are used on
the network to stop a train if it passes a signal at danger. Since
the PPP the number of "category B" SPADs caused by equipment
failure or malfunction has risen slightly, after an initial fall.
However, this reflects a long-term trend caused by ageing signalling
assets and more intensive usage as train frequency has risen.
We do not believe that the PPP has contributed to the increase.
PPP incentives have resulted in some localised improvements and
initiatives to reduce the number of SPADs
Track maintenance and renewals
12. The quality of track has implications
for train safety, and was implicated in the 2003 Hammersmith derailment.
The PPP Infracos took time to develop their priorities for maintaining
and renewing track and this meant that some of the most pressing
renewals work was not done as quickly as it should have been.
In April 2006 we took enforcement action to require Metronet SSL
to maintain the District Line to an appropriate standard. The
Infracos are now developing track strategies that will deliver
a better-maintained railway.
Broken rails
13. Undetected broken rails can derail trains,
as at Hammersmith in 2003. The number of broken rails across the
LUL network was rising when the PPP was introduced. After an initial
rise, the number of broken rails has fallen during the PPP, following
concerted action by the Infracos. Improved detection methods and
more frequent testing means that rail defects are now more likely
to be detected before they become rail breaks.
Rolling stock maintenance
14. The number of rolling stock incidents
has been falling and reliability has improved under the PPP. The
Infracos inherited some deferred maintenance, and they have acted
positively to manage and rectify the situation. While the effect
of Metronet's decision to transfer rolling stock maintenance to
Bombardier remains to be seen, we see no indication that the PPP
has had a detrimental effect on rolling stock maintenance.
HEALTH AND
SAFETY INTERVENTIONS
15. We recognise that the PPP arrangements
for controlling risk need to be tested and verified as robust,
particularly at a time when more people than ever are using the
LUL network. Our programme of inspection and investigation work
aims to identify strengths and weaknesses in the management of
the greatest safety risks. When Metronet entered administration
we swiftly carried out additional inspections to ensure that Metronet
continued to be able to safely maintain track, signals and rolling
stock.
CONCLUSION
16. Overall safety on LUL continues to improve.
We have no evidence that the PPP has had, or is having, a detrimental
effect on safety performance. We will continue to monitor the
safety performance of both LUL and its Infracos. The table overleaf
summarises performance against key indicators.
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