Memorandum from David Slinger (RS 04)
INTELLIGENT SPEED
ADAPTATION (ISA)
I believe that this is the key factor in the
search for ways to reduce road casualties significantly in the
future. The painstaking and rigorous research has been done. No
significant doubts now exist about its technical effectiveness
and convenience in use. The critical factors now are political
and social ones. In this, Parliament and this Committee have the
opportunity and, I firmly believe, the duty, to give a decisive
lead towards making the implementation of this life-saving technology
a reality.
This will no doubt be a long-drawn-out process.
I think it is instructive and encouraging to recall the course
of campaigns to introduce motorway speed limits, breathalyser
tests and seat belts, Thank goodness for parliamentarians of the
stature of Barbara Castle; may their tenacity inspire this Committee!
I trust that it will be acceptable for me to
make the points I wish to raise as a mixture of observations and
questions, as below:
1. I consider one of the best expositions
of the ISA case to be the article by George Monbiot in The
Guardian, 27 July, 2004.
2. A DfT official (Mr Alex Jones of Vehicle
Standards and Engineering) reported to me in a letter of 12 March
2003 that "fatal accidents could be reduced by over one half"
according to estimates of a DfT research project completed in
2000. Even if this estimate is very optimistic, why has the Government
been so lukewarm in its commitment to the eventual implementation
of ISA? ("The UK has no plans to mandate the use of ISA .
. ."—Mr David Patterson of the DfT Speed Policy Branch
in a letter to me of 21 June 2005).
3. If the complete ISA system is deemed
to be politically unacceptable at present, why does the Government
not do more to encourage the "half-way house" technology
of black-box in-car monitoring devices which Norwich Union is
beginning to promote, as a means whereby drivers can reduce their
insurance premiums. What about the idea of compelling drivers
who have been prosecuted for dangerous driving also to have such
devices fitted, to monitor their future driving performance? (This
sort of system is already in force in other countries—eg
Ireland, I believe).
4. The issue may be one where the EU will
have to take the final decisions. This does not excuse our Government
and Parliament from taking a lead with our European partners.
Let us build on our relatively good road safety tradition.
5. This is no longer a technical issue,
but a moral, political one. Once the ISA speed limiters become
standard equipment, their cost will fall to below that of many
of the "must-have" extras and accessories which motorists
seem to afford quite easily. What value do we attach to the lives
that can be saved in this straightforward way?
MORE VISIBLE
POLICE TRAFFIC
PATROLLING
The reduction over recent years in the amount
of routine police traffic patrolling, particularly on motorways,
is a major cause for concern. It has, in my view, contributed
to a belief by many irresponsible motorists that they will probably
"get away with" bad driving practices.
There seems to be a deep reluctance in decision-making
circles of the Police and Government to acknowledge the deterrent
effect of police patrols on our roads. The mantra is about "solving"
crimes and pursuing criminals; shouldn't we move back to a belief
in the value of deterring crimes—including the crime of
dangerous driving?
Has any research work been done to measure the
relative effectiveness of different forces' traffic patrolling
profiles between those who believe in a high profile and those
who do not? If not, why not?
Many vehicles on motorways exceed the 70 mph
limit by a wide margin. Are they automatically monitored by CCTV
surveillance and "flagged up" by the system to be stopped
further down the motorway and their drivers prosecuted? If such
action is taken—which I believe should be the aim—why
is the public not made more aware that an effective system is
in place? If such active interventions are not taken, why not?
Why have the expensive and extensive monitoring equipment if it
is not routinely acted on?
In connection with the above questions, I would
ask the Committee to insist on robust statistical and other evidence,
not on bland assurances of a general nature, pointing to the "need
to prioritise and show discretion" etc.
PROCEDURE FOLLOWING
NON-INJURY
COLLISIONS
My wife and I were no-fault victims of a collision
on the M6 motorway in Birmingham during 2003 which could easily
have had fatal consequences. The collision occurred when an articulated
lorry drove into the back of our car as we were proceeding normally
in the middle lane along the motorway. The lorry driver must have
been either (a) driving without due care and attention or (b)
driving under the influence of alcohol or other substance or (c)
overcome by some medical/physical condition or (d) asleep at the
wheel.
However, there is no way of knowing which of
these possibilities applied, because the police patrol which attended
at the scene of the collision (which blocked the north-bound carriageway
of the M6) took no statements, either of my wife, myself or the
lorry driver, nor of the many witnesses of the incident. No breathalyser
tests were done either. The deciding factor: no one appeared to
have been injured.
The lorry driver's insurers accepted total responsibility
on his behalf. But what were the consequences for him? We shall
never know; but in the absence of any witness statements or breathalyser
test, there can have been no legal proceedings.
Surely, in such a case, it should be mandatory
for the police at the very least to conduct a breathalyser test.
It was good fortune that we were not seriously injured or killed.
How can society be sure that the lorry driver does not represent
a serious risk to other road users' safety now?
January 2008
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