Memorandum from the Rev Brian M. Cave
(RS 06)
QUESTION 1.
TO WHAT
EXTENT HAVE
TARGETS FOR
CASUALTY REDUCTION
BEEN A
USEFUL TOOL
FOR FOCUSING
PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITY?
1. The test as to whether targets have been
a useful tool for focusing professional activity is to be found
in the results of that activity, and the hitting of the target
of "casualty reduction". The question to be asked is—"What
was the outcome of that activity—both positive and negative?"
It is important to consider whether any gains outweigh any losses,
or vice versa. Not only has the aim of "casualty reduction"
to be considered, but there are also moral, legal, personal, social,
community and economic considerations.
2. This is especially important when dealing
with what is naturally the very emotive subject of road accidents
and casualties, and how to reduce them. One only has to note the
reaction of the police and the public to disaster of all kinds.
But we need to stand back and see what is possible and effective—or
else we can so easily rush into legislation and action where we
ask men and women for the impossible—and we hit the wrong
target. Any legislation to seek to reduce loss of life and injury
on our roads should be measured and balanced—not oppressive
and "knee-jerk" to statistics which appear to be shocking.
3. Road accidents need to be seen in the
context of other accidents. Road accidents account for about a
quarter of all fatal accidents. Accident fatalities in the home
account for a very slightly higher number. This is not to say
that we should be complacent about accidents, but to recognise
that accidents happen—they are "part of being human"—and
we must accept that. We should not, however, shrug our shoulders
and say "That's life!", and do nothing to improve things
in our homes, in our work and on the roads.
4. To answer the Question 1 we therefore
need to look at the effectiveness and results of two casualty
reduction programmes—that relating to "the New Drivers
Act 1995", and that relating to "Speed Cameras".
5. The New Drivers Act 1995 seeks to effect
casualty reduction amongst novice drivers—with legislation
affecting those learning to drive, a theory test, a longer practical
test, "Pass Plus" training and the introduction of revocation
of licences for six points.
6. The Seventh Report of the Select Committee
on Transport acknowledges that the 1995 Act is ineffective, and
that the "measures appear to have had only a marginal impact
on novice drivers (Para 2)". That is a very serious and far-reaching
statement about the effectiveness of the Act and the failure to
attain the target of casualty reduction for novice drivers. Looking
at the effects of this Act should be very instructive as to what
might or might not be done in the future.
7. The statement in that Report, Para 2,
that "the appalling collision rate of novice drivers clearly
demonstrates that the problem must not be ignored. "Do nothing"
is not an option" is highly emotive. It also invites the
question—"What is the problem?"
8. The Report shows that there is "little
understanding" about why "the casualty reduction as
a whole has not been matched among novice drivers (Para 18.)"
And that, "We questioned several witnesses about the reasons
for the increased novice driver casualty rates but were unable
to identify the cause of the problem. (Para 16)"
9. The 1995 Act was supposed to be "a
solution"—here it is acknowledged that there is no
apparent answer to "the problem". It is no good solving
problems that aren't there—or solving one problem and creating
a host of other problems. If the answer to "a problem"
is not understood, then rather than `doing anything' it is probably
better to "do nothing" until the answer is fully understood—and
then take any steps that might be necessary.
10. The 1995 Act makes it more difficult
to become a driver, and puts an emphasis on exclusion by revoking
the licences of those who, having passed the theory and practical
tests, receive six penalty points. The effect of the Act is that
there has been a 20-25% fall in the number of novice drivers holding
driving licences (Para 15), about 15,000 novice licences are being
revoked each year under the 1995 Act (Para 154), and about half
of these do not go on to retake their test. The Report also mentions
in Para 3 that about one million are driving without a valid driving
licence. It might be reasonable to conclude that an increasing
number of those of "novice age" (17-25 years old) are
"opting out"—either not taking part in "the
system" because it has become too difficult or academic,
or when they fail to live up to the unreal expectations of the
system (of not driving to a higher standard than that expected
of experienced drivers) and get their licences revoked, they decide
to drop out and join the "alternative society" and continue
to drive unlicensed (and uninsured).
11. The results of the punitive aspect of
the 1995 Act appear to have been largely overlooked, although
the Seventh Report does refer in passing to the social and economic
impact, but does not look "sideways" at the consequences
of and repercussions of the Act.
12. The Seventh Report suggests that revocations
are "an incentive to safer driving (Para 144). That may be
the intention in theory—but when they are applied, they
are "excluding penalties"—they are "Draconian
penalties." A novice driver whose licence is revoked may,
like those who are disqualified, need a car either to go to work
or to do their work. Becoming unable to drive independently may
therefore result in the loss of their job. Public transport is
often not an option for many revoked (or banned) drivers. To say
that "they should have thought of that before they went speeding
(or whatever)" is unacceptable and patronizing. The penalty
of loss of mobility has then become a penalty of loss of work
as well. If the driver has their own home and a family to support
the effect is even more serious—the penalty may escalate
to the loss of their home and the inability to support their family.
The driver may turn to the Social—and maybe begin the circle
of dependency on the State. Not only is the driver punished, so
is their family—and the State picks up the tab—maybe
for years. The punishment does not fit the crime—it is totally
disproportionate—and economically foolish.
13. The individual driver whose licence
is revoked and who loses their job and goes on the Social faces
a personal tragedy. But when multiplied by hundreds of thousands
(if we include those who are disqualified under the points system)
it can be seen as a social and economic disaster for our country.
The Aim of any "Casualty Reduction Legislation" should
be to continue to be inclusive not exclusive.
14. The alternative for the revoked or disqualified
driver is to join the "alternative society" and continue
to drive—unlicensed and uninsured. They have been "pushed"
into a criminal spiral of illegality, fines, prison (with huge
costs to the State)—by bad legislation—legislation
that it is acknowledged does not work. How does this help these
drivers? How does this help the "community"? Accidents
involving uninsured drivers are still paid for by the rest of
us. And as for "forfeiture of vehicles"—there
has to be a better way. Legislation that excludes men and women
in the pursuit of "casualty reduction" (which is acknowledged
does not work) should have no place in a civilised society.
15. In the Seventh Report drivers are blamed
as being "lawless and anarchic". But as the legislation
has been acknowledged to be ineffective, it is the Act and its
outworking that should be blamed. Applying "a tighter penalty"
is NOT the answer—the growing criminalisation of the motoring
public is a blight on our way of life, and a disgrace to it.
16. The problem as to why the measures appear
to have had only "a marginal effect" on novice drivers
needs to be addressed. That they have had only "a marginal
effect" would strongly suggest that they are the wrong measures
and should be repealed. So what is the answer to the "unanswered
problem"?
17. Para 7 of the Seventh Report says that
"1,077 people died in 2005 in crashes involving a driver
aged 17-25 (or whom 377 were drivers aged 17-25)."
18. The emphasis in the 1995 Act is on the
driver. The Seventh Report lays greater emphasis on the role of
the car, which is an aspect that has not been recognised to its
full extent in the past in relation to novice drivers. Para 10
states—"Young novice drivers (and this is true of those
under 35 who feature in 60% of car accidents) tend to drive older
vehicles which have fewer safety features than are offered on
newer vehicles. This means that in the event of a crash, the injuries
inflicted tend to be worse than they would have been in a newer
vehicle with better secondary safety features." This, in
fact, understates the position—for in addition to more serious
injuries in an older vehicle in an accident, the vehicle is more
likely to be in a collision because the lack of ABS or Electronic
Stability Programmes makes it easier to lose control of the vehicle.
The car itself gives the answer to the "unanswered problem"!
19. Para 10 also says—"20% of
the 17-22 year old male drivers killed in collisions were driving
cars more than 13 years old". The safety levels of cars of
more than 13 years old, manufactured in 1994 (or before), are
almost the same as those manufactured in 1981 (13 years earlier).
The main safety feature in both being seat-belts. Those cars allow
their drivers to lose control quite easily as they have no ABS,
no Electronic Stability Control—and in collisions the risk
of fatal or very serious injuries is much higher with no crumple
zones, no air bags (or one at best).
20. In new cars drivers do not lose control
of their vehicle so easily with ABS and Electronic Stability Control,
and in a collision the occupants are protected to a great extent,
by the crumble zone, padded fascias and multiple air-bags, so
that fatalities are less common and injuries less severe. In the
last 13 years there has been an increasing gap in the safety levels
of old cars and new cars. And this means drivers (often those
who are older), who can afford newer cars with more safety features,
are protected. But those drivers, who tend to be younger but buy
older cars, whose priorities are a very loud stereo and a very
noisy exhaust, are at very great risk—apart from the fact
that many of them have little or no experience. It is therefore
to be expected that whilst there has been casualty reduction generally,
among novice drivers casualties have hardly changed.
21. The Seventh Report in Para 51 says that
"experience has a larger impact on collision risk than age".
Therefore those who lack experience, as we all once did, are more
vulnerable to collisions and injury (especially if driving an
older vehicle)—and those who are younger are more likely
to "make mistakes" of one kind or another. It is perverse
of the 1995 Act to punish by revocation those who make mistakes,
and so do not exceed the standards required of experienced drivers,
in the process of gaining experience,
22. The future, however, is brighter—time
will do what the 1995 Act has failed to do and reduce fatalities
and casualties amongst novice drivers! For by 2021 (13 years'
time) novice drivers' KSI will have started to fall because many
of them will be driving much safer cars—manufactured this
year, or in very recent years. The answer to why "casualty
reduction as a whole has not been matched among novice drivers"
is much more in the safely level of cars—than in the ability
of the drivers. The 1995 Act has been solving a problem which
doesn't exist—creating more problems in other ways.
23. The 1995 Act calls for "radical
measures (Para 2)". Radical measure would be:—repeal
the 1995 Act, cancel all revocations and disqualifications, restore
licences, and stop vehicle forfeitures. This would make a lot
of unlicensed driving legal, reduce prison sentences, and free
up the police to deal with more serious criminal behaviour.
24. Speed Camera Legislation is also very
pertinent to Question 1. There is something very wrong with the
whole system when the Rt Hon Dr Stephen Ladyman was reported as
admitting to nine points on his driving licence, Chief Constable
Richard Brunstrom and the Rt Hon Harriet Harman with points, hundreds
of highly-trained, highly motivated police officers have points
on their driving licences, let alone the many ordinary drivers
who seek to be "law abiding" who find themselves "caught"—caught
because the legislation requires them to drive in a way that is
not humanly possible. As the police acknowledge—"speed
limits are not always easy to spot, especially if you are concentrating
on a developing situation", or "because of a moment's
inattention". No-one concentrates 100% one hundred percent
of the time—it is not humanly possible.
25. It has been quoted in the comments relating
to the 1995 Act that "the under-35 age group feature in 60%
of car accidents". Yet "over 65% of Speeding Tickets
(NiPs) are sent to those over-35". This is a statistic obtained
under FoI. Speed Cameras are missing the target. That statistic
puts a big `?' against the effectiveness of Speed Cameras.
26. So does this! The Left Table's figures on
fatalities are much used by the DfT, the Police, et al,
to highlight the "success" of Speed Cameras. The Right
Table also on fatalities gives a very different interpretation.
The Left Table shows the "tremendous progress" made
in "Casualty Reduction"—referring to the Base
Line figures, we see the amazing reductions in fatalities by 2002,
2003, 2004, etc, as the Safety Camera Partnerships have developed
their work—aren't cameras wonderful—targets are being
met! But it is an illusion.
| | |
Calendar years | Fatalities
| Fall in Killed | |
| | | 1994
| 3,650 | | Pre-Cameras
|
| | 1995 |
3,621 | 29 | |
| | 1996 | 3,598
| 23 | Decline |
| Baseline Average | Fatalities
| 1997 | 3,599 | -1
| 6 year average |
| 1994-98 | 3,578 | 1998
| 3,421 | 178 | 40
|
| | 1999 | 3,423
| -2 | 6 year total |
| | 2000 |
3.409 | 14 | 241 |
| | | |
| | |
| Calendar Years | Fatalities
| 2001 | 3,450 | -41
| With Cameras |
| 2002 | 3,431 | 2002
| 3,431 | 19 | Decline
|
| 2003 | 3,508 | 2003
| 3,508 | -77 | 6 year average
|
| 2004 | 3,221 | 2004
| 3,221 | 287 | 40
|
| 2005 | 3,201 | 2005
| 3,201 | 20 | 6 year total
|
| 2006 | 3,172 | 2006
| 3,172 | 29 | 237
|
| | | Total Fall
| 478 | |
| | | 12 year average
| 40 | |
| | |
| | | |
27. The Right Table looks at the actual figures and how
they have changed—the top half covers the six years before
the mass introduction of Speed Cameras, and the bottom half covers
the six years after the mass introduction of Speed Cameras. The
decline in fatalities is almost the same in both six-year periods.
Before 2001 there were very few cameras around, yet fatalities
fell by 241 overall in the six years. The question is "Why?"
And from 2001, with the mass introduction of speed cameras to
effect "Casualty Reduction, fatalities fell by 237 overall
in that period of six years. If the same factors, that were causing
the ongoing reduction over the first six years, were present in
the second six years, then if Speed Cameras were effective for
"casualty reduction", then they should have resulted
in a noticeable extra decrease in fatalities but none was seen.
The 3 and 4 year evaluation reports on Speed Cameras claim a reduction
of 100 fatalities per annum, but that is not evident in the figures
above. Also there should have been a noticeable decrease in novice
fatalities and casualties, but none was evident. The conclusion
has to be that Speed Cameras are not effective for "casualty
reduction".
28. In 2000 RoSPA said that seat-belts had probably saved
some 50,000 lives. As commented, Para 10 of the 1995 Act says
that novice drivers tend to drive older vehicles—but this
can be extended to the wider at-risk under-35 age group. Those
under 35, on average, tend to be less affluent than those older,
they have less available money, they have a mortgage and a family,
and they buy less safe cars because of the price. If new, the
car is not top of the range with all the safety aspects included;
and if second-hand—from no side and curtain air-bags, to
no Traction Control, no ABS, no passenger airbag, no rear head
restraints, no driver air-bag—down to the £100 old
banger with the only essential being a very loud stereo!
29. The advance in vehicle safety has been dramatic over
the last decade or so. As with the seat-belts, these advances
are taking time to have full effect (especially those that cannot
be retro-fitted)—maybe 20 years. The older, unsafe vehicles
are slowly being lost from the stock of vehicles on our roads.
We can therefore expect fatalities to continue to fall until all
vehicles have very high levels of safety—air-bags, Electronic
Vehicle Controls and crumple zones. With the decline of fatalities,
many serious injuries will become less serious. We should therefore
be looking at ways to remove the most dangerous vehicles from
our roads. Younger drivers will continue to buy them while they
are available—to their peril.
30. Speed Camera Legislation however blames the drivers.
I am not advocating a free-for-all on the roads. However the punishment
of drivers for technical offences of speed, rather than for offences
against safety, should stop. And the Draconian penalties of disqualification,
as with revocation, is way out of all proportion to the "crime".
It, again, pushes drivers into the "alternative society",
and unlicensed driving—or else into State dependency. The
country cannot afford to have huge numbers of banned drivers—whether
they are sitting at home on the Social, driving unlicensed or
incarcerated in prison. We have to consider how many prison places
need to be built for the increasing numbers of those who defy
the law in order to provide for their families.
31. "Radical measures" must be taken over Speed
Cameras. Many Speed Cameras should be removed. The criminalisation
of motorists must cease. Those disqualified should have their
licences back. The Law has shown to be ineffective and counter-productive.
The Law is supposed to be for the benefit of the community and
the country. Both the 1995 Act and the Speed Camera Legislation
fail this basic test.
32. Targets have hindered the necessary process of thinking
"outside of the box" by focusing too narrowly—and
as a result targets have done more harm than good.
QUESTION 6. WHAT
FURTHER POLICIES,
NOT ALREADY
USED, MIGHT
BE CONSIDERED
FOR ADOPTION
AND WHAT
EVIDENCE THERE
IS FOR
THEIR SUCCESS?
1. Firstly, it needs to be commented that governments
love to be able to announce "new policies" and "new
initiatives"—they show the public that they are "on
the ball", dynamic, progressive—meeting the needs of
the times. However the introduction of an endless number of new
policies and initiatives often results in not solving the problems
of the day, but producing the problems of tomorrow.
2. In relation to "casualty reduction" there
needs to be a "new direction" rather than adding on
new policies and initiatives. The New Drivers Act 1995 and the
Speed Camera legislation are two cases in point. The Seventh Report
of the Select Committee on Transport acknowledges that the New
Drivers Act 1995 is ineffective. If ever there was a warning about
new initiatives here is it! The Report says that the "measures
appear to have had only a marginal impact on novice drivers (Para
2)".
3. The New Drivers Act1995 (as with the Speed Camera
Legislation) is based on the premise that it is the drivers who
are at fault for fatalities and casualties—and so the novice
driver is targeted, with a "tighter penalty regime",
to seek to reduce the proportionately greater number of casualties
among younger drivers. The same premise pervades Speed Camera
legislation—the driver is at fault—"If only they
would keep within the speed limit we would all be safe"!
The Speed Limit is not the defining line between safe driving
and dangerous driving. Legislation has treated driving as an exact
science—it is more of an art or skill. However the Seventh
Report lays greater emphasis on the role of the car, which is
an aspect that has not been recognised to its full extent in the
past in relation to casualty reduction amongst novice drivers
(or experienced drivers either).
4. The motorists who are most at risk of death and serious
injury are the novice and the less experienced driver who drive
a greater proportion of vehicles which are inherently "dangerous",
which have little or no safety features (apart from seat belts).
This is why novice driver fatality and casualty rates have not
fallen in line with the reduction of fatalities and casualties
across the population as a whole.
5. The car itself is the major and key factor in casualty
reduction. In 2000 RoSPA said that seat-belts had probably saved
some 50,000 lives (and doubtless reduced many more casualties
in severity). This is an amazing result—the only downside
is that a minority of drivers and passengers still continue not
to put them on—to their own peril! One would expect other
safety features to have similar results in casualty reduction—they
are! ABS, Traction Control and Electronic Stability Control programmes
(even one of them) make a tremendous difference to a driver being
able to keep control of their vehicle. (The DfT has said that
43% of accidents are due to loss of control of a vehicle.) And
with ABS, Traction Control and Electronic Stability Control, in
the therefore less frequent event of a collision, the occupants
are better protected when there are two air-bags, crumple zones,
curtain air-bags, soft fascias—and pedestrian friendly bonnets.
As these major advances in car safety have started to be introduced
in mass market cars over the last 10 or so years, their effect
on casualty reduction is clear in the statistics. The fatality
statistics are below.
6. But before looking at those we need to note the statistic
that "the under-35 age group feature in 60% of car accidents".
Yet "over 65% of Speeding Tickets (NiPs) are sent to those
over-35". This is a statistic obtained under FoI. Speed Cameras
are missing the target. That statistic puts a big `?' against
the effectiveness of Speed Cameras.
7. So do the statistics below! The Left Table's figures
on fatalities are much used by the DfT, the Police, et al,
to highlight the "success" of Speed Cameras. The fuller
Right Table, also on fatalities, gives a very different interpretation.
The Left Table shows the "tremendous progress" made
in "Casualty Reduction"—referring to the Base
Line figures we see the amazing reductions in fatalities by 2002,
2003, 2004, etc, as the Safety Camera Partnerships have developed
their work—aren't cameras wonderful—targets are being
met! But it is an illusion.
See previous table
8. The Right Table looks at the actual fatality figures
and how they have changed—the top half covers the six years
before the mass introduction of Speed Cameras, and the bottom
half covers the six years after the mass introduction of Speed
Cameras. The decline in fatalities is almost the same in both
six-year periods. Before 2001 there were very few cameras around,
yet fatalities fell by 241 overall in the six years. The question
is "Why?" Not cameras, not better driving—but
ongoing improvements in vehicle safety! And from 2001, with the
mass introduction of speed cameras to effect "Casualty Reduction",
fatalities fell by 237 overall in that period of six years. If
the same factors of ongoing improvements in vehicle safety, that
were causing the ongoing reduction over the first six years, were
present in the second six years (and vehicles are getter safer
every year), then if Speed Cameras were effective for casualty
reduction they should have resulted in a noticeable extra decrease
in fatalities but none can be seen. The 3 and 4 year evaluation
reports on Speed Cameras claim a reduction of 100 fatalities per
annum, but that is not evident in the figures above. Also one
would have expected there to have been a noticeable decrease in
novice driver fatalities and casualties, but none has been evident
as the Seventh Report acknowledges. The conclusion has to be that
Speed Cameras are not effective for "casualty reduction".
Unfortunately recent safety features are not "add-ons",
but the decline in fatalities of the last decade or so will continue
as old cars come to the end of their life, and the average safety
level of vehicles on the road therefore increases year on year.
However the younger drivers who generally buy older cars will
stay greater risk until the 13+ year old cars contain a higher
level of safety features. Time will do what the 1995 Act has failed
to do, and reduce fatalities and casualties amongst novice drivers.
9. New policies must (a) be switched away from an emphasis
on the driver, and (b) be switched to an emphasis on vehicles.
10. To deal with (a) first! What has gone wrong—and
what must be put right? The emphasis on the driver has criminalised
some 10 million drivers with points on their licences, with over
a million driving having nine points. The target has been the
motorist. One in four motorists now has a criminal record because
of they are asked to drive to a standard which is not humanly
possible, even for experienced drivers. 15,000 novice drivers
are having their licences revoked each year for reaching six points
under the 1995 Act—for not living up to the unreal expectations
of the Act, and not driving to a higher standard than experienced
drivers. And many more drivers are disqualified through reaching
12 points on their licence. The Policy of the 1995 Act is one
of "Exclusion"—drivers are seen as "lawless
and anarchic"—as the Seventh Report reports, and it
speaks of more enforcement. The same is true of Speed Camera policies—enforcement
by exclusion. Revocation or disqualification of licences is a
totally disproportionate penalty for offences which are generally
much more technical rather than dangerous. Some just carry on
driving, unlicenced—others, for whom public transport is
not an option and who need to drive to get to work or to drive
at work, find that their ban results in the loss of their job,
they may have to go on the Social, they may even lose their home.
The effects of Revocations and Disqualifications are unacceptable.
Other penalties should be given—when appropriate, see later.
11. It must be of no surprise that the results of the
1995 Act are that there has been a 20/25% fall in the number of
novice drivers holding driving licences—and about half of
those whose licences are revoked do not go on to retake their
driving test. It might be reasonable to conclude that an increasing
number of those of "novice age" (17-25 years old) are
"opting out"—"the system" has become
too difficult or academic—and they have joined the growing
number, estimated at something like 1,000,000 drivers, who continue
to drive unlicensed and uninsured. It is no wonder that the whole
system is breaking down—bans seldom work, and bad legislation
produces more problems that it solves. The theory test which is
of very dubious value is a doddle to the academic but impossible
to those whom the education system has failed. That is inequitable—the
theory test needs to be abolished.
12. New policies must end the criminalisation of the
motorist. They must restore licences to revoked and disqualified
drivers. (Licences should only be taken away on health grounds,
eg Because of sight problems, or age problems). This would make
much unlicensed driving legal, reduce prison sentences, and free
up the police to deal with more serious criminal behaviour. Vehicle
forfeiture should cease—it has no value in many cases. Drink
driving should be punished with fines (not disqualification) at
a level which will make the driver think twice before he drinks
and drives again—and for subsequent offences, greater fines/a
prison sentence. Speeding offences:—average speed offences
should attract fines, but the targeting of motorists by speed
cameras for "spot" offences, which are mostly technically
illegal rather than dangerous, should stop. (This is not to advocate
a "free-for-all" policy.) Dangerous driving should be
treated as drink driving—fines/prison sentence. Disqualification
should no longer be a penalty—it isn't for many who join
the one million who drive illegally—which brings with it
the problem that those who are not insured are "covered"
by those who are, The aim of the policy should be "inclusion"—the
only "exclusion" being prison sentences.
13. Those who are arrested for driving without a licence
should be given the usual fine but no points—plus £50,
and "given" a provisional one "free", and
told that if caught driving unsupervised they will be fined heavily.
For no insurance the penalty should be a fine plus the cost of
a year's "New Start" insurance—and "given"
it by the courts. The government needs to work with Insurance
Companies to produce a minimum new insurance to bring those outside
the system within it—a "New Start". The premium
levels would not have to be "bumped up" enormously,
but would take into account that those driving uninsured are costing
the insurance industry millions already. Therefore if uninsured
drivers are "given" insurance by the courts (it could
also be offered generally in an amnesty) uninsured driving costs
would decrease.
14. The personnel employed in speed enforcement could
turn to "safer driving training" of offenders—so
that those who have collected, say, 12 points are not disqualified
but required to attend a safer driving course within three months.
15. (b) the emphasis on "the vehicle".
There are two aspects here—making vehicles safer to occupants
and pedestrians at the point of manufacture, and removing vehicles
from the road stock which do not have sufficient basic safety
features.
16. The writer bought a mass-market Ford Escort in 1994.
An option at that time was a "Safety Pack"—for
an extra £600 a passenger air-bag and ABS brakes could be
added. What price safety!! Manufacturers should be encouraged/persuaded
or even compelled to include increasing safety features as standard—offering
options of better sound systems, finishes, etc.
17. Older vehicles which are "dangerous" due
to a total lack of safety features will eventually disappear in
old age. If it is not possible to remove them by legislation,
it would be possible to set up a purchase scheme whereby old cars
without, say, even a driver's air-bag could be bought for scrap
(on a voluntary basis)—at a "flat rate". The cost
of such a scheme would be offset by the inherent cost of leaving
them on the roads. 20% of the 17-22 year old male drivers killed
in collisions were driving cars more than 13 years old. Those
loss of lives has an enormous economic cost—how many dangerous
cars could have been taken out of circulation for that money?
18. Another aspect is advertising. Manufacturers could
be asked to major on the safety features of their products alongside
their power and acceleration, their "sexiness", their
"pulling power", their macho image. The DfT could also
make this a feature of an ongoing advertising campaign on buying
a car under the slogan—"Buying a new car—Buy
Safe". For example—"A better music system won't
save your life—ABS and two air-bags may—Buy Safe!"
"Buying a nice second-hand set of wheels? Alloy wheels and
flash spoilers won't save your life—ABS and two air bags
may—Buy Safe!" "An old banger, and only £100—no
air bags, no ABS—it could be your hearse—Buy Safe!"
"A car for the family—ABS and two air-bags at the front,
and head restraints in the back may save your children's lives—Buy
Safe!" "Don't buy a shiny coffin on wheels—get
ABS and two air-bags—Buy Safe!" "A ghetto blaster
without ABS and two air-bags may not be heard for long—Buy
Safe!"
19. Summary—There needs to be a "new direction"
in relation to `casualty reduction'. The emphasis needs to be
on the vehicle. Ineffective and punitive legislation, such as
the New Drivers Act 1995 and Speed Camera Legislation which is
ineffective as far as casualty reduction goes, needs to be repealed,
as does punitive legislation which is ineffective, excluding,
and unjust—a disgrace to our way of life. There must be
a policy of inclusiveness on the roads.
QUESTION 7. WHAT
SHOULD BE
THE PRIORITIES
FOR GOVERNMENT
IN CONSIDERING
FURTHER TARGETS
FOR CASUALTY
REDUCTION BEYOND
2010?
1. The priority for government must be to accept that
measures taken to achieve "casualty reduction" have
not worked, but have had enormous consequences, not only to the
detriment of motoring but to both the economy and community life
of our country.
2. Casualty reduction must be seen in a much wider context.
It would appear that because casualty reduction has been focussed
very sharply, the possible consequences of policies were not given
sufficient consideration and, in retrospect, we see very real
problems have arisen. These need to be addressed.
3. The targets that have been set both for novice drivers
and motorists in general have been "hopelessly unrealistic".
The "bar has been raised" to such an extent that millions
of motorists are knocking it off. Targets that are set for motorists
must be attainable—motorists are only human, they are not
machines. Driving is an art rather than a science. The targets
set for drivers need to be relaxed to realistic levels so that
drivers can concentrate on driving safely.
4. The Seventh Report of the Select Committee on Transport
acknowledges that the 1995 Act is ineffective, and that the "measures
appear to have had only a marginal impact on novice drivers (Para
2)". That is a very serious and far-reaching statement about
the effectiveness of the Act and the failure to attain the target
of casualty reduction for novice drivers. The effectiveness of
the Speed Camera Legislation at reducing casualties is increasingly
being called into question. (Some evidential comments are given
at the end of this submission.) Speed camera legislation is only
effective in revenue raising, and in disqualifying drivers for
infringements which are more technical than dangerous.
5. The government must recognise that "bans2 are
not the answer. Revocation and disqualification of drivers are
NOT "an incentive to safer driving". They have encouraged
the snowballing of those driving without a driving licence or
insurance. Penalties must be for "real offences" of
dangerous driving—rather than for technical offences. Penalties
for dangerous/drink driving should be fines and/or prison sentences.
Bans and vehicles forfeiture should not be used.
6. In the Seventh Report drivers are dismissively blamed
as being "lawless and anarchic", The presumption seems
to be that they need control through Draconian measures. Some
drivers may be lawless and anarchic, but there are many who seek
to be "law-abiding" members of society who are facing
the unfair and unjust consequences of "bad law". The
10 million motorists who have been criminalised with points on
their licences suggests that the legislation desperately needs
changing. The million drivers with nine points on their licence
underlines the urgency of repealing legislation and cancelling
disqualifications and revocations. When hundreds of highly trained
and highly motivated police officers find themselves unable to
drive within the constraints that legislation has put on them
(without referring to Chief Constables and Members of Parliament)
the case for repealing the legislation is overwhelming. And if
members of the police can't drive within the legislation, what
hope is there for "Joe Bloggs"?
7. The disastrous consequences of the casualty reduction
"exclusion policies" has alienated and "encouraged"
thousands to move over into the "alternative society"
of unlicensed and uninsured road use. Enforcement (of bad law)
is NOT the answer. The DfT estimate for the size of that problem
is in excess of one million—and it will continue to grow.
An alternative way forward has to be found—unless it is
proposed to lock up the million illegal drivers. Suggestions as
to a possible way forward is contained in the writer's submission
in answer to question six of this New Inquiry into Road Safety.
Again this situation underlines the need for urgent action. Enforcement
is not the answer—and the economic cost of enforcement would
be huge. And there would be a very real chance of severe civil
unrest. The need is for legislation which will bring illegal drivers
into the system—cancelling revocations and disqualifications.
Alongside this we need to remember that there is the already dwindling
goodwill and support for the Police—the agents of "bad
law enforcement".
8. The priorities for government must be to become "inclusive"
towards motorists—the only disqualifications should be on
severe health grounds. Government expectations of motorists must
not be unrealistic—especially the novice driver. The novice
has to learn—and will make mistakes—it has been crass
to penalise them for not being better than experienced drivers.
Of course, they are a risk to themselves and to others in their
early years—we all were, and still are to a lesser extent.
That is called life. That is called "being human". And
"Accidents Happen"—we have them in our homes,
we have them in our work, we have them in our leisure activities,
and we have them on the roads. Not to be complacent, but we need
to recognise that there are limit to what legislation can do.
9. It must also be recognised that the vehicle is the
key element in casualty reduction. If every novice suddenly had
a new car with all the modern safety features of ABS, driver and
front passenger air-bags, traction control, electronic stability
control, side and curtain air-bags, there would be an instant
and dramatic casualty reduction among them. Novices, who tend
to buy less safe vehicles because of financial restrictions, are
more likely to have serious accidents because (a) they are inexperienced,
(b) their vehicles lack ABS, traction control and stability control
so that they lose control more easily and, (c) in those more frequent
accidents, without air-bags or crumple zones, they will receive
more severe injuries.
10. The preceding comment in Paragraph 9 also applies
to a large extent to those under 35, and explains why the under-35
age group feature in 60% of car accidents. It also explains why
the New Drivers Act 1995 has been a failure in terms of casualty
reduction. The 1995 Act has been solving a problem which doesn't
exist—and created more problems in other ways. It also explains
the ineffectiveness of the Speed Camera Legislation which, again,
has had more problematic consequences.
11. Speed Camera Legislation.
12. Note again the statistic quoted in paragraph 10 above
that "the under-35 age group feature in 60% of car accidents".
Yet "over 65% of Speeding Tickets (NiPs) are sent to those
over-35". A statistic obtained under FoI. Speed Cameras are
missing the target. This statistic alone puts a big "?"
against the effectiveness of Speed Cameras.
13. So does this! The Left Table's figures on fatalities
are much used by the DfT, the Police, et al, to highlight
the "success" of Speed Cameras. The Right Table also
on fatalities gives a very different interpretation. The Left
Table shows the tremendous progress made in "Casualty Reduction'—referring
to the Base Line figures we see the amazing reductions in fatalities
by 2002, 2003, 2004, etc, as the Safety Camera Partnerships have
developed their work—aren't cameras wonderful—targets
are being met! But it is an illusion.
See previous table
14. The Right Table looks at the actual figures and how
they have changed—the top half covers the six years before
the mass introduction of Speed Cameras, and the bottom half covers
the six years after the mass introduction of Speed Cameras. The
decline in fatalities is almost the same in both six-year periods.
Before 2001 there were very few cameras around, yet fatalities
fell by 241 overall in the six years. The question is "Why?"
And from 2001, with the mass introduction of speed cameras to
effect `Casualty Reduction', fatalities fell by 237 overall in
that period of six years. If the same factors, that were causing
the ongoing reduction over the first six years, were present in
the second six years, then Speed Cameras had no effect on Casualty
Reduction as far as fatalities are concerned. The claims that
Speed Cameras have resulted in 100 fewer fatalities per annum
cannot be read into the figures.
February 2008
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