Memorandum from the RAC Foundation for
Motoring (RS 16)
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The RAC Foundation for Motoring is an
independent charity established to promote and conduct research
into the environmental, economic, mobility and safety issues relating
to use of motor vehicles. Our vision is to advocate innovative
transport solutions for safer roads, safer drivers, greener cars,
improved mobility and a fair deal for motorists.
1.2 The Foundation welcomes the Committee's
inquiry into road safety, which is timely. Today's toll of some
3,000 deaths and 28,000 serious injuries on our roads (DfT, Road
Casualties Great Britain, 2006) reflects no credit on a civilized
society and need not be accepted. A comprehensive review of the
whole range of possible measures is urgently required.
2. THE ROLE
OF TARGETS
IN FOCUSING
PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITY
2.1 Targets are generally considered to
be useful for focusing the mind of professionals on priorities
within their particular field. The key is making sure the targets
are the right ones.
2.2 Based on 2006 figures all of the core
targets developed in the 2000 Transport Road Safety Strategy have
been met or are on-track to be met by 2010 and therefore it is
possible to argue that these targets have helped to focus professional
activity. Strategy themes that have not been directly linked to
specific targets (eg safer driving and safer testing) have seen
slower progress against strategy objectives.
2.3 National targets have two main uses.
Firstly they are used for the analysis and monitoring of options
to establish the combination of measures, which could achieve
a given result. Their second use is to establish a framework within
which local authorities can set their own priorities and work.
We believe that professionals find such targets useful.
3. FURTHER MEASURES
NEEDED TO
REDUCE DEATH
AND INJURY
FROM DRINK
DRIVING
3.1 Despite increased awareness and action
on drinking and driving, it is still causing a serious casualty
problem on UK roads. On average 3,000 people are killed or seriously
injured each year in drink drive collisions and nearly one in
six of all deaths on the road involve drivers who are over the
legal alcohol limit (DfT Think! Campaign, 2007). "In 2006,
it was estimated that 14,350 casualties (6% of all road casualties)
occurred when someone was driving while over the legal limit for
alcohol. The provisional estimate of the number of deaths was
540 (17% of all road deaths)" (DfT, Road Casualties Great
Britain, 2006).
3.2 Although the number of people killed
or seriously injured whilst drinking and driving is down from
the 1980s, there has been an increase in casualties since 1998,
which peaked in 2004 and is slowly starting to tail off. Slight
drink drive casualties have also risen since the early 1990s until
2002, but have started to fall off since this time (DfT, Road
Casualties Great Britain, 2006).
3.3 In January 2008, the RAC Foundation
ran a Facebook survey asking 1,000 members of the London network
the following question:
— This Christmas did you travel in
a car driven by someone you thought was over the drink drive limit?
3.4 13% of all respondents said they had
got in the car with a drunk driver, and this figure increased
to 17% for 18-24 year olds. This was particularly the case for
men in this age group. The results also showed that 13-17 year
olds are being put at risk, indicating that more needs to be done
to encourage drivers to set the right example to children, pre
and novice drivers and to encourage young people to refuse a lift
from a driver who appears to be over the limit.
3.5 Current Government publicity campaigns
target men in the 17-29 age group due to their high involvement
in collisions and failed breath tests. This will obviously continue
to be an important target group, but the risks created by drivers
above this age group should not be overlooked.
3.6 Education and current legislation should
continue to be used to tackle drinking and driving. Enforcement
is a key factor and with police manpower being constrained, proposals
to amend current legislation (eg lowering the blood alcohol limit
for new or all drivers) should be examined very carefully to see
if such proposals would be a cost-effective use of finite manpower,
and whether they might lead to public confusion.
3.7 If drinking and driving legislation
is to work, and to save lives, adequate and visible enforcement
is needed to provide a real and present discouragement to the
drunk driver. The relationship between enforcement, compliance
with the law, and casualties is we believe researchable; and we
would argue that the blood alcohol limit should not be lowered
without evidence that this would be a cost-effective use of scarce
police resources, compared with other enforcement activities.
3.8 Drug driving is increasing and should
feature heavily within any future policing activity. Drugs slow
reaction times and heavy cannabis users are ten times more likely
to be injured or injure others in a collision (University of Auckland,
Addiction Study, 2005). Providing officers with the correct type
approved equipment to secure convictions and discourage drug driving
is urgently needed.
4. THE APPROACH
OF GREAT
BRITAIN AND
OTHER EU COUNTRIES
TO REDUCING
DEATH AND
INJURIES
4.1 Every year, about 40,000 people die
in Europe as a consequence of road crashes. Many more are injured.
While the number of deaths is falling, studies have shown that
faster progress is possible if all effective means are applied
(Elvik and Erke 2006 p.6 IN: ETSC Raising Compliance with Road
Safety Law 1st Road Safety PIN Report, 2007).
4.2 Some European countries have taken a
different approach to road safety in comparison to Great Britain
and there are certainly lessons to be learnt and best practice
to be shared across these different countries.
4.3 Sweden's Vision Zero and the Netherlands'
sustainable safety are often used as examples of good practice
and although these visions are commendable the RAC Foundation
sees merit in the approach suggested in the PACTS report on this
issue (PACTS, Beyond 2010—a holistic approach to road safety
in Great Britain, 2007) which questions whether risk on the road
should be significantly higher than the risks experienced elsewhere
in life. At this stage this must be a question rather than a target.
For such a proposition to be put into practice a thorough analysis
of the possible measures would be needed as well as the costs
and benefits of using them including any effects on accessibility
and mobility.
4.4 The UK has traditionally been one of
the highest performers in Europe for road safety, but in recent
years Great Britain has lost its place at the top of the league
table. The Foundation suggests that the Department for Transport
should seriously consider what lessons can be learnt from the
experiences of other European countries. Some of the largest reductions
in road casualties have been achieved in countries such as Luxembourg,
Spain and Belgium through enforcing existing traffic laws, which
suggests that the UK should learn from these approaches before
developing new initiatives.
4.5 The British authorities should pay attention
to getting the basics right to improve the situation. In particular
this involves enforcing current laws on issues such as seatbelts,
child seats, mobile phones and drink driving. Drink driving is
a case in point as for Great Britain, like half of the other countries
in the EU, drink drive deaths have not contributed to overall
casualty reductions, meaning that overall improvements have slowed
as a result (ETSC Raising Compliance with Road Safety Law 1st
Road Safety PIN Report, 2007).
5. ROAD RISK
REDUCTIONS IN
COMPARISON TO
OTHER MODES
OF TRANSPORT
5.1 Figure 2.4 of the White Paper "Towards
a Sustainable Transport System" (DfT, 2007) shows that although
there has been marked reductions in death rates for all modes
of transport over the last 15 years, the risk of being killed
in a car is still significantly higher per billion passenger kilometres
travelled than being killed in a bus or coach; and much higher
still than the risk of being killed in a railway or air accident.
The possible reason why this anomaly is accepted by the public,
Governments and legislators is that when someone travels by public
transport, they entrust their safety to the operator whom they
have paid to carry them. On the roads, drivers have much greater
control over their own safety and that of their passengers. This
reasoning is presumably why the summary of road safety measures
in paragraph 2.63 of the White Paper lists only interventions
against drivers and no other safety measures.
5.2 While bad driving and breaking the law
must be penalised, the Government's approach pays insufficient
attention to the fact that the roads are a transport system in
many ways like rail and air. In all modes, failures in the system
resulting in accidents can be rectified by interventions to improve
the infrastructure, the signaling, the standards of the vehicles,
or the skills or performance of the human operator. The right
combination of measures should depend on expert evaluation. Roads
differ from the other modes in that access to the system is open
to all drivers who meet a minimum standard of proficiency (though
the police can intervene to enforce standards of behaviour) and
the standards of the road infrastructure are much more variable
than would be accepted in the operation of other modes.
5.3 Despite the higher death and injury
toll on the roads in comparison to other transport systems, the
management of the road system is much slacker. Substandard sections
of infrastructure and signaling are accepted, which would not
be tolerated in other transport systems; the level of traffic
safety enforcement by the police is determined not by the need
for it on the roads, but as a residual after the police have met
Government targets in other areas. Whereas accidents on rail and
air are rightly subject to detailed expert examination, such examinations
are rare in the case of road collisions. The implied value of
life on the roads used to appraise remedial measures is much less
than that on rail or air.
5.4 Two conclusions at least may be drawn
from the above. The first is that much more attention should be
paid to the standard of the road infrastructure, that highway
authorities should be more accountable for improving the standard,
and that much more money should be invested in local road safety
schemes. It is well documented that the returns from local road
safety improvements are very high, with benefit/cost ratios of
the order of 20 or 30 to 1; but such schemes do not attract the
level of investment that such high rates of return would warrant.
Transport safety expenditure on road and rail should be judged
on more consistent criteria. Second, there is a case for setting
up a central specialist unit to examine certain road accidents
in detail, and recommend solutions. Such a unit might be analogous
to the Air Accidents Investigation Branch. It could not, of course,
examine more than a small sample of road collisions, and might
confine itself to those where there was an interesting interaction
between technical and human factors.
6. THE IMPACT
AND BLOCKAGES
CAUSED BY
THE SHORTAGE
OF APPROPRIATELY
TRAINED AND
SKILLED STAFF
6.1 The Foundation has no figurative evidence
for shortages of trained staff, but we are frequently told that
shortages occur particularly in local authorities. This may in
part explain the lack of investment in local safety schemes mentioned
in paragraph 5.4 above. Developing appropriately trained and skilled
staff and providing defined career paths for them is important
for improving road safety.
7. THE ROLE
OF NEW
POLICIES AND
EVIDENCE FOR
FUTURE SUCCESS
7.1 Many new initiatives are being considered,
for example in driver training and testing and in measures to
tackle unlicensed and uninsured drivers. These should be pursued.
The Think campaign also appears to be having an impact. However,
the Foundation believes that it is time for a fresh and radical
look at road safety policies to revitalise the drive to cut deaths
and injuries, and to restore the country's leading position in
this field.
7.2 The objective of the fundamental review
would be, very briefly, to consider what combination of measures
would be needed to reduce the current level of deaths and injuries
to, say, one half of present levels (ie 1,500 deaths), or perhaps
1,000 deaths. To do this, the review would project current and
foreseeable trends, such as the ageing driving population; increasing
congestion; and improvements in the vehicle. It would then consider
the range of interventions open to central or local government,
such as improvements in infrastructure; changes in signs and signals;
speed limits; changes in training and testing; vehicle standards
and enforcement levels and techniques.
7.3 The review would aim to produce packages
of measures directed to achieving the targets set. It would be
a necessary condition that the evaluation of possible measures
should be based on sound research and evidence. The packages would
then be the subject of public consultation and Parliamentary scrutiny.
Some measures might involve some loss of individual freedom (such
as the introduction of ISA, or other measures of speed enforcement;
or changes in driving standards); others might involve spending
more public money, for example on more traffic police or better
roads. The review could also consider whether road traffic law
could be simplified and made more intelligible. It could also
consider the possible implications for road safety of road user
charging.
7.4 The objective would be to secure public
understanding and acceptance of very demanding targets for cutting
deaths and injuries; and the means of achieving them. By showing
that reducing deaths and injuries required a partnership—in
effect a deal—between authority and motorists, the hope
would be that it would reduce the present "disconnect"
between the political class and the motorist, which comes about
as the motorist sees road safety policies being implemented by
more and more aggressive measures using automatic devices backed
up by databases of varying reliability.
8. PRIORITIES
FOR GOVERNMENT
CASUALTY REDUCTION
TARGETS BEYOND
2010
8.1 Future targets and goals for road safety
should be based on sound evidence, not prejudice. They should
be developed and implemented in a way that encourages motorists
to comply voluntarily with rules rather than engendering fear,
dislike and distrust towards the governing bodies. There should
be a drive towards local road improvements, which save lives and
show the motorist that the authorities are playing their part.
8.2 Segmenting the market (eg older driver
and younger drivers) can be helpful, but policies and targets
must emphasise the diversity inherent in these groups. More emphasis
should be placed on influencing the behaviour of all drivers and
the interaction between different road users needs closer attention.
8.3 Current targets appear to have been
well received by the professional community. Future targets should
not be overtly prescriptive to allow flexibility at local levels
and data collection should not create an industry in itself. Wider
buy-in for targets associated with road safety should be also
sought (eg police, health service). Leadership is needed, but
the backing of public opinion is essential.
February 2008
| 
