Select Committee on Transport Written Evidence


Memorandum from Oliver Carsten, University of Leeds (RS 48)

1.  INTRODUCTION

  My area of research is particularly focussed on new technologies and safety, including how new technologies can be applied to further reduce casualties. There is quite a long lead time associated with deploying new in-vehicle and roadside systems. Therefore this memorandum discusses how full advantage can be taken of the potential of new systems to deliver benefits post-2010.

2.  NEW SYSTEMS

  Potentially we are now entering an era when new systems will account for a very large part of casualty reduction. We have already seen this happening in the area of occupant protection (passive safety), where the improved performance of vehicles in protecting their occupants has delivered a substantial proportion of casualty savings among occupants. No vehicle manufacturer wishes to score less than five stars for a new model in the Euro-NCAP crash tests, and it is likely that further improvements in the performance of vehicles in protecting their occupants will continue to deliver savings in injuries.

  Even more promising are the various active safety systems now ready for deployment or under development. At a European level various activities are grouped under the eSafety initiative. These include the very useful work of the eSafety Road Map Working Group looking at paths to implementation (eSafety 2005). The report from this group points out the major role of incentives in speeding up deployment and hence ensuring that the benefits can be realised.

  Two types of system can be distinguished. On the one hand there are autonomous systems, often know as ADAS (Advanced Driver Assistance Systems). On the other hand there are cooperative systems, often known as CVHS (Cooperative Vehicle Highway Systems) or CVIS (Cooperative Vehicle Infrastructure Systems). Such systems require vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication or infrastructure-to-vehicle communication (I2V). An example of a V2V system would be one in which the car in front notifies the following vehicle that it is beginning emergency braking, so that the car behind can respond immediately. An example of an I2V system is one in which a vehicle or driver is automatically informed by a transmitter in the infrastructure that the road surface is icy.

  It is not inherently obvious which kind of system will produce greater benefits. For example, both autonomous and cooperative systems are looking at the benefits of assisting or warning drivers in intersections (both urban and rural). Such locations continue to account for a high proportion of collisions including very serious and fatal collisions at rural intersections. It is possible as the INTERSAFE subproject of the large European project PreVENT has shown to address the problems using advanced wide-angle scanning radars to create an entirely autonomous system. Such systems would be costly and would initially be available on expensive luxury cars. On the other hand it is possible to apply an infrastructure-based approach in which the road is equipped with detectors to identify impending conflicts and the relevant vehicles are then warned about the potential for an accident. This is the approach being adopted by I2V projects such as SAFESPOT. An investment may be required from the relevant highway authority but vehicles could be equipped with the relevant warning devices for quite low cost. Such devices could easily be offered as a retro-fit. Only the most dangerous junctions could be equipped initially, but penetration into the vehicle fleet could be rapid, since no special link to the vehicle would be required for the on-board device.

  There are thus substantial and significant choices to be made in terms of deployment. Reliance on vehicle manufacturers may slow down the roll-out of systems and may lead to lower benefits in the short to medium term. On the other hand I2V equipment may require public investment to speed up the process of realising safety benefits from these new systems.

3.  DEMONSTRATING BENEFITS

  The need to demonstrate the benefits of new in-vehicle technologies has, to some extent been appreciated in the UK. It is after all the motivation behind the recent real-world trials of Intelligent Speed Adaptation, funded by DfT. The same need for robust testing of the systems in a real-world context has now been grasped at a European level with the recent emphasis on the need to demonstrate the concrete benefits of Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) and Cooperative Vehicle Highways Systems (CVHS) through so-called Field Operational Tests (FOTs). Such tests are intended to prove the real-world impacts of using various systems by conducting rigorous large-scale trials using participants who drive the vehicles in their everyday driving. Equipping the vehicles can either be done by adding the relevant system to the participant's or the fleet's vehicles, but is more typically done by loaning equipped vehicles to the participants. Such FOTs have been quite common in recent years in North America, with examples being a trial of Adaptive Cruise Control (Fancher et al 1998) and a trial of Forward Collision Warning (University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute and General Motors Research and Development Center, 2005). However, with the notable exception of trials of Intelligent Speed Adaptation, they have been much less common in Europe. The resulting lack of solid empirical evidence on the impacts of new technologies has been identified as a critical weakness by a report from the eSafety Forum setting out the research priorities for the European Seventh Framework Programme (FP7) (eSafety Forum, 2006):

    [T]here is still a great need to investigate the behaviour of the user in the real traffic environment when being equipped with new ICT systems for safety and efficiency as compared to the user's behaviour without the ICT systems. The short and long term effect of the use of such systems is also of great importance to assess as a justification of the systems.

    Field Operational Tests (FOTs) have during later years developed as a powerful tool to gain insight into how new functions and systems suit the user when operated in the real context under sufficiently long time to reach the "daily operational and behaviour level".

  Two large consortia have been funded by the European Commission to conduct such FOTs on near-market or already on-market systems such as Forward Collision Warning and Curve Speed Warning. However, it can be noted that the overall UK participation in these projects is quite small and that little of the testing will take place on UK roads and with British drivers.

  At the same time that the European Commission is funding these FOTs to establish the real benefits of the new technologies, it continues to promote the introduction of some systems whose benefits are questionable. One such system is eCall, which is the system that automatically notifies the emergency services in the event of a serious crash. The European Commission is planning fitment in new cars from 2009 as part of full-scale rollout. Counterpart equipment in emergency centres ins required and the Commission is putting pressure on the member states to provide that infrastructure. Viviane Reding the European Commissioner for the Information Society and Media has stated of eCall: "It has huge potential. Every year it can save 2,500 lives in Europe, with very large socio-economic benefits. We cannot wait any longer: we have to work together and sort out the barriers remaining to the implementation of eCall." (European Commission, 2005) It is suggested that up to €26 billion annually could be saved with eCall, were all cars equipped. The claimed savings in fatalities would amount to a reduction of over 6%.

  It is therefore important to examine the actual evidence for the benefit of eCall. One source was the European project E-MERGE, which focussed on technical validation of the system at various test sites, but they also produced safety predictions. The prediction of E-MERGE was based on a questionnaire survey sent out to the PSAPs (Public Service Answering Points, ie emergency call centres) in the project test sites[91] (Geels, 2004). The report states: "The replies show a positive view for the additional value of an E-MERGE system. The foreseen live savings are estimated on an average between 5-10% which means 2,000 to 4,000 lives given the current number of fatalities of approximately 40,000 and the reduction of the severity of injuries is estimated at the same number 5-10%. None of the PSAP's foresees large procedural or technical problems with implementing the E-MERGE solution". (page 47)

  The E-MERGE final report adjusts these conclusions somewhat (Nielsen, Lindholm. and Andrade, 2004). Drawing on the same questionnaire, it states:

    Based on the project's investigations, a full-scale deployment of the E-MERGE system is expected to lead to a decrease in fatalities and severe injuries in traffic accidents as follows:

—  Fatality: 5% reduction.

—  Severe Injuries: 10% reduction to light injuries.

—  Light Injuries: No positive effect foreseen.

    That level of reduction would mean 2000 lives saved each year and a saving of nearly €4 billion each year in related social and health costs and lost "public" income calculated for the European Community. (page 49)

  This is most probably the source for the European Commission predictions. It is not clear where the €26 billion in claimed savings came from. The SEiSS project on the socio-economic impact of intelligent safety systems, drawing on the E-MERGE results, estimated the annual accident savings at €12.4 to €21.9 billion (Abele et al, 2005). Overall, it is remarkably thin evidence for making an important decision on the Europe-wide implementation of a safety system.

  Only one detailed study from a European country on the impact of eCall has been found (Virtanen et al, 2006a and Virtanen et al, 2006b). This study was carried out in Finland and used in-depth accident reports on fatal accidents. In Finland, all road accidents that result in a fatality within three days are investigated by an in-depth team. For the study cases covering 1180 fatalities, of whom 919 were motor-vehicle occupants were used. The time delay between accident occurrence and the notification of the emergency response centre was calculated. Two trauma specialists were on the study team and their task was to assess whether a fatality would have been prevented had there been no delay in accident notification. The conclusion was that eCall would have saved 3.6% of the fatalities, but it was also found that eCall would have been most effective in accidents involving vehicles for which eCall is not designed, ie motorcycles and mopeds. The likely effect of eCall could not be authenticated for any fatality to a pedestrian or cyclist.

  There were also cases where the system might possibly have prevented the fatality. This proportion was approximately 5% for motor-vehicle occupants and 1% for pedestrians and cyclists. Thus the overall conclusion was that eCall could have prevented approximately 4-8% of the road fatalities that occurred in Finland during 2001-03. It was also calculated that benefits would most likely exceed the costs.

  In thinking about the transferability of these results to Great Britain, it should be noted that in Finland 70% of fatal accidents occur outside urban areas and single-vehicle accidents account for 47% of all fatal accidents. In Great Britain, 58% of fatal accidents occur on rural roads, and single-vehicle accidents constitute 26% of fatal accidents (RCGB, 2006). In addition the country is much more densely populated than Finland and British roads carry heavier traffic. There is thus less scope for eCall, although there are no doubt parts of the road network such as the Scottish Highlands where eCall would no doubt affect rescue times and hence severity outcomes.

4.  PROMOTING DEPLOYMENT

  It was stated above that reliance on the vehicle manufacturers to introduce and promote the new systems may not lead to the most beneficial deployment path in safety terms. The government needs to give careful consideration as to how to best encourage and ensure rapid take-up of the most beneficial systems. Waiting for market forces to deliver may mean that the benefits are restricted for some time to drivers and passengers in expensive luxury cars. It could even mean that the full potential is never realised as the vehicle manufacturers may be reluctant to offer systems such as Intelligent Speed Adaptation (ISA) to their customers, especially in their more effective forms such as the version of ISA that is directly linked to engine and brake control. There are a number of mechanisms for promoting system introduction that should be considered:

    1. Consumer information. Euro-NCAP has been extraordinarily successful in promoting safer design for occupant protection. It needs to be extended to include primary safety, ie crash avoidance, including giving points for equipment with beneficial ADAS technology.

    2. Tax incentives to vehicle purchasers.

    3. Use of the purchase of vehicles for the government fleet to promote new systems that are of proven benefit.

    4. Dialogue with the insurance industry.

    5. Strong encouragement to manufacturers to improve what they offer—Swedish pressure has resulted in virtually all cars on the market in Sweden being fitted with Electronic Stability Control.

5.  REFERENCES

Abele, J, Kerlen, C, Krueger, S, Baum, H, Geissler, T, Grawenhoff, S, Schneider, J and Schulz, W H (2005). Exploratory study on the potential socio-economic impact of the introduction of intelligent safety systems in road vehicles. SEISs Final Report. VDI/VDE Innovation + Technik, Teltow, Germany.

European Commission (2005). eCall—saving lives through in-vehicle communication technology. Factsheet 49. European Commission Information Society and Media.

eSafety Forum (2005). Final report and recommendations of the implementation road map working group. European Commission, Information Society and Media, Brussels.

eSafety Forum (2006). Strategic research agenda: ICT for mobility. eSafety Forum, Working Group RTD. European Commission, Information Society and Media, Brussels.

Fancher, P, Ervin, R, Sayer, J, Hagan, M, Bogard, S, Bareket, Z, Mefford, M and Haugen, J (1998). Intelligent cruise control field operational test. Final report. Volume I: Technical Report. University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA.

Geels, A (2004). E-MERGE compiled evaluation results. Deliverable D6.3 of E-MERGE. Cap Gemini Ernst & Young, The Netherlands.

Nielsen, M, Lindholm, R and Andrade, M (2004). E-MERGE Final Report. Deliverable D1.2 of E-MERGE. ERTICO, Brussels, Belgium.

University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute and General Motors Research and Development Center (2005). Automotive collision avoidance system field operational test report: methodology and results. DOT HS 809 900. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Washington, D.C.

Virtanen, N, Schirokoff, A, Luoma, J and Kulmala, R (2006a). Impacts of an automatic emergency call system on accident consequences. Ministry of Transport and Communications, Helsinki, Finland.

Virtanen, N, Schirokoff, A, Luoma, J, Karkola, K and Saalo, J (2006b). In-depth evaluation of the effects of an automatic emergency call system on road fatalities. Unpublished paper.

February 2008







91   There were six test sites, one in each of six countries. Back


 
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Prepared 29 October 2008