Memorandum from Unite the Union (RS 69)
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 This evidence is submitted by Unite
the Union, the UK's largest trade union with two million members
across the private and public sectors. The union's members work
in a range of industries including manufacturing, financial services,
print, media, construction, transport and local government, education,
health and not for profit sectors. The Passenger Transport (PT)
and Road Transport Commercial (RTC) Trade Groups of Unite. Unite
are the main trade groups representing professional drivers, although
we also have significant professional driver membership in the
food, drink and tobacco sector of the economy. This results in
Unite being the largest trade union representing professional
drivers in the United Kingdom.
1.2 We welcome the opportunity to respond
to Transport Committee's inquiry into Road Safety, and our response
will reflect the issues we see as affecting professional drivers.
1.3 In this response will comment on driver
fatigue, which is recognised by most people, as a major cause
of road accidents, and especially those involving professional
drivers. Occupational Road Risk, fatigue, the safe loading of
vehicles and the inspection regime.
2. DRIVER FATIGUE
2.1 In Tomorrow's roads: safer for everyone
there was a section on Drowsiness and an Action plan: relating
to work-related driver fatigue. The action plan was:
"4.42 Separate, and different, UK drivers'
hours rules apply to certain HGV and bus operations that are exempt
from the EU rules. The Government proposes to consult on the repeal
of these rules in favour of the EU rules when we know the outcome
of the current discussions in the EU of the proposed extension
of the 48-hour Working Time Directive. This would impose working,
as opposed to driving, time limits on mobile transport workers"
(Department for Transport 2000).
2.2 The extension of the Working Time Directive
has taken place and all professional drivers' are working under
the provisions of the Horizontal Amending Directive—Domestic
Hours Regulations, or the Road Transport Working Time Directive—EU
Driving Hours Regulations. We are still awaiting the review of
the Domestic Hours regulations referred to in the 2000 White Paper.
2.3 According to the Jan-Mar 2007 Labour
Force Survey 7% of LGV drivers and 4% of Bus and Coach Drivers
worked over 60 hours per week. While 43% of LGV Drivers work 49
hours or more, and 24% of Bus and Coach Drivers—see Table
1.
Table 1
| Hours worked
| Heavy Goods Vehicle Drivers Employee onlyCumulative Total
| Bus and Coach Drivers Employee onlyCumulative Total
|
| <33 | 3% | 3%
| 15% | 15% |
| 33-36 | 3% | 6%
| 4% | 19% |
| 37-40 | 18% | 24%
| 27% | 46% |
| 41-44 | 9% | 33%
| 11% | 57% |
| 45-48 | 23% | 56%
| 20% | 77% |
| 49-52 | 17% | 73%
| 14% | 91% |
| 53-56 | 8% | 81%
| 5% | 96% |
| 57-60 | 11% | 92%
| 1% | 97% |
| 60 + | 7% | 99%
| 4% | 101% |
| Total People | 256,704
| | 121,065 |
|
Source: Department for Transport
2.4 While we recognise that there has been a reduction
in drivers' hours since 2000, the long hour's culture still exists
and the fatigue associated with it still exists in these industries.
Table 2
USER CASUALTIES 2000-06
| User casualties | Fatal Bus or CoachHGV
| Serious Bus or CoachHGV |
Slight Bus or CoachHGV |
| 2000 | 1 | 42
| 50 | 439 | 973
| 2557 |
| 2001 | 4 | 47 |
60 | 387 | 928 |
2416 |
| 2002 | 2 | 51 |
51 | 387 | 820 |
2219 |
| 2003 | 1 | 42 |
43 | 325 | 818 |
2227 |
| 2004 | 3 | 41 |
42 | 316 | 777 |
2094 |
| 2005 | 0 | 48 |
31 | 299 | 787 |
2094 |
| 2006 | 2 | 36 |
38 | 294 | 684 |
1802 |
| % Change | 100.0 | -14.3
| -24.0 | -33.0 | -29.7
| -29.5 |
Source: Department for Transport
2.5 During the period between 2000 and 2006 there appears
to have been an overall reduction in the number of casualties
involving professional drivers—see Table 2—the figures
are very volatile and need to be treated with caution. Overall
HGV fatalities fell by 14.3% between 2000 and 2006, while Bus
and Coach Drivers increased by 100% over the same period.
2.6 It is our view that neither employers nor the Government
take the issue of Occupational Road Risk (ORR) seriously. We hear
plenty of fine words but the reality is somewhat different. In
2003 the Health and Safety Executive in collaboration with the
Department of Transport published guidance for employers entitled
Driving at work: Managing work-related road safety. One of the
key elements in regards to ORR was in regard to the activities/journey
(routes and scheduling).
Scheduling is an area where we have major concerns for both
LGV and Bus and Coach that shift work, especially night-time driving,
has on the driving standards of the drivers. Shift working limits
the amount of sleep that workers are able to obtain to ensure
that they are able to maintain sufficient alertness when at work.
The risk increases considerably for night workers after the first
night of the shift.
Yet the road haulage industry, along with its customers,
is calling for the reduction in the number of lorry curfews. So
that more lorries can deliver goods at night to avoid congestion.
For example, in a recent study by the South London Freight Quality
Partnership came out in favour of increasing out-of-hours deliveries
to South London shops, saying that it could improve fright efficiency,
and environmental performance (Croner 2008:3). They would appear
to be more concerned with economics than ORR!
Table 3 shows the percentage of accidents that occur between
02:00 and 06:00. Again the figures are variable, but in 2006 30.6%
of HGV accidents occurred between 02:00 and 06:00. The period
accounts for 16% of the hours.
Table 3
PERCENTAGE OF ACCIDENTS BETWEEN 02:00 AND 06:00 2000-06
| | Fatal Bus or CoachHGV
| Serious Bus or CoachHGV
| Slight Bus or CoachHGV
|
| 2000 | 0.0 | 21.4
| 4.0 | 13.0 | 1.7
| 8.9 |
| 2001 | 0.0 | 17.0
| 5.0 | 13.7 | 1.2
| 8.1 |
| 2002 | 0.0 | 11.8
| 5.9 | 11.9 | 1.3
| 7.7 |
| 2003 | 0.0 | 26.2
| 2.3 | 13.2 | 1.1
| 7.8 |
| 2004 | 33.3 | 19.5
| 2.4 | 11.4 | 1.4
| 9.7 |
| 2005 | 0.0 | 29.2
| 9.7 | 14.7 | 1.7
| 9.5 |
| 2006 | 0.0 | 30.6
| 5.3 | 9.2 | 1.9
| 7.6 |
Source: Department of Transport
The bus industry is just as bad. In a larger number of cases
schedules for bus drivers working under Domestic Rules, can involve
the driver only having eight hours break between shifts. This
can happen up to three times a week. We wonder how many passengers
realise that their bus driver could have
had as little as three hours sleep when they are driving them?
It is difficult to take the claims of bus companies seriously
in regard to ORR when they have consistently opposed bus driver
being brought under the more stringent EU Drivers' Hours Regulations.
2.7 The overly long driving periods without sufficient
breaks is another issue of concern to Unite. The Think! Tiredness
Kills Campaign key message is Tiredness kills. Take a 15 minute
break every two hours. Yet professional drivers are expected as
a matter of course to drive for up to 5½ hours without a
break. This raises serious doubts about the commitment of employers
and the Government in regard to ORR.
2.8 The Government is also open to serious criticism
in regards to the reform of the Domestics Hours Rules. In the
1999 publication From workhorse to thoroughbred: a better role
for bus travel the Government stated in 12.9: "We announced
in the UK Transport White Paper our plans to consult on a proposal
to repeal the domestic rules and bring most of the operations
within the scope of the EU rules. We expect to publish the consultation
document in the summer. The changes will require primary legislation.
In addition, we are currently considering proposals from the EU
Commission to extend the Working Time Directive to the road transport
sector, which would include bus and coach services. We will take
into account the views of industry, the unions and the public
before any final decisions are taken on both these matters."
Initially, the Government delayed the consultation on the grounds
that changes were taking place to working time regulations and
drivers hours rules. All these changes have now come into effect
and we are still awaiting the announcement on this consultation!
2.9 The real problem is that there is not one agency
which has the responsibility for ORR and the Health, Safety and
Welfare of professional drivers. The responsibility for recording
road casualty accidents lies with national government, and local
police forces, who work closely to achieve a common reporting
standard. However, because the cab is not classified as the driver's
place of work, these accident figures are excluded from the HSE
Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995 (RIDOR) figures.
This problem has been recognised both by the HSE and the
police and changes to the reporting of road transport accidents
(RTA) have been implemented in an attempt to capture this information.
The form that was used to take down details at the scene of an
incident has been revised to record specifically whether or not
a driver involved in an incident was working at the time. So we
are looking forward to receiving more accurate data in regards
to occupational road transport accidents in the future.
Unite however believe that there should be one agency which
has the responsibility for ORR, the Health, Safety and Welfare
of professional drivers, and the collection and processing of
occupational road transport accidents.
2.10 Undiagnosed sleep disorders pose a serious threat
to safety, especially for those who drive for work. In particular
we are concerned about the condition known as obstructive sleep
apnoea (OSA)/hypopnoea syndrome which is a condition in which
a person stops breathing for a short time when they are asleep
because of closing or narrowing of the throat. This can happen
many times during the night, and causes the person to wake up
for very short periods to allow normal breathing to restart (although
usually the person won't remember waking up). A person with sleep
apnoea often snores, may be unusually sleepy during the day and
may have problems in concentrating because of lack of sleep.
OSA is more likely to occur with professional drivers but
especially LGV drivers, as it is most prevalent amongst middle
age men who are overweight. Therefore we welcome the recent recommendations
of the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence in
regard to the treatment of OSA. However, we would like to see
both the haulage and the bus and coach industries take more proactive
policies to identify professional driver who are likely to be
at risk from OSA and have them assessed for the condition.
3. SAFE LOADING
OF VEHICLES
3.1 Unite is becoming increasingly concerned in regard
to the loading of LGVs. Increasingly the driver is unaware of
the content of the load or how the load has been loaded and distributed
on the vehicle. But the driver is ultimately responsible for the
load carried on their vehicle, whether or not they were involved
in the securing of the load. We are being told by our members
that there is an increase in the number of vehicles overturning
due to unbalanced or insecure loads.
The Code of Practice (Department of Transport 2002) states
that legal requirements and common sense require that all loads
carried on vehicles are secured, whatever the journey. This is
to protect the people involved in loading, unloading and driving
the vehicle, together with other road users and pedestrians.
Both loading and unloading should be subject to a risk assessment,
as required by the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations
1999.
Loading and unloading should be carried out by trained staff
who are aware of the risks involved. Drivers should also be aware
of the additional risk of the load, or part of the load, moving
when the vehicle is being driven. This applies to all vehicles
and to all types of load.
The problem occurs most often part way through a route when
the driver is told to go away and the warehouse staff unloads
the relevant material for that drop. This can result in the load
being unbalanced, and when the driver drives away and goes round
a sharp bend the lorry overturns. Unbalanced loads also occur
when the load inside a contain slips, so although the weight remains
constant, the container becomes unbalanced, but because the container
is sealed the driver is unable to identify that the load has slipped.
4. ENFORCEMENT
4.1 If road safety is to be improved then we believe
there has to stricter enforcement of the driver's hours regulation,
load safety, and the safety standard of commercial vehicles. We
believe that currently there are insufficient resources currently
allocated to enforce the legislation.
4.2 One major problem is that we have no real estimate
of the size of the problem. As far as we are aware there has never
been a proper national survey to identify the amount of drivers'
hour's regulations breaches, or to identify what proportion of
the national fleet is overloaded or does not meet the required
safety standards.
4.3 Operation Mermaid, a multi agency operation involving
the police, VOSA and other agencies goes some way to deal with
the problem. But until the size of the problem is known, how can
we know what resources are needed to combat it?
The lack of resources means that both employers and professional
drivers will continue to break the law, because they know that
there is little or no chance of them being pulled up and their
drivers hours regulations or working time offences being identified.
The same problem in regards to lorry condition and loading applies.
4.4 Results of VOSA's vehicle checks: On the 23 October
2006—the latest information we could obtain[136]—in
regard to roadworthiness 445 vehicles were checked (251 UK-registered
vehicles and 194 foreign).
Of the 251 UK vehicles checked, 74 prohibitions were issued
with brakes and tyres being the most common defects.
Of the 194 foreign vehicles checked, 33 prohibitions were
issued.
4.5 In regards to traffic offences 223 vehicles were
checked (130 UK-registered vehicles and 93 foreign). Of the 281
UK vehicles checked, 35 prohibitions and 25 verbal warnings were
issued for drivers' hours offences.
Fifteen reports for further Investigation were issued for
drivers' records/hours, and operators' and drivers' licence offences.
Of the 93 foreign vehicles checked, 19 prohibitions and 60
verbal warnings were issued.
4.6 In regard to the South East of England Table 4 shows
the number of foreign-registered vehicles inspected and prohibitions
issued during the South East pilot during the financial year 2006-07.
From this table we can see that 47.7% of the vehicles inspected
were issued with prohibition notices in regards to road-worthiness
offences. In regards to traffic enforcement offences 21.8% were
issued with prohibition notices, and 22.1% were issued with overloading
offences.
Table 4
ROAD-WORTHINESS AND TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT OFFENCES
| Number | %
|
| Roadworthiness offences Heavy Goods Vehicles
| | |
| Inspected | 4,342 |
|
| Prohibitions | 2,073 | 47.7
|
| Trailers | |
|
| Inspected | 4,200 |
|
| Prohibitions | 2,040 | 48.6
|
| Traffic enforcement offences Drivers' hours
| | |
| Inspected | 6,513 |
|
| Prohibitions | 1,418 | 21.8
|
| Overloading | |
|
| Inspected | 1,921 |
|
| Prohibitions | 424 | 22.1
|
| Source: Hansard 17 Oct 2006: Column 1137W
|
4.7 Given even with the limited data we have available
we have serious reservations about the Government's proposals
to privatise VOSA services. We do not have any confidence whatsoever
that the private sector will deliver safer lorries and buses on
our roads, let alone the rigorous enforcement of drivers hours
and working time regulations, the consequences of moving away
from independent inspection agency is horrifying!
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Croner (2008) Road Transport Briefing Number 287. Kingston
on Thames: Wolters Kluwer (UK) Ltd.
Department of the Environment Transport and the Regions. (1999)
From workhorse to thoroughbred: a better role for bus travel.
London : DETR.
Department of the Environment Transport and the Regions. (2000)
Tomorrow's roads: safer for everyone. London: HMSO.
Department for Transport (2002) Code of Practice Safety of Loads
on Vehicles Third edition. London: HMSO.
136
http://www.vosa.gov.uk/vosacorp/newsandevents/pressreleases/2006pressreleases/23-10-06illegalimmigrantsarrestedduringoperationmermaid.htm Back
| 
