4 Conclusion - the Government's options
83. The British Government does not have many options
at its disposal. It is entirely possible that a qualified majority
of transport ministers and economics and finance ministers respectively
will decide to go ahead with Galileo in the manner proposed by
the Commission, and with funding being re-allocated from other
headings within the Financial Perspective.[122]
In the worst case scenario, we may therefore end up with a solution
that our Government finds unacceptable, forced through with unseemly
haste and poor justification, but which British tax-payers nonetheless
have to fund to the tune of several hundred million pounds. The
Minister acknowledged that opting out of the project unilaterally
is not even a viable proposition, as we could not withhold the
UK share of the funding for the project.[123]
84. We believe it would be very unwise indeed to
discuss, let alone agree, a financial settlement for Galileo before
it has been possible to make a proper, evidence-based decision
on the future of the programme as well as on the nature and level
of involvement by the private sector. Given the state of the cost-benefit
evidence base on Galileo, we therefore believe that it would be
unrealistic to schedule any further discussion of Galileo in EcoFin
this year. In the event that such discussions did go ahead, we
welcome the Minister's belief that a blocking majority may oppose
the proposal to re-open the Financial Perspective.[124]
Having said that, the pressures we have outlined in this report
should not be underestimated, and we fear that minor modifications
and bargains behind the scenes could result in an unacceptable
finance proposal nonetheless being adopted.
85. As for the decision on whether or not to proceed
with the project, and if so in what form, it is imperative that
the evidence base for the decision should be improved before the
questions are put to the vote. Unfortunately, it seems likely
that a qualified majority may vote to allow the programme to proceed,
and the Government's only option to prevent this, is to try to
build alliances with other Member States, and perhaps with Members
of the European Parliament also. Other options open to the Government
are to seek a debate among Heads of State and Government at a
European Council, and as a final, hard-ball tactic, to seek to
make progress in negotiations and discussions in other policy
areas contingent on a degree of progress on Galileo.
86. The jury is out on the continued rationale
for Galileo. There is insufficient reliable and robust information
about projected costs, relative to the benefits, for us to be
able to judge whether scrapping or proceeding with the programme
offers the better value for money for taxpayers. Neither are we
able to judge which system configuration, and what level of involvement
by the private sector, would provide the best cost-benefit ratio,
in the event that we proceed with the programme. More worrying
still, neither the European Commission, nor any Member State,
is in any better position to make these judgements. The evidence
and analysis provided by the Commission is scant, and gives no
real thought to crucial risks and alternative options. On this
basis, Governments find themselves pressurised to make snap decisions
costing billions of pounds of taxpayers' money. The Government
must do everything within its power to prevent any decision on
Galileo from being made until independent and robust analyses
of the costs and benefits of all the options are on the table.
87. We note that the Government on its own does
not have the power to stop, or to impose changes on the Galileo
project. However, the Government must nonetheless consider seriously
what the true price of complacency on Galileo could turn out to
be. In the worst case scenario, this matter is serious enough
that the UK might have to make progress in negotiations in other
EU policy areas contingent on a reasonable and well-informed decision-making
process on the Galileo programme.
88. We are not opposed to the Galileo project
per se, but we see no choice but to recommend that the
British Government seek a debate on the future of Galileo at a
European Council of Heads of State and Government. We also recommend
that the Prime Minister discuss with other Heads of State and
Government how to ensure that decisions of this magnitude will
never again be pressed through in this unacceptable manner, or
on the basis of such poor evidence and analyses as has happened
in the case of Galileo.
89. The history of the Galileo programme provides
a textbook example of how not to run large-scale infrastructure
projects. Many of the problems encountered by the project are
not peculiar to the EU and can be observed across a wide range
of projects carried out by Member States. However, the processes
and institutions of the European Union are in danger of falling
into disrepute if Galileo is allowed to continue in its present
form. The Government must work to ensure that common sense and
good governance are reinstated. The time has come for the Government
to initiate a reappraisal of other large EU projects to ensure
that the Galileo fiasco is not repeated elsewhere, outside the
limelight.
90. We believe it is essential that the UK Parliament
is given the opportunity to debate developments in the Galileo
programme once again before any decision is made on the project.
British tax-payers will be paying around 17% of the cost of Galileo—hundreds
of millions of pounds at the very least—and they have a
right to expect that this expenditure will be adequately scrutinised
by their elected representatives. If no time is found for an urgent
debate, we shall seek an Estimates Day Debate at the earliest
opportunity. We therefore recommend that the Government schedule
a debate on the floor of the House of Commons as soon as possible,
and certainly before the next meeting of the Transport Council
on 29 November 2007.
122 Qq 83-84 ; see also HM Treasury: Explanatory
Memorandum on European Community Legislation: Commission Proposal
for a decision of the European Parliament and the Council on amending
the interinstitutional agreement of 17 May 2006 on budgetary discipline
and sound financial management as regards the multi-annual financial
framework, Council number 13237/07 COM(2007) 549 Final, p5;
Department for Transport: Explanatory Memorandum on European
Community Legislation: Amended proposal for a regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the further implementation
of the European Satellite radio navigation programmes (EGNOS and
Galileo), 13113/07, COM (2007) 535, para 17 Back
123
Q25; Qq 69-71 Back
124
Q21 Back
|
