Memorandum from London TravelWatch (TPT
09)
INTEGRATED TRANSPORT
1. Is ticketing sufficiently integrated across
different modes of transport and different geographical areas?
In London significant progress has been made
with integration of multi-trip ticketing, notably through the
multi-modal Travelcard. More recently prepayment for individual
trips by different modes has become available in the form of Oyster
Pay-as-you-go. In other areas, the introduction of PlusBus tickets
has extended the scope of through ticketing between rail and bus
services. However, this is often still limited to tickets which
are bought at rail stations for journeys which involve the use
of a bus at the end of a train journey. In many cases it would
also be desirable from the passengers' perspective to be able
to purchase a combined bus and rail ticket (or one day Travelcard)
on the bus to the station. There is also still much that could
be done to make the public more aware of the ability to purchase
such through tickets, with their associated benefits.
London TravelWatch has recently expressed concern
about the length of queues at Underground ticket offices at major
National Rail termini in London (Kings Cross, Euston, Paddington,
Victoria, Liverpool Street). Much of this problem stems from rail
passengers arriving without tickets that would take them onward
via the Underground. In many cases this is because they have not
been made aware of the availability at their stations of origin
of tickets which include a Travelcard. In the case of some journeys
from places outside the former Network SouthEast area, no such
through ticket exists. For visitors to London staying for more
than one day, it would be helpful if the longer distance train
operators (Virgin, Midland Main Line, One, GNER, First Great Western)
followed the example of Gatwick Express and sold pre-paid Oyster
Pay-as-you-go cards on their trains and at booking offices. It
will be particularly important to resolve this matter before the
2012 Olympics.
2. Does the Government have an adequate strategy
for developing the integration of ticketing systems?
If the Government has such a policy, we are
not aware of it, as the current situation is highly reliant on
the initiative of individual companies and transport authorities.
Any involvement from the Department for Transport is largely reactive
in nature, except to the extent that participation in the all-operator
National Rail ticketing system is an obligation placed upon all
franchised train companies. Indeed, it is a licence condition
imposed by the Office of Rail Regulation on unfranchised operators
as well. The Government has only very lately chosen to use its
influence as the franchising authority for the railways to promote
the take up of smartcards.
Outside Greater London the interpretation by
the Office of Fair Trading of competition law has had an inhibiting
impact on the development of integrated ticketing systems. It
is difficult—or there is little incentive—in practice
to develop these without co-ordinating fares charged, rendering
operators open to the risk of accusations of anti-competitive
behaviour (conduct presumed by the law to be contrary to the public
interest).
THE USE
OF SMARTCARD
TECHNOLOGIES
3. Is the industry taking up modern smartcard
technologies adequately and appropriately?
Transport for London's Oystercard is one of
the most extensive and versatile contactless smartcard systems
in the world. Its development predated any significant interest
on the part of the Department for Transport and its regulatory
offshoots in such technology, with the result that—for example—National
Rail operators have until recently been under no obligation to
participate in it.
The rate at which smartcard technology is now
taken up further in the public transport sector will be determined
by the willingness of the DfT to use its power through the franchising
system to require rail companies to do so. To date, with a few
notable exceptions, British bus and train companies have been
very slow to introduce smartcard ticketing. This is despite its
obvious benefits both to passengers (in terms of convenience and
a wider range of fares options) and to operators (in terms of
reduced costs of fare collection and a clearer knowledge of journey
patterns).
4. Does the ITSO system cater for the needs
of all passengers and travel providers?
Very few ITSO compliant systems are yet operational,
so it is too early to say with confidence whether ITSO will provide
adequately for the needs both of passengers and operators. The
development of Oyster preceded the development of the ITSO specifications,
and there are some technical challenges to be overcome in ensuring
that the two are compatible (not least in the area of protecting
intellectual property rights).
5. What can be learned from the experiences
of areas such as London and Scotland where smartcard technology
is already in place?
Transport for London had to design a bespoke
system in the absence of a fully-developed and commercially available
product. The advent of contactless bank cards and the further
development of mobile phone technology are pushing back the boundaries
of what it may be possible to achieve (for example the use of
e-tickets via mobile phones by Chiltern Railways and Stagecoach's
Megatrain). The key to the success of such initiatives will be
the ability to add low value cash transactions such as buying
newspapers and snacks, and paying parking fees. The development
and start-up costs may be prohibitive for small operators unless
they are able to participate in joint industry-wide schemes.
The high take-up rate in London has been boosted
by the substantial fares savings offered to passengers willing
and able to switch to electronic payment technology. But currently
these savings are only available to users travelling on services
provided by Transport for London, and they could be withdrawn
at any time. Currently, there seems little prospect of their being
extended to National Rail passengers when Oyster pay-as-you-go
becomes more generally available to them too.
It has also been necessary to have a high level
of reliability in the cards and the card-reading equipment (to
maintain user confidence), a wide network of sales outlets, and
a easily-accessible "helpline" to answer queries and
resolve difficulties. It is unfortunate that in the case of Transport
for London the accuracy of information offered via the helpline,
and the speed at which erroneous transactions are corrected, has
been less than ideal, at least in the initial period. The fact
that the same Oyster branding has been used both for season tickets
and for stored value (Pay-as-you-go) cards has undoubtedly made
smartcard ticketing more difficult for users—and prospective
users—to understand, and new entrants may wish to consider
whether there would be advantages in keeping these two fare products
more visibly distinct.
REVENUE PROTECTION
AND THE
POWERS OF
TICKET INSPECTORS
6. Is the legal framework within which ticket
inspectors appropriate?
7. What appeal mechanisms
exist for passengers and are they adequate?
8. Are the rights of passengers and the powers
of ticket inspectors well balanced?
The legal framework has two distinct parts,
though it is likely that many passengers (and some transport operators'
staff) have only limited awareness of the difference between them.
On the one hand, there are provisions in the
Regulation of Railways Act, the railway companies' bye-laws, and
the PCV "Conduct" regulations (applying to buses), which
make travel without a valid ticket an offence, punishable with
a fine—but only on conviction in a criminal court.
On the other hand, railway companies and organisations
providing services under the auspices of Transport for London
can (but are not obliged to) charge penalty fares. Despite their
title, these fares are not fines, but simply a higher charge levied
retrospectively for travel made without a ticket having been purchased
in advance. An unpaid penalty fare is a civil debt, recoverable
by applying for an order in a civil court.
Prosecutions are expensive to bring, and not
necessarily easy to secure since it is necessary to prove intent
to defraud the operator—whereas the in the case of penalty
fares, the simple test of "could the passenger produce a
valid ticket when challenged?" applies, and the burden of
proof is reversed. Certainly, the police (working in conjunction
with ticket inspectors) have found the existence of a penalty
fares scheme on London buses a useful means of identifying passengers
who have not only neglected to pay for their journeys but who
may be committing other misdemeanours as well, such as carrying
illegal substances. This facility is not generally available to
them on buses elsewhere, because other bus companies do not have
similar schemes.
It is in the interests of all honest passengers
that there should be effective means of preventing fares evasion,
not least because the revenue lost by this means may be reflected
in higher charges paid by the rest of the travelling public. For
this reason, London TravelWatch's predecessor did not object when—in
the 1980s—British Rail and London Transport first sought
and obtained powers to levy penalty fares, provided that sufficient
safeguards were put in place to minimise the likelihood of innocent
users falling foul of the system.
In particular, we argued then (and continue
to believe) that all reasonably practicable steps must be taken:
(a) to publicise the existence of the penalty
fares scheme, and the manner in which it works;
(b) to ensure that passengers have a convenient
opportunity to pay for their travel before—or at the start
of—their journey, and are not at risk of being penalised
when no such opportunity is provided;
(c) to warn passengers of the fact when they
are entering a penalty fare area (eg a platform, train or bus);
(d) to explain to them why they are being
issued with a penalty fare when this happens, and of their right
of appeal;
(e) to provide an objective, impartial and
demonstrably independent system for determining appeals; and
(f) to operate the scheme in a consistent
manner, so that the same actions by different passengers (or by
the same passenger on different occasions) have the same consequences.
Our caseload suggests that none of these conditions
is invariably met, and that much more could be done to educate
passengers about the existence and operation of penalty fare schemes,
both in general and at the time they are issued with penalty fares.
The fact that not all transport operators choose to have such
schemes at all, and that even where they do not all ticket inspectors
are empowered to issue penalty fares under them, undoubtedly creates
confusion—because the same action on the part of a passenger
will have a different outcome depending on where and by whom the
ticket (if any) is inspected. As with the enforcement of parking
controls, we believe that it is often difficult for staff "on
the ground" to be expected (and seen) to exercise discretion
in a manner which is demonstrably fair, so we recognise that it
may be better for flexibility to be exercised via an appeals system.
But we have three main criticisms of the manner in which they
currently operate.
First, transport operators are perceived to
be judges in their own cause. It was only after penalty fares
had existed for more than a decade that Transport for London was
finally persuaded to set up an independent appeals body (whose
members are nominated by London TravelWatch—an arrangement
which now works well). But those National Rail operators who have
penalty fare schemes use what are effectively in-house appeals
services, since they are operated from railway premises by railway
employees, and the guidelines under which they work are not published.
Their communications are frequently peremptory and give little
or no indication of the grounds on which their rulings are based.
The manner in which some of them work (most notably the self-styled
"Independent Penalty Fares Appeals Service") gives rise
to frequent criticism in our casework, not least because what
is effectively the same organisation also operates as a debt-collection
agency ("Revenue Protection Support Services") outside
the scope of the penalty fares regulations, and thus beyond the
supervisory reach of the Department for Transport.
Second, the simple test of fact which is used
to determine whether a penalty fare is due can sometimes be applied
in a heavy-handed and inflexible manner which alienates honest
passengers who have innocently fallen foul of the system. This
applies, for example, to season ticket holders who have neglected
to bring their tickets with them on a particular trip but can
prove afterwards that they did hold a ticket which was valid for
the journey. It also applies to passengers with Oyster Pay-as-you-go
smartcards, which are valid for travel on some National Rail routes
in London, who wrongly assume that they are therefore valid on
any route. To issue (or uphold) penalty fares in such circumstances—particularly
on the first occasion—is manifestly unfair.
Third, the distinction between the criminal
and civil law is not sufficiently clear cut. A passenger cannot
be both prosecuted and charged a penalty fare for the same unpaid
journey. An unpaid penalty fare is a civil debt. But if a passenger's
appeal against a penalty fare is unsuccessful, the penalty fare
may then be deemed to have been the fare due, and failure to pay
it can be construed as intention to travel without payment, resulting
in a threat of prosecution.
London TravelWatch is not opposed to penalty
fares in principle. But it does believe that the manner in which
they are applied in practice can sometimes raise legitimate concerns
about whether the principles of natural justice are being observed.
Previous reviews by the former Rail Regulator and Strategic Rail
Authority did not, in our view, seek relevant evidence on, or
take sufficient account of, these weaknesses. We would welcome
a more searching inquiry into the subject.
9. Do operators of public transport take
adequate measures to protect fares revenue?
We have already argued that it is in the interests
of honest passengers that all fares due should be collected. We
have welcomed the introduction of automatic ticket gates at stations
(including virtually all of those on the Underground), which make
it more difficult to evade payment. Other changes such as flat-fare
systems on buses, and free travel for children and concessionary
pass holders, have reduced the scope for (and scale of) non- or
under-payment for travel.
But some other recent developments have had
the opposite effect, such as multi-door boarding on articulated
buses. And we are still surprised that it is possible to travel
freely on most National Rail trains in London (other than to or
from the largest stations) at little or no real risk of being
challenged to produce a ticket. We are aware that most passengers
are honest, and that the spread of pre-paid tickets (such as bus
passes and Travelcards) means that it is increasingly likely that
the costs of selling fares for individual journeys will exceed
the revenue collected at less-busy times. Nevertheless, the fact
that it is perceived to be possible to travel unpaid adds to the
belief that operators are uninterested in maintaining the security
of their premises and vehicles generally, and thus reinforces
widespread public anxiety about the risk of crime and disorder
on public transport systems.
CONCESSIONARY FARES—THE
RIGHT STRATEGY?
10. Is the Government's concessionary fares
strategy, including the proposed scheme for concessionary bus
travel, adequate?
The scheme proposed by the Government for introduction
in 2008 is still very rough at the edges, and we believe that
there need to be significant changes if it is fully to meet the
needs of those it is intended to benefit. On 16 November 2006
the Chairman of London TravelWatch wrote to Gillian Merron MP,
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, in the following terms:
"We have serious concerns about the proposed
Bill to implement a concessionary fares scheme giving free travel
to people with disabilities and those over 60 on the English local
bus network. Whilst we welcome this, we are very concerned that
it is too narrowly focused on the bus as a mode of transport,
rather than on the travel needs of individual users."
"Currently the proposal would exclude the
use of any concessionary bus pass on trams and other forms of
transport. Whilst we accept that you propose to give discretion
to local authorities to include other modes in their concessionary
fares schemes; in practice this will probably only happen in a
very piecemeal fashion. This will result in confusion as to where
and when such passes may be used, and discrimination against those
persons who because of the nature of their location or disability
sometimes cannot use buses."
"For example, in our area Croydon Tramlink
is regarded as part of the bus network. This is because when it
was constructed it replaced a significant number of local bus
services which were abandoned, curtailed or reduced in frequency.
I realise that you, in conjunction with London Local Authorities,
intend to preserve the benefits currently available under the
Freedom Pass. However, in the case of many Surrey residents who
view Croydon as their local shopping centre, their pass will be
valid on the feeder bus to the tram interchange but not on the
tram for the major part of their journey. In other cases it may
be that community transport or dial-a-ride services are more appropriate,
either because local bus services do not exist, or the local bus
stop is too far away for them to walk, or the bus is not physically
accessible—whereas virtually all tram and light rail systems
are fully accessible. Under the new scheme it would be very odd
that some people could use the tram free while others who live
a few yards down the same road could not."
"Can I urge you to consider revising your
proposal, to widen the scope of the concessionary fares scheme
to include trams or similar quasi-bus transport, as well as buses
themselves? If you would like to meet to discuss this further
I would welcome the opportunity."
The Government's concessionary fares strategy
is also deficient in that it only applies to people over 60 and
those with disabilities (and to those categories of railcard which
have statutory protection). There is no discernable strategy for
targeting other potential beneficiaries such as children, students
in full time higher education or jobseekers. Any initiatives to
assist these groups have been largely left to local decision makers,
either in local government or the transport industry itself. The
cost of fares for families travelling together by public transport
can be very high if child fares are only 75 or 50% of the cost
of an adult fare, and will exceed the perceived the costs of car
(or even taxi) travel for a similar journey. This is particularly
important for low income families.
It is noteworthy that in a number of schemes
around Britain (such as park and ride in Salisbury and Cambridge,
and the Mayor of London's free travel scheme for accompanied under-11s)
significant modal shift has been achieved from car to public transport
where accompanied children travel free, as this has reduced the
overall cost of travel by public transport for the family group.
The availability of free or reduced-cost home to school or college
transport also has a significant impact on the ability of children
from low income families to access education facilities sited
too far from their homes to be within reasonable walking or cycling
distance.
However, there are a number of lessons to be
learnt from the London experience of free travel on buses for
under 16s. The availability of such a concession can also have
the effect of attracting children to use public transport for
short journeys who had previously walked or cycled, as well as
those who had previously been taken by car. Some will take advantage
of it to make unnecessarily short hops or, conversely, to travel
continuously from end to end of a route. There must be robust
procedures in place to ensure that the privilege of free or reduced
cost travel is not abused, and can be withdrawn as a penalty for
inappropriate behaviour.
11. Are concessionary fares schemes sufficiently
integrated across different modes of transport and different geographical
areas?
Unlike most other local government services,
concessionary fares are really a universal benefit which is unrelated
to the locality, as has been recognised in Wales and Scotland.
While it may be convenient to use local authorities as agents
for issuing passes, it makes little sense for each authority to
be negotiating separate settlement arrangements with operators,
or devising not-always-consistent criteria governing eligibility
on grounds of disability (or entitlement to concessionary travel
for escorts). Once all authorities' schemes are required to be
(a) issued free to users, (b) valid for free travel at the point
of use countrywide, and (c) honoured on all local buses for the
same minimum hours, there is little scope for local variation.
Where this still exists, eg in terms of additional hours and/or
modes of validity, this is likely to cause confusion and argument
when one authority's holders try to use them elsewhere (eg London
Freedom Pass users making local rail or metro journeys outside
London because they are entitled to do so within it).
There are many localities—though not in
London—where some public transport links are provided only
by rail or ferry, not by bus. And a bus-only pass is of little
or no use to passengers whose disabilities prevent them from travelling
on mainstream public transport vehicles and who are therefore
restricted to door-to-door services such as dial-a-ride or taxis.
We would therefore welcome the maximum practicable
consistency in the times of operation of concessionary fares schemes
and the modes of transport which they cover, provided that this
is achieved through levelling-up to the standards of the best
and not by depriving existing holders of benefits they currently
enjoy.
March 2007
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