Select Committee on Treasury Fourth Report


The rationale for environmental taxation

78. Where individual polluters fail to take full account of the impact of their actions on the environment, the result may be a level of pollution that society as a whole considers inappropriate. Taxes offer one potential solution: by using taxation to augment the private costs of pollution, polluters can be forced to confront the full social costs of their actions. A report by the Institute of Fiscal Studies highlighted some of the advantages and disadvantages of taxation compared with regulatory approaches:


79. One of the biggest problems with environmental taxes is identifying the rate at which to charge the tax. This difficulty is especially relevant with climate change, because the environmental costs of carbon emissions are complex and uncertain, and in some situations, there may even be benefits from climate change. The Institute of Directors told us that:

This means that any tax set by government would run the risk of significantly under- or over-estimating the cost of carbon, which could undermine the credibility of the tax by sending out an inaccurate price signal. The manufacturers' association EEF pointed out another problem—that the cost of carbon will vary over time as technology evolves, the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere changes and understanding of climate change improves. EEF stated therefore that "a carbon price established through taxation would lack the necessary flexibility to respond quickly enough to changing circumstances", because it would only be likely to be reviewed annually as part of the Budget process.[139]

80. There are several problems with the application of environmental taxes to real-world scenarios, not least determining the level at which the tax should be set in the first place, and designing a system that is flexible enough to cope with changing circumstances. In the case of climate change, these problems are magnified because the costs (and benefits, if any) of current emissions are uncertain, and will be felt over extremely long time horizons. The Government must take great care in designing environmental taxes, but nevertheless we are firmly of the view that environmental taxes are a useful and valuable tool to combat carbon emissions.

The Government's Statement of Intent on Environmental Taxation


81. The Government has formally stated its broad objectives for environmental taxation twice in the last ten years: first in 1997, then in 2002. In July 1997, the Government issued its Statement of Intent on Environmental Taxation. This set out the Government's broad policy objectives in relation to environmental taxation:

In 2002, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer reaffirmed the Government's commitment to this approach and outlined some examples of Government action taken towards achieving this objective:

    Well-designed environmental taxes and other economic instruments can play an important role in ensuring that prices reflect environmental cost—in line with the "polluter pays" principle—and discouraging behaviour that damages the environment. The climate change and aggregates levies, for example, have sent strong environmental signals. Environmental taxes can also be an efficient mechanism for improving the productivity of natural resources, in line with the wider productivity improvements the Government is seeking to make across the economy.[141]

82. The Centre for Sustainable Energy (CSE) expressed some reservations about the Government's Statement of Intent. The CSE saw "a number of inherent dangers" in shifting from taxing 'goods' (such as employment) to taxing 'bads' (such as carbon emissions). The CSE feared that Government might become so reliant on the revenue raised from taxing 'bads' that it would lose impetus for reducing their occurrence because every reduction in emissions would mean a reduction in revenue. The second danger was that the Government might set the tax level on the basis of the amount of revenue it wished to raise "rather than on any reasoned consideration of the external cost it is trying to internalise or any careful assessment of the tax level required to achieve the intended environmental improvement." In such circumstances, they argued, the purpose of the tax becomes "muddled" and the level difficult to justify on the very environmental grounds upon which it was introduced. CSE also told us that carbon taxes were highly regressive.[142] They argued that "the role best played by fiscal instruments is to demonstrate government approval (and disapproval) for low (and high) carbon goods and services".[143] However, Professor Ekins described the 1997 Statement of Intent as a "very innovative document and one which, had it been followed through, would have been something of an international first".[144]


83. In assessing the Government's progress against its Statement of Intent on Environmental Taxation, it is important to establish a clear definition of precisely which taxes are environmental, and which taxes are not. Unfortunately, evidence received by us suggests that there is no such clear distinction. Sir Nicholas explained that classifying a tax as "environmental" was not straightforward, because of the existence of several arguments associated with any tax.[145] Indeed, the Treasury and Office of National Statistics use different definitions.

84. The Treasury employs a relatively narrow definition of "environmental taxes", using the term to refer to only the climate change levy, the aggregates levy and landfill tax.[146] By contrast, the ONS uses a much broader definition, which includes energy taxes and taxes on transport, such as Air Passenger Duty and Vehicle Excise Duty. The Treasury definition is based on the aims behind the introduction of a particular tax, whereas the ONS definition looks more to the effects of a particular tax. The Minister confirmed to us that the Treasury definition was "much more focused" than the ONS one:

    Where we are devising taxes for specific environmental policy ends or gains, and, in terms of policy development, if we are concerned with environmental gain then clearly it makes sense to make your policy instrument (in this case, tax) as sharply focused as possible. That is why I would argue that the climate change levy or the aggregates levy are environmental taxes with specifically an environmental policy purpose in mind and not simply [taxes with] potential environmental impacts which may be associated with their operation—which would be true of fuel duty or air passenger duty.[147]

85. Professor Ekins agreed that there was an important distinction between taxes designed purely in order to change behaviour and taxes designed to raise revenue:

    In environmental taxes it is important to distinguish those which are purely designed to change behaviour, and indeed at the limit might change it to such an extent that they generated no revenues at all. One might think of the plastic bags tax in Ireland in that context. The use of plastic bags has, I understand, fallen by over 90%. Therefore, that tax is not raising a very great deal of revenue. One distinguishes those taxes from other taxes such as those on fuel where there is certainly a demand effect. People use less fuel than they would otherwise use, but certainly demand does not drop like a stone and it remains an enduring revenue base. Energy is certainly the clearest example of that, but there are others. One can imagine, for example, that however high the aggregates tax one would still want to use some aggregates and the revenues that one gets from such a tax are the price times quantity. If one raised the price, unless the quantity fell by an equivalent amount—in other words, the elasticity is one, but most elasticities are less than one—one would increase the revenue, even if demand fell somewhat.[148]

86. Sir Nicholas told us that "an important part of taxes, for example on petrol, should be seen as environmental taxes. If one looks at the reasons for taxing petrol, they are: the environment, a partial substitute for congestion and a means of raising revenue as any other tax is. I think that there is an important environmental tax associated with petrol."[149] Professor Ekins considered that the Treasury definition was too narrow:

    The evolved international consensus as expressed by bodies such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, which has done an enormous amount of work on environmental taxes and has in a sense standardised what we mean by those taxes and how they should be thought of … is very much in line with the definition of the Office for National Statistics. That seems to me to be the definition that makes most sense.[150]

87. The different definitions of environmental taxes used by the Treasury and the Office of National Statistics are a source of confusion. We prefer the Office of National Statistics definition, which, in line with that of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, is based on examining the effects of a particular tax, to the Treasury's definition, which examines the intent of a particular tax. The most important measure of the success of an environmental tax is the change in behaviour it achieves, so it would seem appropriate that the Treasury definition should capture all taxes that have a significant impact on behaviour. We therefore recommend that the Treasury bring its definition of environmental taxation in line with that of the Office of National Statistics.


88. According to the Office of National Statistics (ONS), the proportion of total tax revenue collected from environmental taxes has fallen over the period since the Statement of Intent on Environmental Taxation. Based on the ONS definition, environmental taxation revenue as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) showed a trend of small increases between 1993 and 1999. Since 1999, however, this trend has reversed. In 2006, the receipts from environmental taxation fell to 2.7% of GDP compared with 3.6% in 1999. Environmental taxation accounted for 9.7% of total tax revenue in 1997, but this proportion has since fallen to 7.3% in 2006.[151] These findings are based on the definition used by the ONS (which is broader than the Treasury's definition).

89. As the ONS notes, the interpretation and use of measures of environmental taxes need care. A fall in environmental tax revenues as a proportion of total tax revenues could result either from falling rates of environmental tax or from the tax successfully changing behaviour, so diminishing environmental problems (e.g. carbon emissions), leading to a shrinking tax base.[152]

90. The Minister said that the falling share of environmental tax revenues in total tax revenues did not indicate that the Government was drifting away from its environmental objectives. He told us that the proportion of total tax earned from environmental taxes was a "misleading and imperfect measure"[153] because the most important output of environmental tools was the extent to which behaviour changed:

    The ultimate test of effectiveness of tax in the green territory is not the overall tax revenue take from what are classified as green taxes but surely it is the behaviour changes and the environmental gains that come as a result of the tax policies that are introduced for those ends. For instance, surely the test of the climate change levy is less the £760 million a year that it raises and more the 28 million tonnes of carbon it has saved since it has been introduced, which is more than a quarter of our Kyoto effort. Surely the test of the aggregates levy, another environmental tax that we introduced, is less the £300 million a year that it raises and more the fact that the volume of recycled aggregate stone now is 8 million tonnes a year higher and the amount that is being drawn out of the ground for the first time is 8% less despite the fact that construction during that period has been very buoyant.[154]

91. Professor Ekins was aware of the Treasury's argument that the proportion of total tax earned from environmental taxation was a bad indicator because of the difficulty in identifying the extent to which behaviour had changed. He accepted that this might be true for some environmental taxes but not in the UK's case, because the entire fall in the proportion of tax was caused by the abandonment of the fuel duty escalator in 1999 and the failure to uprate fuel duty in line with inflation:

    What has driven that indicator over the past five or six years is not the fact that people's behaviour is changing to such an extent that revenue is falling but the fact that the tax rate has been lowered in real terms and that is why one gets less revenue. [The Minister's] argument in that particular instance is not the case. One cannot put that forward as a reason why the tax shift does not appear to have taken place.[155]

Similarly, the Institute of Fiscal Studies concluded that the trend of environmental tax revenue falling as a proportion of total tax revenue was "almost entirely driven by the decision to abandon the annual fuel duty escalator". According to the ONS, fuel duty accounts for two thirds of total environmental tax revenue, so it is perhaps not surprising that changes to the fuel duty regime would have the most significant impact on environmental tax receipts as a whole:

    Duty on hydrocarbon oils such as petrol and diesel accounted for 66.3 per cent of total environmental taxation in 2006. This is a share that has remained broadly unchanged since 2000. Between 2005 and 2006 hydrocarbon revenues increased from 82.8 per cent to 83.0 per cent of total energy taxes. This share was up from 76.8 per cent in 1993.[156]

92. Several witnesses were of the view that the Government's commitment to environmental taxation had faltered since the publication of its Statement of Intent. Professor Ekins told us that the Government's commitment had been vigorous at first, but had since lost impetus:

    For the first few years the Government seemed to pursue that agenda quite vigorously, but a combination of events, of which probably the most important was the fuel duty protests in 2000, caused them to lose political heart. Obviously, it was not helped in that what seemed to have been cross-party consensus on that particular tax, namely the fuel duty escalator, broke down at that time … Since then the real tax on fuel has fallen. If one looks at the share of environmental tax in taxation generally one sees that it peaked in about 1999 and since then has declined quite substantially.[157]

93. Friends of the Earth argued that the Government was "extremely timid, even when—as now—there is increasing public acceptance that climate change must be tackled".[158] Natural England and the Energy Saving Trust (EST) also believed that the Government had made only limited progress against its Statement of Intent.[159] Natural England commented that:

    There appears to be a growing sense of timidity on environmental tax matters despite their well documented efficiency advantages over alternative approaches. As a result, progress has been limited in recent years over potential new environmental tax instruments to deliver improved environmental outcomes. Equally, there is a sense that existing environmental taxes are not being used to their full potential. For example, rates of fuel duty have been frozen over recent years to compensate for increasing petrol prices, which has contributed to the underlying trend of declining real cost of motoring. In addition, the 2006 Pre-Budget Report announced a revalorisation of the Climate Change Levy for the first time since its introduction almost 5 years ago. In real terms, the tax rates have fallen.[160]


94. The Government set worthy objectives in its 1997 Statement of Intent on Environmental Taxation, and reiterated its commitment to them in 2002. Since then, the Government has introduced specific environmental taxes in certain areas, notably the Climate Change Levy and Aggregates Levy. Whilst we welcome the advent of these taxes with clearly-stated environmental purposes, they are relatively insignificant in financial terms, and in terms of changing behaviour, when compared with the major fuel and energy taxes.

95. We acknowledge the Minister's argument that behaviour change achieved is a valid measure of an environmental tax's effectiveness, but do not believe that it is the only relevant measure. The ratio of environmental tax to total tax can be a useful measure, particularly when it can be determined that the reason for changes in the ratio are predicated on falling real tax rates rather than a shrinking tax base.

96. Using the ONS definition of environmental taxation, it is clear that the ratio of environmental tax to total tax has been falling in recent years. In our view, the principal reason for this ratio diminishing is falling real tax rates (particularly on fuel), rather than the tax base shrinking as a result of changing behaviour. The fall in the ratio of environmental tax to total tax, using the Office of National Statistics measure, is disappointing, and shows that the Government has failed to maintain its commitment to the 1997 Statement of Intent. We recommend that the Government reverse this reduction in commitment and, in response to this Report, indicate the measures it will deploy to reflect that renewed commitment.

Hypothecation of tax revenues

97. Hypothecation is the earmarking of certain tax revenues for specific areas of public expenditure. Advocates of tax hypothecation argue that by linking revenue from a specific tax to a related area of expenditure that tax might become more palatable to the population being taxed. The Government has experimented with a certain degree of tax hypothecation in the environmental field. Some revenue from the Climate Change Levy is used to support the Carbon Trust, and some revenue from the Aggregates Levy is put towards the Aggregates Sustainability Fund. The Minister told us that

98. Professor Ekins did not believe that hypothecation was desirable:

    Governments need revenue and in general it makes sense to raise that revenue from taxing bads rather than goods. In some cases it may be that where there is a case for public expenditure it can make the tax more palatable and politically acceptable to link a particular tax with a particular form of spending, but if that principle became widely established in government all sorts of desirable public expenditure would not find suitable sources of money to finance it. I think that a much better approach is to say that government has a certain revenue requirement and to get it from activities that cause social harm is in general better … than getting it from other sources. Indeed, that was broadly what the Statement of Intent on Environmental Taxation in 1997 said.[162]

99. We have considered the desirability of an extension of hypothecation in relation to environmental taxes, but do not think that such an approach would be appropriate. Setting taxes is one decision facing a government; spending this revenue is another, separate decision. Any widespread linking of environmental tax receipts to environmental expenditure would become complex, and create a risk of certain worthwhile expenditure failing to find a source of funding, if that expenditure were to lack an obviously related revenue source.

The social impact of environmental taxation

100. An important aspect of our consideration of environmental taxation involved the social impact of such taxes. Some environmental taxes are regressive, being charged against commodities that consume a more significant share of income for the poor than the rich, for example vehicle fuel and heating fuel. The Centre for sustainable Energy argued that a carbon tax was "a highly regressive means to raise funds from the citizenry".[163] Environmental tax policies need to be carefully designed to avoid unintended distributional consequences.

101. Professor Ekins' research had modelled the distributional impacts of introducing carbon taxes compared with an individual carbon trading scheme.[164] That research found that carbon taxes were highly regressive, and remained more regressive than individual carbon trading, even if a tax system managed to optimise the recycling of revenues through the welfare system to compensate those on lower incomes.[165] In contrast, Professor Ekins found that a hypothetical individual carbon trading scheme based on an equal per capita allocation of allowances would be fiscally progressive without any compensatory schemes because, in general, the poor emit less carbon dioxide than the rich. The rich would therefore need to buy allowances from the poor if they wished to sustain their more carbon-intensive lifestyles.

102. Sir Nicholas explained that there would inevitably be some "distributional consequences" from environmental taxes, but the same consideration would apply to "any use of a price mechanism wherever one looked, whether it be bananas, externalities, climate change or congestion". He argued that it was wrong to look at taxes idiosyncratically:

    That is why one looks at transfer schemes, pensions and the progressivity or otherwise of every tax. One has to see taxes in their entirety to make judgments about progressivity or not. I do not believe that it is right as an analytical and policy point to pick them off one by one. [166]

103. The Minister indicated that the abandonment of the fuel duty escalator in 1999 was at least partly influenced by the need to balance environmental goals with the potential for undesirable economic impacts. In this specific case, the Treasury had to consider the economic and social consequences for poorer households of increasing duty on top of already rising fuel prices:

    I think it would have been a mistake to have an automatic escalator that jacked [fuel duty] up still further. It would have caused problems for the motorist and indeed economic consequences for British business. I use that simply as an illustration of how judgments on tax have to be able to weigh some of the environmental ambitions that are there with the economic consequences, and indeed the social consequences too, because in some cases some taxes will hit poorer people and poorer households harder.[167]

104. One potential solution to the danger of an environmental tax having unwelcome social impacts could be to compensate those poor households which are adversely affected by the tax through a redistribution scheme. Professor Ekins argued that designing such an effective scheme that compensated every poor household was unrealistic, because of the very high range of energy use within income groups, but he thought that a scheme could be designed that would compensate 80% of very low income households, "some of whom would be considerably better off than under the status quo".[168] This redistribution could occur, he argued, via the existing social welfare mechanisms. A political decision would then have to be made as to whether the deleterious impact of the proposed environmental tax on the 20% of highly energy-intensive low-income households should be allowed to "thwart" the policy as a whole both on environmental and social grounds. Professor Ekins added that any social impacts could be lessened as a result of various energy efficiency policies that the Government was developing. Low income households did not need to use as much energy as before in order to keep warm, "because the energy efficient commitment and Warm Front policies are very substantially improving the thermal quality of households, especially low income households, on whom these schemes tend to be targeted".[169]

Aviation taxation


105. The European Commission has stated that the aviation sector's contribution to global climate change is increasing. While the European Union's total greenhouse gas emissions fell by 3% from 1990 to 2002, emissions from international aviation increased by almost 70%. According to the Commission, a significant improvement in aircraft technology and operational efficiency "has not been enough to neutralise the effect of increased traffic, and the growth in emissions is likely to continue in the decades to come".[170] Friends of the Earth agreed:

    Aviation emissions have risen heavily in recent decades, continue to rise, and are predicted to rise way into the future … This is because demand growth for flights heavily outstrips technological improvements to plane efficiency. Demand growth is in turn heavily influenced by flying falling in price.[171]

106. Virgin Atlantic admitted that "no objective observer would dispute that the projected growth of the airline industry will have a significant impact on the environment", but they argued that no-one should "ignore the critical importance of aviation in sustaining UK and global economic growth … and enabling people to extend their horizons by undertaking airline travel.[172] Flybe argued that it was:

    far more effective to reduce the emissions of aircraft [through technological investment, for example] than to seek to put an end to low cost air travel, which … has transformed the industry and brought new opportunities for the UK's regions … It has brought jobs and investment, and transformed an elitist pursuit into an activity accessible for all social classes. Now is not the time to restrict growth and impose new taxation, but to make sure that future growth is sustainable.[173]

107. IATA believed that the benefits to the wider economy made possible by air travel could justify the industry receiving favourable treatment from the tax system, for the following reason:

    I think there is also the impression that air transport is all about cheap holidays. Actually, 35% of people travelling from the UK are on business. It is less than 30% who are travelling on holiday according to the CAA surveys. Air transport plays a critical role in linking British businesses with global markets. It provides a lot of benefits to the economy that go beyond the price that passengers pay. That in my mind is the principal reason.[174]

The Minister told us that it was "surely right that aviation at least covers the environmental cost that its activities impose".[175]


108. A theoretically attractive aviation tax might tax aviation fuel, much the same way as road fuel is taxed. However, as the Minister pointed out, as a result of international law,[176] the Government was unable to consider duties of any type on the use of fuel in international aviation.[177] The airlines also pointed out that if one country were to act alone in imposing a tax on aviation fuel, airlines would be given an incentive to indulge in "tankering" (planes carrying heavier fuel loads from lower-tax States to avoid paying tax in higher-tax States), and this could therefore result in higher emissions. Instead of a tax on aviation fuel, the Government collects Air Passenger Duty (APD) on each journey made by individual passengers. APD was introduced in 1994 at £5 per passenger per flight, and is now £10 for flights within Europe and £40 for flights elsewhere (£20 and £80 respectively for business or first class).


109. The Minister told us that, when APD was first introduced in 1994, its policy purpose was:

110. The Minister said that APD would have some environmental impact, in that the doubling of APD in the 2006 Pre-Budget Report was forecast to reduce demand by "perhaps five million passengers out of 140 million a year … by 2010". He equated this reduction to an environmental gain from that of between 0.2 and 0.5 million tons of carbon a year by 2010.[179] Sir Nicholas agreed that some element of APD was an environmental tax, because it would have some impact on behaviours through increasing the price of flights.[180] The Minister's statement that APD does have an environmental impact appears to be at odds with the Government's response to the Environmental Audit Committee's Report on Pre-Budget 2005: Tax, Economic Analysis and Climate Change, which stated that "APD does not incentivise improved environmental performance".[181] EasyJet explained how a passenger travelling in economy class from London to Auckland generated more than 15 times the emissions of a passenger travelling from London to Marrakech, yet would be charged the same rate of APD.[182] Virgin Atlantic argued that because APD bears "almost no relation to the actual emissions generated by a given flight, and is based on a fixed rate per passenger carried, it does not offer any incentive to operate more efficiently or invest in new technologies".[183] Flybe regarded APD as "an anomaly that serves no purpose other than a revenue raising mechanism for HM Treasury".[184]

111. EasyJet argued that any form of environmental taxation had "the potential to reduce the capital available to the airline industry for investment in more environmentally efficient technology and is therefore poor policy".[185] As we have already noted, some in the aviation industry argued that taxation would be more expensive than emissions trading, for the same environmental impact.


112. In the 2007 Pre-Budget Report, the Chancellor announced that the Treasury would be consulting on a successor to the APD regime. The Government's proposals are that APD would be replaced by a 'per plane duty' (PPD),[186] an idea that we considered during our inquiry. Such a tax would offer an increased incentive to airlines to fill their planes to capacity and could also encompass freight flights, which do not incur APD charges. BATA said that such a tax would be a

    small step towards something much more sophisticated like emissions trading. Although it perhaps would capture a different range of aircraft [to include freight planes, for example] it still does not create an incentive for airlines to invest in better technology. It is really moving around the deckchairs.[187]

113. Freight planes are currently exempt from APD. Virgin Atlantic told us that "with freighters, as a generalisation, operating older, less fuel-efficient aircraft and more polluting aircraft, this would appear to be underline the unsuitability of APD as a green tax seeking to address the environmental impact of aviation".[188] The Government's consultation seeks responses to the question of whether freight planes ought to be included in the new Per Plane Duty scheme, although the Chancellor of the Exchequer has already announced that they will be.[189] BATA suggested that a further step towards an emissions trading scheme would be an aircraft departure tax with differential charges according to the carbon emissions of the particular aircraft.[190]

114. Several airlines expressed concern that once aviation become included within the EU ETS scheme, they would still be liable to pay an aviation tax of some kind. In Flybe's view, this would mean aviation paying twice for its emissions:

    It is unacceptable to increase the level of APD on the basis that it will cover the external cost of aviation, and then introduce emissions trading with the same objective. Britain's airlines face being forced to pay twice for the external cost of emissions if APD continues when ETS is introduced. ETS is a more efficient option to achieve this objective and it must replace APD, not be added as a further cost.[191]

British Airways expected that once aviation was included within the EU ETS, APD as an environmental tax would be eliminated.[192]


115. When the European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS) is extended to include aviation, that scheme could be a suitable framework for ensuring that airlines pay the environmental costs of their emissions, at least in Europe. Until that point, however, the Government must ensure that an effective tax structure is in place to ensure that aviation at least covers the cost of its environmental damage. As the Minister told us, Aviation Passenger Duty (APD) is far from ideal, and it offers neither sufficient incentive for airlines to invest in cleaner technologies, nor empowers passengers to take action themselves. APD does not distinguish full flights from half-empty ones, nor does it distinguish between a flight to Morocco and a flight to Australia. We are pleased that the Government is now considering a Per Plane Duty, but strongly regret that it has taken till now to introduce a replacement for APD. We urge the Government to ensure that Per Plane Duty includes cargo flights and private planes, and that it will offer clear incentives for the industry to invest in cleaner fleets, through providing tax differentials for cleaner technologies.

116. The necessity of ensuring aviation pays the full cost of its environmental impact will not cease upon its inclusion in the EU ETS in 2011. We recommend that the Government, in its response to this Report, clarify whether aviation will continue to pay Per Plane Duty (or another form of aviation tax) once aviation is included in the EU ETS.

137   The UK Tax System and the Environment Institute for Fiscal Studies, November 2006  Back

138   Ev 76 Back

139   Ev 117 Back

140   "Statement of Intent on environmental taxation", HM Treasury, 2 July 1997 Back

141   "Tax and the environment: using economic instruments", H M Treasury, November 2002 Back

142   See later section on social impact of environmental taxation Back

143   Ev 144 Back

144   Q 1 Back

145   Q 177 Back

146   Environmental Audit Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2005-06, Pre-Budget 2005: Tax, economic analysis, and climate change, HC 882, Ev 82  Back

147   Q 290 Back

148   Q 18 Back

149   Q 160 Back

150   Q 13 Back

151   Office for National Statistics website  Back

152   'Environmental Accounts: Environmental Taxes 2.9% of GDP in 2005', Office for National Statistics, 23 November 2006 Back

153   Q 321 Back

154   Q 257 Back

155   Q 19 Back

156   Office for National Statistics website  Back

157   Q 1 Back

158   Ev 136  Back

159   Ev 130 and Ev 81 Back

160   Ev 130  Back

161   Q 310 Back

162   Q 6 Back

163   Ev 141  Back

164   The distributional impacts of economic instruments to limit greenhouse gas emissions from transport, and Economic Instruments for a socially neutral national home energy efficiency programme, Policy Studies Institute, 2004.  Back

165   Cited in Ev 143 CSE Back

166   Q 180 Back

167   Q 322 Back

168   Q 20 Back

169   Q 21 Back

170   European Commission website  Back

171   Ev 136  Back

172   Ev 107 Back

173   Ev 123 Back

174   Q 467 Back

175   Q295 Back

176   Article 24 of the Chicago Convention exempts fuel for international services from fuel duty Back

177   Q 294 Back

178   Q 291 Back

179   Q 292 Back

180   Qq 162-163 Back

181   Environmental Audit Committee, First Special Report of Session 2006-07: Pre-Budget 2005: Tax, economic analysis and climate change, HC 195, p3  Back

182   Ev 86 Back

183   Ev 106 Back

184   Ev 123 Back

185   Ev 85 Back

186   2007 Pre-Budget Report and Comprehensive Spending Review, HM Treasury, p 113 Back

187   Q74 Back

188   Ev 106 Back

189   Treasury Committee, Second Report of Session 2007-08, The 2007 Pre-Budget Report, HC 54-II, Q 348 Back

190   Q 75 Back

191   Ev 123  Back

192   Ev 157  Back

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