Select Committee on Treasury Sixth Report

3  Events leading to the closure of the credit markets

Growth of problems in the sub-prime mortgage market

73. Problems in the US sub-prime mortgage market emerged in 2005 with arrears and defaults rising through 2006. There had been warnings through the course of 2006 that conditions in the sub-prime market would continue to deteriorate and would get worse in 2007. For example, the Centre for Responsible Lending, a research and policy organisation, specialising in home ownership issues and based in Washington DC, published a report in December 2006 stating:

As this year [2006] ends, 2.2 million household in the sub-prime market either have lost their homes to foreclosure or hold sub-prime mortgages that will fail over the next several years. These foreclosures will cost homeowners as much as $164 billion, primarily in lost home equity. [91]

74. The Centre for Responsible Lending's December 2006 report predicted that "one out of five sub-prime mortgages originated during the past two years will end in foreclosure", double the rate for sub-prime loans originated in 2002.[92] Professor Buiter told us that arrears on US sub-prime mortgages had already been rising for some time: during the second half of 2005 and the delinquency rate [93] on US mortgages had risen from approximately 10% during 2006 and reached 15% by early 2007.[94] Mr Bernanke, in May 2007 confirmed that the situation was continuing to deteriorate, stating that whilst "mortgage credit quality has been very solid in recent years … that statement is no longer true of sub-prime mortgages with adjustable interest rates, which currently account for about two-thirds of sub-prime first-lien mortgages". Mr Bernanke went on to explain that:

For these mortgages, the rate of serious delinquencies—corresponding to mortgages in foreclosure or with payments ninety days or more overdue—rose sharply during 2006 and recently stood at about 11% about double the recent low seen in mid-2005 … In the fourth quarter of 2006, about 310,000 foreclosure proceedings were initiated, whereas for the preceding two years the quarterly average was roughly 230,000. Subprime mortgages accounted for more than half of the foreclosures started in the fourth quarter.[95]

75. Problems in the sub-prime market continued to worsen through the second half of 2007 with Mr Bernanke noting that, by August 2007, "the rate of serious delinquencies has risen notably for sub-prime mortgages with adjustable rates, reaching nearly 16 percent in August [2007], roughly triple the recent low in mid-2005". [96] The IMF has noted that "the speed with which delinquency and default rates have risen for the 2006 vintage of loans has been striking" with high volumes of 'early payment defaults', in which the borrower misses one or two of the first three monthly payments.[97]

76. The sharp rise in delinquencies and foreclosures through 2006 and 2007 on sub-prime mortgages in the USA and on adjustable-rate mortgages in particular has multiple inter-connected causes. These include the interplay between the growing use of adjustable rate mortgages (comparatively novel in the USA), interest rate rises and house price falls, as well as looser lending standards and fraud.

77. Adjustable rate mortgages, as outlined in the previous section, accounted for a large number of defaults on sub-prime mortgages. Adjustable rate mortgages often come with an initial fixed, but below market, or 'teaser' (and sometimes interest-only) rate. Their use increased from 2005 and 2006 when heightened competition between sub-prime originators to maintain volumes and increase market share led to product innovations, such as 'affordable lending' products, often incorporating low initial 'teaser' rates that are reset after two or so years.[98] "Teaser rates", whilst intended to make mortgages more affordable also, however, made borrowers vulnerable to interest rate resets which the IMF has labelled 'reset shock'.[99] Professor Buiter explained that "because many of the mortgages granted in 2005 and 2006 had up-front 'teaser rates', which during 2007 and 2008 would reset at much higher levels, there was only one direction delinquencies were going to go: up".[100]

78. As long as house prices were rising, rate 'reset shocks' that occurred when the 'teaser' rate expired could be averted by re-financing the mortgage into another adjustable rate mortgage.[101] However, Mr Bernanke explained that house prices in the United States, "after rising at an annual rate of nearly 9% from 2000 through 2005, then decelerated, even falling in some markets", which Mr Bernanke went on to say "occurred at the same time as interest rates on both fixed and adjustable rate mortgage loans moved upward".[102] Mr Corrigan stressed to us that these absolute falls in house prices were unanticipated, before going on to say no-one could have anticipated that "in key segments of the residential mortgage markets in the United States house prices, which have not declined in absolute terms in over 30 years, would do so by 5% or 6%".[103] Mr Bernanke has explained that the consequence of these falls in house prices combined with interest rate rises was that some sub-prime borrowers with adjustable rate mortgages who might have counted on refinancing before their payments rose, might not have had enough home equity to qualify for a new loan given the sluggishness in house prices.[104] The end result according to the IMF was that "slowing house price appreciation and rising interest rates left many stretched borrowers with no choice but to default".[105]

79. The Governor of the Bank of England stressed the unsuitability of some lending decisions in the US sub-prime market, telling us that there was:

some pretty extraordinary lending in the sub-prime mortgage market to people who could just about afford to buy a home that they never thought they would be able to afford and they were encouraged to think that they could afford it, but only when the policy rate set by the Fed was 1% and once interest rates got back to a more normal 5% they clearly could not afford it.[106]

80. Looser underwriting standards is another contributory factor to growing problems in the sub-prime housing market. An IMF working paper dates looser underwriting standards in the sub-prime mortgage market to 2005-06.[107] Mr Bernanke has also stressed the role of loosened underwriting standards as an important contributory factor to the problems in the sub-prime mortgage market, linking lower credit risk assessment standards to the continuing search for yield by investors:

The practices of some mortgage originators has also contributed to the problems in the sub-prime sector. As the underlying pace of mortgage originations began to slow, but with investor demand for securities with high yields still strong, some lenders evidently loosened underwriting standards. So-called risk layering—combining weaker borrowing credit histories with other risk factors, such as incomplete income documentation or very cumulative loan-to-value ratios—became more common.[108]

81. Looser underwriting standards were also emphasised by Mr Corrigan: "there is no question as far as I am concerned that at origination point the standards of diligence, credit-checking, marketing and promotion—some of these mortgages got out of hand". [109]

82. Looser underwriting standards have played an important role in the problems affecting the sub-prime mortgage market in the USA. We are concerned that these looser standards are linked to the decisive loosening of the link between creditor and debtor under the 'originate and distribute' banking model. There are therefore important lessons to be learnt that go far beyond the sub-prime housing market in the USA and which apply to other markets. We discuss the issue of a loosening of underwriting standards under the 'originate and distribute' model further later in this Report.

83. A final factor which contributed to rising sub-prime defaults were regional economic problems and rising unemployment in some parts of the USA. This helped explain why some states in the Midwest, such as Michigan and Ohio, hit hardest by job cuts in the car industry, are among the states with the highest rate of new foreclosures.[110]

The spillover into the credit markets

84. The Governor of the Bank of England told us, in his letter of 12 September 2007, that "rising default rates on sub-prime mortgages in the United States were the trigger for the recent financial market turmoil".[111] Under the traditional 'originate and hold' banking model, growing defaults on sub-prime mortgages would have impacted largely on the banks and other mortgage lenders who made and then held the loans until maturity. However, under the 'originate and distribute' model, described in chapter 2, many sub-prime loans were parcelled into asset-backed securities and other structured products, such as collateralised debt obligations, and sold on to investors, with the end result that risks and exposure to the sub-prime market in the USA were spread far more widely through the international financial system.

85. Beginning in early 2007, the problems in the sub-prime market discussed above began to feed through into the credit markets. For example, US sub-prime spreads in the credit markets rose in early 2007,[112] reflecting market expectations of increased sub-prime mortgage defaults. The IMF also reported that market participants began to increase their expectations for non-prime mortgage-related losses around this time and that this was "reflected in a pronounced widening in cash and credit default swap spreads on asset-backed securities and collateralised debt obligations backed by recently originated sub-prime mortgages, beginning in early 2007".[113]

86. Another early sign that problems in the US sub-prime housing market were impacting more widely upon financial institutions was HSBC's announcement in February 2007 of large sub-prime-related credit losses of approximately £10.5 billion.[114] Despite this early announcement of losses by HSBC, Mr Corrigan believed that observers were slow in recognising the potential scale of the problems in the US housing market and its potential contagion effects:

It was probably the losses experienced by the Bear Stearns hedge funds in the early summer that brought the problem into sharper focus and served as the wake up call as to the serious nature of the problem and its potential to unleash damaging contagion risk forces. [115]

87. As discussed previously, default levels on US sub-prime mortgages continued to rise through 2007. As a result, credit spreads on US sub-prime securities continued to increase further through 2007, rising sharply in July 2007, indicating even higher perceived default risk on underlying assets. However, through the course of 2007, credit spreads began to rise on other non sub-prime asset-backed securities. Professor Buiter told us that, as 2007 went on, "the widening of credit risk spreads was not confined to sub-prime related instruments and institutions".[116] Indeed the Bank of England noted that "from July 2007 spreads on asset-backed securities rose across the globe".[117] The British Bankers Association dated this 'contagion' effect to June and July 2007, stating that "the impact was no longer confined to the US sub-prime market, but affected the market for all mortgage backed securities globally and banks who typically securitised their mortgage book found that they either could not do this at all or could only do so on much worse terms than before".[118] Paul Tucker, Executive Director, Markets at the Bank of England, explained to us that "all the asset-backed securities market seized up on the basis of problems in a relatively localised area—sub-prime".[119] Mr Tucker went on to explain that one of the underlying problems fuelling the 'contagion' effect was investors not distinguishing "between one type of security that has got into real difficulties and other types of security that are maybe okay".[120] This failure to distinguish between different securities may help explain the 'contagion' effect which led to widening spreads through the course of 2007 in all markets for asset-backed securities and not just those exposed to sub-prime mortgages.

The role of the credit ratings agencies

88. The OECD explained that, in June and July 2007, in response to the continuing deterioration in the sub-prime housing market, "hundreds of securities backed by sub-prime loans were downgraded or placed on review for downgrade with most of the securities downgraded by three to four notches".[121] This meant that the ratings for securities backed by sub-prime loans had been lowered in the ratings scale and by three to four levels, for example from AAA to A+ indicating an assessment by the agencies of greatly increased default risk.[122] For example, on 10 July 2007, Standard & Poor's said it was considering cutting ratings on $12 billion of sub-prime mortgage-backed securities which it finally did on 19 July.[123] These large-scale ratings downgrades during June and July 2007 were described by the Organisation for Economic Development (OECD) as "unexpected".[124] However, these ratings downgrades did not end the uncertainty about credit quality and the OECD reports that uncertainty about credit quality continued after the June and July 2007 downgrades as the "ratings agencies admitted their lack of appropriate models to assess the effects of the turmoil in the housing market on ratings of the remaining securities".[125]

89. Over the same period the ratings agencies began the process of reviewing their methods. For example, Standard & Poor's told us that, in response to deteriorating sub-prime performance and increasingly poor data performance, they took steps to modify their models and ratings in July (as well as October) 2007. Standard & Poor's said that these steps "included increasing the severity of the surveillance assumptions we use to evaluate the ongoing creditworthiness for residential mortgage-backed securities transactions and downgrading those that did not meet these stress test scenarios within given time frames".[126] The consequence of these ratings downgrades and doubts over the methods used by the ratings agencies was drawn out by Bank of England, in its October 2007 Financial Stability Report: "ratings downgrades and changes in agencies' methodologies further undermined the confidence of some investors, prompting further selling of these assets."[127]

90. We note with concern that the credit rating agencies appear to have been slow to downgrade their ratings for securities backed by sub-prime mortgages. Additionally, the ratings downgrades they made over the summer of 2007 were large-scale in nature and appear to have been 'unexpected' by many market participants. Large, belated and unexpected shocks can only serve to exacerbate the problems in credit markets. The very fact that the credit rating agencies began reviewing their methods during this period is an implicit admission that they got it wrong and that they did not have the appropriate models to rate such securities during a time of stress.

Warnings from public authorities about pricing of risk and potential impaired market liquidity

91. During the first half of 2007, a number of public authorities, including the Bank of England and the FSA, as well as international organisations such as the International Monetary Fund and the Bank for International Settlements, had raised questions about the under-pricing of risk in credit markets, characterised by very low risk spreads, with declining differentials between risky assets and safe assets, as well as risks of impaired market liquidity. For example, the FSA in its January 2007 Financial Risk Outlook warned that:

this period of economic and market stability does not mean that the financial system is necessarily in a position to withstand the impact of a significant event. Financial markets have become increasingly complex since the last financial stability crisis, which implies that transmission mechanisms for shocks have also become more complicated and possibly more rapid. Market liquidity remains abundant (irrespective of how it is measured), but it is still important for market participants to consider how they would operate in an environment where liquidity is restricted.[128]

92. The Bank of England's April 2007 Financial Stability Report similarly highlighted potential weaknesses, including impaired market liquidity:

Financial institutions can become more dependent on sustained market liquidity both to allow them to distribute the risks they originate or securitise and to allow them to adjust their portfolio and hedges in the face of movements in market prices. If it becomes impossible or expensive to find counterparties, financial institutions could be left holding unplanned credit risk exposures in their 'warehouses' awaiting distribution or find it difficult to close out positions, as was apparent in synthetic US sub-prime mortgage markets in February. [129]

We will discuss the extent to which market participants acted on warnings from the public authorities and whether there is a need to ensure that market participants heed such warnings in the future later in this Report.

The closure of the credit markets

93. Events in August 2007 provided the final trigger for the closure of global credit markets. On 7 August, German banks organised a bailout for IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, which was in trouble because of its investments in sub-prime residential mortgage collateralised debt obligations. Around the same time two US mortgage finance companies —Countrywide [130] and American Home Mortgage Investments made announcements of significant losses flowing from US mortgage lending. The OECD reports that "in the wake of this event [IKB] and news of similar problems elsewhere, there was a major correction in the market for mortgage-backed securities" and that "mortgage-backed security spreads, in particular in the high-yield segment began to rise to unprecedented levels in early August".[131]

94. On 9 August, a French investment bank, BNP Paribas, suspended withdrawals from three of its hedge funds that had invested in sub-prime residential mortgage CDOs. BNP Paribas said in a press release that it had taken this step because "the complete evaporation of liquidity in certain market segments of the US securitisation market has made it impossible to value certain assets fairly regardless of their quality or credit rating". The BNP Paribas press release went on to say that the "situation is such that it is no longer possible to value fairly the underlying US ABS assets in the three above-mentioned funds".[132]

95. The announcement by BNP Paribas was the trigger for a sharp reappraisal of risk by investors. Repricing of risk was taking place through the course of 2007, demonstrated by widening credit spreads on a range of asset-backed securities, but the events of 9 August spurred a much sharper and more rapid move to reprice risk. The Governor of the Bank of England in his Belfast speech on 17 October 2007 explained that on 9 August:

the unexpected revelation by a French bank [BNP Paribas]that its investment funds could no longer value their exposures to US sub-prime mortgage loans produced a sharp reappraisal of the risks they were taking by investors around the globe. The returns demanded by investors on all risky assets rose—from packages of bank loans to plain vanilla company shares—so the prices of those assets fell. And in some markets for complex financial instruments, investors realised that perhaps they did not understand as much about the nature of the risks involved as they should. So not only did asset prices fall, but the markets in some of these instruments virtually closed. There were no buyers.[133]

96. The Governor of the Bank of England explained to us that the increasing illiquidity of markets in structured finance products over the course of 2007 was an inevitable consequence of the complexity of such products. The Governor spoke of:

parts of the financial system thinking that they could advise and invent instruments of ever-growing complexity and, at the same time, assume that the market in those instruments would always be deep and liquid. It is almost a contradiction in terms that if you invent an instrument that only a handful of people understand, it may demonstrate the kind of abilities that win you a Nobel Prize, but if it is not sufficiently understood by enough people, you cannot expect the market to be deep and liquid … [134]

97. Sir Callum McCarthy in a speech on 20 October 2007 in Washington DC said that events in the credit markets since mid-2007 comprised "a long overdue repricing of risk, which I hope will bring greater discipline to markets which had for sometime responded to world liquidity and the search for yield by compressing the spreads between low and high risk investments".[135] Mr Corrigan also described the market turmoil as "a broad-based drive to re-price credit risk which took hold across broad segments of the credit markets that were by no means limited to sub-prime mortgages. The motivation associated with the market-driven effort to re-price credit risk was to enhance and strengthen credit terms from the perspective of credit suppliers".[136]

The closure of the money markets

98. From late July, as the exposure of a growing number of banks to US sub-prime loans became more apparent, the interbank money markets dried up with related interest rates reaching record levels in August. Despite ample global liquidity, liquidity froze in the money markets leading to what the Chancellor described as a "complete freezing of liquidity" which he added "was unprecedented in modern times".[137] The Chancellor of the Exchequer explained to us that the "fundamental problem was that, whilst there was plenty of capital available, the banks and other financial institutions became very reluctant to lend to each other and there was an acute shortage of liquidity".[138]

99. Paul Tucker explained to us that in understanding why banks became reluctant to lend "the key point … is the way this jumped from the capital markets into the banking markets or money markets" which was because "banks had provided very large committed lines of credit or liquidity to a lot of vehicles in the system" and that, "faced with an increased probability of the drawdown of these massive lines of credit, they [the banks] started to stockpile liquidity rather than lend in the term money markets".[139] The Governor explained that:

banks that had relied on selling packages of loans in securitised form found that they couldn't sell them. Investment vehicles that held securitised loans have found it difficult to finance their holdings by borrowing. Faced with the possibility that they would have to finance these vehicles themselves, banks with spare cash have hoarded it and have become reluctant to lend to other banks beyond very short maturities.[140]

100. This 'liquidity freeze' caused serious problems because the effective closure of asset-backed securities markets as well as the leveraged loan markets left many financial institutions needing to fund growing 'warehouses' of assets that they had expected to distribute and not retain on their balance sheet. In addition, many banks were exposed through commitments—either formal or informal—to off-balance sheet vehicles or to counterparties which were now experiencing growing funding difficulties. Dr Martin Weale from the National Institute of Economics has argued that problems were compounded because many banks were believed to have invested in similar securities, so that banks felt they did not know enough about the solvency of other banks to which they might lend".[141] The consequence of these factors, the Chancellor of the Exchequer told us, was that the banks "simply stopped lending to each other".[142]

101. Paul Tucker told us that the closure of the commercial paper markets was a key part of the problem because many securities had been sold to investment vehicles, with many of these vehicles funding their purchases by issuing short-term commercial paper, a process we discussed earlier. Mr Tucker told us that "the fact that banks and these so called conduits were not able to raise commercial paper or were only able to raise commercial paper at very short maturities" was at the heart of the problem.[143] The Governor in his 12 September letter to the Committee, described the problems in the asset-backed commercial paper market:

markets are now withdrawing short-term funding from such vehicles, a process not unlike a bank run. Many investment vehicles have been forced to shorten the maturity of their commercial paper, making their borrowing even more short-term and their maturity mismatch even greater. [144]

102. Mr Tucker went on to explain that these problems would not be resolved without "that market [commercial paper] being restored to something like normality", or alternatively, through 'reintermediation' by the banks. Mr Tucker concluded that it was "because of the latter possibility [reintermediation] that banks have been stockpiling liquidity and trying to protect themselves against that eventuality and that has been individually rational but collectively deleterious".[145]

Central bank intervention

103. The 'liquidity freeze' facing banks during 2007 led some UK banks to request additional liquidity from the Bank of England in August 2007, at zero penalty rate. As we discussed in The Run on the Rock, the Bank of England refused to agree to the banks' requests for three reasons: the banking system as a whole was strong enough to withstand the problems on its own; secondly, banks would gradually re-establish valuations of asset-backed securities, thus allowing liquidity to build up again; and thirdly, there would have been a risk of moral hazard if the Bank had given the banks what they asked for.

104. Meanwhile, other central banks appeared to be more proactive in their response to the unfolding events. In the Run on the Rock we set out the different responses of the US Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank to liquidity problems in August 2007, and concluded that the Bank of England paid too much attention to the risk of moral hazard and should have adopted a more proactive approach.

105. However, the Bank of England later softened its position—agreeing to extend the range of collateral it would accept in providing liquidity to the banking sector on 20 September 2007. We concluded that such a facility should have been granted at an earlier stage. Subsequent actions by the Bank of England, including a coordinated operation by major central banks from around the world, are discussed in the next chapter.

91   Losing Ground: Foreclosures in the sub-prime market and their cost to homeowners, Centre for Responsible Lending, December 2006, p 3 Back

92   Ibid. Back

93   The number of loans with delinquent payments divided by the number of loans in a portfolio. Back

94   Ev 320 Back

95   Speech by Chairman Mr Ben S Bernanke, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the US Federal Reserve System, at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago's 43rd Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, Chicago, 17 May 2007 Back

96   The recent financial turmoil and its economic and policy consequences, Speech by Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, at the Economic Club of New York, New York, 15 October 2007, p 2 Back

97   IMF, Lessons from sub-prime turbulence, IMF survey magazine: IMF research, August 2007, p 3 Back

98   Bank of England, Financial Stability Report, April 2007, p 22 Back

99   IMF, Money for nothing and checks for free: Recent developments in US sub-prime mortgage markets, IMF Working Paper, by John Kiff and Paul Mills, July 2007 Back

100   Ev 320 Back

101   IMF, Lessons from sub-prime turbulence, by John Kiff and Paul Mills, IMF survey magazine: IMF research, August 2007 Back

102   Speech by Mr Ben S Bernanke, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the US Federal Reserve System, at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago's 43rd Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, Chicago, 17 May 2007 Back

103   Q 1273 Back

104   Speech by Mr Ben S Bernanke, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the US Federal Reserve System, at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago's 43rd Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, Chicago, 17 May 2007 Back

105   IMF, Lessons from sub-prime turbulence, IMF survey magazine: IMF research, August 2007 Back

106   Q 1678 Back

107   IMF, Money for nothing and checks for free: Recent developments in US sub-prime mortgage markets, IMF Working Paper, by John Kiff and Paul Mills, July 2007, p 7 Back

108   Speech by Mr Ben S Bernanke, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the US Federal Reserve System, at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago's 43rd Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, Chicago, 17 May 2007 Back

109   Q 1240 Back

110   Speech by Governor Randall S. Kroszner, at the Consumer Bankers Association 2007 Fair Lending Conference, Washington DC, 5 November 2007 Back

111   Ev 214 Back

112   Bank of England, Financial Stability Report, October 2007, p 7 Back

113   IMF, Global Financial Stability Report, October 2007, p 9 Back

114   HSCBC trading update - US mortgage update, 7 February 2007 Back

115   Ev 333 Back

116   Ev 322 Back

117   Bank of England, Financial Stability Report, October 2007, p 7 Back

118   British Bankers Association submission to the Tripartite authorities: recommendations regarding financial stability, regulatory coordination and issues in the international mortgage backed securities and credit markets, British Bankers Association, p 21 Back

119   Q 10 Back

120   Q 92 Back

121   OECD, Financial Markets Highlights, November 2007 Back

122   See paragraphs 55-56. Back

123   British Bankers' Association submission to the Tripartite authorities: recommendations regarding financial stability, regulatory coordination and issues in the international mortgage backed securities and credit markets, British Bankers' Association, p 21 Back

124   OECD, Financial Market Highlights, November 2007, p 21 Back

125   Ibid. Back

126   Ev 274 Back

127   Bank of England, Financial Stability Report, October 2007, p 7 Back

128   FSA, Financial Risk Outlook 2007, January 2007, p 29 Back

129   Bank of England, Financial Stability Report, April 2007, p 7 Back

130   Countrywide reports 2007 Second Quarter Results, Countrywide Financial, Press Release, 24 July 2007 Back

131   OECD, Financial market Highlights, November 2007 Back

132   BNP Paribas, press release, 9 August 2007 Back

133   Speech by the Governor of the Bank of England, at the Northern Ireland Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Belfast, 9 October 2007, p 3 Back

134   Q 1688 Back

135   The implications of globalised financial markets on regulation, Speech by Sir Callum McCarthy, Chairman of the Financial Services Authority, at the IIF 25th Anniversary Annual Membership meeting, Washington DC, USA, 20 October 2007 Back

136   Ev 333 Back

137   Q 780 Back

138   Q 749 Back

139   Q 11 Back

140   Speech by the Governor of the Bank of England, at the Northern Ireland Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Belfast, 9 October 2007 Back

141   Martin Weale, 'Northern Rock: Solutions and Problems', National Institute Economic Review, October 2007 Back

142   Q 783 Back

143   Q 93 Back

144   Ev 215 Back

145   Q 93 Back

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