Select Committee on Treasury Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 320-339)

RT HON ALISTAIR DARLING, MR DAVE RAMSDEN, MR MIKE WILLIAMS, MR EDWARD TROUP AND MR SIMON GALLAGHER

19 MARCH 2008

  Q320  Mr Dunne: With respect, you have considered it, you decided to defer it for a year and you have not told us how you are going to treat it.

  Mr Darling: We are still considering how we deal with that. We have decided, as you say, that it is not going to be implemented this year. What I would say to you is that the PFI has enabled us to do a lot of building of schools and hospitals and so on that we would not otherwise have been able to do. What I want to do is to consider how we deal with it because we do not want to get ourselves into a situation where we reach decisions that no rational person would actually reach because of a change that might be made. But that is something which I am still reflecting upon.

  Mr Ramsden: Could I just add—and I hope this is helpful—that actually the ONS when they came and discussed this issue with you said that it was rather more complicated than that they had decided. They said that they would have to look at what was decided by the accountancy guidance coming out of FRAB on the standards that were going to be applied and then they would have to see how those would be translated into the national accounts framework, which is the one that ONS use to produce their statistics. What we announced in the Budget and as we discussed with you yesterday was that as a result of discussions with departments it has become clear that the IFRS standards are going to have to be applied a year later because some departments are having particular problems, and also local authorities are having problems with the new standards on PFI. So there is a lot of detailed technical work that has to be run through first before we are in a position to consider the implications, if any, for the fiscal framework.

  Q321  Mr Dunne: Just picking up on your response to Mr Fallon on the issue of Northern Rock, which, again, you have chosen not to include within the sustainable investment rule.

  Mr Darling: Because it would be ridiculous to do so.

  Q322  Mr Dunne: The US authorities and JP Morgan took five days to sort out Bear Stearns; you took over five months to sort out Northern Rock. Have you had the opportunity to calculate what the impact on public debt would have been had you taken the Lloyds TSB offer and provided a facility which has many parallels to what happened in the US last weekend?

  Mr Darling: Let me go to this. There was no Lloyds TSB offer. When I have given evidence on two or three occasions now I have made the position absolutely clear—there was an inquiry made on a "what if?" basis but it was never pursued. Indeed, you also covered in your excellent Treasury Select Committee report the question of this and you said that you came to the view that I think you would have doubts, even if such an offer had been made, as to whether or not it would have been wise and prudent to have done it. So I really have to deal with that yet again. There was no offer made, as a number of witnesses who have appeared before this Select Committee have said. In relation to Northern Rock point generally, since you and Mr Fallon keep repeating the point, the reason that we spent the autumn looking to see whether or not we could find a private sector buyer is because I believed then and I believe now that Northern Rock's future ultimately must lie in the private sector. That is why we worked to see whether or not we could find a solution and because of current conditions it was not possible to do so. That is why we took the decision and then eventually we took the view that because of all the considerations it was best to take Northern Rock into a period of temporary public ownership. I think we were right to do all these things and we were right to do it because of the particular time when these things took place. So I do not accept the underlying premise of your proposition but it follows, therefore, that, no, I have not made the calculation that you are asking about. The other thing is that I think it would be absolutely bonkers to take account of Northern Rock in relation to the sustainable investment rule because, frankly, it would mean you would have to slash large amounts of public expenditure to accommodate what is a temporary arrangement, and I cannot see the sense of that and I do not know if any sensible commentator is arguing that we should.

  Q323  Mr Dunne: Chancellor, the parallels with Bear Stearns are now very, very close and I think your analysis that you just gave to Mr Fallon is incorrect. You said that you rested your argument very much on the share price of Bear Stearns and my recollection—

  Mr Darling: No, I did not.

  Q324  Mr Dunne: I think the transcript will show you did.

  Mr Darling: I mentioned it as one of the points; I did not rest my argument on it.

  Q325  Mr Dunne: The share price of Bear Stearns on the Friday, I believe, was of the order of $27 and $2 was the price which JP Morgan agreed to pay on the Sunday, so that was determined in negotiation with the authorities and the board of Bear Stearns and was not determined by the market, which was the argument you were trying to make.

  Mr Darling: That was not the argument I was trying to make. I understand perfectly what you are trying to do and I just do not accept it. As I said to you, since you have raised the matter, in relation to Northern Rock Lloyds TSB did not make an offer; they made an inquiry over a weekend as to would the government or the Bank be willing to make something like £35 million available, and as you yourselves said—and again I think you are a signatory to this report—what they were asking for is apparently to give £30 billion to a healthy, profitable bank to purchase what, at that time, was also a bank that was a going concern. There were state aid considerations, there were the considerations of whether or not you would do it, whether it was the right thing to do; there were considerations about whether or not you would have to ask around to see whether other people were willing to do it at a lesser price—all these considerations would have to be taken into account. As it happened Lloyds TSB did not pursue their inquiry and by the beginning of the week they had lost interest in it. Whether you like it or not those are the facts of the matter and actually if you look at the conclusions that you drew in your own report that rather bears out what I am saying. The position in relation to America was different, and I mentioned that the difference in the share price was simply this: that at the time we are talking about, the conversation with Lloyds TSB, to the outside world most people were blissfully unaware of what was happening, and what you had was Northern Rock at that time having reported pretty good profits—it was trading quite happily. But the position with Bear Stearns by the end of that last week was rather different.

  Q326  Ms Keeble: I want to ask about child poverty. First of all, can you give us some assurances about the government's prospects of meeting the 2010 target for halving child poverty?

  Mr Darling: That is what we are working towards. I think I said—if not at this Select Committee I have certainly said in the House—that I feel very strongly about our obligation to meet our 2020 target, which is to eradicate child poverty, and our objective is to halve child poverty by 2010. What I tried to do last week was to make a substantial contribution towards that. This is a difficult target but it is a target that is well worth pursuing.

  Q327  Ms Keeble: I understand that and I think all of us would agree with that. I want to ask particularly about changes on housing benefit and council tax in relation with child benefit, which is, along with the increase in the child tax credit element, the most expensive part of your package. Could you confirm first of all that that only comes in in October 2009?

  Mr Darling: Yes.

  Q328  Ms Keeble: Secondly, the Budget papers say that the working couple with one child would get up to £17 a week. The Library did what they call a rough and ready calculation based on the information that was provided and they found that a couple with one child would get £7.46 a week—there are certain assumptions under that. The Treasury figures, working on slightly different income figures, estimated it was £19.63 a week. That is quite a wide range.

  Mr Darling: I would need to see the House of Commons Library's calculation.

  Q329  Ms Keeble: The Treasury figures of £19.63 are obviously well above the "up to £17" so I wondered how robust the figures are, when all the information is going to be provided so that people can work out what it is, and also an assurance that you are actually going to be able to afford it and that it will be properly, fully funded and carried through in October 2009?

  Mr Darling: On the last point, yes, it is affordable; and, yes, we will do it. I thought you were going to ask a slightly different point, but I am not sure that the Committee got the papers it asked for yesterday?

  Q330  Ms Keeble: Yes, I did and I have read them and that is what I am asking you about.

  Mr Darling: One of them was in relation to housing benefit and when we endeavoured to explain—which I readily accept is a complex calculation, which is to show a comparison between this year and next year in relation to the same family, and it shows how that family will gain as a result of the changes we have made. But the answer to your question is yes, we can afford it; yes, we will see it through. What I cannot comment on is the House of Commons Library calculation—rough and ready or not, I have not seen it and I think we would need to see the basis on which they were making that calculation. But there is such a wide difference and the calculations have been made of the best possible estimates we could make.

  Q331  Ms Keeble: The other thing is that since this is only coming in in October 2009 the full year effect will only be in 2010-11, so how can you count these figures towards the achievement of the 2010 target? How do you include those numbers in?

  Mr Darling: The 2010 target makes an allowance for that. From the moment they come, in October 2009 they will have an effect.

  Q332  Ms Keeble: Yes, but that is two months before the end of the year—

  Mr Darling: October.

  Q333  Ms Keeble: That is two months before the target, is it not?

  Mr Darling: The figures that we gave in the Budget are our best estimate of how many people will gain as a result of the changes that we are making to housing benefit and also in relation to the child credit. But in relation to the actual breakdown of figures, unless Mike Williams, who may have seen these things, can add to it I do not think I can say anything. But the housing benefit which comes in in 2010—the measure is implemented before 2010.

  Q334  Ms Keeble: October 2009. So the full effects of tax year 2010-11.

  Mr Darling: Yes, that is right.

  Q335  Ms Keeble: And there will be a muddle with the councils for the first two months whilst they sort it out, I have no doubt.

  Mr Darling: We will try and resolve that but I would think that other people too would agree that it is quite a sizeable step in the right direction.

  Q336  Ms Keeble: Yes, indeed; I agree with that. What I was going to say was that given there is still going to be a gap that has to be filled, are you then considering more measures towards the back end of next year, around about October 2009 or into 2010? Would you be looking perhaps at something like seasonal grants, or are you looking at other measures particularly to support people who are entirely on benefit, given that these advantages go to the working families?

  Mr Darling: Obviously as and when we have further proposals to make we will announce them, but probably not today because it is only a week after the Budget. You will see that on the day of the Budget we published a short paper which outlines various measures that we wanted to take to tackle child poverty. You raised a perfectly pertinent point in relation to the administration of housing benefit, which particularly in London is a big problem because you want people to go into work, you want to be able to make the change calculations for in-work help as quickly as you possibly can, but there are a number of measures that we want to take in relation to that to help get more children out of poverty. Some of what we can do does come down to cash—other things come down to administration. The other key thing, of course, is getting more and more people into work. But if you look at the cumulative effect of what we have been doing over the last few years, and measures last October, which will affect about 100,000 people and about 250,000 people as a result of measures I announced last week, as well as last year's Budget, of course, it does make, I hope, quite a substantial contribution to the objective we both share.

  Q337  Ms Keeble: I agree with that. I have one further question, which is have you revised your target of three million new homes to be built by 2020 in the light of the reported closure of credit markets for speculative development; and what impact will have that on affordable and social housing, given that increasingly that is being provided as part of percentages of private sector building?

  Mr Darling: No, we have not. This is a long term target and it really goes back to what I was saying right at the start. Yes, there is short term uncertainty but we are, I believe, well placed to get through that. But it is important that in the Budget last week and in the future we remain very focused on what we need to do over the longer term, which is to get more houses. Of course, in the Budget too I also announced the review into housing finance generally and there are other measures that we are looking at to improve the financing of housing. These were important even before the recent events and they are extremely important now.

  Q338  Mr Mudie: Chancellor, I thought you were a bit unfair with my colleague, Mr Dunne.

  Mr Darling: I do not think I could ever do that!

  Q339  Mr Mudie: I thought you were a bit unfair because our view did contain reservations about how the Bank of England had behaved with the TSB, and you can set our minds at rest if you can put on record that a representative, maybe even as high as the Governor, actually met the TSB to discuss a possible offer because we can find no evidence other than the Governor saying he "remembers a vague telephone call" put through his officers, emanating from the FSA about "some sort of bid". When I compare it with what the Fed got stuck into last week and compare that with our Central Bank, I am certainly of the opinion that it left a lot to be desired.

  Mr Darling: I have no knowledge that the Governor met anybody from Lloyds TSB. The best of my knowledge is, as Callum McCarthy said to you, that that was that a phone call was received, I think one weekend, asking speculatively "what if?" and the speculative reply was given and that was that.



 
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