Mr.
Francois: I shall switch briefly to Sudan. As the Minister
will know, EUFOR Chad is due to merge later this month with the United
Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and
Chad—MINURCAT. What role will the EUSR have in Chad when EUFOR
comes to an end, and how are the arrangements going for the handover,
which is clearly a mater of some
importance?
Caroline
Flint: The special representative for the Sudan has worked
to develop a clear and consistent EU policy in line with the P3
partners. It gives other international partners a clear indication of
the EU support of UK policies in Sudan and will encourage others,
particularly Russia and China, to engage in a similar way. The special
representative will also—perhaps this will answer my hon. Friend
the Member for Leyton and Wanstead’s earlier
question—assist Sudanese parties, the African Union and the
United Nations to achieve a political settlement to the conflict in
Darfur through the Darfur peace agreement, the comprehensive peace
agreement and the south-south dialogue, and the eastern Sudan peace
agreement,
too. The
EU issued a statement congratulating both parties on the fourth
anniversary of the signing of the CPA on 9 January this year, and was
represented by the EUSR at both the AU summit and the Darfur peace
talks in Doha in February. Reporting on contacts continues to be
provided on Sudan and information on EU activities can be shared with
EU
partners.
Harry
Cohen: In relation to Georgia, does the EU special
representative accept that it was wrong to take a partisan and
uncritical position in relation to President Saakashvili, who started
the conflict in that area?
Caroline
Flint: My right. hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary and I
have acknowledged that some of the actions taken in Georgia could have
been better thought through. Having said that, the actions by Russia
were disproportionate and broke the international agreements that it
had signed up to. I mentioned Ambassador Morel earlier. Given his
background and experience as ambassador to Moscow, he is a good person
to play the role that he does in relation to the Geneva talks. He and
his team frequently visit London for talks with UK officials and he
brings considerable skill and experience of the region to that
job.
Harry
Cohen: In those circumstances, would it be better for the
emphasis to be on discussions with Russia to try to get a long-term
solution, and to abstain from the threats that were made to Russia by
the EU in the aftermath of the conflict?
Caroline
Flint: My hon. Friend asks for quite a wide debate. We
support Mr. Morel’s endeavours, and talk-talk is
always a good idea with all
parties.
Mr.
Francois: While we still have time, on the matter of
Sudan, as the Minister will probably know, on Wednesday 4 March the
office of the prosecutor of the ICC is likely to make a decision on
whether it will issue an arrest warrant for President Bashir. What role
has the EU special representative played and what contingency plans are
in place should there be an adverse reaction if such a warrant is
issued?
Caroline
Flint: The hon. Gentleman raises a serious point. The ICC
judges said that they will issue a decision on 4 March. It is a bit
premature to comment in advance of their announcement, but there has
been close UK and EU co-ordination on Sudan. It will be even more
important at this sensitive time. We continue to urge the Government of
Sudan to engage with the ICC and to take concrete actions towards peace
in Sudan. On those issues we are working hand in hand with the
representative.
Mr.
Cash: The Minister may be aware that under Council joint
action 2009 regarding Kosovo, there is specific provision under article
8 for the security of classified information, and therefore that kind
of information within the framework of the Council security regulations
is not a matter on which the Minister is able to provide us with any
information. Does she not agree that that is something that prevents us
from being able to question her, the Foreign Secretary or even the
Prime
Minister?
Caroline
Flint: I am not quite sure what that has to do with the
representative.
Mr.
Cash: It has a great deal—it is his
role.
The
Chairman: That brings us to the end of questions, and we
now move to an hour and a quarter of debate. Up until now, everybody
has had an opportunity to have their say, and I hope that hon. Members
will, in that spirit, be generous to each other and allow everyone who
wants to get in on the debate to have their
say.
Motion
made, and Question proposed,
That the
Committee takes note of an unnumbered explanatory memorandum dated 14
January 2009 from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on European Union
Council Joint actions
extending the mandates of the European Union Special Representatives for
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, the African Great Lakes and
Sudan; and supports the Government's policy of extending these mandates
until 28 February
2010. 5.45
pm
Mr.
Francois: I have already paid my compliments to you on
chairing the Committee, Mr. Hancock, and if I may crave your
indulgence for one moment, I should like to mention something that
happened as I came through Portcullis House on my way to the Committee.
By sheer coincidence, I bumped into a man called Geoff Williams who
was, and still is, the leader of the Liberal Democrats on Basildon
council, on which I served in the 1990s. I mention that because he
suffered from a long illness, from which he has, fortunately, now
recovered, and I just want to say how wonderful it was for me to see
him looking
well.
The
Chairman: And for me, too.
Mr.
Francois: I hear you pay him your compliments, too,
Mr. Hancock. Thank you for that, and I hope that the
Committee will forgive me that indulgence. Mr. Williams is a
very decent man and it is good to see him back on fine form.
I thank the
hon. Member for Luton, North for introducing the documents on behalf of
the European Scrutiny Committee. Having heard some of his questions to
the Minister, I am particularly pleased that he turned up this
afternoon. The
documents allow the mandates of four EU special
representatives—those to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Sudan
and the African great lakes region—to be extended for a further
year. In a fifth case—Macedonia—the proposal is to extend
the mandate for six months, partly to coincide with the double-hatting
of the special representative, Mr. FouÃ(c)rÃ(c), as
the head of the European Commission delegation in Skopje. In her letter
of 19 February, the Minister explained that in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, where the incumbent Miroslav Lajcák, suddenly
resigned, a new mandate will presumably be required once a replacement
is found, and we clarified the technical issues in our questions
earlier. The
Minister agreed the mandate extensions on behalf of the UK at the EU
Economic and Financial Affairs Council on 10 February. I am grateful
for the explanation in her letter of 9 February of the timing of the
decisions on the scrutiny reserve and of the need to go ahead without
agreement the following day so as not to bring about the premature
closure of the special representative’s offices.
I am also
grateful to the Minister for her letter of 26 February on
the distribution of materials to this Committee and for looking into
the late arrival of documents. I hope that the process will now work
more smoothly and that documents to be debated will arrive in good
time. I thank the Minister for chasing that up.
There are 11
EU special representatives covering a number of important crisis areas
or areas of strategic interest to the EU. They are appointed by the EU
Council and are responsible to Javier Solana, the EU High
Representative for the common foreign and security policy. They are
tasked with carrying out EU policies agreed by the EU Council. In that,
they remain distinct
from the EU Commission, although in a number of areas they are also the
EU Commission’s head of delegation, which has already started to
blur the distinction between the EU Commission and the EU
Council. I shall
examine the post in more detail. I begin with Bosnia and Herzegovina,
which we have discussed on a number of occasions and which remains
critical to the stability of the western Balkans. Quite a number of the
questions that I asked earlier were about Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
part of the reason for that is that no member of the
Committee—indeed, no Member of Parliament—would wish to
see a return to violence in the Balkans. I therefore hope that the
Minister will understand why I pressed her in such detail on the
issue.
The EU
special representative to Bosnia and Herzegovina is presently
double-hatted with the post of the international High Representative.
As we have heard, Mr. Miroslav Lajcák, has recently
resigned to take up the post of Slovakian Foreign Minister.
Unfortunately, that leaves Bosnia without a strong local EU voice at
this difficult time. Reforms have slowed down or even reversed, the
central institutions remain weak and nationalist voices in Republic
Srpska have again started to talk of secession—threats, which if
carried through, could lead to serious outbreaks of
violence.
Mr.
Cash: Does my hon. Friend agree that there are
considerable problems and potential crises with the issue that he has
just mentioned? It is a serious problem, is it
not?
Mr.
Francois: It is, which is why I put so many questions to
the Minister. I hope that I can amplify the seriousness of the issues
in the next couple of minutes.
Bosnia is
approaching a turning point—whether it goes forward or regresses
to the sectarian violence of yesteryear. It is therefore vital that the
EU has a strong representative to replace Mr. Lajcák,
as well as a strong EUFOR mission to maintain the stability of the
region. Unfortunately, the circumstances surrounding the appointment of
his replacement appear confused. The Minister, in her letter of 19
February to the European Scrutiny Committee, stated that the UK was
proposing Mr. Emyr Jones Parry for the role. Sir Emyr is,
indeed, well qualified for the role and could have brought the
political weight of a large EU member state to the position. However,
he withdrew from the selection process before the final decision was
taken, and there are conflicting media reports about why. One
explanation is that he withdrew when it became apparent that his
commitments as chair of the All Wales Convention for further Welsh
Assembly powers made it impossible for him to take up the post.
However, that appointment had been on public record for some time and
was surely known to the FCO before his candidacy was proposed. Another
potential explanation is that Russia and Republic Srpska made it clear
that they would not accept a British candidate, possibly because,
remembering Lord Ashdown’s period in office, they feared a
British candidate would provide a strong international voice and help
to strengthen the central Bosnian institutions.
Unfortunately,
that gloomy, short-term prognosis has not been met with strong
international resolve or political will. EUFOR is no longer under
threat of imminent withdrawal, and that is welcome. However, the lack
of
clear political will is in danger of allowing political instability to
grow. Given all that, the uncertainty about the office of the EU
special representative and of the international High Representative is
very unwelcome, and the confusion over the nomination of Sir Emyr
compounds the problem. I should therefore be grateful if the Minister
could explain the background to the confusion and set out her thinking
about how to strengthen the EU’s institutions in Bosnia to
prevent the real threat of it falling back into the problems that we
witnessed so unfortunately in the 1990s. The EU
special representative in Kosovo is Peter Feith, who is tasked with
helping to implement the Ahtisaari plan. There is still much work to be
done in Kosovo so it makes sense to roll over his mandate for a further
year. On a related point, will the Minister clarify whether there is
any truth in recent media reports that the EU is likely to scale down
the EULEX mission? She gave me an ambiguous response when I questioned
her on that point so, being generous, I shall allow her one more bite
of the cherry to see if she wishes to say anything further about EULEX
and Kosovo.
The
EU’s mission to Macedonia is important due to its oversight of
the 2001 Ohrid framework. Progress has been made in that area, but, as
we saw with the violence surrounding last year’s election, to
which several Members have referred this afternoon, much work remains
to be done. We therefore support the continuance of the mandate for
another year and hope that the EU will continue to help Macedonia to
progress in the meantime.
I shall
switch continents and move on to Sudan. The EU special representative
to Sudan has in his mandate the task of co-ordinating with the EUFOR
mission to Chad and helping with the implementation of the Darfur peace
agreement and the comprehensive peace agreement that includes southern
Sudan. It is clear that major problems remain in Sudan and that the
situation is far from peaceful. We therefore believe that extending the
mandate for another year is necessary.
I shall move
south towards the equator and the African great lakes area. The EU
special representative for the great lakes region is tasked with
helping to promote stability and democracy, which is no small challenge
in what has been a much-troubled mission, so we think it sensible to
extend Mr. van de Geer’s mandate for another year and
hope that progress can be made in that area, too.
The motion
asks us approve the extension of the five mandates that we have been
discussing. However, the European Scrutiny Committee suggests that we
might also take this opportunity to comment on some of the activities
of the EU special representatives in Afghanistan, central Asia,
Georgia, Moldova, the middle east and the south Caucasus. Several
Committee members touched on some of those posts during questions to
the Minister. I thank you again, Mr. Hancock, for using your
discretion to allow the question time to be extended. Nevertheless, I
have just a few points to add in relation to some of the other
countries and I hope that the Minister will have an opportunity to
respond. The
Minister will be well aware that we have been in dialogue for some time
with a number of our European and NATO partners about the need for them
to provide a greater military contribution, particularly a front-line
contribution, to operations in Afghanistan. To what extent, if any, has
the EU special representative been
involved in these discussions or in encouraging our partners to step up
their military contributions to the international security assistance
force? Switching
to the middle east, following the recent events in
Gaza—
The
Chairman: May I interrupt for a few seconds to say that
the Committee’s brief this afternoon is to stick very much to
the five? I know that Mr. Hopkins, in his introduction,
suggested that the Committee might have a wider-ranging debate, but we
ought to make small suggestions about the actions of the other six and
stick to discussion on the five. May I ask you to bear that in
mind?
Mr.
Francois: Of course, I will abide by the ruling of the
Chair. But in all seriousness I ask for greater guidance. Perhaps I can
explain. My understanding is that the motion relates to the five
special representatives, which we are debating, in essence, but I also
understand, looking at some of the correspondence in the bundle, that
the European Scrutiny Committee—not you, Mr. Hancock,
or I—recommended that the other documents on the role of the
other EU special representatives should also be included in this
afternoon’s debate. So having spent a bit of Sunday reading some
of this stuff, I thought that it was probably right to ask the Minister
at least a few questions, because the ESC put them forward to be
debated this afternoon. I look to the hon. Member for Luton, North to
see if he wants to
intervene. That
is my understanding, Mr. Hancock. Perhaps you can guide
me.
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