Mr.
Francois: I have one further
question.
Caroline
Flint: I am sorry, but I shall not give way. I have taken
a lot of questions during the debate, and it might be that I answer
some of the hon. Gentleman’s questions in my next contribution.
However, as I said, I am always happy to write to him and other
Committee members if I have not got all the information to hand in the
debate. On
the European capability initiatives, we have signed up to those on
helicopters and European carrier group interoperability. The latter
includes current carriers. We facilitated the work that set up the
airlift fleet under our presidency, but we are not one of the 12
nations partaking because we have a significant airlift fleet of our
own. The purpose of the airlift fleet is to allow countries that wish
to do so to pool their capabilities and resources to enable those who
need an airlift capability to benefit from shared efficiencies. The
countries that have signed the declaration to that effect are Belgium,
the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and
Spain. A
question was asked about why the European Defence Agency rather than
NATO has undertaken capability development. I agree that we should look
to develop capability across all European nations—both NATO and
EU members. A number of initiatives, such as the UK-launched helicopter
initiative and the successful strategic airlift interim solution are
open to both EU and NATO member states co-operating together with EU
and NATO staff. All such initiatives are voluntary and therefore do not
constrain UK procurement.
It is
important to get that matter in perspective: the European Defence
Agency employs around 100 staff, whereas NATO has many hundreds of
staff managing defence planning and capability. I am sure that the hon.
Gentleman would agree that it is beneficial to work through both
organisations to capture all the levers to support countries to improve
capability. The EU has been instrumental in transforming
Sweden’s deployable capability, which has already contributed
both to EU missions and to NATO operations in Afghanistan. It is
important that the EU and NATO work together. We have been working with
the Czech presidency to see how we can strengthen the EU-NATO
capability group to achieve that, including through joint working
groups on unmanned aerial vehicles and other areas.
We support
the civil-military planning directorate. Every expert in crisis
management agrees that success requires civilian and military effect to
be planned together as part of a comprehensive approach. It is one of
the EU’s great strengths that it is able to deploy the whole
range of civil and military tools and the development work of the
Commission to the same aim.
The issue of
how we look at development and other softer measures to complement and
enhance where there is military engagement was also mentioned. It makes
much more sense to bring those staff together into one team. That is
how we try to do strategic planning nationally in the UK, so, of
course, it is how
we would like the EU to operate. It is important to remember that we are
talking about strategic planning, which we have always supported; we
are not talking about a separate EU operational headquarters. The EU
already has other means available to run its missions. So why should we
continue to impose an EU operational HQ in
Brussels? A
question was asked about EULEX and what is happening with that mission.
We will continue funding for 32 personnel to EULEX in the next
financial year, which is down from 63 personnel at present. The
remaining UK secondees have influential roles in every major unit of
EULEX and we also provide the deputy head of commission. In deciding
which roles to keep, we have consulted the head of mission and focused
on areas where we believe UK personnel can add real expertise and have
maximum impact. As I said, we will have UK secondees in all the major
offices. In the justice component, we have a range of people in
different positions, from a judge to court recorders, to strengthen the
sector, which was deemed by the head of mission to be the weakest in
Kosovo. We believe that these secondments will deliver direct benefits
to the UK’s work on stability and the rule of law in Kosovo, as
well as supporting our overall commitment to
ESDP.
Mr.
Francois: So, in simple terms we have effectively halved
our
contribution?
Caroline
Flint: Let us not forget that we make a contribution in
many countries, both in Europe and beyond, to make sure that we can be
as effective as possible. That is what we have judged we have done. We
have a very important presence in Kosovo. Our work there runs alongside
the other work that we do, in terms of diplomatic activity and the
other ways that we support Kosovo on the
ground. The
hon. Member for East Dunbartonshire asked a question about arms to
Israel, which I answered. However, I thought that I might expand a
little on recent developments. Our record on exporting arms to Israel
has recently undergone a judicial review. The courts found no evidence
to suggest that Her Majesty’s Government are not properly
applying EU and national export controls. It is not yet clear what
equipment was used by the Israel Defence Forces in Gaza and we have
undertaken our own assessment, based on a variety of sources. When that
process is complete, we will make the information available to
Parliament. My colleague, the Minister of State, Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, the hon. Member for Harlow (Bill Rammell), made
that clear at the evidence session of the Foreign Affairs Committee on
4 March. I hope that the hon. Lady finds that information helpful in
response to her earlier inquiry.
Along with
the hon. Member for North-East Cambridgeshire, the hon. Lady also
raised the question about the EUPOL COPPS mission in Palestine. Again,
I answered that question and I am happy to confirm that the assessment
report on the Palestinian criminal justice system, including elements
on penitentiary reform and donor nations, was completed in January
2009, as I indicated earlier. An action plan is being drawn up with the
Palestinian authorities to draw on the recommendations of that
report.
Our policy
remains that there will be no standing European army, navy or air
force. EU member states contribute to rapid reaction elements known as
battle groups, which are small, mobile, self-sustained multinational
forces designed for rapid intervention to nip a crisis in the bud,
typically in response to a UN request. Member states collectively
provide two battle groups on stand-by in any six-month period. Any
decision to deploy battle groups on operations is voluntary and is a
decision for national Governments to make on a case-by-case
basis.
We have a
double lock on deploying British personnel in an ESDP context and, as I
have said, unanimity among the 27 EU member states in the Council is
required. The decision makers in the UK will always have a veto on
whether the EU should undertake a particular operation. Each member
state then offers military or civilian assets on a voluntary basis and
any UK contribution to such an operation is strictly voluntary and
considered carefully against other national commitments. That is also
the position of the French President, who said on 17 June 2008 that
French armed
forces: “are
and will remain national. They will not be integrated into any
supranational force.”
We believe that it
makes no more sense to describe ESDP as a “European army”
than it does to talk about NATO being a “transatlantic
army” or the UN a “world
army”. The
review of the European security strategy is intended as an update of
the 2003 European security strategy. We see it as a framework within
which the EU should take forward its actions in the external field. It
is not intended as a detailed programme of action. Its usefulness is in
having achieved a common understanding across the EU27 of the security
challenges that we face and the main areas of action required to tackle
them. As
a Council document agreed by all 27 member states, we would expect the
ESS review to be used in strategic decisions about policy across all EU
institutions. It is publicly available as well as being signposted on
the Council intranet. We will encourage presidency chairs and the
secretariat to take it into account in their work.
I hope that
the Committee agrees that the French presidency report on European
security and defence policy is a fair and valuable report on the
positive
ESDP-related initiatives undertaken during the French presidency. I also
hope that it now agrees that the review of the ESS provides a helpful
assessment of the EU’s progress in tackling key security and
defence
threats. Mr.
Francois: Will the Minister give
way?
Caroline
Flint: No, I shall not give way again.
Finally, I
hope that the House agrees that the EU has already proved its worth in
the field of European security and defence, and that by improving the
civilian and military capabilities needed for crisis management
operations, the EU can become increasingly significant in conflict
resolution and prevention. I and UK citizens should feel safer as a
result of this engagement and the positive results delivered through
the EU, which can add value to what we can achieve as a national
Government. Question
put. The
Committee divided: Ayes 8, Noes
4.
Division
No.
1] Question
accordingly agreed to.
Resolved, That
the Committee takes note of European Union Documents No. 16686/08,
French Presidency Report on European Security and Defence Policy, and
No. 17104/08, Report on the Implementation of the European Security
Strategy—Providing Security in a Changing World; welcomes the
French Presidency’s report and the High Commissioner’s
review; and supports the Government’s position that UK and
European security are enhanced by action coordinated at an EU
level. 6.42
pm Committee
rose.
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