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As matters unfold over the coming months, I hope that the Government will be prepared to give more time on the Floor of the House to these important issues. The Foreign Secretary will know that, for some time, we have argued for regular, detailed, quarterly reports to the House when British troops are engaged in prolonged action, with an explanation and assessment of objectives set and attained, and of the policy intentions and resources allocated for the future. In the absence of such reports, the Government have sometimes elided one stated objective into another less ambitious one, without much formal acknowledgment to Parliament. I will give the Foreign Secretary some examples, because he is looking a bit doubtful about that. For instance, the lead role for the United Kingdom in combating the Afghan narcotics trade was clearly trumpeted in our original objectives. However, the conversion of that lead role into a lower-key partner nation role emerged only in answers to written parliamentary questions.
As my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) has pointed out, we have recently seen a change of tone in how the objectives are spoken of by the US Defence Secretary, in a probably inevitable move away from idealism to realism that we should welcome. However, it was only through written parliamentary questions that we discovered that 17 British officials have, quite rightly, been working with, and effectively embedded within, the American strategy review.
Mr. Denis MacShane (Rotherham) (Lab): Good!
Mr. Hague: Yes, it is very good, but perhaps Parliament should be informed of these things, without the information having to be elicited all the time through written answers. We were told on 26 November last year in a written answer from the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the hon. Member for Harlow (Bill Rammell):
“A formal review mechanism was initiated this year”—
“the first detailed periodic assessment covering the preceding 12 month period will be completed by the end of 2008”
“the House will be informed of the implications of the assessment.”—[ Official Report, 26 November 2008; Vol. 483, c. 1742-43W.]
However, it is not evident that that review has been completed or that the House has been informed of the implications of the assessment.
The Prime Minister announced a week later that he was leading a review of Afghanistan policy, bringing all the Departments together. I say to Ministers, however, that it is not clear from outside the Government what form that review will take or why the periodic assessment was not complete at the end of last year. From what one can tell from outside the Government, there are several overlapping processes going on rather than a single review. They include a process that the Prime Minister chairs in person but irregularly, trilateral meetings between the three relevant Departments chaired by the Foreign Secretary, an Afghanistan strategy group separate from that, a separate senior officials group and three separate strategy teams within the relevant Departments. I would be happy to be told that matters are better co-ordinated than that sounds, but it puzzles me why this work does
not take place as a single integrated review under the auspices of the National Security Committee that the Prime Minister announced in July 2007. A Downing street website lists the responsibilities of that Committee as discussing
“all issues relating to defence and counter-terrorism, including international defence and security”,
but the setting up of separate reviews of Afghanistan policy suggests that the Committee is not working together as an integrated departmental forum.
I make those points because the way government functions is fundamental to the consistent pursuit of a sound strategy and because there have undoubtedly been difficulties in co-operation between the relevant Departments in previous conflicts, which is one reason why I believe there are important lessons to be learned from the circumstances of the war in Iraq and why there should be no further delay in establishing an inquiry into the origins and conduct of the Iraq war.
Turning to the situation in Afghanistan now, it is clear to all of us who have visited that country in recent times that British servicemen and women—and, indeed, the diplomats and aid workers to whom the Foreign Secretary referred—do a job that is often little short of heroic and sometimes literally heroic, fighting in conditions of extreme heat or cold, spending long periods in close proximity to the enemy and using equipment often not originally designed for such situations or terrain.
In the last year, according to international security assistance force officials, there has been an increase of a third in the number of attacks against coalition forces, and of course a huge increase, to which the Foreign Secretary referred, in the number of improvised explosive device attacks in Helmand province against our own troops. All that is in the context of a truly vast country with huge deserts and dramatic mountain ranges. Seeing such terrain with one’s own eyes brings home how difficult it is for relatively small numbers of troops to control that sort of formidable terrain. As the noble Lord Ashdown pointed out last week in an article in The Times:
“We are trying to win in Afghanistan with one twenty-fifth of the troops and one-fiftieth of the aid per head than in Bosnia. And... Afghanistan is much more difficult.”
In Helmand province the scale and difficulty of this challenge have meant that our forces have only relatively small areas under permanent and secure control—a situation that has made the delivery of aid and reconstruction projects extremely difficult and the eradication of the narcotics trade, for the moment, impossible. Our troops do a wonderful job not only in relations with local communities but, of course, in military terms, winning every tactical encounter and often inflicting sustained and serious damage on their enemy. But as we all know, that is not the same as controlling the ground or achieving a strategic victory.
The Taliban’s intended route to a strategic victory is, I think, discernible. It is to confine our forces in Helmand and other NATO forces in difficult areas near their bases, while attacking NATO’s supply lines and beginning to make life more difficult in Kabul itself, so that it starts to feel being closed in on. Following the destruction of a bridge in the Khyber pass in recent days and the apparent intention of the Government of Kyrgyzstan to deny the United States the use of the Manas air base,
Ministers may wish to expand at the end of the debate on the outlook for NATO’s supply lines and assure the House that the operations of our troops will not be endangered by any disruptions to military and civilian supplies.
History teaches us that embarking on an attempt to conquer Afghanistan would be a foolish exercise, and military experts would tell us that any such attempt would require many times the level of forces that the United States and the rest of NATO have committed. But that, of course, has never been the objective. Our purpose has been to permit the people of Afghanistan to decide their own future in a way that enhances their own security and livelihoods without presenting a danger to the rest of the world. Success has therefore been predicated on popular support rather than military force on its own, for none of us has ever believed that there was a purely military solution to this conflict.
The great problem now appears to be that support among the Afghan people on a sufficiently widespread basis that the Taliban and its allies would find it impossible to prosecute the war depends on at least four factors being in place. The first is visibly effective reconstruction of the Afghan economy and infrastructure across the country; the second is effective government that is respected and not seen as arbitrary or corrupt; the third is relative security for Afghan families and communities; and the fourth is a perception of inevitable success rather than uncertainty about the outcome.
I think it fair to say that the reason our troops are having such a difficult time in realising the vision of a peaceful and democratic Afghanistan is that at present none of those four essential requirements for their success is in place. The result is, at best, a strategic stalemate, and that is what the current review of strategy, particularly that taking place in Washington, must obviously set out to break.
It is hugely welcome that President Obama has said all along, and said throughout this election campaign, that he would bring an urgent and fresh focus to Afghanistan, and has also said something confirmed by the appointment of Ambassador Holbrooke: that the United States will regard the issues of Afghanistan and Pakistan as an integrated whole. That General Petraeus, whom the Foreign Secretary will talk to later, is at the centre of Washington’s strategic review is enormously encouraging, because he has shown in Iraq a keen sense of the need for political and military progress to run alongside each other. We now await details of the action proposed when the review has been completed. We hope that Ministers here will make a fresh statement in parallel with any announcements made in Washington, rather than the British Parliament’s hearing about what is to happen on CNN one afternoon when we are not expecting it.
Mr. MacShane: The right hon. Gentleman quoted President Obama, who said just before his election “Afghanistan is a priority for me. The solution to Afghanistan is not achievable without the help and involvement of Pakistan, and to secure some stability in Pakistan we must address the Kashmir issue.” I note that the Foreign Secretary did not mention India or Kashmir—probably rightly, as far as he is concerned. I wonder what the shadow Foreign Secretary, who has a freer remit, has to say about that. If he has nothing to say, I shall address the issue in my speech.
Mr. Hague: The Foreign Secretary probably feels that he has said enough about Kashmir for the moment, and that we are all familiar with his views. Of course we all look forward to the day when India and Pakistan can together find a way forward on that issue. We know that they are often quite resistant to the idea that they can be told from outside what that way forward may be. So rather than expanding on the subject today and getting into difficulties similar to those experienced on the Government Front Bench recently, I will avoid the temptation and continue with the rather interesting points that I thought I was making.
The United States is considering an increase in its military presence in Afghanistan. Indeed, it has announced some increase, which we assume to have been a subject of discussion with United Kingdom officials. In the light of that, may I ask the Minister who will wind up the debate what the Government’s assessment is of the number of additional troops that will be arriving in Afghanistan in 2009? How many of those troops will be operating in Regional Command South, and more specifically in Helmand province, and—crucially for us—what will be the command relationship between US and UK forces operating in Helmand province as part of ISAF?
If the Government are to propose that the level of British forces in Afghanistan should be increased—and there is much rumour of that at the moment—we hope that Ministers will have at the forefront of their minds the serious overstretch of our military resources in recent years, in both human and material terms, as well as the huge contribution that British forces have already made. Conservative Members have long argued for a more rapid increase in the number of helicopters available to support our forces. Some changes appear to have been made, but they have largely related to an increase in flying hours rather than in actual helicopters, with the result that the number of helicopters that was servicing 3,000 soldiers at the beginning then had to service 8,000. We welcome the fact that some of the Merlin helicopters from Iraq will eventually be transferred to Afghanistan, but there remains a serious time gap before this new capability arrives.
I hope that when the Government present to Parliament the result of their review—or the Washington review, perhaps, or a joint review—they will ensure, especially if they are to propose an increase in our British troop levels, that that proposal is accompanied by a clear explanation of the military necessity and purpose of such a deployment. I also hope they will ensure that it is part of an overall strategy encompassing further improvements in the co-ordination of international aid—we have been drawing attention to that for some years, and the Foreign Secretary joined us today in that—and accompanied by a readiness by other NATO allies to increase their effort and, if necessary, to engage in actual fighting, and that it will give some indication as to how the better governance that is central to military success will eventually be achieved. It must be a civil, political and military strategy so that the people of Britain—and, indeed, normal, peace-loving people in Afghanistan—can have some confidence that it will succeed. I do not underestimate how formidably difficult it is to bring such a strategy together and execute it, but even for those of us outside the Government who do not possess all the necessary information and advice, it
seems clear that a new strategy must, as a minimum, have all the attributes I have listed, and I hope Ministers will also feel able to say that it must have all those attributes.
In addition, it is obvious to all that one of the key differences between defeating the insurgency in Iraq and the insurgents in Afghanistan is that in the latter case it is possible for them to take refuge on the territory of another country—in the tribal areas of Pakistan. That is one of several reasons why the future stability and success of Pakistan as a nation are fundamental to our security and that of the wider world.
Members in all parts of the House pay close attention to the affairs of Pakistan. We have all expressed the hope that the return of democracy will be for the long term, so that the repetitive cycle of democratic experiment and military intervention that has plagued Pakistan for decades comes to an end. For Pakistan, and for the future of the entire region, this is now a time of great opportunity, but of equally great danger.
It is a time of opportunity because a new, democratically elected Government have come to power, and by all appearances that Government have made a serious effort to improve relations with Afghanistan and understand the importance of combating terrorism. The scale of the attacks on Pakistan itself—most notably and tragically in recent times the bombing of the Marriott hotel in Islamabad—has underlined the fact the Pakistan has no choice as a state but to try to root out terror from its territory.
The danger lies in the sheer scale of the challenge. The federally administered tribal area alone covers more than 27,000 sq km, is not covered by national legislation, and has an impoverished and isolated population. Worryingly, power in recent times seems to be shifting from the traditional assemblies of tribal elders—the jirgas—to militant or neo-Taliban groups. Danger also lies in the economic condition of Pakistan, which is currently facing depleted foreign exchange reserves and an International Monetary Fund loan package but with every prospect of a continuing financial crisis. There have also been serious concerns about the role of elements of Pakistan’s own internal security services.
Our response to this must be serious, large scale and determined. We must do everything we can to help to entrench democracy for the long-term future in Pakistan, to encourage its leaders in their struggle against terrorism and to give financial assistance.
Mike Gapes: Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that co-operation between India and Pakistan in combating terrorism is also extremely important, and that it is a tragedy that the people who carried out the Mumbai attacks—who were also responsible for the bombings in Pakistan to which he referred—have been successful in that they have managed to create a situation in which the Indian and Pakistani Governments do not have good relations and are not co-operating?
Mr. Hague: It would undoubtedly have been one of the objectives of those who carried out those terrorist attacks to make relations between India and Pakistan worse and to reduce the effectiveness of their security co-operation. That is why all of us in the House look to the leaders of India and Pakistan to work together on a range of issues and to co-operate closely on the security challenge that they face.
Mr. Ellwood: My right hon. Friend began by saying that we have to tease answers from this Government to understand what is going on. There is no clearer illustration of that than the answers that came back highlighting the fact that there are no Pakistani army representatives in Helmand province and no British Army representatives on the other side of the border, in Pakistan. Pakistan’s army is now making an effort to deal with the insurgency, but because it cannot communicate on the other side of the border, things are going via Kabul. Is that not one example of the fact that there is not a lot of communication? So much more could be done if that situation were improved.
Mr. Hague: I believe that Pakistan’s armed forces have been making a considerably improved effort to deal with these matters in recent months. I have not looked at the particular point to which my hon. Friend refers but, undoubtedly, if that effort is to be effective, good communication across that border will be required. I shall certainly look at that point, and I hope that Ministers will do so too.
I was discussing the scale of financial aid required for Pakistan. President Obama has spoken of tripling American aid to Pakistan, but he has also said, on the campaign trail:
“As President I would make the hundreds of millions of US aid conditional, and I would make our conditions clear—Pakistan should make substantial progress in closing down the training camps, evicting foreign fighters, and preventing the Taliban from using Pakistan as a staging area for attacks in Afghanistan.”
The Foreign Secretary has pointed out, as Ministers have often done, that the Department for International Development is doubling our assistance to Pakistan over the next three years—it is becoming DFID’s second largest programme in the world. The Opposition support that emphasis on assistance to Pakistan. We are very concerned about what has been happening in the border areas. We receive a lot of letters and e-mails from visitors and those with family in these tribal areas, who are appalled by the increasing radicalisation of young people and by last year’s destruction of 150 government schools, most of them for girls, in the North West Frontier province. We therefore hope that a great deal of that money will go to help in those areas, if that can be done in a secure way; otherwise we will find that a whole new generation of children have been raised under Taliban-style control.
Given our domestic security situation, the presence of British troops in Helmand province and our long-term links with Pakistan, we hope that there will be close British input into the deliberations and mission of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke in his work as the special representative of the United States for Afghanistan and Pakistan. US Secretary of State Clinton has stressed that Ambassador Holbrooke
“will co-ordinate across the entire government an effort to achieve United States’ strategic goals in the region”.
A similarly joined-up approach must be pursued in this country.
The problems that we are debating today are among the most intractable in the world. Some people would argue that they are nothing to do with us, although we know that in such an interdependent world, particularly with regard to our own security, we cannot walk away
from them. Others would say that they are hopeless and unresolvable. In my view that is too pessimistic, but it is beyond doubt that we need an improvement in the situation in this region in the coming year. If all the factors of which I have spoken are addressed at the same time and with great energy by the leaders of Pakistan and Afghanistan, by our Government and that of the United States, the opportunity to get these things right will more or less be upon us in the coming months, and the importance of that is underlined by the likelihood that it will not easily recur.
Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Michael Lord): Order. Before I call the next speaker, may I remind the House that there is an eight-minute limit on Back-Bench speeches and that applies from now on?
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