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31 Mar 2009 : Column 213WH—continued
In 1912, Sir Winston Churchill said that security in oil depends on diversity and diversity alone, which extends to our discussion of energy today, because we need a diverse energy supply. Unless one has an objection in principle to nuclear on the grounds of safety, and my party does not, it is clear that the technology makes a low-carbon contribution to diversity of supply. Providing
that it is economically viable and does not present a charge on the taxpayer, therefore, it will be one of our diverse sources of energy going forward.
There is agreement that we need to be clear about such issues, because we are contemplating major investments. Providing that Government subsidy is not involved in construction, operation, decommissioning or the storage of waste, no regulatory obstacles should be put in place.
Martin Horwood: During the passage of the Energy Bill, the Conservative party asked for more reassurances on the long-term liability to the taxpayer and, in particular, on what was meant by a fair share of long-term waste disposal costs. Is the hon. Gentleman now satisfied or dissatisfied with the Government’s position on that?
Greg Clark: I am pleased that the hon. Gentleman has raised that question, because it is crucial. The history is that nuclear power has left the taxpayer with liabilities. Some years ago, I was a special adviser in the Department of Trade and Industry and I well recall the sale of British Energy. That sale was partly designed to take liabilities off the public balance sheet, but I was there when officials came to tell the Secretary of State that it was not possible and that those liabilities had to remain in the public sector. The arrangements going forward therefore need to be absolutely rigorous so that there is no chance the taxpayer will face an unfunded liability.
Albert Owen: I understand what the hon. Gentleman is saying in theory, but I am not clear what it means in practice. He has just acknowledged that there is a capacity problem and that nuclear could be part of the solution. How would he get the guarantees that he mentions? The programme needs years to develop, and there could be an incoming Conservative Government in that period. When would he say, “Yes, we are pro-nuclear and we are going ahead with this,” and what assurances must the industry give him?
Greg Clark: Each application needs to come before the Secretary of State for approval, and it is essential that the guarantees in place—whether on decommissioning liabilities or operating costs—provide Ministers with sufficient satisfaction that a charge will not be laid on the taxpayer. The fiscal risk must be taken care of, because it has been a problem in the past and it must not be one in the future. I therefore look to the Minister for an update on whether he is satisfied that such guarantees are in place in the proposals that have come before him for discussion so far.
Mrs. Gillan: Does my hon. Friend agree that it is difficult to answer the question from the hon. Member for Ynys Môn? I was looking at the lifetime plan for Wylfa, and the milestones over the decommissioning period go right up to 2125, when none of us will be around. It is therefore impossible to give a strictly honest and accurate answer to his question at present.
Greg Clark: I am grateful for that intervention, which takes us to an important part of the debate. We need to concentrate now on ensuring that we have rigorous arrangements in place.
Yesterday, we had the announcement of the prospective sale of UKAEA Ltd, which raises similar issues. I have no problem in principle with a private company operating the contracts, but UKAEA Ltd will have the long-term contract for decommissioning nuclear power stations. How can we be satisfied that a delegation from a private company will not come to the Minister some years down the line, when the contract is with that company and work has proceeded, to demand more money than was provided for in the contract to finish the job? We need satisfaction on such issues.
It is the Government’s responsibility to remove excessive regulatory risk. There is enough risk involved in making major multibillion pound investments—not least the cost of capital and the anticipation of future energy prices and the cost of carbon. Public policy should not amplify those risks, but most people in the industry would say that the 10-year delay that we have seen and the inconsistency of energy policy—indeed, the lack of a credible policy—have amplified them. That is not the way forward if we want to take up our traditional role in the energy sector as a world leader in nuclear technology.
On planning issues, it is important that the Conservative party supports the type approvals used by the nuclear installations inspectorate, because they allow safety standards, which are obviously crucial, to be applied consistently. On planning applications, it is important that there be genuine scrutiny, but not a review of national energy policy lasting for years on end for each application. The Government’s role in ensuring that we have a long-term safe storage capability is also important.
We have suffered the consequences of policy ambiguity and indecision on this issue, and there is no better example of that than the Isle of Anglesey. Anglesey Aluminium Metals Ltd is contemplating 500 job cuts—those are important jobs—because any prospective decision on a second Wylfa nuclear power station will come too late to avoid interrupting the energy supplies necessary for investment and production to carry on.
Albert Owen: The hon. Gentleman mentions my constituency. Does he not accept that the decision to decommission Wylfa was made in 2000, so it is not as if there is any irrationality now? The Wylfa B plan was put in place in 1987, and had it been carried out in the relevant time scale, even with the ad hoc planning that we have seen, it would have come on stream many years ago. It is therefore incorrect to put the blame on people now.
Greg Clark: There is no advantage in casting around blame. All I would say is that if decisions on the replacement had been taken sooner, we would have avoided the hiatus, which has caused the loss of jobs.
Skills have been mentioned, and there have been severe consequences for some of our most skilled professions because of the delay and vacillation over energy policy. British Energy has estimated that only 6 per cent. of the nuclear industry’s 100,000 employees are under 24 and that 40 per cent. of its employees will retire in the next 10 years. Dr. Tim Stone, one of the Government’s advisers, makes much the same point about the nuclear installations inspectorate, which is a crucial body. He
says that there are staffing shortages related to the age profile of the expert and highly experienced inspectors being skewed towards retirement age.
I want to leave time for the Minister to reply. I do not want to sow division for the sake of it, because it is important that we do not present potential investors with a view that creates difference where there is none. Instead, we should present the possibility of a stable public policy regime. However, we need to ask whether the Minister, who is in a position to judge, can be satisfied that the fiscal risk of nuclear is adequately taken care of; whether some of the outstanding questions about public confidence and safety are being dealt with properly at Sellafield, where some of the NII safety specifications relating to legacy ponds and silos still have not been met—public confidence is very important; and, as I mentioned earlier with respect to yesterday’s statement on UKAEA Ltd, whether there are sufficient guarantees that the sale would not lead to a charge on taxpayers’ funds.
This has been a constructive debate. It is important that we set out clearly the policy regime that would be in place for potential investors, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.
12.20 pm
The Minister of State, Department of Energy and Climate Change (Mr. Mike O'Brien): It is a pleasure to see you take the Chair, Mr. Gale. I congratulate the right hon. Member for Wells (Mr. Heathcoat-Amory), who has managed to secure a debate on an enormously important issue. Sadly, I found his contribution partisan and unfair. It is a shame that in a debate on energy, which should have been dealt with more seriously, I feel that I need to respond briefly in a similarly partisan way with reference to his complaint about our lack of purpose since Chernobyl and Three Mile Island. Since that time there has been public concern about nuclear— something that he had to deal with when he was the Energy Minister from 1992 to 1994. He talks about the period of decline after 1987—well, he was part of that period of decline, so taking the mote out of one’s own eye is part of what he needs to accept. He needs to accept that when he was in office his Government failed to take the steps that were needed.
Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: On a point of information, the decline in nuclear electricity production was after 1997, and, in answer to the point about me, I never took an anti-nuclear stance, and certainly no White Paper or energy document emanated from the Department of Energy when I was there that was anything like as negative or indecisive as the series that was produced until recently. However, I did concede that there had been a change of attitude recently.
Mr. O'Brien:
I accept that during the right hon. Gentleman’s period in government he was never anti-nuclear; indeed, his party was then strongly and resolutely pro-nuclear. It just did nothing about it after Chernobyl and Three Mile Island—or very little. Nuclear power stations often take 12, 13 or 14 years to prepare. We will shorten that period with the new planning timetable. However, given the time scale, there was no preparation, when we came into government, for serious further development of nuclear power, and the Conservative
Government of whom the right hon. Gentleman was a member, and he, as a Minister in that Government, need to accept some responsibility for that.
The right hon. Gentleman talks about leadership. I remind him that Tony Blair and the current Prime Minister led a party that was anti-nuclear, by and large, and have turned it into one that is by and large pro-nuclear with a policy set out in a White Paper—an energy policy that is clearly looking to build new nuclear power stations and that has revitalised the industry in a very short period. That is decisive leadership.
The hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells (Greg Clark) complains of vacillation and delay. Let us see what is meant by those words. When we put forward our White Paper, at a pretty decisive moment for nuclear, where was the Conservative party? Its members were with their new—their current—leader, and their current leader was, as has already been said, in his green phase, when he decided that the Conservative party would no longer be the pro-nuclear party it once was. He turned a nuclear party into not an anti-nuclear, but perhaps a non-nuclear party; it was the great big Tory nuclear wobble.
Greg Clark: I am disappointed that the Minister has turned the debate in the direction he has, but he will recognise that in 12 years of government, in which there have been 10 Energy Ministers—in which sequence he has, I think, taken the role twice—the decisions that needed to be taken rested with the Government, not the Opposition. If he wants to look backwards he should reflect on the record of the Government over the past 12 years.
Mr. O'Brien: I can also reflect on the fact that the hon. Gentleman and his right hon. Friend complain about leadership, yet unlike their current leader, the Government have provided leadership on the issue. We have moved to a clear strategy. The country and the world face huge challenges in the face of climate change and energy security issues. We have set up a new Department whose key objectives are to create a sustainable energy policy, to deal with climate change—a policy that is secure, to deal with the problems facing this country in the long term and the decline of North Sea oil and gas, and affordable, to ensure that the people of this country get security and sustainability in a way they can afford; and to do that now, in the face of the problems associated with the credit crunch.
We need to decarbonise our electricity supplies and ensure that we have nuclear alongside renewables in a low-carbon economy. Combating climate change must
be our top priority. We need to change our energy mix, so that we are less reliant on heavily polluting fossil fuels. We need secure affordable energy and we must ensure that we diversify the roots from which we get our gas and other supplies. By the way, contrary to the comments made earlier by the right hon. Member for Wells when he raised concerns about Russia, we get about 2 per cent. of our gas from Russia and the recent dispute between Ukraine and Russia did not have a major impact on our gas supplies.
We recognise as a party that nuclear is secure, affordable and low-carbon, and that without it achieving the climate change targets we have set ourselves would become difficult and costly. The cost of generating electricity would rise and we would be increasingly reliant on renewables, and although those are important technologies they cannot always provide the base load of electricity that is needed.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Ynys Môn (Albert Owen) said, we need not only a nuclear base load but renewables, because they are low-carbon and can supply electricity on a large scale; but they have a problem in relation to intermittency. Therefore we also need the flexibility in energy supply that involves coal, with carbon capture and storage in due course, we hope, and gas.
As to talk of energy gaps, we believe that any gap that might in theory exist will quickly be supplied by the energy companies. That might be through gas or, we hope, coal with carbon capture and storage, but we believe that it will be supplied, because there is a lot of money to be made by energy companies in preventing such a gap. Anyone looking at their energy bill will know that there is a lot of money to be made.
There are massive opportunities for the UK in creating new nuclear build in this country. There will, I believe, be new nuclear power stations pepper-potting the globe in years to come. If the UK can build up—as we want it to—a supply chain, there is potential for massive benefit for the economy of this country. That is why we have worked so hard with the industry in recent months to build up the supply chain and get interest in it, and to ensure that we have the capacity not only for new build but to benefit the country in the long term.
Westinghouse and Areva have announced initiatives to work with the UK supply chain. The Nuclear Industry Association is working closely with industry to highlight what companies need to do to get involved, and our nuclear White Paper has set out clearly the basis and the policy framework. We hope we are in the process of creating the right conditions to enable the UK to be a target for investment in the future.
Thalidomide Victims
12.30 pm
Mr. Martin Caton (Gower) (Lab): It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr. Gale. Most of us, certainly those who were around in the late 1960s and early 1970s, know something of what the drug thalidomide did to the human foetus if the pregnant woman had been using it for a number of years on prescription. However, before looking at the more recent and current health issues for thalidomiders, it will be useful briefly to recall some of that history and to consider the lives of those whose bodies have been affected by the drug.
Thalidomide was developed by the German firm, Chemie Grunenthal, as an anti-convulsant. It did not work for that purpose, but trials showed that it had sedative properties, with the apparent added benefit that overdoses resulted not in death, but simply in prolonged sleep. It was first marketed in Germany in 1957 and in the United Kingdom in 1958. It was sometimes combined with other drugs to treat a variety of conditions.
The promotion of all those products laid great stress on the safety of thalidomide. Grunenthal also claimed that thalidomide was completely safe for pregnant women and could therefore be used to treat morning sickness and some of the other negative aspects of early pregnancy. Astonishingly, the company made that claim without testing the drug on pregnant animals or testing the science behind the claim that an overdose would not normally kill. The latter factor was the result of the fact that although thalidomide was a highly toxic drug, it had a low absorption rate. That, however, could be affected by other illnesses, the taking of other medicines and, crucially, pregnancy.
Distillers, which manufactured thalidomide in the UK under licence, had to conduct its own tests on the drug, and commissioned researchers at Glasgow university to consider the effect of thalidomide on the body’s hormone balance. The results, published in the British Medical Journal, showed a marked reduction in the activity of the thyroid gland. That should have set alarm bells ringing. It was known at the time that any drug that affected the thyroid was likely to be able to pass through the placenta, yet Distillers, like Grunenthal, did not test the drug on pregnant animals.
Even more disturbing, however, is the fact that the body appointed by the Government to establish whether new drugs had been properly tested—the Cohen committee—failed to ask whether tests had been made on pregnant animals. Instead, it described thalidomide as a drug of proven value. As a result, it went on to the NHS prescription list and was exempted from purchase tax.
We should contrast that with how the Food and Drug Administration dealt with the application by Richardson-Merrell to market the drug in America. There, Dr. Frances Kelly recognised that a variety of factors could affect the absorption rate. She required tests to be made on pregnant animals. Tests were carried out on pregnant rabbits, and deformed foetuses were born.
If the Cohen committee, acting on behalf of the Government, had required similar tests to be done here, it would have seen similar deformities in baby rabbits—the
sort that were later to be seen in human babies. It did not. Some 3,800 babies died, and 508 were born with disabilities to mothers who had been taking thalidomide, assured that it was perfectly safe to do so.
When we think of people affected by thalidomide, most of us think of people with rudimentary arms and/or legs, but the drug caused a far greater range of debilitating conditions. Many suffered damaged ears and hearing. In others, eyesight was affected. A few suffered brain damage, with associated sensory limitations. Some who have legs have no arms, and a large number have arms ranging from half or two-thirds of normal length to 2 or 3 in. Many of those with hands have fingers missing and no thumbs. Leg damage often resulted in one or both legs being short, and feet absent or significantly damaged. In addition, there could be extensive damage to the internal organs and the skeletal structure.
Before the establishment of the Thalidomide Trust, which was later to protect the interests of those children, they were subject to well-meaning but questionable and certainly unwelcome professional attention. Some endured a series of operations intended to make them look “more normal”, such as constructing ears where they had none or removing vestigial digits. There was a drive to find functional artificial arms, but experience of them as children put the majority of thalidomiders off such prosthetics in adult life.
What is truly remarkable is how those individuals affected by thalidomide have responded to the disadvantages dealt to them. In their teens, many refused to accept the limited lifestyle that some thought appropriate for people so badly disabled, and they determined to live as fulfilling a life as possible.
Sadly, 46 of the original 508 have died, but a large proportion of the survivors have taken life by the horns. A majority of them are married and between them have more than 500 children. Many have become highly qualified and have successful professional careers; others are running their own businesses. A large number of them have regular full-time jobs, and half are in some form of paid employment. Many of those not in paid jobs are bringing up their families. However, their very determination to get on with things has taken its toll.
By the late 1990s, it was becoming clear that thalidomiders were facing a new set of health problems, which were brought about by their wholly admirable commitment to activity. They are entering their 40s and 50s, but have always had to use their limbs and other parts of their bodies in ways for which they were not designed. Many have needed hip replacements, or even shoulder replacements, at the age of about 40. Others have reluctantly been forced to give up work or are considering doing so, creating personal financial difficulties.
One thalidomider, Paul, writes:
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