|Previous Section||Index||Home Page|
I hope that the above information addresses your concerns on this matter.
I will place a copy of this letter in the Library of the House.
Mr. Holloway: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many armed forces personnel at each grouping of rank served in Operation (a) Herrick 4, (b) Herrick 5, (c) Herrick 6 and (d) Herrick 7; how many who served in each have been treated for (i) psychological disorders, (ii) post-traumatic stress disorder and (iii) physical injuries; and how many have been discharged as a consequence of (A) a psychological disorder and (B) a physical injury. 
|Numbers( 1) UK armed forces( 2) personnel at each rank who have been identified as serving on Operation Herrick 4-7( 3,4)|
|Rank||Number deployed on Op Herrick prior to April 2007||Number deployed on Op Herrick 6-7|
|(1) All figures are rounded to the nearest 10, with figures of 5 or below denoted by *, totals and sub-totals have been rounded separately and so may not equal the sum of their rounded parts.|
(2) UK armed forces personnel includes UK Regular Forces, Gurkhas, Full Time Reserve Service (FTRS) personnel and mobilised reservists.
(3) Due to data quality issues it is not possible to separate data for roulements 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Op Herrick.
(4) All data are provisional and subject to review.
(5) All rank information is based on NATO rank and includes equivalent ranks in the Naval Service and RAF. Rank shown is rank on outflow.
34 UK armed forces personnel attended the UK field hospital during Herrick 4-7 for psychiatric reasons. Due to the small number it is not possible to provide attendances for psychiatric reasons by roulement.
The number of personnel who were referred to a Department of Community Mental Health (DCMH) in 2007 following deployment on Operation Herrick 4-7 is provided in the following table. Of the 414 who were assessed as having a psychological disorder, 47 were diagnosed with PTSD.
|New attendances at a DCMH in 2007 by Herrick roulement( 1) and initial assessment diagnosis|
|Initial assessment||Herrick 4-5||Herrick 6( 2)|
|(1) These figures show the number of new attendees who have been identified as deployed to Herrick prior to their first referral at a DCMH.|
(2) Includes 156 people who had also deployed to Herrick 4-5, of which 10 had PTSD.
|Op Herrick 4-7 UK military initial field hospital attendances for physical injuries, numbers( 1)|
|(1) Data source: Operational Emergency Department Attendance Register (OpEDAR)|
A proportion of those with physical injuries were returned to the UK for treatment. Since October 2007 these patients have been tracked through their care. For those deployed on Herrick 7 178 personnel were returned to the UK for treatment of their injury.
Mr. Holloway: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many personnel at each grouping of rank who served in Operation (a) Herrick 4, (b) Herrick 5, (c) Herrick 6 and (d) Herrick 7 have left the armed forces. 
Mr. Hutton [holding answer 1 April 2009]: Data on the number of deployed personnel at each rank broken down individually for each of Operations HERRICK 4, 5, 6 and 7 and who have left the armed forces are not available and as such could be provided only at disproportionate cost.
Mr. Holloway: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many rounds of (a) 51 mm and (b) 81 mm mortar ammunition of all natures were used in Operation (i) Herrick 4, (ii) Herrick 5, (iii) Herrick 6 and (iv) Herrick 7. 
Mr. Hutton [holding answer 1 April 2009]: Officials are collating and validating the data needed and this is taking longer than anticipated. I will write to the hon. Member when this work is complete.
Mr. Ancram: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what forewarning the US military gives to British armed forces commanders in Afghanistan of (a) Predator unmanned aerial vehicle attacks into Pakistan and (b) Predator unmanned aerial vehicle flights originating within Pakistan. 
Mr. Hutton: British armed forces personnel in Afghanistan are not forewarned of alleged US Predator unmanned aerial vehicle attacks into Pakistan or whether Predator unmanned aerial vehicle flights over Afghanistan originate within Pakistan.
Anne Snelgrove: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many soldiers from The First Battalion The Rifles have sustained injuries in Afghanistan in the category of (a) very seriously injured, (b) seriously injured, (c) temporary incapacitating illness and (d) injury unlisted. 
Mr. Hutton: Since the Rifles formed on 1 February 2007, up to 28 March 2009, there have been two very seriously injured (VSI) and one seriously injured (SI) casualty from 1 Rifles in Afghanistan. We do not publish data on less severe injuries, so this information could be provided only at disproportionate cost.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what training on improvised explosive devices
is provided to armed forces personnel assigned to duties in Afghanistan before deployment; what percentage of infantry personnel received such training before deployment in the last 12 months; and if he will make a statement. 
Mr. Hutton: All personnel deploying to theatre, including infantry, undertake either collective or individual reinforcement training, which includes counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) training. During pre-deployment training, they are given training in current tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to deal with IEDs. These TTPs are constantly being improved in theatre, and the training conducted prior to deployment reflects the latest developments. A number of individuals are then given more in depth training on the use of specialist equipment for detection of other explosive devices. Training for patrolling skills includes detailed improvised explosive device awareness and avoidance techniques in both the mounted and dismounted roles.
Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many armed forces personnel have been (a) seriously and (b) very seriously (i) injured and (ii) wounded by improvised explosive devices in Afghanistan in each year since 2001. 
Mr. Hutton: Since the start of operations in Afghanistan in 2001 and up to the 15 March 2009, the latest date for which statistics are available, 82 UK service personnel have suffered very serious injuries (VSI) and 103 have suffered serious injuries (SI). These figures include all injured personnel, regardless of the mechanism or circumstances of their injury.
I am withholding further information on the numbers of personnel injured by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) as its disclosure would, or would be likely to prejudice the capability, effectiveness or security of the armed forces.
Mr. Hutton: The main tasks undertaken in Afghanistan by private contractors listed as working for the Ministry of Defence are: troop welfare, leisure and retail services, logistics, provision of catering supplies, and works and maintenance services.
Mr. Hutton: UK troops, as part of International Security Assistance Force, support Afghan security forces to target narcotic traffickers and facilities that are supporting the insurgency. UK forces have also provided support to both the Poppy Eradication Force and the Governor-led eradication plan within Helmand province. The number of UK troops engaged in such activities varies both on a day-to-day basis and also by season.
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: Armed forces policy states that service personnel are not encouraged, at any time, to buy any items of personal protection. No service person is authorised or would be allowed, to deploy to any theatre with any item of protection which has not been issued by MOD.
MOD seeks to provide all necessary items of equipment, but while there is no need to do so, we are aware that some personnel personalise, and occasionally supplement some of their issued kit. This is purely due to personal preference, and supporting guidance to ensure the safety and welfare of all personnel is issued by the chain of command in each theatre.
Dr. Murrison: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the written ministerial statement of 31 March 2009, Official Report, column 53W, on Armed Forces Pay Review Body, from which budgets he plans to allocate the funding for that component of the pay award which is in excess of his Departments planning assumptions of 2.5 per cent. referred to at paragraph 2.13 of the 2009 Report of the Armed Forces Pay Review Body. 
Mr. Hutton: The MODs planning assumption included a 2.5 per cent. pay bill increase in 2009-10; 2 per cent. for the core pay settlement and 0.5 per cent. for targeted measures. The Armed Forces Pay Review Bodys recommendations, which were accepted in full, provide for a 2.8 per cent. core pay settlement and 0.5 per cent. for targeted measures, bringing the total award to 3.3 per cent. Provision for the additional 0.8 per cent. above the planning assumption, which equates to some £65 million, has been generated from within the Defence programme as a whole during the current planning round.
Dr. Fox: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what estimate he has made of the additional expenditure by his Department above its 2.5 per cent. financial planning assumption increase necessary fully to implement the recommendations of the Armed Forces Pay Review Body for 2009; and from which sources within the defence budget this funding will be drawn. 
The armed forces Pay Review Bodys recommendations, which were accepted by the MOD in full, provide for a 2.8 per cent. core pay settlement and
0.5 per cent. for targeted measures, bringing the total award to 3.3 per cent. Provision for the additional 0.8 per cent. above the planning assumption, which equates to some £65 million, has been generated from within the Defence programme as a whole during the current planning round.
|Next Section||Index||Home Page|