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Danny Alexander: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many breaches of security have been reported at (a) the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, (b) the Defence Storage and Distribution Agency, (c) the Defence Support Group, (d) the Defence Vetting Agency, (e) the Meteorological Office, (f) the Ministry of Defence Police and Guarding Agency, (g) the People, Pay and Pensions Agency, (h) Service Children's Education, (i) the Service Personnel and Veterans Agency and (j) the UK Hydrographic Office in the last five years; and what procedures each agency follows when a breach of security involves the disclosure of personal data. 
Mr. Kevan Jones: MOD units are not required to centrally report all breaches of security and therefore the requested information could be provided only at disproportionate cost. The procedures followed when breaches occur are in accordance with the Defence Manual of Security and additionally, in respect of data losses, a Defence Instruction designed to meet the requirements of the Data Protection Act and the Information Commissioner.
Dr. Fox: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what surveys of (a) service personnel, (b) service families, (c) veterans and (d) the public his Department has conducted in the last 12 months. 
Mr. Kevan Jones: The Ministry of Defence keeps all its activities, processes and structures under regular review. As a result, a wide range of internal and external reports, surveys and studies are carried out periodically to collect information on the attitudes, opinions and circumstances of both civilian employees, service personnel, service families, veterans and others dealing with the Department. Information on these is not held centrally and could be provided only at disproportionate cost.
Mr. Kevan Jones: The decision to close most of our military hospitals was taken over a decade ago, after it had become clear that they did not have a sufficient patient volume or range of military cases to develop and maintain the skills of our medical personnel.
On a typical day we have barely enough military inpatients, in all NHS hospitals across the UK, to fill two wards. This would be insufficient to sustain even a
single, low-level civilian hospital and would require all patients to be brought together in one location, which in many cases would involve a major disruption for families and friends as well as for the patient. Meeting the health needs of veterans is the responsibility of the NHS and in the main their needs will reflect the health needs of the wider population. The same argument of not sending patients to a single dedicated hospital to keep it viable would apply equally to the national veteran patient population.
the arguments in favour of the closure of the stand-alone Service hospitals irresistible. We accept that the reduction in numbers of personnel which took place in the Armed Forces after the end of the Cold War meant that there was insufficient patient volume to make the military hospitals viable in the long term.
Dr. Fox: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many service personnel have worked in field hospitals during each roulement of Operation (a) Telic and (b) Herrick; and how many and what proportion of such personnel were reservist medical personnel. 
Mr. Kevan Jones: The following tables summarise data available from centrally held records for service personnel for the period January 2003 to April 2009. They represent instances, at one point in time in each roulement, showing the current and planned manning for that roulement.
|Service personnel deployed within field h ospitals: Op Telic|
|Telic||Established posts||Total personnel||Of which reservists||As a percentage|
|Service personnel deployed within field h ospitals: Op Herrick|
|Herrick||Established posts||Total personnel||Of which reservists||As a percentage|
Operational establishment tables, January 2003 to April 2009.
It should also be noted that the numbers of personnel deployed will usually exceed the number of established posts due to variations in tour lengths depending on speciality. Some individuals will have deployed on more than one roulement; therefore the total number of individuals who deployed over the whole period 2003-09 is less than the sum of the total personnel per roulement.
Miss McIntosh: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what steps his Department has taken to ensure that relevant advisory expertise from (a) his Department and (b) the armed forces is available in the event of an emergency occasioned by floods. 
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The Ministry of Defence (MOD) is fully involved in preparing for a national, regional and local flood. It maintains a network of military joint regional liaison officers who advise on Defence assistance through the Government offices for the regions and contribute to local and regional resilience forums and crisis management groups. The MOD's head office provides advice to the Civil Contingencies Secretariat and other Government Departments on what can be provided in the event of a national flood to aid emergency planning.
The Met Office also keep in direct contact through their National Severe Weather Warning Service and as a partner in the Flood Forecasting Centre, providing weather services to emergency responders, Government, business and the public ahead of, during and after periods of severe weather and flooding.
Following the publication of Sir Michael Pitt's review of the 2007 floods, the MOD and Cabinet Office have recently improved existing central response mechanisms to ensure Defence expertise is available, in an advisory capacity, where existing local or regional arrangements are severely stretched. These changes are now in place but will be formally published in the revised Central Government Concept of Operations which is expected this summer. Further information is available at the following link:
Dr. Fox: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many (a) military and (b) civilian personnel in his Department are working on the (i) Multinational Space-based Imaging System and (ii) the European Defence Agencys Space Situational Awareness programme. 
Mr. Quentin Davies: Currently no personnel in the Department, military or civilian, participate in either the Multinational Space-based Imaging System or the European Defence Agencys Space Situational Awareness programme. We observe developments in both of these programmes and have the option to participate in the future.
Mr. Streeter: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) when his Department will commence formal discussions with Plymouth City Council on the decommissioning of nuclear submarines at Devonport Royal Dockyard; 
Mr. Quentin Davies: A decision on the location of the dismantling site has not yet been made. A Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) for the Submarine Dismantling Project will consider location options for both the dismantling site and the interim storage of the resulting Intermediate Level Waste. Engagement with local councils on both dismantling and storage sites will take place as part of the public consultation period for the SEA. This is planned to begin towards the end of 2009 and to complete in spring 2010.
Angus Robertson: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the planned dates of decommissioning are of (a) each of the Royal Navys Trafalgar class submarines and (b) its Swiftsure submarine. 
Mr. Quentin Davies: Against current planning assumptions, which are regularly reviewed, the out of service dates for the remaining Swiftsure and Trafalgar Class submarines are shown in the following table.
|Out of service date||Vessel|
Sir Menzies Campbell: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether any munitions containing white phosphorus manufactured in the UK have been used in theatres of operation involving UK armed forces in the last 10 years. 
Mr. Bob Ainsworth:
The UK armed forces inventory does include some white phosphorous munitions that were manufactured in the UK. They were manufactured
over 10 years ago and have been used by UK forces in theatres of operation within the last 10 years to protect troops on operations by producing a smoke screen to provide cover.
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