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9 Jun 2009 : Column 225WH—continued
Abu Musa, the Greater Tunb and the Lesser Tunb are three small but strategic islands located along the narrow route through the Gulf into the straits of Hormuz and out into the gulf of Oman. Much of the Gulf’s oil exports and its non-oil imports pass along that route, as do naval vessels entering and exiting the Gulf. Indeed, a
fifth of the world’s oil supplies pass through the straits of Hormuz. About 15 million barrels per day, equivalent to Europe’s daily consumption, pass through the mouth of the Gulf in tankers that must slow down to navigate a hairpin turn in waters 35 miles wide at the straits’ narrowest point. In addition, a number of the Gulf’s offshore oil and gas fields are located in the vicinity.
In the early to mid-18th century, the three islands were used on a seasonal basis by Arab tribes dependent on, and loyal to, the Qawasin, a clan based in Ras al-Khaimah. The islands were a source of fresh water and refuge from bad weather and political trouble—a sort of Chequers in the Gulf, really. The Abu Musa island is only 12 sq km. Abu Musa is the name of both a town and an island. It has a population of around 500, and is notable for its golden sandy beaches. The nearby Greater and Lesser Tunbs derive their title from the word “Tunb”, which is an Arab word meaning a long rope used to erect a tent. The Greater Tunb has a surface area of 10 sq km and is known for its red soil. The Lesser Tunb has a surface area of 2 sq km and is uninhabitable.
There is, inevitably, a complex story to be told in the region, but in essence it appears that successive UK Governments unequivocally endorsed the claims of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah to Abu Musa and the two Tunbs respectively while those kingdoms were under British protection in terms of the 1892 treaties with the Trucial States. Iran did not accept those claims. However, following the decision in 1968 to withdraw British forces from the Gulf, while formally upholding the “Arab claims”, successive UK Governments in practice focused on trying to achieve a peaceful, compromise resolution of the territorial disputes as part of Britain’s legacy.
Once Iran knew that Britain was departing it made a variety of claims, all the more forcefully, for a variety of territories in the Gulf. For example, the Government of Iran put forward a claim for the whole of the island of Bahrain. In the wake of a referendum on Bahrain under United Nations supervision, Iran was obliged to abandon its claim. It promptly revived its dormant claim to Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs. Ultimately, the then Conservative Government were unable to secure a deal for all three islands in 1971. That proved achievable only with regard to Abu Musa. Iran and Sharjah agreed to a joint administration of Abu Musa, without prejudice to their competing territorial claims. The late Sheikh Khalid Mohammed, who was the ruler of Sharjah at that time, said:
“I had spent about two years collecting documents proving that the island is Arab territory, and that it belongs to Sharjah. I had asked a team of jurists to prepare legal documents and papers. These were presented to the Iranian Government. However, the logic of force and threat allowed no room for reason and legitimate proofs...Several factors contributed to the delicacy of the situation, combining to form significant pressure...Thus, after consultations with brothers, I deemed it appropriate to seek a formula that would freeze the problem politically, while dealing with it economically. Hence came the said agreement.”
Iran then seized Greater and Lesser Tunbs by an amphibious assault using hovercraft in the very last hours of the British protectorate and just before the coming into existence of the United Arab Emirates. One Arab policeman and three Iranians were killed. Richard Mobley, in an interesting article in Naval War
College Review in autumn 2003, said of the period leading to the creation of the United Arab Emirates that
“the United Kingdom, on behalf of the emirates of Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah, asserted that all three islands were Arab territory. London explicitly backed Sharjah’s claim to Abu Musa and Ras Al Khaimah’s claim to the Tunbs. With its security obligations scheduled to lapse by the end of 1971, however, Great Britain attempted to resolve the islands dispute while fostering the creation of the new United Arab Emirates.”
I now want to make a brief reference to the exchanges in the House that I have referred to already, which followed the invasion of the Tunbs in December 1971. Sir Alec Douglas-Home stated on 6( )December:
“Once the decision to withdraw our forces from the Gulf and to end our special treaty relationships with the Gulf States was taken, it was inevitable that these long dormant disputes would come into the open. Our aim has therefore been to settle these issues where possible, so that they would not drag on, generating suspicion and hostility in the future.”
Jeremy Thorpe then asked a question. He said that
“when the Tunbs were invaded we were still under treaty obligations to Sharjah. As a result of that, is it our intention to use our good offices between the Sheikh of Sharjah and the Shah of Iran to bring about some amicable settlement? Does he accept that we have continuing political obligation in that connection?”
“The right hon. Gentleman”—
“said that so far as the sovereignty of the Tunbs and Abu Musa is concerned the issue remains open. Is that the view of the Government of Iran or is it the Foreign Secretary’s view?”—[Official Report, 6 December 1971; Vol. 827, cc. 944 to 949.]
What happened next? Diplomatic relations were established between Iran and the United Arab Emirates in October 1972. On 5 October 1972, a statement was read to the 27th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in which the UAE reaffirmed its sovereignty over the islands. A similar statement was read out before the Security Council on 20 February 1974; and a third statement was read to the UN Special Political Committee on 19 November 1974. In 1980, the UAE joined five other nations to form the GCC—the Gulf Co-operation Council.
Throughout the 1980s, the dispute over the islands was overshadowed by the Iran-Iraq war. The Iranians began encroaching beyond the assigned area for their presence in Abu Musa by constructing roads and an airport, and other civilian and military installations. In 1987, they moved troops to the southern side of Abu Musa. In late 1991, Iran imposed restrictions on third-party citizens wishing to enter the UAE zone of Abu Musa by requiring entry permits. The UAE rejected that measure, so in April 1992, Iran ordered all foreigners off the island. Those foreigners ran the UAE-sponsored school, medical clinic and power-generating station. Iran took full control of the island.
After the UAE had taken the matter to the GCC in September 1992, Iran declared full sovereignty over the islands. However, the dispute was temporarily resolved when Iran and Sharjah agreed to abide by the 1971 agreement. When Iraq made threatening moves towards Kuwait in October 1994, Iran increased its military presence on Abu Musa. When the crisis subsided, Iranian troops remained on the island and surface-to-air missiles
and anti-ship missiles were deployed. American Secretary of State for Defence Perry noted that Iran had deployed chemical weapons in the Gulf, particularly on Abu Musa.
Sir Nicholas Winterton (Macclesfield) (Con): I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on securing this debate, which is critical and on a matter of great principle. He referred to the distinguished UAE delegation that visited the United Kingdom earlier this year, and to our discussions about the three disputed islands. Does he believe that the islands belong to the Arabs, and that the United Kingdom Government should make it extremely clear to the Governments of the UAE that we will support them in every possible way in seeking to bring about a peaceful conclusion?
Mr. Grogan: As always, the hon. Gentleman cuts to the quick. Having studied their history, I agree that the UAE has a strong case for claiming the islands. If the hon. Gentleman bears with me, I shall suggest a way forward in my closing remarks.
Tensions between Iran and its Arab neighbours have a long history. Despite that, however, there are many modern-day ties between the UAE and Iran. For example, the UAE is Iran’s main trade partner. The director general of the trade planning office of Iran’s trade development organisation has said that Iran’s exports to the UAE have been on the rise, with an average growth rate of 27.8 per cent.
Earlier this month, the Prime Minister of the United Arab Emirates hailed the advancing trade ties between Iran and the UAE, saying that the two sides enjoyed “deep-rooted and amicable relations”. He reiterated that the UAE will never interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, particularly Iran, and said that he always stresses the importance of improving ties with all countries. He expressed hope that the middle east would be free from weapons of mass destruction but supported Iran’s peaceful use of nuclear power for energy.
Sheikh Mohammed said that disputes
“over national borders have never prevented trade and human exchange”.
“Trade relations between any two nations always lead to better relations and facilitate the resolution of conflicts.”
The commentator Hassan al-Alkin put it another way. He noted that the UAE
“has pursued a policy of peace co-existence with Iran, hoping that the development of good relations would inevitably lead to the settlement of contentious problems.”
On 23 May 2009, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Anwar Mohammed Gargash, gave more detail on the approach of the UAE to the three disputed islands. He said that his country wants to resolve the issue through direct talks or international arbitration. At a side-meeting of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference in Damascus, Gargash said:
“The Emirates want to resolve the occupied islands problem with neighbouring Iran”.
“Unfortunately despite the passage of more than three decades I cannot remember there having been any positive issues in that respect”.
In recent times, there have been a number of statements of support from the international community in favour of referring the issue to the International Court of Justice at The Hague, in accordance with article 33 of the charter of the United Nations and article 36 of the statute of the International Court of Justice. Not surprisingly, the Gulf Co-operation Council countries—including Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Qatar—have repeatedly backed the UAE, which is an approach that I endorse. However, there has been wider support.
In April 2009, the EU and GCC reiterated their support in a joint communiqué for a peaceful settlement of the dispute in accordance with international law through direct negotiations between the parties or by referring the matter to International Court of Justice. In January 2009, the Speakers of the Italian and Turkish Parliaments spoke on the matter. The Speaker of the Italian Parliament said that Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs belong to the UAE and that diplomacy is the way to restore them. The Speaker of the Turkish Parliament said that he would speak to the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, urging the country to speed up the resolution of the dispute. Last year, the US deputy assistant Defence Secretary for middle eastern affairs, Christopher Straub, supported the UAE’s claim over the islands, accusing Iran of exercising hegemonic behaviour in the region.
In recent years, the UAE has painstakingly set out its legal and historical case for sovereignty over the three islands. It points to a clear British recognition of that claim during the protection of the Trucial states. It notes the protestation to Britain by the then rulers of the two Emirates against Iranian violations of its sovereignty. The two Emirates exercised all aspects of sovereignty over the islands before the Iranian invasion, including levying and collecting taxes and duties from pearl fishers and shepherds using the island, installing governors on the island, running public services and so on.
The best way ahead is surely for the International Court of Justice to consider the matter in detail and to reach a conclusion. As I have said, I believe that the UAE has a strong case. Of course, there are many other areas of contention in the Gulf and the middle east, but the islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs should not be forgotten by the House. We have a long and historic association with the UAE and a responsibility to comment on the matter. Indeed, given the strategic location of the islands, the security and stability of the Gulf region will remain fragile in the absence of an effective resolution.
1.48 pm
The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr. Ivan Lewis): I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Selby (Mr. Grogan)—my honourable and good friend—on securing this Adjournment debate. I thank him for his generous and kind remarks on my new role. I suspect that No. 10 has not been in contact with my hon. Friend this morning, because it has been trying the wrong number. I will happily share the correct number later—not, I hasten to add, that I have the ability to influence decisions taken there.
My hon. Friend has raised an incredibly important issue. The Foreign Office and the Government are concerned by the continuing dispute between the UAE and Iran
over the over the islands of Abu Musa, Lesser Tunb and Greater Tunb. As previous Ministers have made clear, we support a peaceful settlement of the dispute by means in accordance with international law. That might be through direct bilateral discussions or undertaken through international mechanisms, such as the International Court of Justice. The United Kingdom, the Gulf Co-operation Council and the European Union are concerned about the lack of progress. As his Excellency, Sheikh Mohamed bin Rashid, Prime Minister of the UAE, said last week:
“If this issue is resolved...we could together avoid all that could possibly disturb the security and stability of this region and the relationship between the two countries.”
Of course, any agreement must be in accordance with international law.
British interests demand peace, tranquillity and constructive relationships in the middle east and in the Gulf. That is the entire focus of British foreign policy in the region, where we have long-standing friendships and partnerships. Events in the Gulf have profound effects on our own security, economy and commercial interests. As hon. Members are aware, the Gulf has 60 per cent. of the world’s oil reserves and 40 per cent. of its gas reserves. We work closely with Gulf nations to enhance regional security, to combat terrorism and to develop a sustainable and successful global economy. As the Foreign Secretary said only last month, in just two generations, the Gulf states have created some of the most advanced and inspiring cities in the world.
The UAE is one of the UK’s closest allies, and we enjoy a long-standing, warm and valued relationship built on years of co-operation in fields as diverse as trade, defence and low carbon energy. For some years, we have been working in co-operation with the UAE in the development of its military capability, and we have assured our Emirati friends of our substantial and enduring support to their security as well as our commitment to that of the wider Gulf region. These close ties have been brought even closer by our peoples—the migration and travel of UK and UAE citizens—and by trade. The UAE is now the biggest middle east export market for UK companies. In fact, the UK exports more to the Gulf than it does to China and Hong Kong combined—a total of £12 billion of goods and services in 2007. About 130,000 UK nationals live in the UAE and more than 1 million visit every year. Many UK companies have a presence in the UAE, including representatives of our banking profession, construction industry and energy sector.
To echo the words of my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary during his visit to the UAE last November, the UAE is a global success story and a
“model of openness; business-friendly, tolerant, peaceful and responsible...a microcosm of what a successful Middle East can become”.
If I may, Mr. Weir, I shall depart briefly from my script and refer to a comment made by my hon. Friend. The most important recent development is the fact that the UAE now owns Manchester City, which is the most important and successful football team in the world—at least that will be the future story. I wish that I could say, hand on heart, that that has been the story of the past 30 years, but I have chosen to support the club in an era when trophies have not been readily available. However, I am delighted not only that the UAE’s royal family
have assumed ownership of the club, but that so far they have been very clear about their responsibility to the wider community.
I pay tribute to them not just for purchasing the football club and being determined to make it successful, but for caring passionately about the city of Manchester and about Greater Manchester more generally. That relationship with Manchester City will bring opportunities in economic regeneration, social relationships and bridging divides between different regions of the world. I have been very impressed during these early days. I also have four season tickets, Mr. Weir, so I do not spend my time in the corporate hospitality part of the great stadium of Eastlands.
Mr. Mike Weir (in the Chair): Order. I remind the Minister to return to the subject of the debate.
Mr. Lewis: I shall move on, Mr. Weir. I just thought that it was important to make that serious point. Of course, I am delighted that the royal family now owns the football club that I support. I am also delighted, however, with their engagement with the wider city and with Greater Manchester. That is important educationally, culturally and economically, and I welcome the early stages of that relationship.
Sir Nicholas Winterton: I congratulate the Minister on his appointment and new responsibilities; they are, indeed, richly deserved. However, have not his comments emphasised the importance of a total commitment from us to the UAE that it will always have our support in this matter? Clearly it owns those islands, and it must be in no doubt that we will give it ongoing and total support.
Mr. Lewis:
As ever, the hon. Gentleman makes a salient point. The British role is to argue, advocate and facilitate a solution that underpins stability in the region,
and that is consistent with international law. It would be easy, especially on day two of my new job, to engage in bellicose rhetoric, but that would not be appropriate in this job, and I have never done it in any previous job. In this new role, grandstanding will not help the situation. I have made clear our friendship and economic and social relationship with the UAE, which are as deep-rooted as those with almost any other country. We are very proud of that relationship, and we want to deepen and strengthen it in future.
We believe in the need for a just settlement in the matter before us today. The best role that we can play is to continue to make that point to the UAE and to use all means possible through international institutions to influence Iran’s attitude and to encourage it to desire a sensible and fair settlement of that long-standing dispute, which continues to be a bone of contention and adds to instability and insecurity. We hope for rapid progress, but we want to facilitate a solution. It is very important, however, that whatever solution emerges is consistent with international law.
As hon. Members are aware, regional security in that part of the world is vital. We therefore support efforts to resolve the issues peacefully and quickly. History has shown that acts of aggression do not create lasting peace and stability. As hon. Members have said, we remain concerned about the lack of progress in a dispute that has lasted for 40 years, and we shall continue to do everything in our power to facilitate a fair and just settlement by any standards in accordance with international law. My new role gives me an opportunity to engage afresh with this issue and to consider mechanisms—perhaps bilateral, but more realistically through international institutions—to begin a process to end this 40-year-old dispute. I shall focus on this matter, consider what is possible and keep hon. Members informed of any progress that we can make.
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