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“confirm that, while the Parliamentary Standards Authority will deal with the financial matters about which she talked—we all accept that—it will not become an appointed quango with jurisdiction over Members of Parliament”.
“I think the answer to that is yes.”—[ Official Report, 18 June 2009; Vol. 494, c. 424.]
She then went on to amplify her reply. However, the Bill before us shows that that is not the case.
Mr. Straw: If the hon. Gentleman can hold his breath for a little while until we get to clause 6, I will give him comfort on that point.
Mr. Garnier: Following on from the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Sussex (Mr. Soames), of course there is a need to tighten up our rules and procedures in relation to expenses and allowances, but I am worried that the clauses dealing with offences create new offences that in fact already exist. For example, the offence in clause 9(1) is already an offence under the Fraud Act 2006, which itself brought up to date the offence in the Theft Act 1968 of obtaining a pecuniary advantage by deception. Why do we need to keep on increasing the number of laws when there are already laws that deal specifically with this sort of criminal behaviour?
Mr. Straw: I will give way to the hon. Gentleman, but before he jumps up he must allow me to answer the question put by his hon. and learned Friend.
The hon. and learned Gentleman is not as well informed as he usually is. There is a difference between what is in section 2 of the Fraud Act and what is in this provision, not least in that in the Act one of the components of fraud is dishonesty, while in the Bill it is knowingly making a false statement. I will deal with these offences when we get to clause 9.
Mr. Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con): I welcome the Secretary of State’s remarks about the scrutiny conducted in this House acting as an opportunity for people to listen carefully to the issues, and indeed to change their minds on them. I say that because just a short time ago I had to run over to the studios of a media broadcaster because it appeared to have been put out by the No. 10 press office that the amendments that had been tabled—many of them are probing amendments to allow this House to consider some of the issues—represented the stated position of the Opposition. I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman will join me in understanding how the procedures of this House should work properly, and I hope that he appreciates the need to table amendments so that we can concentrate on particular issues in Committee.
Mr. Straw: I genuinely have no idea of what is being briefed by others. However, I raised an eyebrow when I saw the amendments tabled by the Opposition in respect of clause 9 on offences, because I happen to think that ours is a sensible way to proceed, and people have to be careful. I spent 18 years in opposition, and the Government of the day showed me no mercy in this respect. I had to accept that the natural consequences of amendments that I tabled was that the words meant what they said, so that the proposed knocking out of an offence would be taken to be the policy of the Opposition.
Mr. Swire: Some clauses in the Bill profoundly alter the relationship between Members of Parliament and the electorate, not least clauses 6 and 10, which I hope that the Government will look at again. Equally, there are clauses that could and should apply to parliamentarians as a whole. Given that it is called the Parliamentary Standards Bill, is it envisaged that some of these clauses will apply to the other place as well?
Mr. Straw: As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister made clear on 10 June, it is envisaged that in due course the arrangements relating to the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority should indeed apply to the other place; that is why we sought to create an authority that covers both Houses. I hope that that matter will be dealt with in subsequent legislation. At the moment, however, the specific parts of the Bill cover only this House.
Mr. Andrew Dismore (Hendon) (Lab): Will my right hon. Friend give way?
Mr. Straw: I shall give way one more time, and then I will make some progress.
Mr. Dismore: I am grateful to my right hon. Friend. As he knows, I have tabled a couple of amendments, because I am concerned to ensure that parliamentarians have the right of natural justice in how investigations are conducted, and indeed the right of appeal. That is a long-standing right, which ought to be provided for if we are moving responsibility for the matter into the outside world. I have not had the opportunity to discuss the amendments with him, but does he agree that parliamentarians are entitled to the same benefit of natural justice as anybody in the outside world?
Mr. Straw: Of course I agree with that. Although we may not have got the provisions exactly right, I think that we are pretty nearly there in that respect. I will listen carefully to my hon. Friend’s points about the amendments, which I have already studied.
The fundamental purpose of the Bill is to replace the self-regulation of expenses, allowances and financial interests with external statutory regulation. The Bill will therefore establish the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority and a separate Commissioner for Parliamentary Investigations. Those provisions are in clause 1 and the schedules. Clause 6, to which I shall return, provides that the House is to continue to have a code of conduct. Clauses 7 and 8 set out provisions for investigations and enforcement, clause 9 prescribes three offences and clause 10 is intended to ensure that the system of external regulation can be operated effectively without falling foul of article 9 of the Bill of Rights on the privilege of this Parliament. I shall return to that point.
Of course, I recognise that the Clerk and distinguished right hon. and hon. Members have raised serious concerns, particularly about clauses 6 and 10, which will have an impact on the privilege of Parliament. I have already explained how I intend to approach the debates about that. I will make specific comments about those clauses later, but I wish first to make three general points to set the context.
First, this House has long acknowledged that in principle, external non-statutory regulation of aspects of the House’s business and the conduct of its Members
may be insufficient, so the House of Commons Commission is established in statute. Freedom of information is a good example of what can happen. The Government’s original proposal was that Parliament should be excluded from the operation of the Freedom of Information Act 2000. Parliament, and specifically the Public Administration Committee in a 1998 report, said that such an exclusion
“may well convey the wrong impression to the general public, given the purpose of this legislation...we recommend that the Government re-examine the exclusion of Parliament in the light of”
a report that had been produced by the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege. In the light of that pressure, which would have been impossible to resist, although I did not wish to, the Government accepted that recommendation. Famously, we are now subject to FOI legislation.
Secondly, once it is agreed that there should be independent, external regulation of our allowances and much else, certain consequences follow as night follows day. Such regulation will be in statute, and interpreting statute is a fundamental purpose of our courts. There is nothing frightening or unacceptable about what then follows, which is that courts may judicially review the way in which statutory bodies, among others, operate. They will do so against long-established principles. Contrary to popular belief, the courts are slow to substitute their substantive judgments for the judgments of the relevant authority. Instead, they are there as a check against unfair process or wanton irrationality.
Thirdly, and again contrary to myth, judicial review is in no sense a challenge to the sovereignty of Parliament. The Bill will put the regulation of allowances, financial interests and the code of conduct on a statutory footing. It will not affect the balance in our constitution between Parliament and the courts, as I shall explain in more detail later. We can expect the courts to continue to acknowledge the fundamental constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers in any proceedings that arise from the procedures in the Bill. Also, what Parliament does, Parliament can undo. That is a fundamental and very unusual feature of our system.
Mr. David Heathcoat-Amory (Wells) (Con): The right hon. Gentleman is now at least conceding that the Bill will affect parliamentary rights and privilege. Will he therefore correct, in her absence, the statement of the Leader of the House last Thursday? Referring to the Bill, she said that
“the question of parliamentary privilege is not an issue in that Bill, so that is not a question that hon. Members need to concern themselves with.”—[ Official Report, 25 June 2009; Vol. 494, c. 950.]
Will he take the opportunity to correct that statement, which was clearly wrong? This is a constitutional Bill, and it is outrageous that it is being treated like an emergency Bill.
Mr. Straw:
I do not accept that. The process was continuing when my right hon. and learned Friend the Leader of the House spoke about the matter, and her comments were therefore accurate at the time and, as I shall explain, will be accurate in future. There is a separate issue about clause 10, and my view is that it must make some provision, even if not in the current wording, for adducing in court proceedings evidence
that arises in the House or in parliamentary proceedings. There is nothing unusual in that—indeed, the House has accepted that for the draft bribery Bill.
Mr. Grieve: Of course, I appreciate the Secretary of State’s points. Indeed, perhaps the goalposts must be moved in the case of parliamentary privilege, which is little understood outside the House. However, is it not right that the system of enforcement—even specifically for the allowances aspect, which will go to the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority—gives rise to the possibility of any conflict between IPSA and the Standards and Privileges Committee being judicially reviewable? That is how I read several clauses, particularly clause 8(6). The Bill also provides that IPSA can make specific recommendations to the Standards and Privileges Committee about the disciplinary powers that the latter should exercise. It would be helpful if, either now or in Committee, we could have some clarity about those important issues.
Mr. Straw: I am happy to follow up that specific point in Committee, but I say to the whole House that—yes—we need to act with great care so as not to affect parliamentary privilege unnecessarily or gratuitously. Privilege is not for the benefit of individual Members but to preserve—
Mr. Straw: The hon. and learned Gentleman says, “freedom.” It is there to protect freedom, and above all, the rights of our constituents as represented by us. I understand that. However, we must also recognise that we collectively failed properly to regulate expenses. We must put that right and do it quickly and collaboratively.
Mr. Straw: I am sorry, but I will not give way.
Putting matters right means a statute and external regulation, and the courts will be able to interpret the powers and duties of that regulating authority. I am also anxious to ensure, so far as is humanly possible, that the courts do not embroil themselves gratuitously in the affairs of the House.
Mr. Straw: I want to make some progress. Later, if there is time, I may allow hon. Members to intervene.
I have already said that clause 1 sets up the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority. Schedule 1 supplements that and provides for its membership, administration and funding. It will have four members and a chair. One of the five members will have held high judicial office; one must be qualified as an auditor for the National Audit Office and one must have been—but be no longer—a Member of the Commons. Schedule 1 provides that selection will be on merit and through fair and open competition, with a process similar to that which has worked very satisfactorily to ensure that high quality people have been appointed to the Electoral Commission—that is, with a Speaker’s panel and Speaker’s committee.
Paragraph 5 of schedule 1 further enhances IPSA’s independence. It provides that members can be dismissed only in response to an address from both Houses of Parliament. We accord senior members of the judiciary
the same protection. Members of IPSA will be able to serve for only five years, with a possibility of being reappointed for up to three years.
Mr. Denis MacShane (Rotherham) (Lab): Will my right hon. Friend assure the House that members of the new “Guardian Council” for Members of Parliament will be paid only the same as hon. Members?
Mr. Straw: I cannot make that commitment— [Interruption.] The House knows very well the reason for that. That does not apply to other appointments, which the House has to approve, including that of the Information Commissioner and the chair of the Electoral Commission.
Mr. Swire: Will the Justice Secretary give way?
The provisions on the Commissioner for Parliamentary Investigations are set out in schedule 2. Schedule 2 makes provision for the appointment of the commissioner and for his or her terms, resignation or removal from office, remuneration, status and annual reporting, which is similar to the provision made for members of IPSA in schedule 1. Schedules 1 and 2 extend the Freedom of Information Act to cover IPSA and the commissioner respectively, and I have referred several times to the Speaker’s committee for the IPSA, which the Bill will establish.
Mr. Swire: Will the Justice Secretary give way?
Mr. Straw: I have already given way to the hon. Gentleman.
Clause 2 provides that IPSA is to take over responsibility for paying the salaries of Members, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the House. It is no part of the scheme—this might be for a future amendment to the Bill—that IPSA should have a role in setting salary levels, which are currently secured by recommendations from the Senior Salaries Review Body and a resolution of this House.
Sir Peter Tapsell (Louth and Horncastle) (Con): Why is it appropriate to go through this great constitutional rigmarole in advance of the recommendations of Sir Christopher Kelly’s committee, which is bound to cover all the same ground? The Prime Minister has said, I think unwisely, that we are going to accept in full all that committee’s recommendations, which are bound to cut across some of the proposals in the Bill, which means that we will have to go through the whole thing again.
Mr. Straw: I do not accept that—
Mr. Straw:
I will explain why not to the hon. Gentleman. He asked me a question and I would now like to answer it, if I may. Sir Christopher Kelly and his committee will come forward with proposals for the scheme of allowances, which will come before this House. As far as I know, all the party leaders have indicated that unless those proposals are in the realm of complete irrationality, which I do
not anticipate, they will be accepted in full, and so they should be. However, that is about the content of the scheme. The Bill is about the operation of the scheme, which includes, for example, who runs the Fees Office, who adjudicates in respect of the scheme and so on. Our plan—we can go into this in more detail in Committee tomorrow and on Wednesday—is that in the early autumn Sir Christopher Kelly will make his recommendations, which will be subject to approval by this House. Those recommendations will be the platform for the scheme that the new authority will operate. With luck, they could all come into force by 1 January next year if we have the authority in place, so the two will work in parallel and then merge together.
Sir George Young (North-West Hampshire) (Con): Does the Secretary of State not risk retrospectively restricting the Kelly committee’s terms of reference by defining them in the very narrow way in which he has just done?
Mr. Straw: I do not think so, and— [ Interruption. ] I really do not. Let me just say to the right hon. Gentleman that, as far as I am aware, just three weeks ago all the party leaders and the parties accepted the principle of the new authority. In the intervening three weeks, we have sought to go into detail in a collaborative way with the Opposition and the other parties, which have been very co-operative indeed, to ensure an agreed framework that can stand the test of time, and I think that it does. However, as I have indicated, I am happy to see whether we can improve upon it.
Mr. Andrew Tyrie (Chichester) (Con) rose—
Mr. Straw: I shall give way to the hon. Gentleman and then make some more progress.
Mr. Tyrie: Did the Secretary of State consult Sir Christopher Kelly about the Bill and is he happy with it?
Mr. Straw: I have discussed the matter with Sir Christopher Kelly, and I am certainly not going to say what his response was, any more than anybody else would quote a private conversation, whether it was complimentary or otherwise.
Dr. Tony Wright (Cannock Chase) (Lab): I was giving evidence to the Kelly committee but an hour or two ago, and I have to say that its members were very interested in the scheme and wanted to explore it in detail. They were particularly interested in the extent to which there was perhaps some confusion about the administration of the system and the regulation of it. Is there not a case, therefore, for taking a little more time, to ensure that we all get it right at the end of the day?
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