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That said, however, it is fair to say that it would in theory be possible for a Speaker, advised by the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority, to appoint somebody as the Commissioner for Parliamentary Investigations who could carry out his functions in an entirely dispassionate and disinterested way. However, my concern is not so much about the actuality, but about the appearance, because we will not get the confidence of the British public—and certainly not in the current book-burning storm that we seem to be facing—if they think that there has been a parliamentary stitch-up. I happen to think that Parliament ought to be big enough and self-confident enough to manage its own affairs and to discipline its malefactors, as we have done in the past, without feeling ashamed. However, I suspect that the political climate is rather different now and that we now have to have a Bill such as this one. However, if we are
to have such a Bill, let us get it right instead of rushing it through and making mistakes that are either unforeseen or foreseeable, but which are none the less mistakes.
The Justice Secretary is trying to persuade us that it is important for the independent fees office, as described by my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Mr. Leigh), to be disciplined—or governed or looked after—by an independent functionary. Yet we also see, and not just in schedule 2, which we are discussing, but in other parts of the Bill, various references— [ Interruption ]—including 20 references to the powers of the Speaker to do things, as my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester (Mr. Tyrie) reminds me. We are persuading ourselves that the machinery that the Bill creates is one of independence. However, every time one looks at a clause or a subsection, one sees that the Bill does not produce machinery that is independent of the House of Commons or Parliament, still less of the Executive; rather, it produces one that remains in their grip. I happen to think that that is not necessarily a bad thing, but it is no good for the Government to proclaim that the Bill sets up an independent machinery when we see the fingerprints of the Speaker’s office and the Executive on more or less every clause.
Mr. Hogg: When my hon. and learned Friend says that the machinery is in the grip of Parliament, what I think he means to say is that it is in the grip of the Executive, and that is what is truly dangerous.
Mr. Garnier: I agree. It has long been my view that while we have an Executive who sit in Parliament, they should not sit on Parliament. We have become too supine as Members of Parliament. I hope that, in recognising the public anger about expenses and so forth, we will none the less remember that we were elected to represent our constituents in a self-confident and independent way, and not to be bullied by either the Executive or other outside interests that wish to knock us off our stride.
Of course Members of Parliament make mistakes. Some may have committed serious mistakes and will have to answer to the law for them. However, I cannot understand an argument that says that we are setting up an independent machinery when one sees, for example, references to the Speaker in paragraphs 1(2), (3) and (4) of schedule 2, references to the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority, which is made up of Members of Parliament, or references in paragraph 4 of schedule 2 to the removal of the Commissioner for Parliamentary Investigations being brought about only on a motion put down by the Leader of the Commons—Hon. Members: They’ve conceded that.
Mr. Garnier: Well, I am delighted to hear that, because— [ Interruption. ] I am so grateful for the attendance of that person over there, whoever he is. None the less, my point in relation to those other aspects of schedule 2 remains. I apologise if I misunderstood the nature of the amendments of my right hon. Friend the Member for North-West Hampshire (Sir George Young) in relation to the motion made by the Leader of the House, but that function will now be performed by the Speaker—is that right?
Sir George Young: I have no idea.
Mr. Garnier: Well, there we are—it appears that none of us has an idea, but perhaps we ought to. I return to what the right hon. Member for Rotherham said at the beginning of his remarks. If we rush the Bill through without having thought about it thoroughly, we will end up disappointing not only ourselves, but those outside.
Sir George Young: Having listened to this debate on schedule 2, I think that we are clearly on a journey with the destination unknown. Where we are now is that we have a one-stop shop. We have one Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards, one code of conduct and one route for complaints. The original proposition from the Prime Minister was for the whole thing—finance and non-finance—to be contracted out to an outside body. That proposition met with criticism, for all the reasons that the Secretary of State knows, so it has now been divided into two aspects: financial and non-financial. The finance bit goes out to IPSA, which will be subject to the new commissioner. However, a bit of the code remains with the House of Commons and the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards.
In his remarks, the Secretary of State helpfully pointed to some provisions in clause 11 that enable us to move on from what we all regard as a rather unsatisfactory position, with two routes for complaints. If the Bill goes through, the commissioner whom we are discussing under schedule 2 could, if everybody agreed, perform the function of dealing with non-financial complaints and reporting not to IPSA, but straight to the Standards and Privileges Committee. If we ended up at that destination, we would have one commissioner who would perform two functions. In other words, there would be a one-stop shop.
There would still be some untidiness, however, in that the rules for one route of complaints might be different from those for another route, and the destination might be different. However, if we end up there, it would be helpful to have some consultation about that at some point, because there are people involved. It would also help to have a time scale. How long will we have two Parliamentary Commissioners for Standards running alongside each other, one reporting to us and the other reporting to IPSA? I have no difficulty with schedule 2, but there is a residual untidiness, although there are also some possible solutions, which the legislation may facilitate.
Mr. Grieve: I should make it clear—I might not have done this earlier—that I can see that there might be some merit in having the commissioner for investigations performing the role of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards. Indeed, there has been criticism in the past about the extent to which parliamentary commissioners have been subject to improper pressure from within this House, and that proposal might help to resolve that problem. However, is not the nub of the issue that if we are to have that conjoined role, the powers of enforcement in clause 8 and the relationship of the commissioner vis-Ã -vis the Standards and Privileges Committee will have to be identical? Otherwise, we will start running into some very difficult areas indeed.
Sir George Young:
My hon. and learned Friend is quite right, which underlines the need for some serious consultation if we are to come up with a solution that meets all the points that have been raised, including his
concerns and mine about exposing those decisions that currently rest with the House to review in the courts, which is not something that I would wish for.
Sir Patrick Cormack: Does that point not underline the good sense of taking time in the other place to get the Bill absolutely right?
Sir George Young: I agree with my hon. Friend.
We have had a useful debate that has outlined some potential solutions, albeit ones that have ramifications that need to be thought through. However, it was helpful to hear from the Secretary of State that he is not unfamiliar with the issues raised by the approach adopted by the Government. I hope that he will be sympathetic to some of the solutions that have been explored.
Mr. Straw: This has been a useful debate, and I should like to respond to it, if I may. My right hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham (Mr. MacShane) talked about a Cromwellian commission, and I understand his anxiety, which is shared across the House, that we might lurch from a system of inadequate regulation—which has exposed the reputation of the House and of the vast majority of honourable and honest Members to being besmirched—to the other extreme of over-regulation. Parenthetically, may I add that my right hon. and learned Friend the Leader of the House and I also understand the concerns about the interpretation of the guidance on so-called second incomes?
May I say to my right hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham that the rules or code that the commissioner would be hoping to enforce could come into effect only by approval of the House on an affirmative vote? The authority will propose the rules or code, but clause 5(6) is absolutely explicit:
“The rules (or revision) do not come into effect until they are approved by a resolution of the House of Commons.”
Mr. Hogg: My reading of that—in accordance with the ordinary procedures on affirmative resolutions—is that the House would have no power to amend. Indeed, once the rules were in place, I do not think that the House would have any power to revoke them.
Mr. Straw: It is certainly the case, as with any affirmative resolution, that the rules would be either accepted or rejected. However, there would be a process of consultation beforehand. I give notice to the House that, when we reach clause 5, I will accept amendments to subsection (4) to extend the list of those who have to be consulted. There will be an iterative process between the authority and the House. In any event, if 95 per cent. of the proposals are acceptable and 5 per cent. are not, it will be for the House to decide.
Mr. Hogg: Once the rules are in place, who will be able to get rid of them? Will it be only IPSA, or will the House also be able to do so?
Mr. Straw: The right hon. and learned Gentleman raises an interesting point. Under the structure of the Bill at the moment, only IPSA could do so, but I will take the matter away. I had not thought of this before, but there might need to be provision in the Bill for the rules periodically to be reviewed and voted on by the House. I will take that matter away; it is an important point.
The hon. and learned Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) raised several points. We have talked about whether it would be possible to appoint people who are independent and capable of exercising authority over us when we ourselves make the appointments. I think that that is possible. The hon. and learned Gentleman was complimentary about the way in which my predecessors as Lord Chancellor and I have supervised the system of judicial appointments, and I think that we can achieve the appointments in question because we have experience of doing so. I must also tell him that the Executive’s fingerprints are nowhere to be found on the scheme proposed in the Bill. It is true that they were, in some of the earlier drafts, but we made sure that they were removed.
I shall turn to the very helpful points raised by the right hon. Member for North-West Hampshire (Sir George Young). Clause 11 was drafted in response to points that he made in the cross-party talks. If it is the wish of the House, we could double-hat the commissioner. One person could perform two sets of parallel functions. Once the House has approved the scheme and the Bill, I undertake to ensure that detailed consultations are entered into on how we might achieve that.
6.45 pm
I acknowledge, in relation to the staff in the Fees Office and to the commissioner and the staff who will work alongside the commissioner, that we are dealing with individual human beings who have been doing the best job they can. Personally, I have very high regard for Mr. John Lyon, who worked with me as an official in the Home Office and in the Ministry of Justice before he came here.
Clause 8(6), which we will come to tomorrow, contains a provision for a protocol setting out the interrelationships between the authority, the commissioner, the Committee on Standards and Privileges and—in respect of criminal prosecutions—the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Metropolitan Police Commissioner. We have included the provision as a result of discussions in the cross-party group to ensure that there were clear dividing lines—in the best sense of the term—between the different functions.
Amendment made: 55, in schedule 2, page 18, line 15, leave out sub-paragraph (3).— (Mr. Heathcoat-Amory.)
Schedule 2, as amended, agreed to .
Question proposed, That the schedule be the Third schedule to the Bill.
Mr. Hogg: I indicated in the previous debate that I would like to have a short debate on schedule 3. The composition of the Speaker’s Committee for IPSA is obviously a matter of some importance, because the committee will be consulted on a number of significant issues and policies. One is therefore entitled to look at its composition. Of course it will have among its members Mr. Speaker, which is a very good thing, but it will also have the Leader of the House of Commons. One has to recognise that the Leaders of the House of Commons are not infrequently extremely partisan. They used not to be, when I first came into the House, but increasingly, instead of being representatives of the House of Commons as they used to be, they have become very partisan.
I notice that there will be no ex officio members of the committee, other than my right hon. Friend the Member for North-West Hampshire (Sir George Young), who at the moment chairs the Committee on Standards and Privileges; I am pleased that that post has been recognised in this regard. I would like there to be a nominated representative from the other political parties. I see considerable merit in the shadow Leader of the House or the spokesman for the Liberal Democrats or another minority party being an ex officio member of the committee. In that way, one could be reasonably sure that the views of the House would be fairly represented in the committee.
It is true that paragraph 1(d) provides for
“five members of the House of Commons who are not Ministers”
to be among the membership, but, as I have repeatedly pointed out, the Whips often control the votes. The Executive, through their Whips, could thus fashion the composition of the committee. I do not want that. I do not trust the Executive. Over the past 12 years, we have seen the power of the Executive over this House increase, and right hon. and hon. Members should do their utmost to prevent any more erosion. This is part of the process. When the composition of the committee is considered further in another place, serious thought should be given to the appointment of Members who represent other parties, who should sit on the committee by right. In that way, the Executive would not be able to fashion the committee through the Whips Office, because that would be an erosion of parliamentary sovereignty.
Mr. Straw: It might help if I explain the basis on which we propose the Speaker’s Committee. We took into consideration the parallel experience of the Speaker’s Committee on the Electoral Commission. I have served on that committee—as Leader of the House, I think, and certainly as Justice Secretary.
I understand the anxiety of the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) about these committees being taken over by the Executive, but the Speaker’s Committee on the Electoral Commission is chaired by the hon. Member for Gosport (Sir Peter Viggers) and is operated on a very collaborative basis. If we are talking about a Public Bill Committee on a contentious piece of legislation, then, yes, of course the Whips will influence the Committee of Selection, but for this kind of Committee, the individuals selected to serve on it do so because of their commitment to this House and, in this case, to the Electoral Commission—and it has worked extremely well. I have no reason to think that that should not also be the case here.
I do not accept what the right hon. and learned Gentleman says about Leaders of the House, and I am not just speaking for myself, but for other Leaders of the House. As I have witnessed, they have stood up for the interests of the House not just here, but inside Government—repeatedly and assiduously—as well.
We are always open to suggestions for improvement, but paragraph 1 of schedule 3 provides that of eight members, only one can be a Minister of the Crown—it would be the Leader of the House. I will give further consideration to the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s suggestion to have some requirement to ensure a balance between the parties.
Mr. Andrew Tyrie (Chichester) (Con): I beg to move amendment 69, page 1, line 17, at end add ‘of 3 July 2008.’
The amendment would take further the implementation of the recommendations of Sir John Baker. It would remove the requirement for the House to pass further resolutions in order to amend MPs’ pay, which would become entirely a matter of statute. Although it incorporates the resolutions passed on 3 July 2008, I am advised that it involves no issues of retrospection. It retains the flexibility built into the Baker recommendations of a review by the Senior Salaries Review Board at the start of each Parliament.
My reason for tabling the amendment is clear enough. Along with allowances, the pay of MPs has been a source of enormous controversy almost every time the House has considered it. To the public, it looks like MPs voting themselves a pay rise from taxpayers’ pockets; it looks like trotters in the trough. There is always a pressing reason, too, for the Government to wish to vary an SSRB recommendation, which can cause even more controversy and require even bigger adjustments to be made later.
That was partly why Sir John Baker was given the task of devising a system
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