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Mr. Jenkin:
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend. In evidence given to the Defence Committee last week, we were told that the Secretaries of State of the three key Departments currently represented on the Treasury Bench meet once a month. They have no Cabinet secretariat, and there is no formal Cabinet sub-committee. We
would be making fewer strategic and tactical mistakes if there were a single Minister with full-time responsibility for the war in Afghanistan.
Mr. Hague: As my hon. Friend will have gathered, I have a great deal of sympathy with that point. A situation such as this requires the regular sharing of all assessments, thoughts and knowledge by the senior Ministers involved-I did not know that that happened only once a month; if that is true, it should be far more often-and a particular Minister who is responsible for the day-to-day concerns of this campaign.
Having covered troop numbers and ministerial direction, I want to ask Ministers about what has become the vexed public issue of helicopter numbers. Ministers have said repeatedly that that issue has been addressed, but it is hard to dispel the impression that that is not the case, particularly when only yesterday the Chief of the General Staff had to borrow a US helicopter to visit troops in Afghanistan. We recognise, of course, that up to 14 Merlin helicopters should be in service by the end of the year and that eight additional Chinook helicopters that are undergoing conversions should be available next year-although it is extraordinary that those Chinooks were delivered eight years ago and have not been in service in all that time. However, even if the numbers will be increased by the end of the year, that does not excuse the fact that now, while a major offensive operation is under way, not enough has already been done.
In the Defence Committee report published today, its Chairman, my right hon. Friend the Member for North-East Hampshire (Mr. Arbuthnot), says:
"It seems to us that operational commanders in the field today are unable to undertake potentially valuable operations because of the lack of helicopters for transportation around the theatre of operations."
Just as worryingly, the summary of the report states:
"Helicopter capability is being seriously undermined by the shortage of helicopters...capable of being deployed in support of operations overseas. We believe that the size of the fleet is an issue, and are convinced that the lack of helicopters is having adverse consequences for operations today and, in the longer term, will severely impede the ability of the UK Armed Forces to deploy."
That is an extremely concerning finding by an all-party Select Committee in a unanimous report, and it merits a considered response from the Defence Secretary.
Mr. Hague: I will not give away to the hon. Gentleman again, if he will forgive me, because other Members wish to speak.
It is not as though this problem had not been noticed for a long time. My hon. Friend the Member for Woodspring, from within days of becoming shadow Secretary of State for Defence in December 2005, has been going on and on about the problem. He said on 15 December that year that the "most pressing requirements" were to do with
"shortfalls in the helicopter lift capability that is essential to our activity in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere."-[ Official Report, 15 December 2005; Vol. 440, c. 1467.]
In October 2007, he told the House:
"At a time when our troops are facing a shortage of lift capacity in both Iraq and Afghanistan, that decision was astonishingly complacent".-[ Official Report, 9 October 2007; Vol. 464, c. 208.]
He was referring to the decision to reduce the helicopter budget by £1.4 billion. He has been warning about the matter for many years, and it is not as though it had suddenly become evident that it is a problem. The Government's performance on this matter really has not been satisfactory, and it is no wonder that there is widespread criticism across the media and across the country of what they have done with regard to helicopters. People deserve a better explanation, and I hope that they will get it at the end of the debate.
The third issue on which I wish to press Ministers is the follow-up to Operation Panther's Claw. We have become familiar with a cycle in Afghanistan that is at the root of many of our difficulties. Territory is won by valiant armed forces after fierce fighting and the Taliban are driven out, but that is not followed by a swift wave of co-ordinated development, delivery of services and embedding of alternative livelihoods. That is not only because the international aid agencies are unable to work effectively in insecure environments but because the overall reconstruction effort in Afghanistan has been mired in duplication and confusion.
General McChrystal, the commander of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan, recently said that the strategy was
"to try to protect the people by getting amongst the people: what we call shape, clear, hold, and build. But the idea is that after we clear an area from insurgents, we'll hold it with security forces-Afghan and American-and then we'll start development projects. That's the 'build.'"
I hope that Ministers will explain at the end of the debate whether they are confident that while UK and US forces are clearing territory, the succeeding two elements of the strategy are this time definitely in place. They are absolutely fundamental to its success. Our armed forces are giving their all, and in many cases giving their lives, and they will be doing so in vain unless those two requirements follow on from their operations.
The Prime Minister said on Monday that as British forces continue the operation:
"Behind them will come Afghan forces, whose numbers I want to see raised very substantially over the next few weeks."-[ Official Report, 13 July 2009; Vol. 496, c. 28.]
He is quite right to want to see them raised, but that implies that there are nowhere near enough of them at the moment. It seems urgent that agreement be reached with the Afghan Government about that element of the strategy, to ensure that the "hold" part follows the "clear", and that territory is held. I hope that the Defence Secretary will tell the House what indications are now emerging from the Afghan Government about their response to the Prime Minister's representations. Is it a difficulty that the Afghan army is usually sent on three-year deployments, and is there a case for more rapid turnover of some of its personnel on deployments into Helmand so that the numbers can be increased?
Will the Defence Secretary also provide assurances that detailed plans are in place for the "build" phase after Operation Panther's Claw? There should be actual plans in place to ensure that any military gain is translated
into an enduring shift in the political and security situation in Helmand province, and the Department for International Development and the Foreign Office should be working together intensively-hopefully they are-and working with our NATO allies to achieve that.
I hope that the Defence Secretary will also clarify where our policy on dealing with opium production in Helmand now stands. This country has spent huge sums of money, hundreds of millions of pounds, on trying to eradicate that production, but the US envoy Richard Holbrooke said at the G8 meeting on Afghanistan:
"Eradication is a waste of money...It might destroy some acreage, but it didn't reduce the amount of money the Taliban got by one dollar."
In the light of that, where does policy now stand? There are British and American forces at work in Helmand, yet the policies of the British and American Governments on poppy production eradication seem entirely different. Surely they need to be brought into line if an effective policy is to be pursued.
I hope that the Minister can also tell us about progress on building up the Afghan army. The Prime Minister has set out the objective of building it up to 134,000 by late 2011. That must be the right thing to do. The speed and scale are crucial-they, along with a non-corrupt and sorted-out police force, will ultimately allow Afghanistan to take care of itself.
I want to make one point about Pakistan. Another lesson of the past is that insurgent groups melt across the border to regroup in Pakistan when they are hard pressed in Afghanistan. A significant difference is that the Pakistani army is engaged in intensive operations on its side of the border. We look to Ministers to confirm that co-ordination is taking place with the Pakistani authorities-I think, from the Foreign Secretary's speech, that that is happening-to ensure that the spillover effects of our operations in Helmand are anticipated and headed off, and insurgent groups are thus denied the breathing space that perpetuated the cycle of conflict in Afghanistan in the past.
Conservative Members want the clear pursuit of tightly defined objectives in Afghanistan. We want the Government to explain their strategy and their achievement-or non-achievement-of objectives regularly to the House and the country. We want the Afghan strategy to be reviewed in the round after the elections and co-ordinated with that of the United States. We want unrelenting attention to be paid to what the nation-and many hon. Members-believe are deficiencies in the number of helicopters provided for our troops. If "clear, hold and build" is the approach, we want to know that, in current operations, in which so many of our soldiers are making every effort, the Government are confident that we can hold and build as well as clear. That is the road to eventual success.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Sylvia Heal): Order. I remind hon. Members that Mr. Speaker has imposed an eight-minute limit on Back-Bench contributions.
2.47 pm
Mr. Jim Hood (Lanark and Hamilton, East) (Lab):
I was in the States last week with the NATO Science and Technology Committee, visiting the Harvard JFK school of government in Boston and discussing topics that
dealt with the priorities of President Obama's Administration and developments in Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. We also examined scientific advances, such as soldier nanotechnologies and cyberterrorism, and talked to experts in non-proliferation issues.
During that visit, we heard about the special operation that was taking place in central Helmand and the south of Helmand-Operation Panther's Claw. We heard the tragic news of the eight British soldiers and some American soldiers who had been killed in the operation, within hours of each other, in separate incidents. The numbness that the news created and the guilt that we all feel when our young men and women pay the ultimate price while putting their lives in harm's way were too awful for words.
However, it is not good enough just to say how sorry we are-and we are; how proud we are-and we are; how the fallen did not die in vain-they did not; or that the mission is defensible-it is. The families, in coping with their grief and loss, need a bit more than that from Parliament. They need to know that their loss is not in vain and that the terror that threatens every man, woman and child in every community in our country will be defeated-and it will.
Few in the House doubt the threat and the danger emanating from Afghanistan. Those who argue for our walking away and letting the Taliban return to power, with all that would mean for the security of our country and the rest of the western world, delude themselves if they believe that the terrorism we seek to defeat in Helmand would not come to the streets of London, Birmingham, Glasgow and other cities in our country. However, my support is not without criticism, particularly when I hear retired generals criticising their successors and/or the Government. We know them-they took the Queen's shilling when they were in charge, but they are now writing books, working for defence companies and being super-critics.
Afghanistan was where 9/11 was planned and executed from. Bin Laden was in the mountains with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. The No. 1 priority for us all should have been to catch and defeat al-Qaeda and stop the terrorism on our streets, but sadly it was not. I believed then, and I believe now, that Iraq was a disaster-it was a side issue and had nothing to do with the 9/11 attack in New York. The world would be a different place today if we had taken on the Afghan mission then, as we should have. Nothing that I have heard since has changed my opinion on that.
I return to where we are today and what we need to do. The Foreign Secretary talked about the importance of the NATO mission, which has been accepted across the House. The Brits and Americans are leading the coalition, but they are providing troops disproportionately to other NATO members. That is just not good enough. Those who argue for the enlargement of NATO would have to convince me that the current NATO members have proven their worth before we look to enlarge further. There are still NATO members that are not sharing the burden in this mission.
I want to comment briefly on troop numbers, about which much has been said. Should we send 2,000 more troops, on top of the 9,000 troops who are already there? General Dannatt is reported as having requested 2,000 more troops. My view is that if he has argued the case for that, that case should be answered. If the
soldiers on the ground are telling the politicians that they need 2,000 more troops, I would certainly support that request. Unlike the retired generals, I much prefer the views of the soldiers on the ground, and I would support them if they needed those troops.
I want to finish my brief contribution by putting a marker down about troop protection and care for our veterans. I started my contribution by saying that I had talks in Boston last week on soldier nanotechnologies. There is fantastic proven research into soldier nanotechnologies taking place now-technologies that will save lives and give protection to our soldiers, but which, until now, had relevance only in Hollywood science fiction movies. That new technology will not be cheap, and it may be that our defence budgets will have to be reprioritised. However, the question must surely be: why should we spend billions of pounds on a nuclear deterrent that does not deter, when we can spend a fraction of the £30 billion to £60 billion needed for renewing Trident and completely change the risk to our armed forces, saving lives and protecting our soldiers from serious injury?
I am a patron of a veterans' charity in my constituency called FEBA, or Forward Edge of the Battle Area. Troops returning from the battlefield need our support, and we have much to do to deliver on that moral duty to our armed forces. We read of statistics: for instance, 8 to 10 per cent. of soldiers who return to our community are in prison, while 25 per cent. of people sleeping rough on the streets are former members of our armed forces returning to our community. Sadly, many of our soldiers return with limbs missing and other serious disablements. However, many more return looking perfectly normal and re-enter our communities, and no one recognises the combat stress that they and many thousands more in our armed forces are suffering. Veterans' charities such as FEBA in my constituency are doing their best, but the Government, politicians and our communities in general need to do more.
2.55 pm
Mr. Edward Davey (Kingston and Surbiton) (LD): The hon. Member for Lanark and Hamilton, East (Mr. Hood) was quite right to remind us about the veterans who return from Iraq, Afghanistan or any other theatre of conflict bearing not physical but mental scars, and I hope that the charity in his constituency goes from strength to strength in supporting those soldiers.
There remains a broad consensus in this House on key aspects of the policy on Afghanistan. The key objective of the mission in Afghanistan to stop al-Qaeda was, and is, correct. We are right to ask that that objective be tightly defined, as the right hon. Member for Richmond, Yorks (Mr. Hague) did, and to ask exactly what it means in practice, but there is no doubt that counter-terrorism remains the stated reason for the war and, unlike in the case of Iraq, that is not being questioned by any of the main parties.
There has also been consensus recently on the need to change the coalition's approach in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and President Obama has provided the leadership to make possible such undertakings as troop reinforcements and the civilian surge in Afghanistan, and the encouragement of the Government of Pakistan
to deal with the Taliban in their country and to back those efforts with expert counter-insurgency support and development aid. We shall wait to see whether those changes are successful, but we agree that they are correct. However, we can question the resources that either America or, in our case, Britain has put behind those changes.
There has of course been total consensus on our shared gratitude to, and admiration and deep respect for, our armed forces, and on the brilliant work of diplomats, UK civilians, aid organisations and others. We are filled with admiration for the great commitment that they show when carrying out their very difficult tasks. And of course we pay tribute to all those who have died. We remember them and their families in our hearts.
Any consensus on matters as serious as these cannot be a cosy consensus; it has to be questioned hard. When our troops have been engaged in a war for eight years, it is surely incumbent on this House to ask the toughest questions about the strategy and the objectives. I do not want the Foreign Secretary to think that our questions are rhetorical. We do not pretend to have all the answers, but we do want to see signs that the Government have some of the answers, and that they are working hard and fast to find the rest of them.
There is consensus on the broader aspects of the objective, but it has not always been clear how we would eventually achieve it. Sometimes, the objective has been described in rather vague language. I hope that notions of a western-style democracy and even of nation building have now been replaced. We need to focus on the counter-terrorism agenda more directly. That is not to say that we should give up other objectives for Afghanistan, particularly those relating to development. Those objectives for the international community should surely be there, whether or not our troops are there. We want to see Afghanistan's economy improve, its children educated, and so on, but that is not why we are fighting, and we need to be more honest about that.
Even working to a more limited, better defined objective of tackling an al-Qaeda terrorist threat to London, New York and elsewhere that has been trained for and organised from Afghanistan and the Pakistan border, we need to ask how we will know when that objective has been achieved. How will we know when we have neutered every al-Qaeda cell in that vast mountainous expanse? The normal explanation is that, once there is stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan and once they have Governments who will themselves take on any terrorists that might threaten us, it will be mission accomplished-if one dare use that phrase.
Indeed, a second part of our Afghanistan objectives, according to the Foreign Secretary, has increasingly become to provide a level of stability to prevent the dangers of a failed state, which Afghanistan clearly has been and Pakistan has at times threatened to become. That prompts further questions about the stability we are seeking. What is the level of stability at which a state is deemed to be functioning well enough to reassure us that terrorists will be expelled or arrested by that Government? I find it difficult to describe that point except in terms that make me wonder whether we could ever achieve it, particularly in Afghanistan.
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