Previous Section Index Home Page


16 July 2009 : Column 537

That said, I challenged the Prime Minister on a point on Monday. I heard the Foreign Secretary say today that there are 51 countries deployed in Afghanistan. What is not said is how few European countries have deployed troops to southern Afghanistan. Certainly none of the major European countries-"major" in terms of population and the size of their armed forces-has done so. If possible, we need to get our European allies on board more.

We will not go into the matter of helicopters-we have had that debate-but I urge the Secretary of State for Defence to look into getting more unmanned aerial vehicles. I am absolutely convinced that if we deployed more of them, our troops would be able to see what is happening, and hopefully could deal with some ambushes before they happen. Please, Secretary of State, let us have a lot more UAVs.

I believe that the Afghan people do, in the main, support what is going on. I have met representatives of the Helmand provincial council, including two lady council members who would never be allowed to hold office if the Taliban ran the country, and that is an important point.

I said that I was sure that messages from this debate will find their way to Afghanistan, but messages come back from the front line to families, too. Two days ago, I received a letter from a mother; I shall end with a quote from it, because I find it poignant, and because it confirms what I say about winning hearts and minds:

That letter comes from New South Wales.

5.5 pm

Dr. Roberta Blackman-Woods (City of Durham) (Lab): I returned this morning from Afghanistan, having in the past few days visited Camp Bastion, Kandahar, Lashkar Gah, Sangin, Kabul and a number of DFID-supported projects, and having met key politicians, including Governor Mangal in Helmand and the district governor in Sangin. In the short time available to me, I shall not be able to do justice to all the information that I gathered.

I also had the tremendous privilege of being able to attend the repatriation service at Camp Bastion for the eight soldiers who were killed. As the House might know, it was an extremely moving and very sad occasion,
16 July 2009 : Column 538
but the Army showed tremendous care and attention to detail in honouring the lives of those young men. Owing to the loss of life, it is essential that we continue to question our role in Afghanistan to be absolutely sure that we are doing the right thing. It is right to question, but it would be dreadfully wrong to conclude that we should not be in Afghanistan. It would be an absolute tragedy for us to walk out and abandon the people of Afghanistan at this point, because I learned, and received very up-to-date information suggesting that, things are moving forward positively in a number of areas.

We have to remember that, in a number of ways, Afghanistan is completely rebuilding not only its state but local government and every single service imaginable, so it has a long way to go. The information on the elections showed that registration was going better than had previously been thought, and there is hope that the result can be taken as the legitimate voice of the people. We will need to see whether that is the case, but the people in Kabul and in the provinces were hopeful.

There were also signs that the Afghan national army is improving. It has been able to take over and plan some operations itself, and to carry them out with support from the international forces. That is seen as a move in the right direction. Absolutely everyone, whether military personnel, politicians or civil servants, talked about the need for better governance at all levels, from the Cabinet to provincial councils and community development councils. In Kabul, there was an acknowledgement that the Cabinet around President Karzai was probably the best that there has ever been, so there was some concern about what would happen post-elections in August. Nevertheless, the fact that a wider group of people in Afghanistan now has the capacity to carry out ministerial roles is a good thing.

I received quite a lot of evidence from DFID about the effect of our aid. A lot of British Government aid goes, quite rightly in my view, to support the Afghan Government and, in particular, to pay the salaries of teachers, the police and other Government officials, because if Afghanistan is to have an independent future, it must have a properly functioning state that is seen to be legitimate by most of the population. It is absolutely essential that aid should support the state institutions as well as the local people.

As soon as we came out of the airport in Kabul, we saw lots of girls in their uniforms going to school. We have to make sure that here in the Chamber we give a balanced view about what is going on: not all girls are going to school, and they cannot go to school everywhere, but there has been a very big improvement on what was happening under the Taliban. It was amazing that we were able to have a meeting with the Sangin district governor, some of his officials, the police, representatives from the security forces and, critically, the provincial reconstruction team, which talked about how to improve the local clinic.

We should not take those advances for granted; we need to pay tribute to our armed forces for helping move forward the situation in Afghanistan, where some thought can now be given to governance. We also have to consider what still needs to be improved. We need to look particularly at the role of the United Nations and how there is still not enough co-ordination of the whole aid effort, to get maximum benefit for the people of Afghanistan.


16 July 2009 : Column 539
5.11 pm

Mr. John Horam (Orpington) (Con): I, too, had the privilege of visiting Helmand province recently, and I strongly echo what the hon. Member for City of Durham (Dr. Blackman-Woods) has just said about the professionalism, commitment and bravery-and, indeed, hope-of the troops there. The fact is that there is greater hope in the country at the moment.

First, there has been the US surge-the extra American troops supporting our British troops contribute enormously to a sensible arrangement between the forces. Secondly, there has been a significant change in the attitude of the Pakistani army, Government and people. We therefore have the opportunity, for the first time in eight years, of having what is in effect a pincer movement, from the north in Afghanistan and the south in Pakistan, against the Taliban troops who are along the border and the Durand line. The situation is definitely hopeful, and we should not underplay that.

In the short time available, I want to move on to Foreign and Commonwealth Office issues rather than military issues, because I have concerns about the FCO. First, I was dismayed to learn at a recent briefing by the interdepartmental committee on policy on Afghanistan and Pakistan that there is no Pashto speaker at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office or Department for International Development in the area and only two Pashto speakers in the military in the area.

Once upon a time-perhaps in the days of the Malakand field force, about which Churchill wrote a book-the Foreign Office could produce people who could speak Pashto out of the top of its head, but the fact is that there are none now. Why is that the situation after eight years? I hope that the Defence Secretary will pass on that concern to his colleagues in the Foreign Office. There is a real problem; obviously, there has to be dialogue between the troops and DFID and FCO representatives and the local Afghan people. That should involve native speakers as far as possible. We know what happened in Iraq: it is very difficult to work all the time through interpreters.

My second point is about continuity of personnel. The contracts are negotiated individually by the FCO, but they often last only six months, and for those six months people work six weeks on and two weeks off. That means that one person may be doing one and a half jobs-not only their own job, but half of somebody else's as well. There is therefore a very short time for people to get experience. Furthermore, because of the difficulties of the situation, more mature officials with families do not want to go to the country. The people on the ground are young, inexperienced, do not speak the language and are there for only a short time. Is that a sensible way to show our commitment to a foreign policy that is so decisive and such a priority in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office? I suggest not.

Thirdly, I want to return to a point mentioned by my right hon. Friend the Member for Richmond, Yorks (Mr. Hague). When I was in Afghanistan only two months ago, the UN commissioner was in despair about co-operation between the various organisations and national bodies: the European Union, the Americans, NATO and so forth. There are so many different people there, and so many acronyms that one has to deal with, that the situation is fantastically complicated. We must
16 July 2009 : Column 540
have some simplification and real co-ordination. I hope that General McChrystal might be able to impose some degree of greater co-ordination. However, I am afraid that the Americans are part of the problem because-according to the UN commissioner-they do not sufficiently tell other people what they are doing and what is happening.

Finally, over the past four or five years there has been mission creep. Other aspects have developed, absolutely desirable as they may be. The hon. Member for City of Durham referred to the young women in the streets of Kabul going to and from school in their hundreds. One's heart leaps at that wonderful, marvellous sight, but the fact is that we are not ultimately there for that reason. We are there to pursue the Taliban and arrive at a point where we can withdraw because the Afghan Government, army, police and justice system are able to cope with the Taliban and the threat from al-Qaeda. That is why we must now, and at all times, concentrate on security and on helping our troops.

5.16 pm

Ann Winterton (Congleton) (Con): I would like to associate myself with the powerfully and eloquently expressed remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Sussex (Mr. Soames) about the families of our armed services, and indeed all those who serve in our armed services.

The answer that I received to my question in Monday's Defence questions from the Minister for the Armed Forces convinced me that it will be a miracle if we ever win the war in Afghanistan. It could so easily end in yet another military defeat, perhaps not like in Iraq, where we were virtually shown the door, but through the potential-I stress that word-collapse of support in the United Kingdom as more and more body bags are returned home and people ask why. I believe that that question has been answered very adequately several times in this debate, so I do not intend to repeat the reasons.

My question to the Minister was:

He responded:

The reality is that both the ministry and the military are spinning like mad, making out that the United Kingdom is winning, just as they did when we were in Iraq, when in fact we are losing. The military and politicians alike blame the Government for underfunding defence, but when one considers the expense and waste in what can only be described as some disastrous procurement decisions, it is enough to make one weep.

Three ministries are involved in Afghanistan-the Foreign Office, the Department for International Development and the Ministry of Defence-and they appear to be failing to work together. Indeed, that must be the case if the three Secretaries of State have only one meeting a month. I can only question how security
16 July 2009 : Column 541
is to be achieved by the provision of health centres and schools-which will, in any case, be provided only in the town areas, not in the countryside. Health centres and schools are very desirable, but the first priority should surely be security so that people can go about their daily lives feeling relatively safe.

Yet another example of a total waste of money is the theme park with the Ferris wheel. Who can have allowed such a stupid decision to have been made, at not inconsiderable expense? Is the international community expected to pay the staff and running costs for ever? Unless the economy in Afghanistan is developed with local people playing a full part, it will most certainly have to continue to do so. Coupled with that, the desire to turn the fragmented tribal nation that is Afghanistan into a democracy greater than the one that we experience here in the United Kingdom is surely a mission beyond reality, not least because of the high levels of corruption, including at the highest level in government.

The international security assistance force and Afghan national army forces can hold the cities and towns-some only just-but the countryside can never be held in the foreseeable future while the rural population continue to be bombed and shot at. They have precious few benefits and certainly no peace or security, and for many years ahead the Taliban will be prepared to evaporate from and reappear at will in that community, from which they are of course indistinguishable to non-Afghans.

One way in which the hearts and minds of the rural population could be won is through the creation of good communications-in other words, a road and bridge network that would allow the movement of goods and thereby encourage trading and the development of markets and businesses. That, in turn, would enhance stability, because people have a vested interest in peace and security.

If one studies the history of any nation, one sees that the greatest progress comes about when there are boom times, with the population in work, fed and housed. A good communications and transport infrastructure is an essential element of that. Schools and hospitals follow when a profitable business base has been developed to support those ventures in both rural areas and towns. We are surely putting the cart before the horse by not focusing on construction projects, which would bring in their wake enhanced security.

Dr. Blackman-Woods: Will the hon. Lady give way?

Ann Winterton: I will not if the hon. Lady does not mind, because of the time.

If ISAF shows no confidence in the inadequate road network and have to use off-road vehicles, what signal does that send to the Afghan national army, the police and civilians, and the-

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Alan Haselhurst): Order.

5.22 pm

Mr. Bernard Jenkin (North Essex) (Con): I agree with much of what my hon. Friend the Member for Congleton (Ann Winterton) said about the lack of co-ordination
16 July 2009 : Column 542
between Government Departments here in Whitehall. It has become axiomatic that Whitehall is not on a war footing, as it should be. I agree with what my hon. Friend the Member for Orpington (Mr. Horam) said about the complexity that we have created for ourselves, particularly between the EU and NATO. Everybody knows that that arrangement does not work and has to be sorted out on the ground in spite of institutional conflicts.

That underlines the fact that, although I have the greatest respect for the right hon. Member for Airdrie and Shotts (John Reid), the original deployment on Operation Herrick IV in 2006 will prove to be one of the most ill-judged and ill-conceived military deployments of modern decades. That is not because of what he said or did not say at the time, but it is widely known and has been confirmed on the public record to the Defence Committee by Brigadier Ed Butler that the whole operation was artificially capped by the Treasury at 3,150 men and a cost of £1.5 billion, a sum that was meant to last over three years. That initial strategy was quickly diverted by political pressures into the platoon house strategy and into defending far too many forward operating bases with far too few troops and-the ubiquitous subject-far too few helicopters.

John Reid: I, too, stand in great admiration of Ed Butler for his courage and skills, and for the kind words that he said about me to the Committee, but on this one he is wrong. I can assure the hon. Gentleman that the force configuration was given to us by the chiefs of staff. My job was to ensure that we got the money necessary for the configuration that they requested. He may say in retrospect that they got it wrong, but I can assure him that that configuration was not cut, limited or reduced by the Treasury.

Mr. Jenkin: I have to accept the assurance that the right hon. Gentleman has given, even though we have conflicting testimony. However, we have wonderful armed forces in this country, who tend to put the best complexion on what they are being asked to do; they tend to give the optimistic view. I have an eye-witness account of the final Cabinet Committee meeting that signed off the deployment. A row was expected, but it never took place. We know that the deployment was driven ultimately by the desire to showcase Helmand as the British province that would lead the way as an example to the rest of Afghanistan. That has lamentably not been the case. We are finding ourselves in an Iraq situation, whereby we depend on American reinforcements to bail us out of circumstances, which we have neither the capacity nor the military will to pursue on our own.

We need to be realistic about the way in which the campaign is developing. Between September and December 2007, there were 75 improvised explosive device attacks on NATO forces. In the same period the next year, there were 180 such attacks. This year, there were 361 attacks in March, 407 in April, 465 in May and 736 in June. The dramatic rise in casualties was inevitable in those circumstances. I respect those who say that a rise in casualties was inevitable, given that there is currently a big push forward, which is being resisted.


Next Section Index Home Page