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However, we are in the early stages of a new Afghan strategy. President Obama, for good or ill, has decided to make Afghanistan rather than Iraq his political priority. I believe that that is directed more by electoral
and politically correct UN-sanctioned considerations rather than a more realistic campaign. It became clear to me as soon as I rejoined the Select Committee in 2006 that the problems in Iraq would be far easier to resolve and that Afghanistan would be a much harder nut to crack. As the hon. Member for City of Durham (Dr. Blackman-Woods) said, we are still trying to turn Afghanistan into a fully functioning state. That is a tall order for a country that has hardly ever been such-certainly not in living memory. At least Iraq had been a country and feels like a nation. Afghanistan is made up of many nations, which have historically been at war with each other.
However, we have a new strategy under General McChrystal of primarily defending civilians and putting in far more troops, but it is too soon to say what will happen. I find myself-somewhat uncomfortably-agreeing with the right hon. Member for Oldham, West and Royton (Mr. Meacher) and the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell), who start from a completely different premise from me. I fear that their pessimism may be vindicated, but it is too soon for the House to decide or form a judgment about whether the new McChrystal strategy will succeed. However, we will know in a few short months-soon after the elections in August and by the time the House sits again in the autumn.
At that time, neither the House nor Ministers should depend on yet more military advice-it is not right just to ask for more military advice until a politically convenient answer is given. The politicians must take responsibility for a proper judgment call on whether it is worth continuing to pursue a strategy that already appears to be in some trouble. Perhaps we will need to revert to a much more limited objective. Perhaps the offensive will buy us the space in which to develop a much more limited strategy. We will know in a few short months the judgments that we are required to make.
5.29 pm
Mr. Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth, East) (Con): It is a pleasure to help to conclude this debate. However, I am sad that it has taken the number of deaths that it has for the Government to recognise the importance of having these debates. We are at war, and we should have these debates on a quarterly basis, rather than being forced to have them in this manner.
If any Member wants to get an idea of how committed our troops are, they should go to RAF Brize Norton just before the take-off of one of the TriStars that take our valiant troops out to Afghanistan and see the worry and the anxiety on the faces of their families as they give them their final embraces before saying goodbye to those departing soldiers who are doing such a brave job for Great Britain.
I have just come back from Afghanistan, where I got a first-hand overview of what is happening in Operation Panther's Claw. Again, I underline the bravery of our troops who are committed out there. My question was: what happens when the bullets stop flying? What happens when the Babaji area is cleared? Not one senior officer had any idea what the plan was to take over, reconstruct, build and help with local governance. That is absolutely appalling.
The Government must wake up and understand, if they believe in this mantra of "clear, hold and build", that at the moment all we are doing is clearing and a little bit of holding. However, absolutely no building will take place if the general in Kandahar in charge of regional command south is not aware of what the reconstruction plan is. [ Interruption. ] I see the Secretary of State grimacing. I invite him to intervene and say what the plan is. Tell us what is going on. He cannot.
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: If the hon. Gentleman is trying to suggest that there is nothing going in behind the military advance in Babaji, he is talking nonsense.
Mr. Ellwood: If the Secretary of State has an idea of what is going on, he should inform his troops, because they do not know. That is what they told us-that is exactly what happened.
Let us look at the figures. Our MOD budget for Afghanistan is £2.7 billion, while the DFID budget is £207 million-these are 2008 figures. The difference is almost tenfold. There is no way that we can go in and clear and hold and then expect to build if there is a tenfold difference between what we are spending on reconstruction and development and what we are spending on security. That money comes from DFID's budget of £7 billion, but that is aside from the myriad other funds that go into Afghanistan, through the EU, the United States Agency for International Development, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Vital co-ordination is required, which needs to be tied in with what we are doing on the ground, so that we have a plan when the bullets stop flying in places such as Babaji.
The other aspect that needs to be underlined is the importance of the Afghan national army. Training is progressing, but as my right hon. Friend the Member for Witney (Mr. Cameron) said two days ago, only 8 per cent. of the Afghan armed forces are based in Helmand, which compares with the fact that 40 per cent. of the fighting in Afghanistan is taking place in that province. Why are the Afghans not doing more? My right hon. Friend made that point, and by the next day the Prime Minister was on the front page of The Guardian claiming to be demanding that President Karzai send in more troops. I am glad that the Prime Minister is waking up to the cause, but it is a shame that he cannot admit where he got the information from.
There is no time to focus on the economic issues; I would just like to stress how useful it would be to complete a 50-km railway line from Spin Boldak to Kandahar. That would allow markets to develop and allow people to move away from the poppy trade.
I would like to end on a tribute to a friend and Army colleague, Colonel Rupert Thorneloe. I have just come from his funeral. He was riding in the front passenger seat of a Viking on 1 July and was killed instantly by an IED, along with Trooper Joshua Hammond. Colonel Thorneloe wanted to see the lay of the land, but there were no helicopters, so he had to jump on a convoy that was taking "replen" to the 2nd Battalion. He leaves behind Sally, his wife, and Hannah and Sophie, his two daughters.
I highlight Rupert Thorneloe not because he is an officer, but because he was a friend. We met at Sandhurst and have been friends since. It is a sombre occasion to hear the names of the fallen read out at Prime Minister's
questions, but it is now a regular event. The reading out of the names of fallen Britons in the battles of Afghanistan is a moving ritual, but there is an emotional distance for us here, where we can secure ourselves away from the horror that a family has to go through when confronted with the news, either on television or in the Chamber, that someone has died. We feel for that family here-for their loss and their emptiness-but unless we know the person or the family personally, we choose to move on, perhaps deliberately, in order not to dwell on the circumstances or the tragic consequences for those who have to live with the memories.
More than 50 regimental colours and battle honours line the walls of the Guards chapel at Wellington barracks. They carry the scars of hundreds of years of campaigns. Each one is weathered and faded, hanging motionless but shouting out a thousand stories of bravery by the soldiers who followed it into battle. They served as a fitting backdrop to the brand new Union Jack that covered Colonel Rupert Thorneloe's coffin, which was carried by eight Guardsmen in complete silence, other than the sound of their boots marching in step. And so tributes were paid, a life was celebrated and a death mourned. He was a brave soldier, and a quiet, intelligent and compassionate man. He was devoted to his wife, Sally, and to his daughters, Hannah and Sophie.
Having known Rupert Thorneloe, I have dwelt on his death, and consequently on the sacrifices that he and others have made. I have made it my business to try to understand what is happening in Afghanistan, which is not so much a nation as a land mass occupied by an incredible mixture of cultures, ideas, languages and peoples who have rarely been united in the past 1,000 years other than when forced to come together to fend off an aggressor on their own land.
I urge the Prime Minister to rethink our objectives in Afghanistan and what we are trying to achieve there, and to provide all the support and resources necessary not only to provide security but to enable the Afghans to stand on their own feet and finally to allow our troops to come home.
5.36 pm
Dr. Liam Fox (Woodspring) (Con): I am confident in saying that, for all of us in this House, the sight of flag-draped coffins carrying those who have died in the service of their country back to our shores is a reminder that the death of every serviceman and servicewoman is a personal tragedy that leaves a permanent hole in the lives of those who loved them. Likewise, every limb lost and every disabling injury represents a life changed for ever. It is not least because of these sacrifices that we have a duty to ensure at all times that we, the politicians, get the policy right.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Richmond, Yorks (Mr. Hague) began this debate by talking about the fact that we are in Afghanistan out of necessity, not choice. The hon. Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Ms Stuart) reminded us that we are there as a legal requirement as part of our treaty obligations when article 5 of the NATO treaty has been invoked. That is not pointed out often enough when we discuss Afghanistan.
We are in Afghanistan primarily for reasons of our national security. It has been pointed out frequently and correctly in this debate that Afghanistan was the place where the 9/11 attacks were hatched and planned, and it would again be a place where that could happen, were we not to deny the space to those who did that planning. That is why we are there. There are many other laudable aims, some of which have been discussed this afternoon. It is wonderful when we can get Afghan girls back into school, and when we see the extension of human rights, but we are primarily there for reasons of national security. We need to remind the public of that if we are to maintain public support and the necessary resilience to see this conflict through.
It is sometimes difficult for us to express what we mean by winning in Afghanistan, but it is easy to describe what we mean by losing. Were we to lose, and to be forced out of Afghanistan against our will, it would be a shot in the arm for every jihadist globally. It would send out the signal that we did not have the moral fortitude to see through what we believe to be a national security emergency. It would suggest that NATO, in its first great challenge since the end of the cold war, did not have what it takes to see a difficult challenge through.
The countries that have rightly been identified today as not pulling their weight and not engaging in proper burden sharing in Afghanistan might like to reflect on what the collapse of NATO would mean. Those countries that have failed to make the 2 per cent. of GDP cut in respect of their defence spending might want to reflect on the effect that a world with an isolationist United States might have on their security. I hope that those in many capitals-not least the capitals of the European NATO member states-are reflecting on what life might look like if NATO were to start to fall apart.
When it comes to what we mean by winning, we have to stand back and recognise that this is a geopolitical struggle. The reason why we can define what we mean by winning is that we want to see a stable Afghanistan, able to manage its own internal and external security to a degree that stops interference from outside powers and allows the country to resist the terror bases and the training camps that were there before. That is what success means in Afghanistan. We are not trying to apply, or we should not be trying to apply, a Jeffersonian democracy or a western European ethos to a broken 13th century state-and certainly not within a decade. Those are unrealistic aims that are likely only to disappoint public opinion in the UK and to frustrate those in Afghanistan who are finding it difficult to build on the ground.
What we need to see, as has been regularly pointed out in this debate, is a strengthening of the Afghan national army, a nurturing and then a strengthening of the Afghan national police and the development of a rule of law in which there is some semblance of the fact that the governing and the governed are being treated in a similar way. That should eventually lead to the concept of rights, which will be necessary if we are to see any sort of democratic structure in the future.
Of course no one believes that we can have a purely military victory in Afghanistan. As has been pointed out, we will have to deal with those who are reconcilable, even from among those who may have fought against us in the past, and we may have to recognise that some will
be irreconcilable-and the only way to deal with them will be in a military fashion. Much as we would like everybody to be reasonable, we need to recognise that some will be utterly unreasonable; they have chosen to confront us, so we will have no option but to confront them in due course.
One aspect that has moved on, and which is enormously positive in comparison with the position in some of our previous debates, is that we now recognise that Afghanistan and Pakistan have to be dealt with as a single entity-a single issue. From the Foreign Secretary's speech onwards today, there has been a realisation in the House that that is where we need to go. We must give Pakistan every support we possibly can financially, politically and militarily, because a collapse in Pakistan would make what we want to see in the region utterly impossible. If we think we have problems with a broken state such as Afghanistan, we should try a broken Pakistan nuclearly armed and with a vastly greater population.
Pakistan already has deep-rooted political problems and very deep-seated economic problems. It has problems with its relationship with India-the situation is still very tense-which causes the country to keep a large proportion of its armed forces facing in that direction. Now we are asking Pakistan to do more in the north-west, which is a tall order. Other countries in the region and traditional allies of Pakistan should also ask what they can do to help on that particular front.
When we send our forces to war, we have two basic duties to fulfil. One is that we have to do everything possible to guarantee the success of the mission; and secondly, we have to do everything possible to minimise the risk to our armed forces in carrying out that mission. We need to have a clear strategy, as my right hon. Friend the shadow Foreign Secretary mentioned at the outset, yet we sometimes have a lack of clarity about what it is that NATO, the UN, the US or Afghanistan are trying to do. It is sometimes not a question of whether we have a strategy, but of whether we have too many of them and whether they are, in fact, compatible with one other.
We also need a clear command structure. I think that the structure is improving, but it has been a problem in recent years. We need co-ordination between Government Departments here and agencies abroad, including in Afghanistan. As the right hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell) mentioned, the relationship with the Afghan Government is rife with corruption. We are not seeing the NGOs going in and carrying out reconstruction. Indeed, I think we need to ask ourselves whether we have the capability in this country to carry out reconstruction in a hostile environment. If the answer is no, we have to do much more to create that capability and learn from what has been done elsewhere.
We must have better burden sharing among the allies, which is simply not happening, and we must have the equipment we need. Let us make no mistake: we are engaged in a crucial and historic struggle, so public trust is important for the resilience that we will need. The public must believe that they are being told the truth and given the full picture. My right hon. Friend the Member for Richmond, Yorks said at the outset that it would be better if we had regular updates or perhaps quarterly debates in the House, with the
Government coming forward, even if it had to be in closed session, to enable Parliament to know exactly what was happening.
My hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Sussex (Mr. Soames) pointed out that the Prime Minister has behaved, at best, in a very casual manner when it comes to keeping the House involved. As my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) said, there is an erosion of trust between Ministers and the public, and Ministers and the military, which is extremely unhealthy.
There is no doubt that the personal equipment that our armed forces are getting is immensely improved. If one talks to soldiers on the ground, they will say that their personal kit is much better than they have had before. That is to be welcomed-a lot of it came late in the day, but it is welcome that it is there. However, we still have a problem with armoured vehicles and helicopters, which are related issues. There is no way to guarantee the safety of our forces in a conflict zone-the public know that we cannot fight wars without casualties and fatalities, but they expect us to minimise the risk. Of course, helicopters are not a panacea-they are vulnerable themselves-but we must give our commanders the option of moving our men more by air, and not simply depending on movements by road, which signal to the Taliban what is coming, and make our forces more vulnerable.
Time and again in recent days, we have pointed out that the cut to the helicopter budget of £1.4 billion in 2004, in the middle of two wars, was a catastrophic decision. The Government were warned about the consequences, did not do anything to deal with the matter and are now playing catch-up. Worse, instead of admitting the mistakes, they are treating us to word games and distorting statistics. I sometimes wonder whether the Prime Minister has a pathological inability to admit that mistakes have been made. When he talked about a 60 per cent. increase in helicopter capacity over two years, he failed to point out that since we deployed properly to Helmand three years ago the number of troops has increased by 100 per cent. It does not take a genius to do the maths and work out what that means. Does he think that that fools anyone? Does he think our troops will not see through the spin being applied? Today's Defence Committee report also pointed out future gaps in terms of helicopters.
The issue of troop numbers was also touched on briefly, and my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Sussex spoke with great clarity on the matter. The Opposition have not had a presentation from our military chiefs about increased numbers. However, there is a widespread understanding that 2,000 extra troops were sought, with an extra battalion to help to train the Afghan national army, and one for the Afghan national police. We have always said that more troops should be accompanied by proportionate and appropriate increases in resources. However, if the Prime Minister turned down a request for more men, which would have helped to speed up the training of the Afghan army and police, therefore enabling us to carry out our task and leave Afghanistan earlier, why was it refused? The British public have a right to know why the Prime Minister did not take the advice of the senior military.
Right at the beginning of the debate, my right hon. Friend the Member for Richmond, Yorks said that we are fortunate that in a society without conscription, we have people courageous and committed enough to put their lives at risk voluntarily for the security of their country and their fellow citizens. They know their duty, and risk their lives carrying it out. We, too, have a duty to them. It is time that that duty was properly and fully carried out.
5.48 pm
The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Bob Ainsworth): It was very important that we debated Afghanistan today, particularly with the losses that we have been suffering in recent days. I do not disagree that there is a need for regular debates: I arranged a briefing from the military on Tuesday, so that we could have a briefing before the recess. We shall try to ensure that we have debates as regularly as possible.
We all need to be focused on understanding what our people are doing in Afghanistan. I understand the importance of ensuring the widest possible cross-party support. With all the talk that there has rightly been about material support for our forces to do the job we ask them to do, let us not forget the need for moral support as well.
Our armed forces are the best of the best: professional, skilled, determined and courageous. As many Members of the House have today, I want to add my tribute to the fallen: their sacrifice must never be forgotten, and neither should we forget the sacrifice of those who return with life-changing injuries, whether physical or mental. They must and will receive the support that they need. We owe it to all those who have fallen, to those who have suffered, and to the entire nation, to explain why the sacrifice is being made.
As the Foreign Secretary has said, we are operating in Afghanistan to protect our national security. We are fighting the Taliban to prevent al-Qaeda, and the terrorists whom they bring, from returning to Afghanistan and threatening us directly. For Britain to be secure, Afghanistan needs to be secure. This is not just about the UK's national security; 42 nations are taking part in one of the widest ever international coalitions, and it is about their national security too. The international community has a joint strategy for success, not just a military strategy but a comprehensive strategy for governance, development and reconstruction.
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