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13 Oct 2009 : Column 6WH—continued
The vast majority of offshore workers are flown to their place of work by helicopter. Aberdeen airport is the busiest heliport in the world. On 18 February a Super Puma helicopter carrying two crew and 16 passengers crash landed in the sea a few miles from Peterhead. Thankfully the sea was calm, although visibility was poor. The crew were all rescued. Two questions arise from the incident. The first is about the use of personal location beacons. Those were introduced by BP when it inaugurated its jigsaw project, a new system of safety in the North sea, involving the use of helicopters and fast rescue craft. A key component was the individual personal location beacon issued to passengers, to be worn on the wrist like a wristwatch. Its use was welcomed widely by the work force and the hon. Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine will remember a meeting that I organised here in the House of Commons with BP, trade unions and members of, in particular, the shipping industry in the North sea. When the unions heard the details of the personal location beacon they saw the advantages immediately and it helped to change their mind and change their attitude towards the jigsaw proposals.
As I said, the beacon is worn like a wristwatch and was welcomed widely by the work force. It made them feel more secure, as in an emergency it would send out a signal to rescue craft allowing rescue to be carried out much more quickly. However, when the helicopter crashed in February it was discovered that the signal from those personal location beacons interfered with the location beacons fitted on the helicopter life raft. When they detected another beacon in the area they automatically switched off. That has caused considerable concern in the industry. I shall not go through the concerns in detail. However, I was concerned that BP's new system had gone through a long process of test and technical examination before it was introduced. It seemed to me that the problem should have been identified and dealt with at that time.
I tabled a question to the Secretary of State for Transport asking when the CAA had become aware of the problem. I was surprised to be told that it had become aware of it in 2003, during the jigsaw testing process. It did not deal with the issue at that time because
"such beacons are not part of an aircraft's approved equipment and are treated in the same way as any other personal portable electronic device, such as mobile phones".
That response seemed to me to be inadequate, particularly given the potential consequences that were shown in the accident on 18 February. If the CAA was aware of interference and that was not part of its remit, I would have expected it to notify those who were responsible. I gather that the CAA and HSE have regular liaison meetings, but the issue was not raised by the CAA until January this year, before the February crash. I understand there was some interference with the beacons on the helicopter because some passengers were fiddling with their watches. Normally a beacon is primed to go off automatically on hitting salt water. I have been on many helicopter visits offshore and it is a very boring journey, so I suspect that people were looking for entertainment. That incident triggered some interest from the CAA, whereas in 2003 when it discovered the problem there
did not seem to be any interest. That is a serious concern. I hope that in the liaison meetings between the CAA and HSE some attempts will be made to secure improved liaison and communication.
The second issue that I want to raise is the time it took for rescue craft to reach the passengers. The first distress signal went out at 18.40 and the first rescue vessel did not arrive until 20.23. Visibility was poor and of course there was interference with the location beacons, but the wristwatch beacons were transmitting. The North sea is cold and it kills very quickly. Luckily all the passengers were in life rafts, and there were no deaths, but serious questions arise over a rescue that took nearly two hours, and no one has yet given an answer or tried to explain the reasons for that.
The second helicopter crash happened on 1 April and had much more serious consequences. All the men in the February crash survived. The helicopter was lost, of course: it sank to the sea bed and has now been recovered. The second crash involved the same type of helicopter, a Super Puma, but of a different vintage, and there were different reasons for the disaster. There was serious mechanical failure, and, again, I do not need to go into the details. The crash, coming a few weeks after a crash that everyone survived, devastated the north-east of Scotland. It came as a huge shock. As I implied earlier, deaths in the North sea are not unusual for us, but that was hard to bear, particularly given the circumstances. Sixteen men died on a Super Puma flight from the Miller field. All that we can say about that incident is that of course we still think about the relatives; but we must look ahead. One of the consequences that I am particularly pleased with is that the industry and the safety authorities immediately saw the need to examine very carefully all the issues affecting helicopter safety. None should be considered in isolation and the industry rightly took the initiative.
Oil and Gas UK, together with the safety authorities, and with the trade unions Unite and BALPA on board, set up a helicopter taskforce chaired by Mr. Bob Keiller, who is chief executive of an offshore service company, PSN. In my discussions with Bob he has made it absolutely clear, despite my pushing him as hard as I could, that he is not interested in the history and what happened in February; he is interested in dealing with the consequences and finding a way to improve safety to ensure that we minimise the risk from all helicopter flights. As I said earlier, virtually everyone who works offshore must travel by helicopter. It can be a frightening experience. Once when I was going off to the Forties field some years ago we hit a bank of fog and it took the pilot three attempts to get us on the helideck because of the fog. There was no radar at that time. To do that week in, week out is deeply unpleasant and of course it is terrifying for the families of the men who work offshore.
I met Bob Keiller last week to get an update, and in the months since the taskforce was set up it has made extraordinary progress. Particularly in this place and in government, we are used to progress having to go through all sorts of processes, hoops, somersaults and so on. However, in the short time since being set up after the helicopter disasters, there has been progress that I find mind-boggling under the circumstances. First, the modification to the Eurocopter, which includes improvements to the mechanical system, has been agreed. That is directly related to the April disaster.
I mentioned the difficult flight that I took. Radar has now been extended offshore. We have had helicopter flights for nearly 50 years, and we are now extending radar offshore. VHF radio has been extended offshore. There is an agreement across the industry, insisted on by the taskforce, that no one will be allow to fly without a survival suit in any non-emergency situation. Anyone who has been offshore will know that survival suits are compulsory most of the time, but apparently that was not being recognised.
With the co-operation of the CAA, plans have now been put together to improve helideck lighting. Those plans will be implemented later this year, and we will see proper, high-quality lighting on all helidecks. That will make landing, take-off, disembarkation and everything else much more efficient.
The Vantage system is to be improved. It is used to identify people going on to helicopters. Because people tend to work either two weeks on, two weeks off, or two weeks on, three weeks off, a person is not allowed to leave the platform unless their counterpart, who is doing the next shift, appears. If someone does not appear on a helicopter, the person who is hoping to go off has to stay, and someone else will take their place on the helicopter. The Vantage system, which should track everyone who is on a helicopter, missed those late changes, so that has been improved.
Finally-this is important-contact with concerned relatives in the event of an accident has been speeded up. When there is a serious accident offshore, relatives often find that they are given a number that they find difficult to get through to, and which is given long after there has been a public announcement. When the April helicopter crash occurred, I immediately got hold of a BBC journalist I know to find out what was going on. They knew everything before the police released the information to relatives. I think that that is wrong. The system has been speeded up and improved.
I am sorry I have taken so long, but this is an important issue. My final point is for all the statutory authorities-I am conscious that the room is full of officials from the HSE offshore safety division, and this is not meant as a criticism of them, but I think that everyone should look at how the helicopter taskforce has operated and carried out its tasks. It has forced people to change to fit in with its requirements and meet the new, improved safety conditions. There are lessons to be learned.
Offshore safety has improved dramatically since the Piper Alpha disaster. It had to, because the system was appalling. It has improved again since the KP3 report, but we cannot afford to rest on our laurels. The matter must constantly be addressed, and I congratulate the HSE on the KP3 report, on the initiative that it took and on its review. I hope to see more improvements coming from its proposals.
10.4 am
Sir Robert Smith (West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine) (LD):
I congratulate the hon. Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Doran) on bringing this issue before the House today. As he said, it is important for us to keep learning lessons and keep the focus on safety. Incidents happen and lessons are learned, and then there is a period of calm, when perhaps people's minds are taken
off the ball. A debate such as this is a chance to focus again and remind everyone involved of how dangerous the situation is, and how important safety, and the culture of safety, is.
I must declare my entry in the Register of Members' Interests related to the oil and gas industry. Like the hon. Gentleman, my key interest is that many of my constituents in West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine work within the North sea, or are relatives or friends of people who work there, and who want to see as safe an environment as possible.
The hon. Gentleman touched on the history of Piper Alpha. There was a sea change in the cultural approach, moving towards the case for safety, rather than the box-ticking approach. Looking at the comparisons with Norway, there is a concern that the Norwegian system is still more of a box-ticking approach than a safety case approach. Therefore, we must be careful when making any comparisons with Norway because people on the Norwegian side also have concerns about their safety culture. If we could get the best of both worlds, that would be excellent.
As the hon. Gentleman said, this industry is extremely important for employment and for the UK economy-something we sometimes underestimate, as so much of it is out of sight on a day-to-day basis. Anything that can be done to make the North sea more of a whole could improve operations within it. That is not only from a safety point of view. If people have to comply with different safety regimes, they face extra expenses each time they switch between different parts of the North sea. Near the middle of the North sea in the fields that straddle the sea, it is almost impossible to take a ship from one side of the field to the other, because there are such different safety regimes.
The KP3 report was a timely reminder of asset integrity, and as I said in my intervention, the industry was conscious that it had drifted into making safety an important part of the message, while again going towards the easier safety approach of slips, trips and falls, which are statistically more measurable and more high profile. It is easier to see that something is being done about them.
The hon. Gentleman made an important point about structural integrity and morale in the working environment. Especially during downturns, the industry thought that surface rust did not really matter as it was not an issue of structural integrity. However, if someone is working in a safety-critical environment and they see rusting equipment all around, that does not send the best message for morale or how they should approach their work as professionals. What starts off as surface rust can become more structural rust if no intervention is made, and later intervention becomes even more expensive and critical to safety. Asset integrity is crucial to avoiding a future Piper Alpha disaster, and the KP3 report was welcome. The review, and the fact that there has been progress is also welcome.
The hon. Gentleman mentioned the worldwide culture. We have something to contribute, because companies that operate in the North sea have taken safety lessons from there to other parts of the world and improved things. In the debate on Piper Alpha, I reminded the House about how the safety case used offshore had
been brought onshore into the construction industry for the North sea, and resulted in major improvements. There are positives to be achieved from learning lessons.
One of the points highlighted by the KP3 report was the importance of industry learning from itself and sharing its experiences. The Energy and Climate Change Committee visited the rough gas storage platform before the recess. One of the first things that we were shown was a video of a major disaster, when there was a major release of hydrocarbons and a fire on board the platform. That dramatic and effective DVD of what had gone wrong seemed an effective way of getting the message across to other operators in the North sea, and of showing the lessons that had been learned from that experience. It was lucky that there was so much hydrocarbon release in a confined area that it did not become an explosive mixture-it became a major fire hazard rather than an explosive mixture. There was a useful message about safety, and a very brave coxswain from a lifeboat who was willing to share the problems that he had had in trying to get his lifeboat to start. His training had been on generic lifeboats, but when he got into the lifeboat that he was using on the platform, he did not know how to start it, and had to radio someone. In a more serious crisis, that could have been critical to safety. From that experience, the industry across the North sea can learn that people need specific training on the life raft that is found on the platform on which they are operating. That message has got across.
As the hon. Member for Aberdeen, North said, safety for the person operating in the North sea transcends just the platform and the journey to and from the platform. We had the tragedy in April and the less tragic incident involving helicopters in February. Relatives and friends are not interested in which authority is responsible for safety. People just want a safe environment from the moment they leave home to the moment they come back from work. The hon. Gentleman has highlighted just how safety-critical the helicopter journey is as part of that. Moreover, it is to be welcomed that the industry, through the taskforce, sees a responsibility across the piece. Again, that will help the interface between the CAA and the HSE.
The use of personal locators seems to indicate that when two people operate in isolation, they may not see the boundary between the safety case in each area. The fact is, however, that the beacons were known to have an interference problem. Helicopter pilots have always been worried about having them on the helicopter, and yet the industry does not seem to have engaged with them until this latest incident to solve the problem. Operators feel reassured by having their own locator in a wristwatch. If they end up in the sea they know that they will not have a long survival time. Wearing that wristwatch means that they will be located. It is very difficult to locate one individual in the North sea. The wristwatch beacon provides an extra reassurance for the worker. They know that in the event of a disaster, they have more chance of survival. I welcome the progress of the taskforce. It is important to gather together all the different players in the industry to come up with a common purpose of improving safety.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Gordon (Malcolm Bruce) made the point about the ageing work force and the importance of training and culture. As I said in the
debate on Piper Alpha, OPITO, the Oil and Gas Academy, is based in my constituency, and it has a good track record of improving training and bringing training to the new individuals who work in the North sea. It would help such individuals if they did not have to gain their experience from another disaster. Instead, they should be mentored by the ageing work force, who can pass on how crucial the safety culture is and how dangerous an operating environment it is. If workers learn how much safer they will be if they operate properly, that will be another benefit for the North sea.
When all is said and done, there is still a lot of oil and gas in the North sea, and for all the economic and security supply reasons, we want to see as much of that produced as possible-but not at any price. Safety must be maintained. The economic and security supply driver is that we should be carrying on much more in the North sea. Yet many of the platforms and pipelines were not expected still to be operating. Now, however, it is hoped that they will be there much longer, which makes it even more important that we focus on this asset integrity.
Such work will require investment and expenditure. If we want to see a long life for the industry in the North sea, we need to ensure that we have a regime that does not say that the safest future for a particular platform or pipeline is to shut it down and decommission it early. We need an investment climate.
Bob Spink: May I introduce a new dimension that will extend the life of the use of such assets? We have carbon capture and storage systems that are being developed, which will see us seeking to achieve a long-term geological storage of carbon in the voids under the sea. That will introduce possible additional use of the pipelines and additional safety issues.
Sir Robert Smith: The hon. Gentleman makes a very important point about the other future for the North sea and the important role that carbon capture will play in tackling our immediate problems of climate change. Again, that will require safety assessments and an effective safety regime. The crucial message is that we as a country have benefited enormously from what has happened in the North sea. The work has been provided by dedicated and loyal teams of people who have taken a lot of risks. They should not be taking unnecessary risks, and we owe it to them to ensure that they are provided with the safest possible environment. That means that we will benefit from the North sea, but not at any price.
10.14 am
Malcolm Bruce (Gordon) (LD): I congratulate the hon. Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Doran) on securing this debate. I should like to testify to his unstinting work on the issues of North sea safety in which he is heavily engaged and interested. He was right to bring this matter to the House-he does so from time to time-and highlight both the problems and achievements. I should like to draw out some of those and reinforce what my hon. Friend the Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine (Sir R. Smith) also said.
According to Oil and Gas UK, my constituency of Gordon has more oil and gas jobs located in it and derived from it than any other constituency in the
United Kingdom. Ironically, the figure is greater than the electorate. That arises from the fact that a number of the headquarters of the major operators and supply companies are located in the constituency; the jobs are not necessarily based there. We are talking about an industry that employs some 450,000 people across the UK. Taking into account the investment and operating expenditure and export and balance of payments benefit, the industry is worth something like £40 billion a year. It is a very important industry. It is ageing, but not decaying, and that is the crucial point. It is in everybody's interest to ensure that the integrity of the equipment is maintained for its efficient and safe operation. In the context of the North sea, safety is everybody's responsibility.
As we have heard from some of the contributions, there is a recognition that it is not an "us and them" approach; that everybody understands the importance of safety. However, everybody must continue to apply pressure to ensure that we have the maximum safety culture. We have not always done that, but there is a recognition now that that is what we must do. If we reflect on the matter, we will see that we have an industry that is international in its scope and reputation, and that has a growing export business. A disaster in the North sea would have significant implications for the credibility of that industry as well as cause huge worries and anxieties to the people who are engaged in it. If we do not have the right culture-of being at the absolute apex of safety consciousness-it will not just prejudice the lives and concerns of workers in the industry, which are absolutely central, but affect the economic performance and capacity of the industry in the long run. That is why all of us must be engaged across the whole piece.
I also happen to represent Aberdeen airport. Although I have been told by the airport manager that it is no longer the busiest heliport in the world, it is nevertheless very busy. It was the airport from which the Super Puma operated by Bond left and was returning to when it crashed. Four of the crew lived in my constituency. That incident reinforces the point for all of us in the north-east. We live daily with the knowledge that we are asking people to trust themselves to this highly risky environment. Collectively, we need to respond to the best of our ability. I want to reinforce the point that I made in my intervention to my hon. Friend the Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine. All of us have been engaged in discussions about the future of the North sea and the work force. There is real concern that the work force is ageing. I do not mean that they are old, but they are approaching a time when they are likely to retire or leave the industry. With them will go a huge residue of cultural knowledge, wisdom and experience. We must ensure that there is a younger generation coming into the industry and that that knowledge, information and culture is transferred to them quickly and efficiently so that they are carried through to the next generation. We all know that there is a challenge to persuade people that this is an industry with a future. Those of us who are engaged in it every day see young people in the industry doing the most amazing jobs and taking on the most remarkable challenges. They want to tell others that this is an industry that has not only a fantastic past but a great future.
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