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"the Department needed a good communication strategy to manage the eventual release of the report into the public domain."
Well done on that one! The third issue is the TA and the severe, utterly inexplicable cuts to regular training, and what that tells us about the Government's priorities.
Over the past three years, the Conservative party has called on the Government to accept our proposals for regular quarterly reports to Parliament on our objectives in Afghanistan, the benchmarks by which progress is measured, and the success or otherwise in meeting those objectives and benchmarks. We still do not have that. Nevertheless we welcomed yesterday's statement by the Prime Minister on Afghanistan and Pakistan.
However, many questions remain unanswered, even after the Secretary of State's speech. The first concerns conditionality. My understanding, and I think that of the House yesterday, was that there were essentially three reasons why we were sending a greater force to Helmand: to augment and support the mission; to increase the protection and safety of our forces; and to increase the speed of training of the Afghan national army. If all those are necessary in themselves, why apply the conditions that the Government have set out? If commanders say that they need these troops now, but the Government's conditions are not met for several weeks to come, are not the Government, even by their own arguments, putting our troops in increased danger by failing to supply them with what they want? We must be must clearer about what the conditions are and how long the Government would wait for them to be fulfilled. That was not clear from the Secretary of State's remarks; I hope that the Minister of State can make it clearer when he winds up. Perhaps he can also clarify, because we do not yet have this information before us, exactly where the extra 500 troops are coming from and what their mission will be in Helmand. Will it be mainly combat ops, training the Afghan national security forces, counter-IED operations, or a combination of those? We need clarity, because there are still too many uncertainties.
In December 2008, the Prime Minister announced "a temporary, until August" increase from 8,000 to 8,300 troops to Afghanistan. Those troops were sent from the theatre reserve in Cyprus. Are they still in Afghanistan? In April this year, as the Secretary of State said, the
Prime Minister announced a further increase from 8,300 to 9,000 troops "until the autumn" to increase the security of the Afghan presidential elections. Yesterday, the Prime Minister justified this slightly differently when he said that we had
"decided to raise the number of troops from 8,100 to 9,000 until we could see what was happening with the American review of strategy".-[ Official Report, 14 October 2009; Vol. 497, c. 307.]
These are not the same things. We need to have absolute clarity on the Government's thinking. Are the extra 1,000 troops sent since last December going to be made part of the permanent establishment figure? Finally on troop numbers, the Prime Minister alluded to the fact that 500 troops normally based in Kandahar as an RC South reserve force will be permanently shifted to Helmand province. While that would be welcomed in Helmand, who is replacing the reserve capability in Kandahar? Will a coalition partner fill this role or will it be left unfilled? The House will expect an answer from the Minister of State.
We all know that we are waiting for the outcome of President Obama's decision on how the way ahead for strategy in Afghanistan will be affected by General McChrystal's review. Regardless of the outcome, General McChrystal deserves credit for producing a rich and vibrant debate about Afghanistan policy in recent times. Anyone who was fortunate enough to hear his speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies will know what a rare treat that was; if only politicians could speak with similar clarity on most occasions. His assessment comprised a very telling document, but one of its most important sentences went largely unreported:
"Inadequate resources will likely result in failure. However, without a new strategy, the mission should not be resourced."
We can talk about more troops, more helicopters and more armoured vehicles, but without a new strategy additional troops and resources will have only a short-term and localised effect. They can win the tactical battle, and they can buy politicians' time, but ultimately unless something fills the gap they have created, their sacrifices and efforts risk being in vain. The surge worked in Iraq because it was fundamentally more than just an increase in troops. It was part of a bigger solution, designed to suit conditions on the ground and built around a revitalised political process that included the re-engagement of the Sunni minority. To secure this result, we will need a sound political plan moving alongside any military plan, because a sound political strategy will help to undermine the insurgency. We await the decision by President Obama.
It is vital that we maintain the public's understanding and trust if we are to have the will and resilience to see through the mission in Afghanistan. We must set realistic goals and expectations to avoid disappointment at home and abroad. A comprehensive strategy for Afghanistan must include clear, tightly drawn, realistic objectives that are regularly reviewed; more rapid development of the Afghan security forces, as the Secretary of State said; and ensuring that the gains won by our forces on the battlefield are swiftly followed by reconstruction, which is all too often far too tardy, as my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth, East (Mr. Ellwood) mentioned.
In the early days after 9/11, there were two main objectives in Afghanistan: to deny al-Qaeda safe haven to plan, train and launch terrorist attacks on a global
scale, and to remove the Taliban regime from power as punishment for not co-operating with the international community and for harbouring terrorism. Both were accomplished with relative speed, but the subsequent picture has been much less successful. There have been vague notions of state building and reconstruction built on UN millennium goals, and a plethora of strategies. People often say that there was no real strategy in Afghanistan, but the problem is that there have been too many. We have had an EU strategy, an American strategy, a UK strategy, an Afghan strategy, a NATO strategy, a World Bank strategy and multiple non-governmental organisation strategies, none of which were exactly the same. That is why we now require great clarity in what the President of the United States is soon to announce.
Because of all that, our inability to produce tangible and achievable results after eight years has disappointed public opinion at home and frustrated those in Afghanistan who are finding it difficult to build on the ground. Public disillusionment with the mission in Afghanistan is exacerbated by the Government's repeated failure clearly to define our objectives in national security terms, and by the widespread belief that our forces have not been fully resourced. The Government have too often failed to explain what Afghanistan means in a broader geopolitical context, and I was pleased that the Secretary of State started to do that more clearly today.
The consequences of failure in Afghanistan are relatively easy to elucidate. First, were we to leave Afghanistan prematurely, by which I mean on a timetable not of our own choosing, it would be a shot in the arm for every jihadist around the world. It would send out a signal that we did not have the moral fortitude to see through what we believe to be an essential matter of our own national security. The impact would be felt beyond the Hindu Kush and the Durand line, extending across the region into the middle east and north Africa in one direction and south-east Asia in the other. We in this country should be under no illusions that were we to fail on those terms, it would also fuel latent fundamentalist sentiment within our own borders and in other European countries, imposing even greater burdens on our domestic intelligence and security forces. The public need to understand what the cost of failure would be, so that they are willing to invest in the price of victory.
Secondly, failure in Afghanistan would suggest that NATO, in its first major challenge overseas to combat terrorism, did not have what it takes to see a difficult challenge through. Again, we should be under no illusions that that would be deeply damaging, if not catastrophic, for NATO's cohesion and credibility. The Secretary of State alluded to the reduced and sometimes falling contribution of some of our European partners. The European members of NATO that are failing to engage in proper burden-sharing in Afghanistan might like to reflect on what the collapse of NATO might ultimately mean for their own regional and global security.
If we can clearly describe failure, can we describe success? Describing to the British public what we mean by winning in Afghanistan will be crucial in maintaining public support. Success in Afghanistan will be achieved when we have a stable enough Afghanistan, exercising its own sovereignty and able to manage its own internal
and external security to a degree that stops interference from outside powers and allows the country to resist the establishment of the terror bases and terror camps that went before. We should not try to apply Jeffersonian principles to what was effectively a broken, 15th-century state. There are noble ideas for development, human rights and democracy, but they are complementary to our military mission, not the same as it. We must not try to justify one by the other.
To achieve the objective of security in Afghanistan today, as General McChrystal set out, we need a counter-insurgency strategy to prevent the future need for a counter-terrorism strategy. It has to begin with the security and safety of the people in Afghanistan itself. Some 80 per cent. of the civilian deaths in Afghanistan are a direct result of Taliban activity. We need to build the trust and support of the people of Afghanistan by giving them the protection that we promised them but which the coalition has as yet failed to deliver. Only when we have their trust can we get the military success that we seek.
As has been said on many occasions, in a counter-insurgency a defection is better than a surrender, a surrender is better than a capture, and a capture is better than a kill. That is why General McChrystal's assessment is so accurate. Any strategy in Afghanistan needs to include renewed and serious focus on reconciliation and reintegration with certain elements of the insurgency. The Taliban are not a homogenous group, and we have to understand the subtleties of what we are dealing with in Afghanistan.
As has been pointed out, and as the Secretary of State alluded to, part of the political process of improving governance will be to deal with those in what we call the Taliban who are reconcilable to the aims of the Afghan Government and the international community, even those who have fought against us in the past. However, we must not put on rose-tinted spectacles, and we have to recognise that some will remain irreconcilable, and the only way to deal with them will be in military terms and by military means. There will be no easy answer for those who are irreconcilable to who we are, what we stand for and the value system that we represent. As General Sir Graeme Lamb, who is now working as an adviser to General McChrystal, said recently:
"We need to take a good look at the people we consider to be our enemies...They have anger and grievances which have not been addressed. The better life they expected has not materialised; these are the people we must talk to, but we must make sure we have something to offer them."
We also need to explore the idea of using auxiliary forces in Helmand province in support of our counter-insurgency operations. Since security is the definition of success, the sooner we get the Afghan security forces trained and on the front line, the faster we can bring our own troops home. That is why it is such a sensible investment to increase the number of British troops, to speed up the training of the Afghan national army. However, we need to remember that the ANA is a national, not provincial, army. It is recruited from across Afghanistan and from all ethnic groups. We need to make it clear that more British troops for training the ANA does not automatically translate into more ANA troops being sent to Helmand to fight alongside British troops, as they will have national responsibilities to carry out.
Consequently, when, where and if possible, we need in Helmand seriously to start exploring ways of forming and utilising local auxiliary forces. Auxiliary forces bring local knowledge and ownership to local security, which foreign troops will never be able to do. As Ministers know, there is already a pilot programme in Wardak province. If possible, a similar programme in Helmand might be worth exploring. It would have to take into account local customs, tribal structures, the views of the provincial and national Governments and of course legitimacy in the eyes of locals, but one would be hard-pressed to give an example of a counter-insurgency campaign that has been successful without using local auxiliary forces in some way. If we do not mobilise the locals, the Taliban will, and if we are serious about winning that is one matter that we need to look into further. I would be grateful if the Minister of State could say whether such an approach forms part of the Government's wider thinking.
Paul Flynn: I regret interrupting the hon. Gentleman's speech, and the question strikes me why on earth his party needs General Dannatt when they have shadow Ministers of his quality. Does he really believe, however, that the Afghan army, who are mercenaries from a wide range of tribal backgrounds, will have the commitment to put their lives at risk and slaughter their fellow countrymen in the defence of a corrupt Pashtun President?
Dr. Fox: We were warned of such potentially catastrophic outcomes in Iraq, yet what has happened there has been largely a success story in building the capacity of the army. I have no reason to believe-especially having been to some of the training grounds and spoken to British commanders on the ground-that the Afghan national army, when fully trained and having fully absorbed their trainers' methods and values, will be anything other than a valuable and effective professional army in the service of maintaining its country's national security. There are questions about whether a similar top-down approach could be applied to the Afghan national police. Indeed, because policing requires consensus-about the application of the penal code and the judicial system that interprets it-training in the Afghan national police needs to be more of a bottom-up exercise, to complement the top-down external security that the Afghan national army provides. That remains one of the biggest political challenges that President Obama and the coalition face in taking the political process forward.
Assuming that we get the strategy correct in Afghanistan-General McChrystal's assessment suggests that that is paramount-the Government must always ensure that our troops are properly equipped for the crucial operations in which they are involved. That includes providing the earliest possible increase in the number of helicopters, armoured vehicles and other key battlefield enablers.
To maximise the mission's success while minimising the risk to our forces, we must have the capability of moving troops safely while maintaining flexibility and manoeuvrability. It cannot be disputed that there is a shortage of UK helicopters in Helmand. That is largely as a result of the Government's dreadful decision in 2004 to cut the future helicopter budget by £1.4 billion in the middle of two wars. There is no getting away from it.
Let me focus on specifics. Recently, two Chinook helicopters were destroyed in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, that is an inevitable consequence of warfare. However, will the Minister give an assurance that the attrition buy for replacing them will be funded from the Treasury reserve, not the core Ministry of Defence budget?
On 1 May, the Ministry of Defence announced that Vectors were being phased out of Afghanistan, but during the summer recess, we learned that an RAF airman was killed when patrolling in a Vector. Will the Secretary of State or the Minister guarantee that the on-scene commander had a choice of vehicles for the mission, as Ministers promised, and was not forced to use the vehicle through lack of choice? Will the Minister state in his winding-up speech how long he believes that it will take before the last Vectors come out of service in Afghanistan?
We welcome the addition of Mastiff and Ridge back armoured vehicles. However, it has been almost two years since the 157 Ridge backs were ordered, but only a trickle of them are getting into theatre, and we still have a shortage of lift capacity. In his oration at his party conference, the Secretary of State criticised my criticism of the slowness of delivering the Ridge backs. His justification was that the vehicles were not due in Afghanistan till the next deployment of forces and that, in fact, they were early. That is a bureaucrat's thought process. When people are being killed yesterday, there is no such thing as "early" for delivering equipment in theatre. It is not the criticism of the lack of equipment, but not having that equipment, that damages morale and jeopardises the mission.
Mr. Bob Ainsworth: The vehicles were not ready for the deployment of 19 Light Brigade and people were not trained to use them in any significant numbers in 19 Light Brigade. The vehicles had to get to theatre before the people who were trained to use them, who were in 11 Light Brigade. Fortuitously, they were early. The hon. Gentleman chose to tell the British nation that we had betrayed our armed forces without bothering to check the facts. By all means, be an Opposition and hold us to account, but for heaven's sake check the facts first.
Dr. Fox: With two years for procurement, one is tempted to ask why we did not have sufficient people trained to operate our vehicles. We are at war in Afghanistan. Our armed forces are at war. It is time Whitehall was fully at war.
Anyone who has visited Afghanistan knows that there is much praise from our armed forces for the Mastiff. It is a great armoured vehicle-a life saver-but only if it is operable and serviceable. According to this week's Public Accounts Committee report on "Supporting High Intensity Operations",
"only around 20 per cent. of the Mastiff fleet was classified as 'fit' in June 2008, with a further 55 per cent. able to undertake a limited role."
My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition raised that point yesterday, and today, when the Minister replies, I would like his assurance that the situation has improved. It is a sad state of affairs when, after eight years, we are still playing catch-up.
I would like briefly to consider Operation Telic and Iraq, in particular the UK training mission there to assist the Iraqi navy. The affair has recently been an
embarrassment. It beggars belief that the Government could not secure the necessary agreements with the Iraqi Government in time, and that, consequently, British troops have been sitting in the desert in Kuwait for more than three months waiting for final approval.
I welcome the announcement yesterday that, after so many attempts, the Iraqi Council of Representatives finally secured the required quorum for the agreement's third and final reading. But how long will we now have to wait for the Presidency Council to ratify and sign the agreement? Perhaps the Minister can help us with that.
The Royal Navy plays a very important role in Gulf security and is well respected, especially by our American allies. There is much criticism-often wrongly directed-of the relationship between the American and the British military, but anybody who has visited the American fifth fleet in Bahrain and talked to American commanders there knows how highly they regard the Royal Navy and its contribution to the mission in the Gulf. When we talk about Iraq as being "over", we should remember those sailors and marines who are still patrolling and looking after security in the Gulf. The Royal Navy plays a vital role in the capacity-building of the Iraqi navy-a huge contribution to regional security. I hope that, when the agreement is back in place, we return to normal functioning there as quickly as possible because our forces are hugely appreciated.
Mr. Davidson: The hon. Gentleman speaks of the excellence of the Royal Navy, and we must obviously consider its future. Would any future Conservative Government guarantee the contract to build two aircraft carriers-yes or no?
Dr. Fox: I have the same experience as the Secretary of State-I know that the question is coming, and every single time I allow the opportunity for it. The hon. Gentleman knows I have often said that the seaborne air power projection is important for expeditionary capability, but we have also said that if we are going into a strategic defence review, we must maintain the discipline of considering everything properly in its time. We need to stick to that.
I want to mention another issue about our naval mission in Iraq that I would like the Minister to tackle specifically in his winding-up speech. It now appears that we will resume our training mission in the near future. What about its financing? In the Secretary of State's letter to me dated 25 September-I thank him for keeping me updated throughout the summer recess on the matter, as he promised-he provided an explanatory memorandum on the agreement for training. It states:
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