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I noted with great interest that page 27 of Bernard Gray's report provides figures, in a tabulated chart, suggesting that even on the most favourable assumption about the resources that will be available to the MOD, there could be a £2 billion annual gap in its procurement plans over the next two years. Looking further ahead, over the course of the next decade, he sees that growing to £4 billion annually, on the most optimistic basis. Taking a less optimistic assumption about the resources
that will be at the MOD's disposal, he sees that gap widening to £6 billion a year-and this is just on procurement. It is quite apart from all the other mismatches between resources and commitments in the MOD. Nobody should be in any doubt about the scale of the financial imbalance and the mismatch between our commitments and the resources at our disposal. If there has ever been a need for a strategic defence review, as a matter of urgency, surely now is the moment.
Dr. Fox: Given that very dark picture, I am tempted not to say that it is actually even worse than that. However, the report says that not only do we have the problems that currently exist, but that they are growing and at an accelerating rate. Things are continuing to deteriorate at an even greater pace. What is coming is even worse than what we have now.
Nick Harvey: I am very sorry to say that the hon. Gentleman is quite right. There can be no doubt that that is the case, which is why it is essential that this spiralling debt is caught hold of right away, and the strategic defence review will have to ask some very tough questions, because by no stretch of the imagination can we afford to continue as we are.
In my view, too often we seek bespoke solutions for British procurement that are out of all proportion to the size and scale of our armed forces. Some things we absolutely have to supply for ourselves, for reasons of national security. Furthermore, we need to keep supplies of some of our equipment on a national basis. Equally, and quite rightly, Members on both sides of the House are always very anxious about jobs in the defence industries. However, in some instances, our defence industries will have to, in the future, gear up far more for supplying through-life support, rather than for the design of a completely unique British solution in the first place.
I can also see that there might be more scope for building under licence in the future, although past examples of that have not always been happy ones. However, I have heard Members make powerful speeches on this in the House. The hon. Member for North Wiltshire (Mr. Gray) made an impassioned speech along those lines in one of our debates early in the summer. Some of this is not always what everyone wants to hear-certainly not what our defence industries want to hear-and sometimes it is not even what those at the head of our armed forces want to hear. The latter are perhaps those who set us off on the wrong path of over-specifying what is needed. However, if we are to address the black hole that we have just identified and discussed, we will have to accept the logic that an Army of fewer than 100,000, an RAF of fewer than 40,000 and a Navy of fewer than 40,000 cannot have their own solutions on procurement as frequently as they have been accustomed to in the past.
Mr. MacNeil: The hon. Gentleman mentioned the defence review and setting off on the wrong path. I thank him and the hon. Member for Woodspring (Dr. Fox) for the help that they gave me in forming a cross-party coalition for the Hebrides range in Uist. However, on the defence review, does he think that the long-term partnership agreement between QinetiQ and the MOD should be looked at? That might have led to a lack of utilisation at the base, but it could provide a better facility for what is Europe's biggest and best missile range.
Nick Harvey: The hon. Gentleman makes a good point, and deserves congratulations on the campaign that he fought. It will be appreciated in his locality. I believe that the strategic defence review must look at everything. There must be no no-go areas for a strategic defence review. We must ask very fundamental questions on a blank sheet of paper about what we want our armed forces to do, and what we need to provide them with in order for them to do it.
One of the experts in defence acquisition, quoted in the Gray report, remarked that
"the system is failing to produce the equipment we don't need".
That is a damning indictment. However, it is just an opinion. The National Audit Office, and others, have attempted to get to grips with the detail. It reported that last year there was an aggregate increase of 12 per cent. on the costs of defence projects. Often in this House, we debate defence inflation. Over the past year, the NAO has quantified that at 12. per cent.-£3 billion more than originally forecast. The total aggregate of slippage on all projects is now around 483 months-that is, the top 20 major procurement programmes have delays of 483 months-with expected cost overruns amounting to £16 billion.
The Public Accounts Committee reported that only 20 per cent. of new Mastiff armed vehicles were classified as fit and ready for use, with the deployed fleet of 87 consuming 176 axles in 13 months. They operate in very difficult terrain-nobody should underestimate that-but that shows, when we are having a discussion about the equipment that we supply to the front line, that there is a great need for improvement.
It cannot be stressed how vital helicopters are for troop movement, medevac and helping people to avoid improvised explosive devices, so I welcome efforts to get more helicopters to the front line. However, I suspect that we will need a great deal more than we have heard about so far.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Quentin Davies): The hon. Gentleman is always very thoughtful about such matters and I have been listening to him with great interest. However, I put it to him, first, that the 80 per cent. solution is something that we are already doing-I am doing it on armoured vehicles, for example. Secondly, on separating support solutions from manufacturing, there will normally have to be a support contract with the manufacturer or design authority with the source codes, who will need a knowledge of the kit that he will be supporting-indeed, there certainly cannot be support without the consent of the manufacturer or design authority. Thirdly, licences are not a panacea for saving money, but are actually rather expensive. We wind up spending money on the licence by having to pay the licensor and also the manufacturer.
Nick Harvey: I thank the Minister for his intervention and welcome what he says about 80 per cent. solutions, as he put it. I recognise that, in the case of some recent urgent operational requirements, that sort of logic and thinking has been more to the forefront. I welcome that, but such common sense has not always been present across the piece with our procurements.
As for the contracts for through-life support, they would of course have to be partnerships with the manufacturing companies. However, I am making a call
for the British defence industries to be far more ready to position themselves for such contracts, because we certainly would not want to take things that we buy from abroad back to those manufacturers for through-life support every time. The British industries-and let us face it: the defence industries are becoming increasingly internationalised-need to think more along those lines for future decades.
I take the Minister's point about building under licence. The experiences have not been happy ones. Perhaps I am being too optimistic in thinking that the idea may be a way forward for the future, but it at least needs to be thought about again. Licences have sometimes been very expensive-I recall one of the helicopter programmes being prohibitively expensive, to the point that Lewis Page said in his book that if we had given every man in the factory £1 million, we would still have saved the taxpayer millions. I therefore take the Minister's point; nevertheless, we cannot continue to think that it makes sense to devise a completely British solution to every need that arises.
I welcome yesterday's news from the Prime Minister that he intends to send more troops to the front line. However, the previous Defence Secretary, the right hon. Member for Barrow and Furness (Mr. Hutton), has said that it would have been
"much more helpful had we had the additional troops there six months ago".
That need has been widely known about for some time. However, I am clear that if it will provide the troops who are already there with additional safety and expertise and if it will help the programme of training the Afghan national army, sending more troops is the right thing to do.
On our commitment in Afghanistan, I entirely echo those who have raised criticisms of the decision to cut back on Territorial Army training. The TA has been picking up a far greater proportion of the burden in Afghanistan than anybody could have expected at the outset, and we should pay tribute to the work that it has done. However, if we are going to take people from ordinary civilian walks of life and throw them into the front line-a contemporary of mine from university, aged 48 and holding a senior academic position, is going out to Afghanistan next autumn to fight in the TA as a private-it is essential that every possible preparation is given to them to enable them to do the job when they get there. I urge the Government to review that issue and think again.
Hon. Members will appreciate that I and others in my party have been raising great anxieties about the strategy being followed in Afghanistan. I therefore greatly welcome the remarks and proposals of General McChrystal, who has said:
"Our strategy cannot be focused on seizing terrain or destroying insurgent forces; our objective must be the population."
There have also been remarks from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who has drawn new attention to the need to try to slice away the Taliban. Indeed, the Prime Minister emphasised in his statement yesterday the need to get out and reach the population. All that is a welcome shift in emphasis.
However, I felt yesterday that too much of the Government's shift in emphasis sat on the single tactic of increasing the size of the Afghan national army from
90,000 to 134,000 in about a year. I would not want to be misunderstood: that aim seems an entirely laudable objective. However, as I sat listening, I asked myself whether any organisation, anywhere in the world and operating in any walk of life, can expand itself by 50 per cent. in a year or so in a way that is sustainable or gives confidence that it will effect such extraordinary growth efficiently and effectively, let alone an organisation as new, young and immature-I do not say that in a critical way-as the Afghan national army.
Mr. Brazier: The hon. Gentleman's strong point is made even more powerful when one reflects on the fact that Afghanistan is a tribal society. The danger is that, in seeking to expand so quickly, there will be parallels with Northern Ireland, for example, with disproportionate numbers of recruits coming from the north and thus being less acceptable to the population as a whole.
Nick Harvey: The hon. Gentleman makes a good point, although one of the Afghan national army's strengths has been that it is drawn from all over and is not always deployed using people in their own areas. Indeed, that is one of its strengths over the Afghan police, who tend to be used in their own areas, which seems to account for the suggestions sometimes made that they seem to be corrupt, as are others in parts of the Afghan structure.
As I mentioned earlier, we will have a strategic defence and security review after the election. Some of the preparatory work is being done on that now, and I welcome the fact that all parties have been invited to cast their eyes over it. I have said that I think that everything must be included, and I simply cannot see the logic in conducting a strategic defence review and not including the consideration of our future nuclear capability and what we will do beyond the lifetime of the existing Trident programme. That is not to say that we should jump to conclusions now, before the event, about what the SDR might conclude. It seems baffling, however, that one of the most significant programmes, militarily, and one of the biggest, financially, should be excluded from an otherwise seemingly comprehensive review. I urge the Government to think again on this.
"we cannot fight the kind of unconventional expeditionary wars that have been the stuff of much of the last decade at the same time as providing the regeneration capacity across the full width of defence capabilities that keeps many critical military technologies within the UK, at anything like the current level of resources."
That sums up where we are very clearly. We must consider what we are good at, and what we want to develop. We cannot continue as a Jack of all trades. That is not in our interests, or in the interests of our allies.
We also need to match our defence practices with our foreign policy ambitions. Governments of any complexion need to look at their wider policy in the context of what they can do with their allies. It is perfectly clear that the countries of Europe must do more of the heavy lifting. Between us, we need to share more of the burden in military matters. The Americans cannot be expected indefinitely to keep doing so much more than their fair share. We recognise the special relationship with America and we must seek to maintain it, but we cannot expect them indefinitely to continue to do as much as they do.
Nor must we continue to follow American policy without questioning whether it is in our self-interest or within our capability to do so. For example, we went along with missile defence under Bush, and now we are going along with Obama, who has decided-quite rightly, in my view-to dispense with it. We need a far clearer idea of what our policy objectives are. We need to reappraise our relationships with others to ensure not only that we get the most out of those relationships but that the allies get the most out of their relationships with us.
I should like to acknowledge the fact that the British Legion came to all the party conferences during the conference season and called on politicians to "do their bit" for the armed forces. Today's debate is not predominantly about the armed forces, but we should all take seriously the need to renew the military covenant. Taking seriously today's report on the way in which we support our armed forces with equipment will be a critical part of that.
The Gray report is welcome and timely, and it says what many people have believed for a long time. We welcome the Government's suggestion that they will accept some of its recommendations, but we are going to need to see what action they take in practice as a result of the report. We all know that dramatic changes are needed in the Ministry of Defence and in the wider defence policy, and we need to work to realise those changes, to ensure that our troops are properly protected and supported, that the country has a realistic defence agenda and that the necessary resources are put in place to make a reality of it.
2.42 pm
Alison Seabeck (Plymouth, Devonport) (Lab): The timing of this debate, in our first week back after returning from our constituencies, is significant-especially for those of us who have constituencies with a substantial armed forces presence. Our cities have had to bear the tragic losses incurred over the summer: the roll of honour read out in yesterday's Prime Minister's questions reminded us starkly of the price that has been paid. We must also support those who have returned injured and in need of specialist support.
Alongside the human aspect, we must also consider the strategically important defence industries. These are all crucial to Plymouth, Devonport, and where we are now and where we go with our defence policy will be crucial for the city and its position as the economic driver for the sub-region. Historically, we have depended on and worked closely alongside the Navy, including the Royal Marines, and clarity on their projected roles is therefore hugely important. I make no apology for the fact that my contribution today is likely to be very parochial as I stress the importance of these industries and the armed forces to my constituency.
It is now some 10 years since the last defence review, which was prompted by changing circumstances after the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of the cold war. Now is therefore a good time for strategic reflection, especially on the back of a recession. For a range of reasons, we must have a long-term look at where we want UK defence to be, 15 to 20 years down the line and beyond. In particular, we need to look at how some of the assumptions and scenarios envisaged in 1998 have changed as a result of what happened on 9/11 and of
our subsequent involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. We also need to consider the challenges caused by global warming and the growing shortages of water and other resources, as well as by nuclear threats from some nations that have not committed to a policy of non-proliferation.
We are not alone in seeking to revisit our nation's defence needs. The French Government have announced their new strategy this summer, after a 15-year gap in their policy development. Their proposals were aimed at changing the emphasis from logistics and maintenance to operational punch. They are maintaining their nuclear deterrent because they believe that it has a role in preventing inter-state conflicts of a traditional kind. Because of global security challenges, which were mentioned earlier, they have accepted the need to place greater emphasis on fast response and hence readiness. It is all about the power to project-something that we in the UK have understood for some time.
We must look at what our defence base will look like post-Afghanistan, when, hopefully, we will not be engaged in any major mission or conflict. That may be 10 years or longer down the line, but given the length of time it can take defence contracts to get going, or indeed be stopped, we need to consider how we will be placed to meet the challenges of 2020 and beyond. If, by then, we are in the fortunate scenario in which the Army is not engaged significantly in intense situations of the type in which we are currently engaged, we must ask what we are likely to need in defence. That is why I shall not speak further about Afghanistan today, but highlight why I believe that, in future, we will need a Royal Navy with the ability, to paraphrase a former Defence Minister, to act as a defence asset and not simply a Navy asset.
I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, South-West (Mr. Davidson) that the carriers-the CVF project-should be central to our future plans. We must stop the speculation. The build has started and we need to go ahead so that at least two carriers are finally built. They are vital as a delivery platform for almost any type of expeditionary warfare.
The continuation of the build programme is also, of course, essential for the work force in my constituency because of the skills that we in Devonport are able to offer both to support directly the work in Scotland and to tackle the overflow work that will come down from Rosyth once Babcock moves into the main build phase. The maintenance of the skills base across this part of the defence industry is something that, by broad agreement, must be maintained if we are to be able to produce and service our defence equipment within the UK.
There are those who would suggest that we could buy cheaper off the peg from overseas, but doing so regularly would lead to the loss of the skills that we might need in future, more unsettled times when we may not want to rely on foreign companies. At a time when we are rebalancing our economy, we would be ill advised to pursue a defence policy that undermined a highly skilled and very successful sector of our economy. Babcock alone has a number of overseas contracts based on the expertise of its UK work force; it is not only supporting UK needs, but bringing in valuable income from overseas. Once lost, those skills will be almost impossible to get back-and any Government must seriously consider the implications of that scenario.
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