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Richard Younger-Ross: The hon. Gentleman makes a valid point. Certainly in the past what he describes has been the case, but that does not mean to say that it has to be that way in the future. We just have to have smarter procurement, which I will come to. The term that applies is pork barrel politics. There has been a lot of that in past European programmes and in the collaboration that we have had with the United States, which has its own problems.

We are able at times to change equipment. The Challenger tanks were seen as unfit for purpose when they were in Oman. We managed to change them so that, as I was told when I visited Iraq in 2003, they were exactly the right vehicle for the time. The SA80 guns that we gave our forces were deemed not fit for purpose. We have managed to change them and, when I spoke to our forces on the ground, they said that the SA80 is a wonderful gun, second to none. There are perhaps one or two other rifles that are as good if not slightly better, but it is in the top tier.

We have mentioned the Snatch Land Rover. Clearly, we needed to bring in other vehicles such as Mastiffs. The difficulty comes with the procurement programme and its ability to change fast. We are looking at changing circumstances and this is about how we can have the structure in the Ministry of Defence and in procurement to allow rapid change and for Ministers to sign off rapid change. They have tried to do that under the urgent operational requirements programme. That has worked to a point, although it has diverted money from the other programmes, which leaves the MOD short for some of its preferred options.

Let us consider the conflict and the threat. A few years ago in Afghanistan, the threat was very different from what it is now. The terrorist tactics-insurgent tactics-in Afghanistan have changed from conventional, almost all-out conflict to try to gain ground and territory, to the simple terrorist attack involving IEDs, which were used in Iraq. However, even the technology of IEDs has changed, which requires a change in our vehicles. We need to look ahead to such changes. The conventional mines were replaced. The IEDs changed and then people started using shaped projectiles, which are very high technology. They have a convex shape. When the explosion goes off at the side of a road, they can penetrate through extra layers of armour plate, so we ended up having to put extra layers of armour on some of our vehicles-we had not done that before-because the risk was increasing. Again, the debate comes back to how we deal with that.

Mr. Gregory Campbell (East Londonderry) (DUP): I thank the hon. Gentleman for his kindness in giving way. He is coming on to a point that is of some interest to me and many others. It relates to adaptability. Of course, it was a completely different conflict in Northern Ireland, where the security forces had to learn over time to be exceptionally adaptable as the terrorist regime changed course, but that is equally so in Iraq and Afghanistan. How does he consider that such adaptability can be pencilled in with regard to procurement and trying to ensure that sufficient resources are made available for the future?

Richard Younger-Ross: I will come on to that, because the Gray report, which has just been published, covers the procurement process. It is a very important point.
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The main thrust of what I am saying is that we must be able to adapt rapidly to changing circumstances. There is no point in just blaming generals for not having the right equipment at the right time, because we do not always have the structures in place that allow them to respond in that way. In dealing with Northern Ireland, which is-

David Taylor (in the Chair): Order. Could the hon. Gentleman remember to address the Chair, rather than taking part in a private conversation?

Richard Younger-Ross: My apologies, Mr. Taylor. The hon. Member for East Londonderry (Mr. Campbell) made his point, but in Northern Ireland the circumstance was slightly different; it is smaller. Dealing with a country of the size and complexity of Afghanistan is much more complex, and the adaptability for different circumstances is changing. We were dealing with lower-altitude fighting in Iraq. The average person reading a paper in the pub on a Sunday in the UK might think that Iraq and Afghanistan are the same, but the altitudes are very different and how the helicopters and other equipment perform at altitude is entirely different. It is not always obvious to a lay person exactly how we should deal with that.

There are two or three specific points on which I am in a lot of agreement with the hon. Member for Congleton. She referred to the Chinooks. Why the Chinooks are still sat, having their digital wiring ripped out for analogue to be put in, I do not understand. Will the Minister give us an update on those Chinooks and when they will be ready for service? My understanding is that only a few people are working on them. Will the Minister explain how progress can be speeded up so that those important Chinooks can come into service?

There has always been criticism-the hon. Lady referred to this-of the number and types of vehicles that we have. That is a very valid point: we have too many types. She talked about simple equipment. It is not necessarily a case of having simple equipment, but having equipment that is the same, so that people do not have to work on a series of different vehicles in theatre, is easier. It will save on training and all the other costs if there are fewer models of vehicle and people do not have to move from one to another.

I have to wonder why the Ministry of Defence is looking to do a life-extension programme for the Puma and the Sea King. The Minister has responded on this, and the Defence Committee is still debating the issue. However, in its 11th( )report of this Session, the Committee wrote:

My understanding is that the MOD has not yet accepted that point, and I hope that the Minister will reflect on it. Other, off-the-peg vehicles are available.

Conclusion 4 of the Committee's report said:

That is probably one of the most significant sentences in that document. Not providing commanders with the equipment that they need on the ground will put lives at
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risk-indeed, it will actually take lives. The hon. Member for Congleton referred to pinch points, and that is exactly the problem in Afghanistan. Troops can go off road, but they will come to a narrow point at some stage. That is what the terrorists tend to concentrate on and what poses the greatest risk to our forces. Our troops cannot always do a helicopter lift over something, but if they can, they can reduce the risk of people being targeted on the ground.

To conclude, the Gray report said:

That resetting and the ability to be flexible are vital if we are to ensure that we have the right equipment at the right time for our forces on the ground.

11.41 am

Mr. Gerald Howarth (Aldershot) (Con): I am delighted to follow the hon. Member for Teignbridge (Richard Younger-Ross) and I will pick up some of the points that he made. However, I want, at the outset, to congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Congleton (Ann Winterton) on yet another masterful piece of debating and on bringing intelligence about our armed forces to the Chamber. That intelligence is hugely valuable to us all, and I am just sorry that there are not more hon. Members in Westminster Hall to hear what she has had to say or to participate in the debate, which is crucial to the men and women of our armed forces. They are all our constituents and they are out there fighting for their lives and for our country as we speak.

I have no doubt that when my hon. Friend, sadly, leaves this place, she will apply to take part in that excellent competition "Mastermind". We have no doubt what her specialist subject will be or that she will be able to see off virtually every question that is put to her on it. She has taken a great interest in the issue before us, and we have all been the beneficiaries of the contributions that she has made. That is not to say that I have always agreed with everything she has said, but she has provoked a debate that we need to have.

My hon. Friend was right to set out the deficiencies with much of our equipment. She rightly started with the Snatch Land Rover, and it was perfectly clear quite early in the Iraq campaign that that vehicle was not up to the task. It is not as though that was something new, because we had precisely the same problem in Northern Ireland. There, however, we addressed it by bringing in helicopters, rather than more heavily armoured vehicles, as we have in Iraq and Afghanistan. Using helicopters allowed us to avoid the improvised explosive devices, or the roadside bombs as they were then known, and to lift troops to the front line at Crossmaglen, Armagh and further west. Like many of us, my hon. Friend will have flown in a Puma into what, in Afghanistan, would be called a forward operating base, thereby avoiding any risk from roadside bombs.

Mr. Gregory Campbell: The hon. Gentleman alludes to the usage of helicopters in Northern Ireland. The loss of life, particularly in South Armagh, was significant
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over 30 years, but it would have been vastly more so had it not been for the deployment and usage of helicopters in particularly troubled parts of Northern Ireland.

Mr. Howarth: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for making that point, which speaks for itself. It also rubs in the fact that the Prime Minister has failed to show any vestige of understanding for the needs of the armed forces. Despite all that experience in Northern Ireland, where we had a body of knowledge, the Prime Minister, when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer, refused properly to fund the helicopter programme. Indeed, he cut £1.4 billion from it, and we have suffered the consequences ever since. Notwithstanding the advice of the Public Accounts Committee at the time, he persisted with a ruinous policy, which has undoubtedly cost lives.

Ann Winterton: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Howarth: I hope that I am my hon. Friend's hon. Friend, but I will happily give way to her.

Ann Winterton: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for giving way. May I just tell him that the situation in Northern Ireland was completely different from that in Afghanistan? The problem in Afghanistan, as he will well know, being a pilot himself, relates to flying helicopters hot and high. We have nothing that is totally suitable for the environment there, so many helicopters spend masses of time on the ground. The spare parts situation is critical, and it takes a huge amount of effort, money and time to keep those helicopters in the air that are in the air. The choices that the military and the MOD have made regarding helicopters have been a bit of a disaster.

David Taylor (in the Chair): Order. That was rather a long intervention.

Mr. Howarth: Yes, some of the helicopters are not adequate, and the Lynx, which my hon. Friend mentioned, is an obvious example. That is why the future Lynx is important, because it will have an upgraded engine and will be able to operate hot and high. However, I have to tell her that the Chinooks and C-47s that are operating in Afghanistan are doing absolutely sterling work. Yes, there is a shortage of spares, to which I will come in a moment, but there simply are not enough aircraft in theatre. My hon. Friend mentioned the Merlin, which is about to be deployed. The six aircraft bought from the Danes are of a slightly different specification from the Royal Air Force Merlins, but I have no doubt that they will add hugely to our capability. Above all-I want to emphasise this-they will give commanders in the field the range of choices that they need. Simply giving them a narrow range of choices is not the answer. We are talking about a complex military operation, and we owe it to our servicemen and women to give them and their commanders the range of air and land vehicles that they need to adjust to the enemy's changing tactics.

Richard Younger-Ross: I entirely agree with the point that the hon. Gentleman has just made. On flying hot and high, it is surely understandable that we had problems when we were first in Afghanistan in 2001-02, because we may not have expected the conflict. Given that we have now been there for a long time and that we knew
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that this would always be a long-haul campaign, does the hon. Gentleman agree that the failure to supply the right equipment is an appalling indictment of MOD procurement?

Mr. Howarth: I think so, but in this case I am going to leap to the defence of the Ministry of Defence, because it was the Treasury and the then Chancellor of the Exchequer who were at fault. The then Chancellor was personally responsible for what happened, and it is only fair to pin the blame on him-he starved the Ministry of Defence of the money it needed to provide kit that was identified as necessary. As Prime Minister, with his current Chancellor, he is responsible for starving the Territorial Army of the money it needs now. It is grotesquely unfair to blame the service chiefs. They have no money. They have got to find the money from somewhere, and wherever they found it they would have been criticised; but we shall debate the Territorial Army tomorrow and I do not want to stray out of order today, Mr. Taylor. Nevertheless, the point made by the hon. Member for Teignbridge is valid.

The only other observation that I want to make about helicopters is that it would be helpful if the Minister told us why he decided to proceed with the Puma life extension programme, by which the helicopter, the accident record of which is not a happy one, is being upgraded in France and Romania, and will take three years to be fit to enter theatre. It is a damning indictment of the Government that they have gone for that programme, which I am told by the manufacturer could be accelerated if they wished. Those of us who have seen operations in Afghanistan know that our forces could certainly do with more Chinooks in the field. They have proved to be extremely capable and resilient aircraft, and perhaps the answer would have been to order more of them. We shall see about that after our defence review next year.

In fairness to the Government, since 2005 they have responded. I think that my hon. Friend the Member for Congleton knows that when I came back from Iraq in September 2005, having seen the inadequacy of the Snatch Land Rover, I picked up the phone to the then Secretary of State and said that something had to be done about producing better armoured vehicles. He said that the matter was in hand. Sadly, at that stage, it was pretty well the Vector, which my hon. Friend rightly criticised. Since then a new range of vehicles has been introduced. My hon. Friend mentioned the Mastiff, which has proved extremely effective. However, that protective kit is not cheap. The Mastiffs are about £1 million a copy. Inside, yes, they are bank vaults on wheels, and the Mastiff in particular has a fantastic record of saving lives, but they are not suitable for all operations. They have limited off-road capability.

[Mrs. Joan Humble in the Chair]

The point that I want to make to my hon. Friend is that there is a vast amount of highly technical equipment in a Mastiff, including communications equipment, none of which comes cheap. There is the equipment for electronic counter-measures, which are one way of trying to deal with some IEDs. A lot of work has to go on ensuring that the latest iteration of the electronic counter-measures equipment does not interfere with the radio communications equipment. I hope that that thumbnail
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sketch shows the huge complexity of producing those vehicles to what is called theatre entry standard. It is very expensive.

My hon. Friend the Member for Congleton referred to the Ridgback. I have driven in a Ridgback at DVD, the defence vehicles display, which is a great exhibition. This year there was a self-contained area just parading the armoured vehicles so that one could see their range at a glance. It was truly impressive. We have certainly moved on in the past four years, since my hon. Friend and I first expressed our concerns. However, at £650,000 for four seats, one must ask how much value for money that is, to achieve the military effect. There is a further problem because from inside those vehicles it is pretty difficult to see outside. In a Warrior, of course, one cannot see anything. Situational awareness is very important to the soldier. That is why the Jackal is so popular. It is not an expensive toy. It is a very serious bit of kit, which has tremendous off-road capability-and off road one has less chance of giving the enemy the planned route, and in theory that extends the options. We now have a range of equipment, but we should keep costs constantly under review, because what matters is not the individual platforms but the capability, and capability can be delivered in different ways. I slightly resile from concentration on individual bits of kit, although of course that is the Minister's responsibility. As the shadow Minister, I have responsibility too, but I should want us to focus in our mind's eye on capability. What do we need to do to achieve the effect? We may do something in a Ridgback, but we may do it in a helicopter.

The scene is one of constant change; it is not static. It was very interesting to talk to a soldier at DVD. He had come back from Afghanistan earlier in the year. I asked him about the Viking. The only time I went out in the desert outside Camp Bastion I was in a Viking. I thought it was a horrible bit of kit-claustrophobic; I did not like it at all. However, when it was introduced about three years ago it was the bee's knees. Everyone thought the Viking was a superb bit of kit. The guy I spoke to said, "Our equipment only has to be out there for a couple of weeks and the enemy has ascertained exactly where its vulnerable points are." That makes the challenge to policy makers and procurers very demanding indeed. The enemy have a vote in this. It is easy to think of the enemy as primitive. Their attitudes are primitive, but their ability to use every bit of modern technology to advance their cause is not.

We, too, must adjust. Our procurement programme must be much more adaptable and agile than it is. The issues are highlighted in the Bernard Gray report, which we all regard as being in part the statement of the blindingly obvious, but also a good encapsulation of where the problems are. There is a need for agility in decision making. The good news is that industry is responding. I do not know whether my hon. Friend the Member for Congleton was able to go to the defence equipment exhibition at London docklands last month. I know that the Minister was there. There was a fantastic array of the capabilities being produced by industry, which is really responding. My hon. Friend mentioned Ricardo and its kit. There are many others coming forward offering a plethora of vehicles, and my hon. Friend will be pleased that most have V-shaped hulls; people have been reading what she and others have said. Industry is responding. It is necessary to have a procurement system that can also respond quickly.


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