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There is, of course, already a provision enabling a permanent secretary who feels that he or she is being required to do something that is not in the interests of the taxpayer to put in writing to the Secretary of State a request that he or she-the permanent secretary-be directed to implement the policy, but to my knowledge that has happened on only eight occasions in the past 12 years. It did not happen when tax credits were introduced. Arguably it should have, because it is understood that robust advice was given to the Chancellor to which he refused to listen. There is a strong case for saying that, given the circumstances, the chairman of the Revenue and the permanent secretary to the Treasury should have put in writing to the Chancellor that they needed to be directed, because their advice was that such action would be very harmful.
In the circumstances in which this country now finds itself, with a ballooning public debt and a budget deficit that seems to be out of control, incredible care with taxpayers' money will be of central importance in the years that lie ahead. It seems to us really important that protection for civil servants against being required to do things that are not in the interests of taxpayers should be entrenched. We think that Ministers should have a statutory obligation to respect the impartiality of civil servants. We have a good deal of sympathy with a Liberal Democrat new clause, which we hope will be reached later. In the meantime, however, this amendment-which reflects the central importance for the whole Executive of respecting and acting in the interests of taxpayers-would provide an extremely valuable additional discipline. As I have said, it would provide protection for civil servants against being bullied into implementing policies that were not in the interests of the taxpayer.
David Howarth: I sympathise very much with the intention behind the amendment. I do not think that it would do any harm to include a responsibility in the code and the Bill to ensure that public money is spent wisely. My only worry relates to the use of the word "fiduciary", which gives the impression that the relationship between civil servant and Government is similar to the relationship that used to exist between local councillors and their authorities in the days of surcharging. The word "fiduciary" always cropped up in surcharging cases.
Given the vast amounts of public money that go through Departments, it would be entirely wrong to open up civil servants to the possibility of having to repay perhaps billions of pounds to the public. I do not think that that was the intention of the right hon. Gentleman, but perhaps he should rethink the wording of the amendment on a future occasion.
Dr. Tony Wright: This Bill has been through so many previous incarnations that it is sometimes difficult to keep up with it. In one of its incarnations, there was a list of various duties that civil servants would be obliged to perform, including the duty
"to discharge public functions reasonably and according to law"
and another duty to do with standards of administration. It seems to me that there are two possible logical positions: to set out the duties of civil servants, or to take the Bill's approach and simply to say what are the core values. There is not a case, however, for taking one duty-in this instance, fiduciary responsibility-and seeking to
insert it into the Bill without addressing all the other ones. There must be all or nothing, and this is just a gesture in the middle.
Angela E. Smith: I have listened carefully to hon. Members' comments, and it might help if I point out the following. Clause 7 sets out the minimum requirements for civil service and diplomatic service codes of conduct. Codes of conduct must require civil servants in the UK, Scotland or Wales to serve the Administration of the day of whatever political complexion, and must contain an obligation on civil servants to carry out their duties in accordance with the core civil service values as set out in the Bill: integrity, honesty, objectivity and impartiality.
"fiduciary responsibility to spend taxpayers' money responsibly"
to the minimum requirements of the code as set out in the Bill. The legislation sets out the core civil service values that are essential to maintaining an impartial civil service. The civil service code gives more details on the kinds of behaviour expected from civil servants in clear and accessible language. It sets out the details of the core values under each of their headings. Under "Honesty" it says that civil servants must
"use resources only for the authorised public purposes for which they are provided."
Under "Objectivity" it says they must
"provide information and advice, including advice to Ministers, on the basis of the evidence, and accurately present the options and facts".
Under "Integrity" it says they must
"comply with the law and uphold the administration of justice."
The requirement on the use of public money is set out explicitly in the code under the core value of "Integrity", where it says civil servants must
"make sure public money and other resources are used properly and efficiently".
I think that covers the matter.
I understand why the right hon. Member for Horsham (Mr. Maude) thought this particular duty was so important that it should be added to the Bill, but I think my hon. Friend the hon. Member for Cannock Chase (Dr. Wright) is right-although he does not agree with me entirely-that there must be either a principles-based approach or a more detailed approach. Adding the details of the principles of one aspect of the civil service code to the Bill would undermine the others in the code.
My hon. Friend the Member for Pendle (Mr. Prentice) made a point about accounting officers. The accounting officer has a personal responsibility for the propriety of the spending of all the money for which he or she is responsible. That is set out in various codes.
I understand the point made by the right hon. Member for Horsham, and it is valid, but his proposal is unnecessary because of the way in which the Bill is set out and the information that is contained in the code.
Mr. Maude: I have listened to the comments of the Minister and others. We think that this duty is an important part of the obligations on civil servants and that a statement of that would give additional protection to civil servants, but there are other ways of addressing the issue and we should look into them further. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 7 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Kelvin Hopkins (Luton, North) (Lab): I beg to move amendment 79, page 4, line 33, leave out 'special' and insert 'Ministerial'.
The Second Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Sir Michael Lord): With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment 80, page 4, line 38, leave out 'special' and insert 'Ministerial'.
Amendment 53, page 4, line 39, at end insert-
'(3A) The special advisers code must contain provision preventing a special adviser from-
(a) authorising the expenditure of any public funds;
(b) exercising any power given by or under an Act of Parliament or an Act of the Scottish Parliament; and
(c) exercising any management function in relation to the civil service.'.
Amendment 81, page 5, line 1, leave out 'special' and insert 'Ministerial'.
Amendment 82, page 5, line 3, leave out 'special' and insert 'Ministerial'.
Amendment 83, page 5, line 5, leave out 'special' and insert 'Ministerial'.
Amendment 84, page 5, line 7, leave out 'special' and insert 'Ministerial'.
Amendment 85, page 5, line 8, leave out 'special' and insert 'Ministerial'.
Amendment 86, in clause 15, page 7, line 38, leave out 'special' and insert 'Ministerial'.
Amendment 22, page 8, line 14, at end insert-
'(e) those terms and conditions prohibit the special adviser from undertaking restricted duties.'.
Amendment 23, page 8, line 26, at end insert-
'(d) those terms and conditions prohibit the special adviser from undertaking restricted duties.'.
Amendment 24, page 8, line 38, at end insert-
'(d) those terms and conditions prohibit the special adviser from undertaking restricted duties.'.
Amendment 87, page 8, line 38, at end insert-
'(1A) A Ministerial adviser appointed to give party political advice to Ministers or to undertake other activities otherwise inappropriate to a civil servant is to be termed a "political adviser".
(1B) A Ministerial adviser appointed for his professional experience to assist with specific projects or problems is to be termed a "specialist adviser".
(1C) All Ministerial advisers must act only in the advisory and not an executive capacity.'.
Amendment 25, page 8, line 45, at end insert-
'(3) The following are restricted duties-
(a) authorising the expenditure of public funds;
(b) exercising any power given by or under an Act of Parliament or an Act of the Scottish Parliament;
(c) exercising any function relating to the appraisal, reward, promotion or disciplining of civil servants in any part of the civil service (including a part of the civil service to which this Act does not apply).'.
New clause 15- Cap on number of special advisers -
'(1) The number of special advisers appointed by Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom shall be limited according to the procedure laid out in subsections (3) to (6) of this section.
(2) Until the procedure laid out in this section has been completed, no new special advisers may be appointed.
(3) A Minister of the Crown must lay before parliament an order setting a limit for the total number of special advisers at any one time in the service of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.
(4) The order may make for provision for different Ministers of the Crown to be allowed to appoint different numbers of special advisers.
(5) The order may make provision, within the limit referred to in subsection (3), for there to be a limit to the number of special advisers who may be paid from public funds at any one time.
(6) An order under this section comes into force when resolutions approving it have been passed by both Houses of Parliament.'.
9.45 pm
Kelvin Hopkins: I say at the outset that I do not intend to press my amendments to a vote. One good reason is that, unfortunately, there are some slight technical errors. However, they are important amendments and I hope that my Front-Bench colleagues will at least consider incorporating their spirit, and even some of their wording, into the Bill at a later stage. They are about special advisers and seek to replace the term "special" with "ministerial", so that we know precisely to whom the advisers are addressing their advice. It is a more accurate word and it would clarify the role of special advisers in future if they were called "ministerial advisers".
The Public Administration Committee, of which I am delighted to be a member, has discussed the role of special advisers at some length. Perhaps other Members have also discussed this issue during the debate, but there is a history to special advisers with which I have some familiarity. In the 1970s, I knew Tony Benn and his special advisers. However, the famous Francis Cripps and Frances Morrell operated strictly as his political advisers; they did not have a role in advising or instructing civil servants. What they did was useful and legitimate, although it did not please the civil servants at the time. Tony Benn's habit was to speak first thing in the morning to his personal political advisers and then later to the civil servants, so that he was well prepared for debating with them later in the day. That was seen then by the civil servants as untoward.
However, under Tony Blair the power of special advisers went way beyond that; they took on a much more powerful role. They were effectively directing civil servants, acting as an Executive layer between Ministers and civil servants. This was something new, and it looked as though it was politicising the civil service in an unacceptable way. I was critical of that at the time, and I think we have rowed back from that arrangement to some extent.
At the time, however, things went even further than that. Some of the special advisers in Downing street were actually giving instructions over the heads of Ministers. At least two former senior Ministers are on record as complaining that their role was being marginalised. They were being kept out of the picture because policy was being passed from Downing street direct to the civil servants by special advisers, almost making the Ministers irrelevant. I am glad to say that that has changed.
Peter Bottomley (Worthing, West) (Con): That was 12 years ago. At the time, what was the proper way for people to raise that issue and say that the situation was either ineffective or improper, or both?
Kelvin Hopkins: Well, it concerned me at the time. I have been a member of the Public Administration Committee for seven years, and we have discussed these matters on a number of occasions. I have made very strong criticisms of that mode of operating, which changed the nature of our constitution and the relationship between Ministers and the civil service. It was a great mistake. I have used stronger language than that many times, which I will not use now-my hon. Friends who are also members of the Committee have heard me use it-when talking about authoritarian regimes and the techniques they use to exert political control at every level. However, to an extent, we have rowed back from that position, which I very much welcome.
I want to divide the role of ministerial adviser again. As my amendments point out, ministerial advisers come in two types: specialist advisers, who are experts who can give advice on technical matters that will help a Minister to do his job better; and political advisers or hacks-the sort of job that I might have done in a different regime. Long before I came into this place, I worked as a political adviser within the trade union movement. I used to use every opportunity to twist and turn politics as I wanted; that is what political advisers do. They act as advisers to Ministers-to one side; they do not instruct civil servants. That is why we want to use the term "ministerial adviser". Such people give advice to Ministers-they do not act as civil servants-and they are divided into those two categories.
If I may say this, it is a good day to bury special advisers, to coin a phrase. We should restore the proper role of the civil service as independent, impartial, neutral and equally able to serve Governments of all persuasions. Also, I hope that within the civil service there will be a range of views, so that good advice can come from all sides-in fact, from different sides of the argument-within the service itself. That is how it operated in the past and that is how it should operate again.
These amendments would restore the proper status of Ministers, whose role has been played down. The Cabinet has not been the power it was in the past. I would like to see Cabinet government genuinely restored, so that politics is really debated and thrashed out at Cabinet level, and does not just come down from the political advisers surrounding a Prime Minister-any Prime Minister.
Mr. Barry Sheerman (Huddersfield) (Lab/Co-op): My hon. Friend and I share an interest in that history. When did we have something that he would describe as functioning Cabinet government? During what period was that?
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