Previous Section | Index | Home Page |
"the Court's resources are used to provide an efficient and effective system to support the Court's business".
For all those reasons, I hope the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham) will withdraw the new clause.
Mr. Bellingham:
The Minister, in his usual charming way, has been extremely persuasive. Although he made some good points, we do not in any way resile from the arguments that we advanced. Our point is simple: the chief executive post at such expense is a huge luxury.
What is wrong with a senior clerk or a manager on a much lower salary carrying out those admin roles? That is what we would like to see, but because of the Minister's charm and persuasion, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
'(1) Section 88 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 is amended as follows.
(2) After subsection (5) insert-
"(6) At no stage during any selection procedure may the Commission apply any written tests."'.- (Mr. Bellingham.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Kelvin Hopkins (Luton, North) (Lab): I beg to move amendment 68, page 18, line 19, at end add-
'(9) The principal function of the Comptroller and Auditor General is to further the purposes of national audit set out in section [Purpose of Part 7] by way of investigation and report.'.
The Chairman of Ways and Means (Sir Alan Haselhurst): With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: amendment 78, in clause 38, page 19, line 2, at end insert-
'(6A) The Comptroller and Auditor General shall also have discretion to examine the accounts of any organisation supplying goods or services paid for out of public funds, which within any one contract, or any one financial year, exceed a sum to be determined from time to time by statutory instrument.'.
New clause 41- Purpose of Part 7-
'The purpose of the following provisions is to further strengthen Parliamentary control and supervision of the expenditure of public money, and for promoting economy, efficiently, effectiveness and probity in the use of such money by government departments and other authorities and organisations.'.
Kelvin Hopkins: It gives me great pleasure to speak to these amendments, if briefly.
In a major piece of legislation it is important that its purposes should be clear, but the Bill nowhere specifies the purposes and aims of national audit, although the National Audit Act 1983 does so. The amendments are intended to remedy that omission.
Mr. Alan Williams (Swansea, West) (Lab): That is not the purpose of the Bill. The statutory powers are already in place, and the purpose of this part of the Bill is to bring better governance into the processes of the National Audit Office.
Kelvin Hopkins: I accept entirely what my right hon. Friend says, but I hope that one purpose of the Bill is to restate the objectives of audit.
Mr. Alan Williams indicated dissent.
Kelvin Hopkins: Clearly my right hon. Friend and I disagree, but I hope it will be accepted that the restatement of the 1983 Act would not go amiss in the Bill.
New clause 41 is intended to be inserted at the head of part 7. It repeats the opening of the 1983 Act, with the addition of the word "probity", which seems appropriate in current terms. Amendment 68 is intended to make clear the function of the Comptroller and Auditor General in relation to the purposes of national audit, and amendment 78 takes account of the modern circumstances in which private firms and third-sector organisations can receive a significant proportion of their funds-up to 80 per cent. in some cases-from the public purse. When the services that they provide were provided directly by public authorities, they were subject to the Comptroller and Auditor General or to local government audit. Modern suppliers of services receiving public money should be subject to the CAG, as plcs will be under clause 50.
It is important to reassert the importance of the CAG and national audit. In the last Parliament, there was a brief, surreptitious attempt by the Government to insert a degree of Treasury control over national audit. That was seen off by a combination of Labour Members, Opposition Members and the House of Lords, and the Bill never proceeded, but it is important that we now reaffirm our commitment to national audit. After all, our primary purpose is to vote moneys for government on behalf of the people. We must ensure that what moneys we vote are spent appropriately. That is what national audit and the CAG are all about.
Mr. David Gauke (South-West Hertfordshire) (Con): I thank the hon. Gentleman for tabling these amendments and the new clause. I suspect that the question whether it is necessary to reassert such objectives in this Bill given that the 1983 Act, which also states them, is not being repealed, will be addressed in a moment, but the CAG's objective of carrying out examinations of the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of public bodies is, as the hon. Gentleman says, very important. Perhaps it is more important now than ever, at a time when we will see spending restraint. The Government are spending more than ever before and, indeed, borrowing more than ever before in peacetime, so the focus must clearly be on achieving more for less. The NAO and the CAG have an important role in achieving that. Taxpayer value for money should unite us all-it should not be a partisan point-whether we are left or right. I do not think the hon. Gentleman will take it as a criticism if I say that it does not get more left wing than him. We must all ensure that public spending achieves good value and it is worth paying tribute to the work that the NAO and various CAGs have performed to achieve that.
We may differ on how to achieve greater economy, efficiency and effectiveness in public bodies, and in many ways, this is a matter for great political debate-I am sure the hon. Gentleman would not necessarily share the Conservatives' views about the importance of choice, competition and contestability in achieving better value for money. However, there is a less political role, and the NAO performs it very well, in conjunction with the Public Accounts Committee. The new clause refers to Parliament's important role. As I said, we could question whether the amendments are necessary, but the objective of the NAO and the CAG is important.
I have one or two points to make on clause 37. If there is a stand part debate on it, I will do so then.
The Chairman: Order. I was hoping not to have a stand part debate in view of the fact that, with the new clause, this is a fairly wide grouping.
Mr. Gauke: In which case, Sir Alan, I shall make those points now.
This part of the Bill, as the Father of the House has said, is predominantly to do with the governance of the NAO and the CAG, and there is a combination of continuity and change in the new arrangements. I think it would be fair to provide a little background on how we got into this situation and why there was a need to look again at the governance of the CAG-doubtless the Chairman of the PAC, my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Mr. Leigh), and the Father of the House will say things to the same effect.
We cannot ignore the fact that there was some adverse publicity regarding the expenses of Sir John Bourn, who was CAG for some 20 years or so. It is a great pity that there was a cloud over the last few months of his service, because he was a distinguished Comptroller and Auditor General. He did much to enhance the reputation of the National Audit Office and worked very effectively with the Public Accounts Committee. Nevertheless, there was some concern and adverse publicity over his expenses, which in many respects led to the commissioning of the Tiner review and various recommendations made as to the governance of the Comptroller and Auditor General and the NAO.
I wish to make various points about corporate governance at a later stage, but two points are appropriate to address in the context of clause 37. The first is the length of term of the Comptroller and Auditor General, and the second is the appointment process. Clause 37(7) provides that the length of term should be 10 years and subsection (8) provides that it should be non-renewable. We welcome those provisions. The tension that exists in the Government's arrangements in this area relates to independence and accountability, and that is a point to which we may return later. However, a non-renewable term of a reasonable length gives the CAG a degree of independence. The Tiner review initially suggested eight years, and we now have 10 years in the Bill. No doubt others will explain the reason for that change, but it is not enormously significant. We welcome those provisions.
The issue of the appointment process has been touched on recently in a couple of debates when new Comptrollers and Auditors General have been appointed. I have had the opportunity to speak in both debates-first, on the temporary appointment of Mr. Tim Burr in January 2008, and secondly, on the appointment of Mr. Amyas Morse as the permanent CAG. The debate has centred on whether the existing structure, which has been in place since 1983-by which time the appointment was made by a combination of the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee and the Prime Minister-is appropriate or whether Parliament should have a wider role, and remove the Prime Minister and the Executive from the process, either altogether or with a diminished role.
Another issue is whether pre-appointment hearings should be introduced. This is not a new debate. In the debate that took place when Sir John Bourn was appointed, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury, the right hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne, East and Wallsend (Mr. Brown), then the Opposition spokesman, said, on the question of a greater role for Parliament:
Next Section | Index | Home Page |