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Bald Eagle 2007-08
Cossack Steppe (CAC 5-2007-08)
Lion Star 1-2007-08
Romanian Express (CAC 7-2007-08)
Lion Star 2-2007-08
Lion Star 3-2007-08
Lion Star 4-2007-08
Flying Rose 2-2007-08
Flying Rose 2-2008-09(1)
Mulberry Tree/Prickly Pear 2008-09(1)
150 Tpt Regt (V) OBUA Trg
Trg weekend 150 Tpt Regt (V)
Outreach 4-Georgian Express
Trg Ex-75 Engr Regt (V)
(1) These exercises were cancelled during 2007-08, but were due to take place in 2008-09.
Bill Rammell: To date, 9 per cent. of programmed training exercises have been cancelled in 2009. Exercises may be cancelled for a variety of reasons including effectiveness of delivery; value for money; international policy dimensions and circumstances; operational constraints; and focus on current operations.
Crimson Eagle 09-1
Snow Falcon 09
Lone Fin 09
Torpedo Focus 09-2
Sheldrake Spear 09
Green Flag West 09-1
TLT NITEX 09-1
UAE ATLC 12
Lone Eagle 09-1
Harding Flame 09-1
Batus Run 09-1
Blue Flag 09-1
Maple Flag 42-2
Maple Flag 42-3
Batus Run 09-2
Crown Pinnacle 09-4
Bold Avenger 09
Latin Bull 09
RAF DOT 09
Batus Run 09-5
1 ACC WTI 09
Lion Sun 11
Mr. Gerald Howarth: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the answer of 2 November 2009, Official Report, columns 569-70, on pre-deployment training, what his definition is of an unacceptable balance of risk. 
Bill Rammell: There is always a balance to be struck in allocating equipment to meet both operational and training needs. When new equipment is introduced into service, the Department's priority is to ensure that sufficient quantities are available for training to enable operators to meet basic qualification standards prior to their deployment. This must be balanced with the requirement to get equipment into theatre as quickly as possible so that troops can benefit from the additional capability.
We recognise that achieving this balance can mean that it takes longer to establish a sufficient pool of equipment fully to meet the training requirement. In such cases, the training pool is managed in a way that ensures operators have as much experience of the equipment as possible before they deploy. If necessary, this training will be supplemented after individuals arrive in theatre. Where troops already in theatre are provided with newly introduced equipment, specialist training teams will deploy to ensure the equipment operators get the training they need.
The quantities of equipment available for pre-deployment training continue to improve. For example the numbers of Jackal and Ridgback vehicles in the training pool increased by 50 per cent. between July and October this year. The number of Mastiff vehicles in the training pool is expected to improve in the next few months.
Dr. Fox: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many armoured vehicles of each type in the armed forces are (a) fit to be deployed and (b) in service in Afghanistan.  [Official Report, 25 November 2009, Vol. 501, c. 13-14MC.]
I can however provide figures for armoured vehicles which are fit for purpose. This is defined as vehicles that are capable of being used in whatever capacity they are required for. Fit for purpose figures as at 4 November 2009 are provided in the following table, along with total fleet numbers.
|Vehicle||Total fleet number||Number fit for purpose|
Dr. Fox: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the (a) required and (b) actual level of spare part availability is for each (i) armoured vehicle type and (ii) aircraft type in the armed forces (A) overall and (B) in Afghanistan. 
The required level of spares for fixed-wing aircraft is included in contractual agreements with industry or is set by the Front Line Command. The achieved level of available spares is measured as part of these agreements.
The following information for the required and achieved level of spares for each fixed-wing aircraft fleet is provided as at September 2009 unless otherwise stated. The level of spares for operational deployments to Afghanistan is not recorded separately unless otherwise stated.
In addition there is an ongoing Group Action brought by 1,011 Nuclear Test Veterans against the Ministry of Defence in which AWE has been providing documentation to assist the legal disclosure process.
Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence with reference to the answer to the hon. Member for Lewes of 4 November 2008, Official Report, column 301W, what his most recent estimate is of the costs arising from the July 2007 flooding at each Atomic Weapons Establishment site. 
Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what progress has been made in the preparation of an integrated waste strategy for the Atomic Weapons Establishment.  [Official Report, 12 March 2010, Vol. 507, c. 13MC.]
Mr. Quentin Davies: An integrated waste strategy for the Atomic Weapons Establishment was first approved by the board of AWE plc. in March 2007 and updated in April 2008 and May 2009. The regulators (the Environment Agency and the nuclear installations inspectorate) have assessed the strategy as appropriate for use. It is being progressively implemented and is subject to annual review.
Mr. Quentin Davies: Nationality will not present an automatic barrier to being allowed to undertake construction work on Project Mensa. All individuals employed on the project will, however, be required to achieve the necessary level of security clearance, on a case-by-case basis, as is the situation for all AWE workers.
Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what emergency arrangements are in place to provide for the protection of contractors working on Project Mensa at AWE Burghfield in the event of an accident leading to a release of radioactive material. 
Mr. Quentin Davies: The Nuclear Site Licence conditions require robust emergency arrangements to be in place at AWE Burghfield to deal with all reasonably foreseeable accidents. Specifically, and in line with other nuclear operators, emergency countermeasures include sheltering and, where appropriate, subsequent evacuation of personnel considered to be at risk from a potential release of radioactive material. These onsite arrangements provide for the protection of all persons present on the establishment, including contractors working within the Project Mensa compound, in the unlikely event of a release of radioactive material.
Nick Harvey: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether he plans to hold an exercise to rehearse arrangements for dealing with a radiation release at AWE Burghfield with the potential to affect contractors working in the Project Mensa compound. 
Mr. Quentin Davies: Onsite emergency arrangements at AWE Burghfield are regularly tested in exercises. Where appropriate, these exercises test the arrangements for the protection of all personnel present on the site, including contractors working within the Project Mensa compound. The last such exercise was held in October 2009. The timetable for the next exercise has not yet been agreed.
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