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11 Nov 2009 : Column 97WH—continued
The next important thing is to have an early discussion about the initial gate for Trident. The debate has been put off, which I regret, as I believe that it would be worth having such a debate before the election. However, I am glad that it has been recognised that the decision should not have been snuck out during the summer recess.
Since the vote two or three years ago the domestic and international reality has been radically transformed. In the light of the economic recession, it is incumbent upon us to review our priorities. It has even put into greater focus the £76 billion cost of running Trident. We have also moved on significantly regarding the threats posed to this country. We no longer have a cold war.
People say that, because we can never predict the future, we should never change our strategy; but unless we try to project into the future and predict what the threats might be, we will be hamstrung. We will constantly be going for the gold-plated option. We will never be considering in a smart or intelligent way how to deal with the threat that is posed. President Obama is opening dialogue with other countries, but it is important that we follow with action.
We must also consider whether, in our dealings with Iran and North Korea, it is possible for us to provide any motivation or incentive for those nations to act differently. Will Britain's continuing to have nuclear weapons have an impact? The hon. Member for Manchester, Central rightly referred to incentives and sanctions. It is an important consideration. The grand bargain has been broken: we did not complete our part of the bargain of constantly striving towards disarmament.
Although my party is not in favour of nuclear power, we recognise that part of the bargain was that other countries would have access to the nuclear cycle for civil nuclear power. That part of the bargain, too, has not been progressed. It is little wonder, therefore, that those countries have lost faith in the non-proliferation treaty and are now seeking to go their own way. If we are to encourage those countries to act more responsibly, we need a package of incentives and sanctions.
It is no good coming up with alternatives just in advance of the NPT. We need longer-lasting initiatives and ideas if we are not to end up with countries saying, "We are fully committed to the NPT," and then going on to say that they will never get rid of their nuclear weapons because they cannot predict the future and therefore need their gold-plated protection to remain in place. We must act on our words. We need much more effective delivery over the long term if those countries are to have any faith in commitments made by NPT members.
We Liberal Democrats have reviewed our position in the light of changing international and economic circumstances. We have also reviewed our position on Trident. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for North-East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell) has been commissioned by our party leader to consider the alternatives. I shall not go into them now, because I do not want to prejudge what my right hon. and learned Friend will say. Nevertheless, if the Government took a similar approach, they could send out to the rest of the world the message that we were seriously considering changes to our nuclear weapons systems, so that there could be more trust in what we were committing to.
As hon. Members know, article VI of the treaty relates to nuclear disarmament. It states:
"Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."
The 2000 NPT review conference agreed 13 practical steps, of which No. 6-I hope hon. Members will forgive me for reading it out-refers to
"an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all states parties are committed under Article VI".
I would challenge those who believe that, as we can never predict the future, we must always have a system, about whether they are truly committed to the NPT conference, the NPT treaty and the 2000 review conference, and to the 13 practical steps that were outlined. I have heard other parties say, "As we can never predict, we will never get rid of it," but I think that that position does not comply with the treaty. I would like to hear from the other parties whether they will consider removal of our nuclear weapons systems, and not adopt the argument about never removing them because we can never predict.
That is an important consideration, because if we do not act on our words, use the right language and have the right commitment, it will be no surprise when other countries deviate from the provisions according to which we believe they should be operating.
5.51 pm
Mr. David Lidington (Aylesbury) (Con): I, too, congratulate the hon. Member for Manchester, Central (Tony Lloyd) on securing the debate and on the quality of his opening speech. A few weeks ago, I had the pleasure of travelling with the hon. Gentleman and the right hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun (Des Browne) to Washington, where we met various representatives of the United States Administration to discuss the matters we are debating today. My conversations with the hon. Gentleman during that visit left me in no doubt about not just his expertise in dealing with this subject, but his deep and long-standing commitment to the cause of non-proliferation and multilateral disarmament.
When we look at the history of the non-proliferation treaty, we can take some pride in the fact that it has helped, in its way, to keep the peace in the world over recent decades. Most importantly, the existence of the treaty and the framework of inspections and controls it incorporates have provided mechanisms that have prevented proliferation. In trying to imagine how the world might have developed if the NPT had not existed, I think we would today see a world with many more powers in possession of nuclear weapons. The NPT and the International Atomic Energy Agency have also provided a mechanism for allowing certain countries-the ex-Soviet republics of Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, and also South Africa-to dismantle nuclear weapons programmes that they had on their territory.
Nevertheless, the NPT arrangements are now under strain as never before. That derives from a number of different trends, to which the hon. Gentleman alluded. At its most basic, nuclear know-how is much more widely spread throughout the world than in the 1960s
or 1970s, and that knowledge of details of nuclear technology can be transmitted from country to country on a disc or at the click of a mouse. Because of rising hydrocarbon prices and concerns about climate change, more and more countries are looking to develop civil nuclear energy programmes, as they are entitled to do, but which adds to the risk of creating a further spread of nuclear knowledge and materials around the world. That makes it ever more important that systems of physical control and of inspection are fit for purpose.
As the hon. Gentleman said, there are now not only sovereign states that have developed or are seeking to develop nuclear weapons capability in defiance of the non-proliferation treaty, but terrorist groups that make no secret of their wish to obtain weapons of mass destruction and use them to create as many victims as possible. Today the ambition and example of North Korea and Iran are testing to the limit whether the controls embodied in the NPT actually work and will provide a safeguard against further proliferation.
My party is utterly committed to making next year's NPT review a success. My right hon. Friend the Member for Richmond, Yorks (Mr. Hague) has spoken on a number of occasions about the critical importance of the review and his fear that if it were to fail or be seen to have been a failure, it would in practice present a green light to other nations with regard to starting to develop nuclear weapons programmes of their own.
We would like to see the parties to the treaty set themselves a number of objectives next year. One should be to strengthen the inspectorate by, for example, making the additional protocol, with its provision for unannounced inspections, mandatory for all signatories to the treaty. Another should be to make it easier for action to be taken against violations of the treaty or defiance of the IAEA. For example, there might be provision for automatic reference to the Security Council if a country acted in the way that Iran has done, having withdrawn from the additional protocol after originally subscribing to it.
Jeremy Corbyn: As the hon. Gentleman knows, I am not in favour of anybody developing nuclear weapons, but will he concede that although Iran has not signed up to the additional protocol, it has maintained membership of the NPT process itself? That is quite valuable, because it provides an opportunity for negotiation, discussion and debate. If Iran was driven out of the NPT, it would not be very helpful.
Mr. Lidington: It is certainly important that Iran remain within the NPT process and that inspectors can carry out checks, but as the hon. Gentleman knows, one of the major anxieties about the Iranian Government's conduct is that they still refuse to co-operate fully with the IAEA's requests to be allowed to inspect the facilities that it wants to examine or to have access to the individual Iranian scientists and other officials to whom it wishes to speak. When Iranian Government spokesmen say or hint that if they are pushed much further, they will walk out of the NPT altogether and chuck the inspectors out of their territory, it sends a message saying that one has reason to mistrust the Iranian Government's intentions. Whether or not that is the message they intend to convey, that is how such an attitude is interpreted elsewhere in the world.
Another important item on next year's agenda should be efforts to internationalise the nuclear fuel cycle. Again, that is very much a live issue in respect of Iran. Different Governments, including our own, have made various proposals such as international banks of enriched material or guarantees from existing nuclear weapons states to supply the enriched material required for the civil nuclear programmes of countries that are not nuclear weapons states but that wish legitimately, within the treaty framework, to develop civil nuclear energy programmes. Establishing some form of international control over the nuclear fuel cycle is essential if those countries seeking to develop civil nuclear energy are to be able to press ahead while retaining confidence that adequate safeguards against weapons proliferation remain in place.
Tony Lloyd: I strongly agree with this part of the hon. Gentleman's speech. Does he accept that a country considering gaining access to civil nuclear energy would want absolute guarantees that it would not face massive commercial disadvantage as a result of internationalisation or the possibility that, for reasons outside the ambit of the NPT, people could try to use the process as a way of interrupting the fuel cycle? It must be a system secure enough to allow those who buy into it to trust the regime.
Mr. Lidington: I agree. Confidence on the part of those countries that are not nuclear weapons states but wish to develop civil nuclear energy that they will not be put at a permanent disadvantage in the security of their legitimate energy supplies by arrangements designed to stop weapons proliferation will be crucial to the success of the review which we all hope for. That is an important point.
The other item that has to be addressed next year, though I do not underestimate how difficult it will be to achieve, is finding a way of extending the NPT regime to those nuclear weapons states--India, Pakistan and Israel--that have nuclear weapons but are not party to the treaty and recognised as nuclear weapons states. One big problem we will face next year is that any change or new and binding arrangement will need unanimity. Looking around the world at the tensions in various regions, one sees how easy it would be for even a relatively small number of countries to disrupt proceedings for their own reasons and make it impossible to reach a unanimous and constructive conclusion.
The political climate in which the review will take place is certain to be influenced by other developments, not least what happens between now and then in North Korea and Iran. I hope that the Minister will bring us up to date on the Government's assessment of the situation with both those countries. From the outside, it seems that the challenge posed by North Korea has calmed somewhat in recent months. The language of the North Koreans is not quite as belligerent as it was earlier this year. Does the Minister believe that there is cause to hope that there is a way forward in persuading Pyongyang to return to the NPT and to suspend and then abandon its weapons programmes?
With Iran, from where I stand, it seems to be a case of pessimistic assessments becoming more powerful. A couple of weeks ago, we were all hoping that the compromise proposal for Iranian nuclear material to be
sent abroad for enrichment might be agreed by all parties, but the reluctance of Tehran to sign up to that compromise is disheartening. That causes us to wonder about the good faith of the Iranian Government in the nuclear negotiations. It would be helpful to have the Minister's assessment of how the Government see the state of play there.
As the hon. Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn) pointed out, the context for next year's review of the NPT will also be affected by progress, or the lack of it, in other nuclear negotiations and agreements. I do not think that he and I have ever in our political lives been on the same side of a debate on nuclear weapons, but I make it clear that we accept that all nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT are bound by the obligation to seek multilateral disarmament. In response to the call by Henry Kissinger, George Shultz and Sam Nunn for setting an objective of abolishing all nuclear weapons, we said that we would sign up to it while remaining cautious about the time that it will take and the enormous difficulty of achieving such an objective, however desirable.
The first step that might be taken towards a new round of multilateral disarmament and creating a propitious climate for the NPT review would be if the United States and Russia were to agree on a replacement for the strategic arms limitation treaty when that expires next month. Do the Government believe that such a deal between Washington and Moscow is likely and, if so, what time frame might it be achieved in? Do they think that a START--strategic arms reduction treaty--agreement might then lead to a further round of multilateral talks in advance of the review of the NPT next summer? I hope too that the Government might be able to tell us something about the state of progress on international agreement on physical control of nuclear materials and the idea of a fissile material cut-off agreement.
Finally, I hope that next year the Government will encourage our friends in the United States, particularly our friends in both parties in the US Congress, to accept that American ratification of the comprehensive test ban treaty would be a major signal of US commitment to the process of multilateral disarmament. It would undoubtedly help towards the achievement of a successful review of the non-proliferation treaty, which it is profoundly in the interests of this country to secure and which, clearly from today's debate, commands the support of all sides of the House.
6.10 pm
The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr. Ivan Lewis): I begin by congratulating my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Central (Tony Lloyd) on securing such an important debate and by paying tribute to him, as one of my predecessors as a Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister and in his role as a parliamentarian, for being a long-standing champion of a nuclear-free world.
As my hon. Friend said, we are facing a year of unique opportunity, but also one of unique challenge in some ways, which will be a test of political leadership and political will. In the same way as this generation's response to the challenge of climate change will determine the destiny of future generations-that is generally understood-the question of nuclear proliferation is
very much up there as one of the top issues about which this generation of politicians must make difficult choices that will determine the destiny of the world in the long term.
Today's debate has been measured, mature and an important contribution to raising awareness of the non-proliferation issue as we face a year of unique opportunity and challenge. The issue needs a lot more of the oxygen of debate in Parliament and in the country, in terms of the leadership role that Britain seeks to play and will be playing.
Since the House last debated nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, the Government have continued to give the issue a top priority. The Prime Minister launched the UK's "The Road to 2010" plan in Parliament on 16 July, which set out a detailed blueprint of proposals for a balanced strengthening of the non-proliferation and disarmament regime. It has been well received and gained positive support from President Obama.
On 3 and 4 September, we hosted a groundbreaking conference for the P5-the five permanent United Nations Security Council members-to discuss confidence-building measures towards nuclear disarmament. We worked closely with the Security Council members to secure the landmark summit chaired by President Obama and resolution 1887, which has helped to increase political momentum for strengthening the non-proliferation treaty. Secretary of State Clinton said that the UK's leadership was a crucial factor in the success of the summit.
Next May, at the NPT review conference, we must give expression to and make tangible steps forward towards the new positive approach. Working with partners from across the international community, we shall seek a mandate for concrete, realistic and balanced action to strengthen the NPT's three mutually reinforcing pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. We want a mandate to strengthen the non-proliferation regime through improved safeguarding, verification and compliance measures.
We believe that comprehensive safeguard agreements, which allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to track its members' declared activities, and the additional protocol that will allow the IAEA to detect undeclared activities, should become the obligatory minimum standard, so that the organisation can police the non-proliferation regime effectively. We are committed to ensuring that the IAEA has the necessary authority and capacity to assure compliance with non-proliferation objectives.
As hon. Members have said, improving the organisation's ability to detect safeguard violations will not be enough. Potential violators must know that if they are caught there will be a high price. We should adopt automatic penalties for violation of safeguard agreements, such as suspending international nuclear co-operation or technical co-operation projects until compliance has been restored. Referral to the UN Security Council would be another option.
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