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I will place a copy of the most up to date statistics in the Library of the House. These statistics are updated fortnightly online. We do not disclose information on how casualties are injured as its disclosure would, or would be likely to prejudice the capability, effectiveness or security of the armed forces.
Information on patients from Afghanistan who require treatment at the Royal Centre for Defence Medicine at Selly Oak Hospital and the Defence Medical Rehabilitation Centre at Headley Court is also publicly available on the website of the Defence Analytical Services and Advice.
http://www.dasa.mod.uk/applications/newWeb/www/index.php?page=48&pubType=0&thiscontent=1350&Publish Time=09:30:00&date=2009-10-30&disText=30%20September %202009&from=listing&topDate=2009-10-30&skipCheck=l
Bill Rammell: I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave to the hon. Member for Castle Point (Bob Spink) on 2 November 2009, Official Report, column 644W. Determining amputations related to action specifically in Helmand would be complex and would at the very least necessitate interrogation of individual records. Even this would not be definitive as wounded could arrive at any one of many field hospitals, potentially including those outside Helmand. At the same time, casualties evacuated from Helmand field hospitals could have been wounded elsewhere. Consequently, obtaining verified data would be problematic and any data provided could not be relied upon.
Lembit Öpik: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what effect recent steps taken by Pakistan against al-Qaeda have had on the number of terrorist attacks in Afghanistan; and whether he has made a recent assessment of the extent to which co-operation with the Pakistani armed forces could enable UK forces to withdraw from Afghanistan. 
Bill Rammell: Current Pakistani military operations in South Waziristan are directed against Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), however, we assess that they have placed pressure on other militant groups in South Waziristan.
While we work closely with the Pakistani military in building its capacity to conduct counterinsurgency operations within its own borders, we have always been clear that ISAF's mission in Afghanistan will only be complete once the Afghan National Security Forces themselves can take on the conduct of security operations.
Bill Rammell: The Institute of Naval Medicine is currently assessing 'end of deployment' data on the diet experienced by personnel who were deployed to forward operating bases and patrol bases in Afghanistan.
This data collection is one element of the surgeon general's armed forces feeding project to provide an evidence base in support of UK armed forces feeding in training, in unit and during overseas operations.
Mr. Quentin Davies: The use by our armed forces in Afghanistan of all equipment types is kept under constant review to ensure that they continue to meet operational requirements. This includes the use of Snatch vehicles. Operational commanders have repeatedly stressed the importance of having a range of vehicles from which they can select the most appropriate for specific tasks. This includes a lighter, smaller and more agile patrol vehicle, such as the Snatch 2A and Snatch Vixen Land Rover. But to ensure that our personnel have the best possible protection, a strengthened variant of the vehicle, Snatch Vixen-Plus, is being procured for delivery to Afghanistan next year. This will be followed shortly thereafter by the new lighter protected patrol vehicle.
Mr. Lancaster: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will publish the letter from the Prime Minister to the then Secretary of State of 11 March 2008, reference MSU/10/7/2 serial number 1421/2007, on expansion of the cadet force. 
Mr. Kevan Jones [holding answer 28 October 2009]: I am withholding the information requested as its release may prejudice the development of Government policy. However, I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave to him on 4 November 2009, Official Report, columns 987-988W.
Bill Rammell: Historical data to support the calculation of the average tour interval for each battalion or regiment of the Infantry since 1997 is not held centrally and could only be provided at disproportionate cost.
The following table shows the last operational Tour Interval for each Infantry unit as at 1 November 2009, based on the unit's last two operational tours to Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans, Northern Ireland or Cyprus.
|Latest Information||Previous Information|
|Unit deployed/Infantry||End d ate||Last operational deployment (as a unit)||Start date||Previous operational deployment (as a unit)||End date||Last unit tour interval (months)|
|(1) 1 RS and 1 KOSB amalgamated to form 1 SCOTS in August 2006. 1 SCOTS deployed for the first time as a formed unit to Iraq in December 2007.|
(2) 1 KORBR, 1 KINGS and QLR amalgamated in July 2006 to form 1 LANCS and 2 LANCS. Due to the nature of this amalgamation it is not representative to carry forward the unit deployments of 1 KORBR, 1 KINGS and QLR to 1 LANCS and 2 LANCS.
(3) 1 RGBW and 1 DDLI amalgamated in March 2007 to form 1 RIFLES. 1 RIFLES has deployed for the first time as a formed unit in October 2008 on Herrick 9.
The deployments listed are by units, defined as a regiment deploying with a regimental headquarters and more than two manoeuvre sub-units for four months or more.
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