Mr.
Laws: Thank you, Mrs. Humble. We come to one of
the more interesting parts of the Bill. Some people outside this place
have suggested that the Bill has been pulled together by the Government
from a rag-bag of policy odds and ends that have been hanging around
for some time, to create a sense that the Government have some momentum
in education, rather a sense of a Government in their last year who are
perhaps running out of momentum and direction in education. However, I
think that that is not entirely fair, because two important parts to
the Bill—parts 7 and 8—are both important and
controversial. Those parts have attracted a large number of
amendments—some 200—about half of which were tabled by
the two Opposition parties, with the Government tabling about 100,
which may be a comment on something. We will reflect on what that
something is
later.
Mr.
Gibb: Is the hon. Gentleman not being unfair in
criticising the Government for being at the end of their period in
office and running out of steam when they have created, according to
the Minister, a single portal for schools, website clarification and,
of course, the bureaucracy reduction
group?
Mr.
Laws: Yes, perhaps I am, or perhaps those outside this
place are being unfair and not giving the bureaucracy taskforce the
credit that it deserves. We look forward to receiving the
Minister’s letter to find out how much credit it
deserves. Schedule
9 introduces the Ofqual part of the debate. With your tolerance and
willingness, Mrs. Humble, you will understand that it will
be sensible for me to make some opening comments on why this part of
the Bill and amendments 50, 51 and so on are so important. They touch
on the schedule that makes provision for the constitution and
governance of Ofqual, which are matters of fundamental importance. It
is necessary to reflect on the reasons why Ofqual has come into
existence, why it is so important that that body is seen to be properly
independent of Ministers, and whether the terms in which that
independence is framed are adequate for the job that Ministers require
Ofqual to do. I assume that you will want us, Mrs. Humble,
to have a schedule 9 stand part debate as part of the debate on the
amendments, though obviously you will indicate if you are not happy
with
that. I
emphasise the importance of schedule 9. I have been responsible for my
party’s education portfolio for the past couple of years, and it
has become obvious to me that one of the problems in discussing
education policy is that it is very difficult to get any sense of
agreement among the individuals and groups that have an interest in
education policy, even on what has happened to standards in the past 10
or 20 years. The Government are entitled to point to statistics
indicating that there has been some improvement in
examination results, particularly in the past decade, but others,
including academic researchers, suggest that, if anything, standards
have declined, and that young people, including those who go on to
universities, are not as well educated as in the
past. There are a great many anecdotal reports of universities and
other bodies instituting additional catch-up courses for new students
to compensate for the educational standards that, according to those
institutions, prevail
today. The
Government have responded in some ways to such concerns by introducing
schedule 9, which is so important in determining the governance and
independence of Ofqual. When the Secretary of State for Children,
Schools and Families announced the establishment of Ofqual at the
Labour party conference in September 2007, he acknowledged
the scale of the problem with which the Government, through this
schedule, are trying to deal. He
said: “We
have not managed to persuade the public, parents and employers about
the standards of exams. The more I’ve looked at this the more
I’ve concluded that there are...problems that require
reform.”
He then announced that a
new body would be responsible for the oversight of standards and that
it would be properly independent from the Government and seek to end
the annual debate and uncertainty about exam standards, which usually
occurs around August and September, when many of the most important
exam results are
announced. It
is a great pity that in pulling those proposals and measures together,
the Government have ignored some of the advice from the relevant Select
Committee and elsewhere that reflects the debate on educational
standards, as well as what has happened to those standards and the need
for more objective reporting of them. We will obviously discuss that
issue when we debate clause 125, but it is worth reflecting upon
present concerns, both in and outside Parliament, about the degree of
autonomy that Ofqual will have, which relates directly to
schedule 9.
The Secretary
of State gave a number of undertakings on Second Reading. He suggested
initially that Ofqual would be an independent regulator of standards;
we will return to the meaning of that later. He sounded some alarm
bells, however, when he spoke of the Government’s view of the
nature of Ofqual’s independence and of their expectations of the
new body. He
said: “We
have to get away from this ridiculous, damaging and draining debate
about dumbing down, when, whenever standards go up and teachers and
young people have worked hard, some politicians and commentators jump
up and say, ‘This must be because standards have been dumbed
down.’ That is not fair, and it is not right. Rather than my
making such assurances about standards, it will be much better when
Ofqual, the independent regulator, makes such assurances to the public
and to families.”—[Official Report, 23 February
2009; Vol. 488, c.
27.] The
Secretary of State did not say that Ofqual was going to be an
independent commentator that would often criticise the Government and
comment upon standards that might have declined. Whether he meant to
say it or not, what he actually said was that it would be Ofqual that
would give assurances about standards each year. That betrays the
Government’s intentions in setting up the new body. Ofqual has
not been made as independent as it should be, as we will show in our
amendments. There is still a great deal of potential for the Secretary
of State to influence it and there are concerns about how it will carry
out its responsibilities. We will come on to that, too,
later.
Mr.
Gibb: I am listening very carefully to the hon.
Gentleman’s excellent introduction to the amendments. I do not
believe that the cause of concern is just that one-off statement in the
House by the Secretary of State. All the subsequent letters we have
received from Ministers confirm my view that establishing Ofqual is
actually about public relations and telling the public that standards
are high, rather than ensuring that standards are high. That is our
principal concern about the way Ofqual has been
established.
Mr.
Laws: I agree with the hon. Gentleman. It is interesting
to note that in the September 2007 interview with the Secretary of
State in The Daily Telegraph in which the announcement
was trailed, the right hon. Gentleman was very explicit about a loss of
confidence among the public regarding standards. However, I noticed
that when the Minister for Schools and Learners gave his evidence to
the Committee a couple of weeks ago, he was very clear that there had
been no dumbing-down at all and that standards were as high as they had
ever been.
It is
dangerous for Ministers to set up a body that is charged with ensuring
confidence in standards and to then pre-empt the conclusions of that
body. To be fair to the Secretary of State, on Second Reading, after he
made those comments about Ofqual giving assurances about standards each
year, he said that he was
“not going to
second-guess its work. That is Ofqual’s remit and
responsibility, and it should get on with that
work.”—[Official Report, 23 February 2009; Vol.
488, c.
27.] unhindered—my
word, not the Secretary of State’s. We will reflect on that as
we discuss the amendments to schedule 9.
The
Government’s attitude to Ofqual is important; the way that
Ofqual discharges its responsibilities is also important. Early
indications of how it has operated since it was established in shadow
mode are not entirely reassuring. When we took evidence from Kathleen
Tattersall a few weeks ago, we encountered great reticence about
commenting on the standards debate over examination results in the last
10 or 20 years. That does not indicate that Ofqual will build the
reputation for impartiality that is necessary to its gaining the
confidence of the public and education professionals.
The Committee
should consider also the comments that Ofqual made during and just
after the utter shambles of marking key stage 2 and key stage 3 tests
last year. It was very quick to say that, on the basis of the evidence
it had seen, the quality of marking was at least as good as in previous
years. That comment was made before the recent report on the number of
reviews of key stage 2 and key stage 3 test results, which
showed not only an explosion in the number of appeals against the
marking of those tests, but a very high level of the appeals being
upheld. The combination of a quadrupling of appeals with a very high
rate of upholding those appeals indicates to me that there were
question marks about the quality of marking last year. It makes me
nervous that Ofqual should be so quick to jump to conclusions before
even seeing the results of the appeals process.
We are
arguing for a far more independent educational standards
authority—one that is not only capable of regulating the
existing approved qualifications, but able and empowered to make
judgments about standards that do not rely only on looking at the
existing qualifications themselves. We know that that is an important
ongoing debate because we have the comments of Mike Cresswell and
others from the Assessment and Qualifications Alliance about the risk
there will be to the credibility of standards when the new modular
GCSEs come in. He suggests that results are likely to improve because
of the introduction of modular GCSEs in a way that is not related to
the underlying standards. If we do not get Ofqual and the basis for its
independence correct now, we will have problems in the
future.
5
pm As
I mentioned, schedule 9 deals with the constitution of Ofqual and
touches on its independence. We are disappointed that the opportunity
has not been taken to give more independence to Ofqual in the way that
key staff members are selected, in how it operates, and in questions of
accountability. There has been an increasing amount of debate in this
place over the past five or
10 years about the important role that Select Committees
should play in holding bodies such as Ofqual to account. However,
schedule 9 and part 7 miss a number of opportunities to introduce that
accountability, not only to the Secretary of State, but to a
cross-party Select Committee that might help to preserve a greater
element of independence in the way that Ofqual discharges its
responsibilities. As briefly as
possible, I would like to go through some of the amendments to schedule
9 tabled in my name and those of my hon. Friends the Members for
Bristol, West and for Mid-Dorset and North Poole. If the hon. Member
for Bognor Regis and Littlehampton will allow me, to save time I would
also like to indicate those amendments tabled by him that we
particularly support, as well as a couple that appear to cut against
our argument in favour of a greater degree of independence.
Amendment 50
would remove the power of the Secretary of State directly to appoint
the seven to 12 ordinary members of the Ofqual board. There must be a
serious concern about how independent we can expect the board of Ofqual
to be if it is appointed entirely, or almost entirely, by the Secretary
of State. There is a strong argument for Crown appointments to the
Ofqual board, in order to try and institutionalise a greater degree of
independence in the way that members of the body are chosen. The
individuals on the board, the chief executive and the way that Ofqual
discharges its responsibilities will make all the difference to whether
the body is an effective monitor of standards or a lapdog of the
Secretary of State on a tight leash. It is vital to ensure that we have
a process that properly selects members to be on the board of
Ofqual.
Amendment 51
would remove the power of the Secretary of State directly to appoint
the deputy chair of Ofqual; instead, it would place that power with the
ordinary members of the Ofqual board. It is not obvious why the
Secretary of State should take it upon himself not only to have powers
in relation to the chair, the chief executive and the ordinary members
of Ofqual, but to dictate and determine who is the deputy chair. Those
are important appointments and we think that a greater degree of
independence should prevail.
Amendment 52
would remove the power of the Secretary of State to dismiss the deputy
chair of Ofqual; it would instead place that power with the ordinary
members of the Ofqual board. At the moment, schedule 9 gives the
Secretary of State power to remove the deputy chair of Ofqual if he
thinks that that is appropriate. That seems an extraordinarily
far-ranging power to give the Secretary of State. The power is poorly
defined and surely unnecessary if Ofqual is to be genuinely independent
of the Government in the way that the Secretary of State indicated when
he first made the announcement in September 2007 and when he repeated
his undertakings about independence in the House of Commons on Second
Reading.
Amendment 53
would remove the power of the Secretary of State to dismiss the
ordinary members of the Ofqual board and place that power with the
fellow members of the Ofqual board. The Bill as drafted gives powers to
the Secretary of State to remove members of the Ofqual board if they
are unfit to carry out their responsibilities or if they are absent. It
seems very odd indeed that the Secretary of State should have to get
involved in circumstances where a board member is absent for a
prolonged period. It seems entirely sensible that the
Ofqual board itself should deal with that. There also seems to be no
reason why the Ofqual board cannot carry out a policing responsibility
in relation to the fitness of members of the board to discharge their
responsibilities. Amendment 54
would allow Ofqual the power to appoint its own chief executive, rather
than have that individual chosen by the Secretary of State. Clearly, if
Ofqual is to be regarded as an independent body, that is a
fundamentally important power. At the moment, the fear is
that the Secretary of State will use many of the powers set out in
schedule 9 to select people who are likely to have a particular view in
the standards debate and who are likely to echo the type of complacency
about standards that we have heard from Ministers in general over the
past few
years. In
our view, it is vital that the individuals who are on the Ofqual board
and the key officers of Ofqual, including the chief executive, should
be as independent and as independent-minded as possible. Even if the
individuals who are selected are independent-minded, there is a serious
concern that if the Secretary of State takes to himself these powers,
which we have discussed in relation to earlier amendments, to dismiss
individuals in the rather cavalier and light-touch way that is allowed
for in schedule 9, it might restrict the willingness of the individuals
on the board and the senior officers to act in a way that is as
independent and as impartial as we would
want. Amendment
55 would allow Ofqual the power to set conditions of service for its
own first chief executive, rather than have them dictated by the
Secretary of State. Again, if the Secretary of State really wants
Ofqual to be seen to be an independent body and to manage its own
affairs, as he indicated on Second Reading, it is astonishing that he
should take to himself powers in these
areas. Amendment
57 would remove the power to approve the appointment and conditions of
Ofqual chief executives from the Secretary of State and give it to the
Children, Schools and Families Committee. That comes back to the point
I made earlier about the importance of having mechanisms of
accountability in this place that do not simply rely on the political
leadership of the Department, which potentially has incentives to put
pressure on Ofqual to say the right things and be consistent
with what the Government are saying about the standards
debate. I
think that amendment 58 has not only our support, but potentially that
of the interim chair of Ofqual herself. It would take the power to
approve the number of staff members at Ofqual, their conditions of
service and their remuneration away from the Secretary of State and
give that line of accountability to the Children, Schools and Families
Committee. If Ofqual is to be as independent as the Secretary of State
suggested only a few weeks ago in the House, it is extraordinary that
paragraph 6(5) of schedule 9 gives the Secretary of State the power to
approve “the
number of members of staff of Ofqual...their conditions of
service”
and
“the amount of
remuneration, allowances and expenses paid to
them.” In
the note that was sent to the Committee before the evidence session
with Kathleen Tattersall, Ofqual
said: “The
Bill sets out a role for the Secretary of State in the set up and
appointment processes for Ofqual, for example in relation to the
appointment of the ordinary members... I understand that
the proposed Ministerial involvement in appointments is in line with
arrangements for many other regulators, although I would expect the
Chair of Ofqual to be fully consulted. In my view the requirement for
Ministerial approval of such matters as numbers of staff and terms and
conditions (Schedule 9, paragraph 6(5)) is more
questionable.” Ofqual
is clearly concerned about the powers in the schedule that insist on
the Secretary of State’s approval even for matters such as the
number of staff and their terms and conditions. That suggests a degree
of micro-management that is surely not
necessary. Amendment
59 would remove the duty on Ofqual to review its committees every five
years. It would be sensible of Ofqual to review its committees and to
do other things relatively regularly, but it is beyond me why the
Secretary of State should use the Bill to direct and micro-manage
Ofqual in quite that way. That suggests an unwillingness on the part of
the Secretary of State to accept that this body will be properly
independent. I
will touch on a couple of the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for
Bognor Regis and Littlehampton. We support amendments 385 and 420,
which would make more explicit the duty to maintain the standard of
regulated qualification. We will come back to that issue under clause
125. We also support amendments 416 and 417, which deal with openness
on pay and pensions. Although we want Ofqual to have the flexibility
and freedom to determine its own priorities, it should be held publicly
accountable on some of these key issues and it must be transparent.
Recently, there has been evidence of great profligacy in the public
sector over the levels of pay and pensions. I am not talking only about
this
place. As
the hon. Member for Bognor Regis and Littlehampton might expect from my
earlier comments, we have less sympathy with amendments 418 and 415.
Amendment 418 would give the Secretary of State the power to appoint
the head of Ofqual and amendment 415 would allow the
Secretary of State to sack the chief executive of Ofqual on the basis
that it is appropriate to do so. Just as it is wrong that the deputy at
Ofqual can be dismissed in such a cavalier way, it would be dangerous
to accept amendment 415. It would be dangerous to give the Secretary of
State the power to get rid of the chief executive of Ofqual when the
chief executive might say things that are not in favour of the
Secretary of State or criticise the Government’s activities in
relation to standards and the dumbing-down
debate. We
have serious concerns about whether the Government are delivering on
their promise that Ofqual will have genuine independence and be
accountable to Parliament rather than just to the Secretary of State.
We fear that unless some changes are made, there is a serious risk that
from day one Ofqual will be seen to be not fully independent and
autonomous. It will therefore not secure the reputation that it needs
for the debate on standards to be resolved in the way that we all
want. 5.15
pm
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