Mr.
Gibb: It is a pleasure to follow the clear exposition by
the hon. Member for Yeovil of the Liberal Democrat position regarding
Ofqual in general and schedule 9 in particular. I agreed with some of
his comments and I am pleased he agreed with some, although not all, of
our amendments.
Clause 124 and
schedule 9 would establish the Office of Qualifications and
Examinations Regulation. We have long advocated making the regulatory
side of the QCA independent. My right hon. Friend the Member for Witney
(Mr. Cameron) said when he was shadow Education
Secretary:
“Reform
of the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority is one such positive
step. It is not acceptable that the QCA, the guardian of our exams, is
not independent of the Government.”
By
“Government”, we mean not just Ministers but all those
who are paid directly or indirectly by the taxpayer to produce and
administer exams or who are paid by the taxpayer to train our teachers
to teach pupils and students to pass exams. Essentially,
“Government” means all those who have control or strong
influence over the direction of education policy and who receive their
income from the state. In other words, Ofqual needs to be independent,
not just of the Department for Children, Schools and Families but the
education establishment, which by definition is as important in
determining the direction of education policy, the structure of our
assessment system and the variation in standards over the years as any
Government Minister.
Sir Michael
Barber points out in his seminal book, “Instruction to
Deliver”: “Officials
in the Department tried desperately to
block” the
announcement of a national literacy
strategy. He
went on to
say: “While
the civil service was not party political, it was heavily influenced by
the various lobby groups who competed for influence in the Department
which thus tended to see issues from the producer
angle...Moreover, the lack of ambition which characterised the
education service as a whole inevitably affected the Department
too.” When
that lack of ambition is combined with an ideological approach to
education that is Rousseauian in nature, child-centred in ideology,
equivocal about the acquisition of knowledge, hostile to rote learning
and testing—all of which have increasingly dominated thinking in
the education establishment over the past half century—one sees
the importance of ensuring the independence of Ofqual from that
education establishment. Leaving aside the ideology, it is clearly in
the interests of everyone in the education establishment for Ofqual to
pronounce that standards in exams are as high today as they were 10 or
20 years ago and to pronounce that exam standards in any given year are
as high as they were the previous year. They have a vested interest in
Ofqual asserting that view. All their work, their approach, and their
philosophy would be undermined if Ofqual were to say otherwise.
Ensuring that Ofqual is completely independent of the education
establishment and the producer interest is even more important than its
independence from the Minister for Schools and Learners, the
Under-Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Families, and the
Secretary of State. There is no understanding of that point in the
drafting of the Bill.
Over the past
few years a huge amount of independent academic research has
demonstrated that exam standards have fallen. Over the same period, the
regulatory wing of the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority has
consistently claimed that there has been no such decline, even while
others in the QCA have acknowledged widening access to those same
exams. Peter Tymms at CEM—the
centre for evaluation and monitoring—at the University of Durham
has demonstrated that a student who obtained an E in A-level maths in
1998 would have been awarded a B in 2004. Duncan Lawson of the
University of Coventry tested students’ mathematical competence
on entry to university and found that those entering with a grade B in
2001 established a slightly lower level of competency in basic skills
than those entering with a grade N 10 years earlier. Professor Peter
Williams said in the Observer in July
2007: “Over
20 or 30 years, I do not think there is any doubt whatsoever that
absolute A-level standards have fallen. They have edged south
continuously over a long period of time. I think all university
academics and a good proportion of sixth-form teachers would agree with
my
assertion.” That
same Observer article also cited a wider study carried out at
the centre for evaluation and monitoring in Durham. The article
said: “For
nearly two decades up to 50,000 pupils a year have taken the same
ability test before facing A-levels. Researchers found that, in most
subjects, pupils of the same ability achieved two grades higher in
their A-levels in 2006 than in 1988, jumping to three grades in
maths.” That
is the A-level information system, or ALIS, test, which CEM introduced
in 1983.
I could go on
and cite much more evidence, Mrs. Humble, but I will not try
your patience or that of the Committee. Although my hon. Friend the
Member for South Holland and The Deepings has departed from the
Committee for a short while, I do not wish to replace him in that
regard.
Jeff
Ennis: I know that this is one of the hon.
Gentleman’s main campaign themes, as it were, which he pursues
in the House on a regular basis. If we have had this grade inflation
over the years, can he explain to me why we have not had a similar
grade inflation for the degrees that are awarded at university? I ask
the question because it appears to me that, if the students are getting
worse by achieving lower A-levels or they are not rising to the same
academic standard at A-level, there would be a consequential knock-on
effect in the degrees that are awarded by our universities. I think
that the reverse has happened. We have also seen a certain amount of
inflation with degrees awarded by our universities, which seems to
underline the fact that students are getting better rather than
worse.
Mr.
Gibb: A book that I regard as the set text on this subject
is “The Schools We Need and Why We Don’t Have
Them” by E.D. Hirsch, who is an American academic and has a
chapter dealing with precisely that argument.
I think that
the answer to the hon. Gentleman’s question is twofold. First, a
lot of universities are now implementing remedial classes for students,
even high-calibre students coming with very high grades and A-levels,
to bring them up to the level that they need to start their university
course. Secondly, I am afraid to say—this is an issue that
really concerns Conservative members of the Committee—that the
proportion of students from the independent sector taking places at
some of the top universities is increasing and that concerns us more
than anything else in this whole debate about education. It is not that
we have anything against the independent sector—quite the
contrary—but it is alarming that the
state sector is declining in the proportion of students from that sector
going to Oxford and Cambridge, despite huge efforts to counter any
possible prejudice that there might be in either of those
universities. What
concerns me is the response by Ofqual to the evidence that I was just
citing. Evidence has been around for a long time about a concern that
has been prevalent and, indeed, growing for many years. Ofqual was
informally established in early 2008, following an announcement by the
Secretary of State in September 2007. Before that, the regulatory
division of the QCA was responsible for regulating qualifications and
maintaining standards, ever since the QCA was established in 1997.
However, when the chairman of interim Ofqual, Kathleen Tattersall, was
questioned in an evidence session by my hon. Friend the Member for
Broxbourne, the following exchange took place. My hon. Friend
asked: “Does
Ofqual believe that there is grade inflation in A-levels and
GCSEs?” Kathleen
Tattersall
replied: “Ofqual
will take the evidence that it has and that comes to its attention to
make any pronouncement, one way or the other, on issues of that kind.
That is something that we have not particularly explored and I do not
think that it would be appropriate for me to come to a view without
full consideration of the
evidence.” Why
is that something that Ofqual has “not particularly
explored”? When my hon. Friend asked if, in future, Ofqual would
be exploring that issue, he received another evasive answer from
Kathleen Tattersall, who
said: “What
we will be doing as a regulator is looking at the evidence,
particularly where there are any issues of public concern. If that
issue is a matter of public concern, clearly we will be seeking
evidence on it, but there are a range of other issues where our
starting point would always be to look at the evidence and to come to a
considered judgment on the
evidence.” Why
have the QCA and Ofqual not been looking at the evidence, including
that of Peter Williams, the Durham evidence, and that of Duncan Lawson,
Jonathan Ramsey and John Corner? What did Kathleen Tattersall mean when
she said:
“If
that issue is a matter of public
concern”? When
challenged by my hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke, her response
was: “Ofqual
has been set up to regulate the system, to get better public
accountability for the system, to ensure that there is a better public
understanding of the issues and to assure public confidence. That is
what regulators do. I do not think that it has been set up to address
any specific concerns, such as the one that was just
mentioned.”——[Official Report,
Apprenticeships, Skills, Children and Learning Public Bill Committee,
3 March 2009; c. 70,
Q182-184.] It
is depressing that she should say that Ofqual was not set up to assess
standards over time or to address public concerns over grade
inflations, but to ensure better public understanding of the issues and
to assure public confidence—in other words to proselytise and to
persuade the public that all is well with the system, but not to take
evidence or examine whether standards have been
maintained. The
answers by the chairman of Ofqual were not a slip of the tongue. The
exact same use of words and phrases appears throughout her evidence in
response to questions about standards. They are carefully crafted,
rehearsed and considered replies, but there is one
slip: “When
you asked me about looking at grade inflation, I should have said that
several studies that have been conducted over the years involving
international experts looking at our system have
concluded that there is grade
inflation.” ——[ Official Report,
Apprenticeships, Skills, Children and Learning Public Bill Committee,
3 March 2009; c. 81,
Q214.] When I
quoted that to the Minister, she
responded: “I
presume that you are taking that Kathleen Tattersall quote from
Hansard. She did not say that. We have asked for Hansard
to be corrected.”——[Official Report,
Apprenticeships, Skills, Children and Learning Public Bill Committee,
10 March 2009; c. 156,
Q350.] Hansard
is still as I quoted it on 10 March. I am concerned by the
“we” in the Minister’s response. Surely Kathleen
Tattersall could ask for Hansard to be corrected—not the
Minister or the Minister’s officials? I am afraid that it is all
too cosy. There is a desperation not to admit to a decline in
standards. The chair of Ofqual refuses point blank to admit that there
has been grade inflation, despite masses of evidence to the contrary,
and refuses to admit that there is even public concern about grade
inflation. Ofqual has been in place sufficiently long for it to have
taken the evidence and pursued the issue, but it has done no such
thing. It seems to see its role as assuring the public and telling them
what the issues are, rather than listening to the public and being told
by them what the issues are. I do not believe that Ofqual as currently
configured will deliver consistent standards in our qualifications
system, because I do not believe that it considers that to be its role.
However, it should be, and to ensure that Ofqual does see that as its
role we need to amend its objectives, which is a debate for the next
clause. We
also need to ensure that the right people are appointed to the
board—people who are independent of, rather than cosy with,
Government, and people who are independent of the education
establishments. Amendment 197 requires the board to have one member who
is a member of another regulatory body. We need to be sure that Ofqual
uses the same principles and approaches as other regulatory bodies,
including the same rigorous approach to data collection and analysis.
Amendment 198 requires the chief regulator and the chief executive to
be full-time positions. That is an additional safeguard to avoid
conflict and it also ensures that Ofqual’s role is taken
seriously. It is not just a PR role; it is a huge job that requires
application to reverse the trends in our exam
system. It
is not good enough to say, as Kathleen Tattersall did,
that “wherever
there are conflicts of interest we will also look for ways in which
they can be
managed.” There
must be no conflicts of interest, which is why amendment 40 amends
schedule 9 to prevent anyone with a financial or occupational interest
that might conflict with the objectives of Ofqual from serving on its
board. Greg Watson, the chief executive of Oxford, Cambridge and RSA
Examinations
said: “Yes,
absolutely. It is important, equally, that Ofqual is independent from
those that it regulates.”—[Official Report,
Apprenticeships, Skills, Children and Learning Public Bill Committee,
3 March 2009; c. 64-65, Q171 and
174.] Anyone
who is a lecturer or professor at a teacher training institution, any
serving teacher or head teacher, anyone involved with exam boards or
publishers of school textbooks, anyone working for a local education
authority and any current or past civil servant or Minister in the
Department for Children, Schools and Families should not be able to
serve on the board of Ofqual. All
those people have a vested interest in demonstrating that exam standards
have not fallen over that period, even if they have done so. There is a
need for expertise in assessments and academia, but care needs to be
taken to ensure that people with that knowledge do not have a
reputational or other interest in demonstrating that the UK exam system
has maintained its standards over the
years. 5.30
pm Amendment
385 adds a third reason as to why or when the chief regulator can be
removed from office. Paragraph 3(7) of schedule 9 currently gives two
such reasons, including
“inability or
unfitness to carry out the duties of
office” and
unauthorised “absence from Ofqual’s meetings” for
six months. The amendment
adds “failure
to ensure the standard of regulated qualifications is
maintained.” I
am pleased that the hon. Member for Yeovil supports that amendment,
because we might well test the Committee’s opinion. It is
important that the legislation is clear that a key role of the chief
regulator is to ensure the standards of regulated qualifications are
maintained. The same additional grounds for removal from office are
added by amendment
420. Amendment
417 seeks to introduce transparency into the payment of public
officials, by ensuring that all details of their contracts of
employment are published in each annual report, including pension
arrangements. Similarly, amendment 416 ensures that the same
information is published for the chief executive, together with all
details of expense
payments. Amendments
418 and 419 change schedule 9 so that the Secretary of State appoints
not just the first chief executive of Ofqual, but subsequent ones.
Amendment 415 gives the Secretary of State the power to fire
the chief executive. Schedule 9 already gives the Secretary of State
power to remove the chief regulator, but we believe that the power
should extend to the chief executive as well. It is important in a
democracy that those held accountable to the public for manifesto
promises and for the quality of public services have powers to remove
senior people responsible for the delivery of those public services, if
they are not delivering what they should be, which is higher
standards. Ministers
should also have the power to appoint people to those positions. That
does not mean that Ministers will or should be able to interfere
inappropriately. There are clear demarcation lines set out in the Bill
and elsewhere—if a Minister seeks to interfere in, say, lowering
the grade boundaries or getting more pupils to achieve a pass or A
grade, the chief regulator would be perfectly within his right to
refuse and could well go public with the fact if such an attempt had
been made. However, it is important that the Secretary of State has the
power to remove people who are clearly not delivering the key objective
of maintaining standards in our exam
system.
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