Mr.
Laws: I understand the hon. Gentleman’s views,
although I do not agree. If he is not going to go on to discuss this,
does he feel that the Government ought to be micro-managing other
areas, such as the regularity
with which the committees are reviewed, the number of staff or their
terms and conditions? Or does he share some of the views expressed not
only by me but by Kathleen Tattersall in her note to the
Committee?
Mr.
Gibb: I am sympathetic to the hon. Gentleman’s
point about the micro-detail, such as how often to review the committee
structure of Ofqual. If it is being held to account for its
performance, it needs to be given as much leeway as possible to carry
out its role. Having said that, there is a role for Ministers in
ensuring that such non-departmental public bodies do not empire-build
and expand the number of employees within their remit without recourse
to the Secretary of State who is, after all, responsible to Parliament
and the public for how our taxes are spent. It is important that a firm
grip is kept on the number of people
employed.
Mr.
Laws: Is not that necessary oversight exercised through
budget
control?
Mr.
Gibb: Yes, but unless we keep a grip on all aspects that
lead to high budgets, the result can often be regarded as the bleeding
stump policy: “Oh, Minister, we have to have a 5 per cent.
increase otherwise we shall have to sack 53 people.” Keeping the
expenditure of such bodies under control is difficult and, of course,
we must have control over the headline cash figure for them. However,
to make sure that those cash figures are delivered, there is a case for
ensuring that the body count is kept under control,
too.
Mr.
Laws: Is the hon. Gentleman not concerned that, if this
body is to be the independent assessor of standards that we want it to
be, it might wish at some stage to take on more responsibility for the
oversight of qualifications than was given to it originally by the
Government? That might imply an increase in the number of staff, even
within the budget envelope. If such powers continue to be exercisable,
would there not be a risk that a Secretary of State might interfere in
the number of staff if he or she did not wish the powers of oversight
to be exercised in that
way?
Mr.
Gibb: We have to trust Ministers in a democracy to carry
out their role with
integrity.
Mr.
Laws: Blimey, the hon. Gentleman is
confident.
Mr.
Gibb: Well, if Ministers were appointed from the
Conservative Benches, I am sure that they would have integrity.
Ministers are accountable to Parliament and to the
public.
Sarah
McCarthy-Fry: Will the hon. Gentleman give
way?
Mr.
Gibb: Perhaps the hon. Lady is about to shatter my
illusion about
Ministers.
Sarah
McCarthy-Fry: I merely wanted the hon. Gentleman to
clarify that he was not suggesting that it was only Conservative
Ministers who have integrity.
Mr.
Gibb: Of course not. My jocular response to the
intervention was not intended to imply such matters. I was merely
saying that Ministers appointed from the Conservative Benches certainly
would have
integrity. We
believe in creating a regulatory body that is genuinely independent.
However, from observing the words of Ofqual since its establishment in
2008 and the activities of and views expressed by the quasi-independent
regulatory arm of the QCA since its establishment in 1997, it is clear
that more of the same approach will not serve to deliver higher or
consistent standards. We need a fresh approach that divorces the
regulator from those with vested producer interests so that we can all
be sure that a genuine, independent regulator will not allow standards
to continue a downward drift. The amendments would go some way to
helping change Ofqual into such a body and I hope that the Minister
will accept them.
Sarah
McCarthy-Fry: One thing on which we can all agree is the
importance of an independent regulator so, hopefully, we can start from
that premise. The difference of opinion is over how that independence
is demonstrated. I am a little concerned by some of the arguments from
the hon. Member for Bognor Regis and Littlehampton, which seem to
suggest that, if the regulator does not say that standards have fallen,
she cannot possibly be
independent.
Mr.
Gibb: It was not just that comment, but the fact that the
regulator has not seen it as her role yet to pursue any of the evidence
that has been around for many years and nor did the previous QCA
regulatory body. That is what worries me. I was also worried by the
fact that she said “if this is a concern”, when clearly
the newspapers report massive public concern about such matters
daily.
Sarah
McCarthy-Fry: If we promoted Government policy on the
basis of what we see in the newspaper each day, we would not be in a
very good
position. It
is important to point out that there is no conclusive evidence. I
accept that there have been reviews, such as those to which the hon.
Gentleman referred, but most subject reviews have found that standards
have been maintained. I wish to refer back to the report quoted by
Peter Tymms. It said:
“From
this perspective, it is either not really possible to say whether
standards have been maintained, or, so far as one can say, the evidence
suggests that they have
been.” That
was probably the point that Kathleen Tattersall was trying to make. I
am not trying to speak on her behalf and I would not dream of doing so.
However, the inference that I took from the report was that much of the
evidence is conflicting and mostly inconclusive. One of Ofqual’s
new roles will be to take on the rolling programme to which the hon.
Gentleman referred. It has a clear remit to ensure that standards are
maintained.
Mr.
Laws: The Minister spoke about maintenance of standards.
Will she clarify what she means by that? She will be aware that Mike
Creswell has already gone on the record saying that when the modular
GCSE is introduced, he expects there to be a consequential improvement
in GCSE results. In order to keep standards constant, does the Minister
expect there to be a change in the borderlining of grades so that the
percentage of students in each cohort getting A, B and C grades remains
roughly the same?
Sarah
McCarthy-Fry: That is a matter for Ofqual. I accept Mike
Creswell’s point, but we have to wait until we get the evidence
rather than acting on what people think might happen. It would be
unwise for us to go forward saying, “Because he believes that
that could be a result of a new modular
GCSE”.
Mr.
Laws: Kathleen Tattersall’s evidence made it clear
that she had an expectation that if a change in an exam improved
results, there should be change in the grade boundaries to ensure that
the same proportion of students were getting grades A, B and C as
before. That is a really important issue in the standards debate. Does
the Minister, therefore, agree with Ofqual on that
point? 5.42
pm Sitting
suspended for a Division in the
House. 5.57
pm On
resuming—
Sarah
McCarthy-Fry: To repeat to the answer that I gave to the
previous question asked by the hon. Member for Yeovil, if his
hypothetical example comes to pass it will be for Ofqual to decide and
regulate. We have given Ofqual the powers to do that under the Bill,
and it would be within its remit to do
so.
Mr.
Laws: But the Minister must have a view about whether
Ofqual’s duty to maintain standards means that, if a
qualification changes and there is an improvement in the results as a
consequence of that change, there should be an adjustment so that the
standards remain the same. She must have a view on whether there should
not be an adjustment and the results should be allowed to improve or
whether standards should be kept level by adjusting the grade
boundaries. Ofqual will not be able to do its job unless it knows what
Minister means by “maintaining
standards”.
Sarah
McCarthy-Fry: It is quite clear what that means. We are
looking at consistency over time. Ofqual’s remit is to have
consistency over
time.
Sarah
McCarthy-Fry: Of maintaining the standard that has been
reached. That is the purpose of Ofqual as the regulator. I am not
convinced that we are getting anywhere with this exchange, so I shall
move
on. I
want to pick up on the point about Ofqual only saying that standards
have been maintained. With interim Ofqual, most of the subject reviews
have found that standards have been maintained. In one or two cases
where there have been problems, interim Ofqual has not shirked from
coming out and saying so and I have no reason to believe that Ofqual,
as constituted, will shirk from doing that. It would be in
nobody’s interests, least of all the Government’s, for
Ofqual not to be independent and to demonstrate that it is independent;
if it were not independent it would lose all credibility. Ofqual will
have to report to Parliament and account for the reports that it
makes.
I will now
move on to a group of amendments—all of which, unsurprisingly,
we will resist—that relate to provisions in schedule 9 about the
organisation and structure of Ofqual and the appointment and conditions
of service of its members and staff. Amendments 50 to 53 relate to the
mechanisms for appointing members of Ofqual. The Secretary of
State’s interest in appointing Ofqual members and the deputy
chair reflects the importance of those roles.
The Secretary
of State will want to ensure that the best possible appointments are
made to lead an organisation that will play a key part in the education
sector. However, the public appointment process will be regulated by
the Commissioner for Public Appointments to ensure independence and
transparency. We are talking about getting the best people for the job
and, once they have been appointed, their reporting line being clearly
to Parliament, not to Ministers. Amendment 50 is not feasible, because
I do not think that the Crown can appoint lots of members to bodies
such as this—apart from anything else, there is a problem of
volume. The Secretary of State is the most appropriate person to do the
appointing; it is neither realistic nor desirable for the Crown to do
it. 6
pm On
amendment 51, Ofqual’s deputy chair will play a vital
role—not least because if the chief regulator is absent for a
period, the deputy will assume those duties. Again, the Secretary of
State’s interest in appointing the deputy reflects the
importance of the post. The amendment, which proposes that the ordinary
members of Ofqual should elect their deputy, would not be
appropriate.
On amendments
52 and 53, given that it is right for the Secretary of State to appoint
Ofqual’s ordinary members and deputy chair, it should also be
for the Secretary of State to have the powers in the schedule that
relate to dismissal. There cannot be one person appointing and another
dismissing. We reject the proposals in amendments 52 and 53 that
ordinary members should be able to remove the deputy chair and ordinary
members. Amendment
530 is intended to clarify that the Secretary of State’s power
to remove a person under the clause refers to his power to remove them
from the office of deputy. The amendment is not necessary as that is
already the effect of the clause. The Secretary of State’s power
to remove an ordinary member from office is found in subsection (5) of
the clause and subsection (4) relates only to the office of
deputy. Amendment
529 would make the appointment of the chief regulator subject to the
approval of Parliament by requiring the appointment to be made by means
of a statutory instrument that either House could annul. The chief
regulator will be appointed by Her Majesty by Order in Council, which
reflects the independence and importance of the role.
The chief
regulator will be the chair and public face of Ofqual. It is essential
that the operation of the qualifications system is effective and that
the chief regulator is credible and respected. A fair and transparent
appointment process is an important start if that is to be achieved.
Two things will help with that. First, the
Office of the Commissioner for Public Appointments recently extended its
remit to cover non-ministerial departments, which we intend will
include Ofqual. The OCPA monitors and reports on public appointments,
which enables people to have confidence in the appointments
process. Secondly,
last year, the Government introduced pre-appointment hearings by Select
Committees for key public appointments. That enables Select Committees
to take evidence from candidates for certain public appointments before
they are appointed. The Government have announced that, subject to the
passage of the Bill, the chief regulator is one of the key public
appointments that will be subject to pre-appointment hearings and
therefore to scrutiny by the relevant Select Committee. This will help
the Select Committee to gain confidence in what will be a key
appointment for
them. Mr.
Charles Walker (Broxbourne) (Con): Will a panel of
candidates be shown to the Select Committee or will it purely be the
candidate that the Secretary of State wishes to appoint who will appear
before the Select
Committee?
Sarah
McCarthy-Fry: I cannot answer that question off the top of
my head, but I will endeavour to find out for the hon.
Gentleman.
Any new
candidate for the role will in future face scrutiny under these
pre-appointment hearing arrangements. Those two factors—the OCPA
regulation and the pre-appointment hearings—should give everyone
confidence in the independence and transparency of the appointment of
the chief regulator. For that reason, the Government reject that
amendment.
Mr.
Gibb: I have may have missed the point, but will Kathleen
Tattersall go before the Select Committee for her appointment to be
confirmed, given that she is now chair of interim Ofqual and not of
Ofqual as set out in the
legislation?
Sarah
McCarthy-Fry: No, Kathleen Tattersall is in post. The
chief regulator to succeed her that will go through that
process. Amendment
385 would add failure to ensure the standards of regulated
qualifications is maintained to the grounds for removal. That amendment
is not necessary because paragraph 3(7) already states that
the
“chief regulator
can be removed because of inability or unfitness to carry out the
duties of
office”. If
Ofqual fails to maintain the standards of regulated qualifications
because of any inability or unfitness on behalf of the chief regulator,
the chief regulator can be
removed.
Mr.
Gibb: The hon. Lady makes an important point. I am
interested in what she has to say, bearing in mind Pepper v.
Hart. My interpretation of paragraph 3(7)(a) is that not performing the
job well would not be sufficient reason for the removal of the chief
regulator. To me, it suggests some other form of unfitness to do the
job. Will she confirm that if standards are perceived to decline or do
decline, that will be grounds for removal under that
paragraph?
| 
