Mr.
Woolas: It is the best in the world. People come here to
look at
it.
Damian
Green: The Minister says that it is the best in the world.
I dare say that some other countries come to look in at it, and I would
see what they say when they have left. The specific problem with the
clause is that yet again, the Government are falling through the trap
of making the system as intrusive as possible for the respectable
traveller, whether coming to Britain or taking a trip away from here,
while not necessarily collecting all the information that will be
needed to track our professional criminals or terrorists. Essentially,
my fear is that we are setting up the worst of all worlds, where the
general aggregation of private information about entirely innocent
British citizens will be more intrusive than any other regime in the
democratic world. At the same time, it is not at all clear that those
who quite properly should be stopped and checked and have their details
down will be
caught. One
of the paradoxes that the Minister needs to address is the sheer weight
of information that is being collected, and the sheer length of time
that it is being collected for, which may well militate against the
effective action against those who we all want to stop. We have seen
the manifold failures of databases—again, this is
not the appropriate clause under which to discuss the matter—and
it must have impinged on the Government now that simply collecting more
information about entirely innocent journeys and people and keeping it
for longer is not the most effective way of making our borders secure.
It is not, in this context, the best way of ensuring that we get the
appropriate customs information and then using that information to
contribute to the general safety of the
border. As
people increasingly understand that point, those who find their
journeys made more difficult—they might have to queue for
longer—or feel that they have to give up unnecessary information
to immigration and customs officials, their resentment about the queues
and the information that they are giving will increase. They will want
to know that every piece of information collected is necessary, and
also what is going to happen to that information, even if it is not
left on a disc or a laptop stuck on a train by somebody going home at
night. Who in Government has access to it? It is precisely apparently
harmless clauses in Bills such as this one, about the use and
disclosure of customs information, that allow information to be
collected and spread. That should ring alarm bells in anyone who cares
about
privacy. I
invite members of the Committee who have not necessarily studied every
last comma of the Bill to look at the clause very carefully, and look
at the powers that are being given to officials to collect and
disseminate information. We are now entering a part of the Bill that is
potentially quite dangerous for the future of the privacy of innocent
British citizens and for the effectiveness of the attack on immigration
and customs crime, which is the purpose of this part of the Bill. I
hope—but not very expectantly—that perhaps Minister can
reassure me on those
points.
Tom
Brake: I welcome the opportunity for us to examine a new
area of the Bill that I hope will allow us, without stepping too far
away from its content, to touch briefly on issues that many hon.
Members from both sides of the House have raised relating to the use
and disclosure of information. Given the Government’s preference
for setting up large databases, this may give the Minister another
opportunity to jump up and ask, “Are the Liberal Democrats in
favour of large databases or against them?” He has to
acknowledge that Liberal Democrats, as a party, are not luddites.
Therefore we do not necessarily have any objections in principle to
large databases. However, we are concerned about the information that
is being collected in such databases, the duration for which it will be
kept and the controls that exist in respect of access to that data: who
has access to it and whether it is appropriate for them to have it, and
so on. We also have significant concerns about the potential for large
chunks of data to be lost. It is appropriate for the Minister to
respond to those concerns in respect of this part of the Bill and to
provide some reassurances about the safeguards that will be in place to
ensure that these data are managed, the minimal nature of the data that
will be collected and the maximum controls to safeguard those data and
restrict access to
them. We
are becoming an increasingly surveyed society. Although it has not yet
been confirmed that we are a surveillance society, with the number of
CCTV cameras, databases and different ways of collecting data on people
that are being rolled out, any opportunity to try to redress that
balance through this Bill as it relates to the use and disclosure of
information, including the use and disclosure of customs information,
is helpful. I will listen carefully to what the Minister is about to
say about the
safeguards. Mr.
Woolas: I understand the intent of the hon. Member for
Carshalton and Wallington in seeking
safeguards. Let
me start my reassurances by saying that the clause relates to the
powers that Revenue and Customs and immigration officers have already.
The clause is about how they share information with each other for
their own purposes. This is not, as the hon. Member for Ashford said,
about the electronic borders system, but about how customs and
immigration officials hand information to each other, particularly with
regard to the purposes of prosecution of customs and immigration
offences.
Tom
Brake: I thank the Minister for confirming that that is
what this process is about. However, does he agree that it is precisely
at a moment of transition where structures and procedures are being
changed that the potential for breaches, for instance, is at its
greatest?
Mr.
Woolas: I agree; that is my experience. That is why the
hon. Gentleman is right to press me on that point. However, let me
build on my reassurances, because they are
important. To
understand the purpose of the clause and see who it applies to,
Committee members have to look specifically at clause 14(2) and at
clause 15, with its prohibition on disclosure of personal customs
information, which is the other side of the coin. My reassurances are
not just contained in clause 14, but are built upon in later clauses.
In relation to the exercise of the existing functions, the provision is
an essential tool in support of law enforcement, national security and
securing the border effectively. It is also necessary to be able to
secure the optimum development of the officers
involved. We
talked earlier about the benefits of coming together, which means that
officers need to share information in respect of certain cases. That is
the purpose of the clause. However, there is a restriction and
prohibition on the disclosure of information imposed elsewhere in part
1 of the Bill and in other enactments, and in any agreement to which
the United Kingdom is party. Those restrictions and prohibitions will
be particularly important in relation to personal customs
information. The
provisions in the relevant clauses apply only to customs information
acquired by the UK Border Agency from sources other than Revenue and
Customs or the Revenue and Customs Prosecutions Office. There is a
separate confidentiality framework for the use and disclosure of
information provided by Revenue and Customs and the Revenue and Customs
Prosecutions Office, which is set out in existing legislation
including, in particular, as the hon. Member for Ashford will remember,
the UK Borders Act
2007. All
information within the UK Border Agency is shared, held and retained in
line with the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998. The agency
has implemented enhanced procedures to protect personal data in the
light of the recommendations of the review of information handling. We
have adopted those recommendations, which include the appointment of a
senior information risk owner and the use of encrypted laptops and
removal media only, if they contain personal data and are to be taken
outside secure premises. A new centralised encryption service, a new
system for reporting security instances and an information charter have
been
established. Let
me emphasise that my assurances relate to the wider database that does
not leave the premises and can only be used by us, as opposed to the
carrier information that the hon. Member for Ashford mentioned. That is
not directly relevant to the clause, which is about sharing customs
information inside the
agency. Amendment
9 replicates an amendment tabled in the other place, during Report
stage. First, it probes the nature of the information that it is
envisaged the UK Border Agency will acquire given the provisions of the
Bill, and the purposes for which that information might be used.
Secondly, through the amendment the hon. Member for Ashford probes the
e-Borders programme once again. However, it would prevent a designated
customs official from using the personal data of a UK citizen to
restrict that citizen’s right to enter or leave the UK where
there is an apparently legitimate purpose for the
journey. In
layperson’s terms, the issue before the Committee is this: if a
person wanted for criminal purposes is leaving or entering the country,
where that journey is for legitimate purposes, do the officials have
the power to interfere? We argue that they do. Let me use an extreme
example to illustrate my point. If a wanted
terrorist is leaving the country to genuinely go on holiday to Majorca,
I suggest that you, Sir Nicholas, would want me to instruct my
officials to arrest him and not let him go because he is making a
legitimate journey. We come to the heart of the matter. I respect the
hon. Gentleman’s saying that legitimate British holidaymakers
should not be interfered with—quite right, too—but we
need powers and information to stop criminal
activity. The
hon. Gentleman is looking
perplexed.
Damian
Green: The amendment talks about officers designated under
this part of the Bill, which does not include police officers. If a
suspected terrorist was going across the borders, I imagine that the
police would have something to say about
that.
Mr.
Woolas: Ah, the trap has been laid and the quarry has
fallen into it. So are my immigration and customs officials not to
seize that person and hold them in the holding centre, after which the
police would be called, as is so at the
moment?
The
Chairman: Order. I hesitate to interrupt just as the
excitement is mounting, but it is 1 pm. However, before I adjourn the
Committee, can I advise all hon. Members that when they have left the
room will be locked, so any papers and other documents and possessions
can be left here in the knowledge that they will be secure and
safe? 1
pm The
Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put (Standing Order
No.
88.) Adjourned
till this day at Four
o’clock.
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