Schedule
1The
Child Poverty
Commission
Mr.
Gauke: I beg to move amendment 9, in schedule 1,
page 16, line 12, at end
insert— ‘(1A) The
appointment of the chair under sub-paragraph (1)(a) must be approved by
a resolution of the House of Commons within three months of the
appointment. (1B) Before
appointing a chair under subparagraph (1)(a), the Secretary of State
must consult the Treasury, Work and Pensions, and Children, Schools and
Families Committees of the House of Commons, or their
successors.’. The
amendment was tabled before the recess, when little did I realise that
the issue of consultation with Select Committees about appointments
would become quite so topical. I am attempting to achieve two things
with the amendment. First, I want to strengthen the position of
Parliament with regard to the commission by enabling greater
parliamentary scrutiny. The Government might look on that favourably,
as the Prime Minister, in his first statement as Prime Minister on 4
July 2007, argued for greater parliamentary involvement in
appointments. Indeed, he made similar remarks when still Chancellor of
the Exchequer, for example on the “Andrew Marr Show” in
January
2007.
Mr.
Stuart: I welcome this effort to give some parliamentary
oversight. My colleagues and I on the Children, Schools and Families
Committee were dismayed that the Secretary of State for that Department
dismissed the recommendation—or non-recommendation—of the
Committee on the day that that advice was made public. In fact, if I am
not mistaken, he released it to the press the day before. What
confidence can we have that any real parliamentary say would stem from
the amendment? Did my hon. Friend think of going further and insisting
on one Select Committee having power of veto over the
appointment? 6.15
pm
Mr.
Gauke: As I said, the amendment was drafted and submitted
before the summer recess and recent events. My hon. Friend brings some
relevant experience to the matter. The drafting of the amendment could
be improved, and perhaps would need to be strengthened. I had assumed
that Parliament and the Executive would be able to work co-operatively
on such matters. Perhaps I was being naïve, or perhaps the
recent events have been exceptional and future Secretaries of State
would not act in such a way—I do not know; I am speculating. The
row over the appointment of the Children’s Commissioner at least
highlighted the fact that Parliament wishes to have its voice heard on
some of these major public appointments. Perhaps when creating new
appointment procedures, we should bear in mind the need to involve
Parliament. It is good that Parliament can be independent in these
areas.
That brings
me to the second argument in favour of the proposals in amendment 9:
they would provide greater credibility to the position of chair of the
commission. That might not necessarily be the right approach, however.
I would like to press the Minister on a wider question about the chair
and the child poverty commission that arises from our previous debate.
The commission will be an advisory body that has to deal with a complex
set
of indicators and potential policy levers. Is it right that it is an
outside body? I support the independence of the Bank of England, and
the Monetary Policy Committee has, by and large, worked but, as the
Minister says, it is one tool that deals with one particular target.
Child poverty targets are more complicated, and there is a question as
to whether it is right to have a strong advisory body that is
independent of the Government. If we are to have such a body, the
proposal in the amendment would strengthen it. We could have hearings
in front of Select Committees. There would be votes in Parliament and
the opportunity to debate the appointment and scrutinise the qualities
of the chair to a greater extent. That route would be more likely to
result in the chair having a higher profile and being a more
substantial figure in public life, which would strengthen the profile
and credibility of the child poverty
commission. As
I said, I have a slight reservation about the need for a separate body
when developing policy, but if we are to have one, why not make it as
strong and powerful as possible? Amendment 9 would be helpful in
achieving that, as well as strengthening Parliament’s position
in that
area.
Mr.
Stuart: It is a pleasure to speak under your chairmanship,
Mr. Key, although given the number of interventions I have
made, you might feel that I have already done so on a number of
occasions. I
support the sentiments that lie behind the amendment. If we want the
body to be independent, it is important that the chair should indeed
face proper procedure and parliamentary oversight and approval before
taking up the role. However, like my hon. Friend, I doubt whether it is
appropriate in such a complex area of policy for democratically elected
politicians, who are accountable to their electorate, to sub-contract
policy making and the prioritisation of various measures that are
required to tackle child poverty to a quasi-independent commission. The
Government of the day should be responsible for getting the balance
right between, for instance, the use of cash transfers to ensure that
the targets are met in the short term, and ensuring that there are
incentives to work and priorities for public expenditure in areas such
as education, employment and
skills. I
remain deeply cynical about the origins of the Bill. I cannot help
feeling that it was brought about because the Government were
embarrassed by the fact that they would be heading into a general
election next year having failed to meet their child poverty target in
2010. So what better way of sucking in those issues when campaigning
other than to do every last thing that they could to meet that target
and talk about some grand Bill that would eradicate poverty in the long
term? Given the discipline of my Front Bench and its focus on doing the
right thing, we have always resisted temptation and the
Government’s hope of an artificial division. What would better
have suited a failing Labour Government than to have got the
Conservatives to vote against a child poverty Bill? What an excellent
dividing line that would have been from the Government’s
political point of view, even if it did not serve the best interests of
children who live in
poverty? I
do not think that we should have a child poverty commission, because
the Government should take full responsibility and account for
themselves to the electorate,
but if they intend to set up a commission, we need to ensure that it is
accountable to Parliament. It must not be just a halfway house with
most of the people who sit on it having been appointed by the Secretary
of State, while it is claimed that it has genuine
independence. Steve
Webb: I enjoyed that supportive contribution. When I first
read the amendment, I assumed that it had been tabled in the light of
recent events. It is particularly prescient and I congratulate the hon.
Member for South-West Hertfordshire on anticipating what was coming
down the track and tabling the amendment, with which my hon. Friend the
Member for Edinburgh, West and I have a lot of
sympathy. In
a sense, the hon. Member for Beverley and Holderness asked a perfectly
reasonable question about the point of a child poverty commission. One
of its principal points is to be an expert pain in the
backside—I do not mean an expert at being a pain in the
backside, but a group of experts who, because of their expertise, can
be a pain in the backside by knowing what is going on, advising on the
words to be used, and reporting on why things are happening, what is
not working and what needs to be done. We might think that officials
were supposed to do that, because part of the Bill is about ensuring
that successive Governments do something about child poverty. However,
while officials might say, “Minister, we are not doing enough
about child poverty,” we would never know because such exchanges
would be a private conversation. In a sense, the child poverty
commission would turn such issues into a public conversation and allow
us to listen in on it and perhaps stimulate greater effort. I therefore
have slightly more support for the purpose of the child poverty
commission than the hon.
Gentleman.
Mr.
Stuart: The Environmental Audit Committee has the
Sustainable Development Commission report to it each year. The
commission tells the Committee what progress has been made on central
Government delivering on their emissions reduction targets—this
was before the Committee on Climate Change came along. It reported in
public, and a glossy, expensive brochure was produced year after year,
yet even the Department responsible for the policy centrally saw an
increase in the carbon footprint of its own central offices. I have no
faith in the ability of such a commission to make a real difference,
especially one that is poorly funded and with no research skills, like
the one
proposed.
Steve
Webb: The analogy that the hon. Gentleman draws is
interesting. I think that Jonathon Porritt has been the chair of the
Sustainable Development Commission. Because of that title, when he said
things to the media, it was reported as, “The
Government’s adviser says”, not just, “A guy from
the green group says”. I agree that there has not been enough
progress and that the mechanism has not been as effective as it should
have
been. Returning
to the amendment, if we as parliamentarians can help to ensure that
whoever is appointed to the role—who may or may not survive in
post longer than the Secretary of State—is an expert and a pain
in the backside, in a constructive sort of way, that would be a good
thing. If that is the case, I shall lend my support to the
amendment.
Helen
Goodman: I welcome the fact that Members are so interested
in the appointment of the chair of the child poverty commission. The
Government’s view is that we should have an open and transparent
process. I should like to begin by saying something about the way in
which we intend the appointments to be made, and then move on to the
issues that have been raised, particularly by the hon. Member for
South-West Hertfordshire in amendment
9. I
assure hon. Members that the appointment of the chair, and indeed all
appointments to the commission, will be made with the utmost care, in
accordance with the principles set out in the code of practice for
public appointments, which is published by the Office of the
Commissioner for Public Appointments. The code is underpinned by seven
principles derived from the work of the Nolan Committee on Standards in
Public Life. They include openness and transparency, appointment on
merit, independent scrutiny, ministerial responsibility and
proportionality.
Mr.
Gauke: Will the Minister give the Committee some idea of
the time frame for appointments, assuming that all goes well with this
Bill? When does she anticipate that the members of the committee will
be
appointed?
Helen
Goodman: As the hon. Gentleman will be aware, the
Secretary of State has an obligation to produce a strategy quite soon
after Royal Assent. Obviously, it would be very helpful indeed if the
commission was in place before the strategy was produced. One of the
disadvantages of going down the path that the hon. Gentleman proposes
is that it would be more difficult for us to hit all those target
deadlines.
Mr.
Gauke: As the Minister says, the Secretary of State must
publish a strategy—I think that that has to be done within 12
months of the Bill being passed. I assume, therefore, that it will be
published quite late in 2010. Is she prepared to give us an estimate of
the month in which she would expect the appointments to be made? To put
it another way, does she anticipate that the appointments will be made
before early May next
year?
Helen
Goodman: I am sorry to disappoint the hon. Gentleman, but
we have not got quite as far in the detailed planning as he imagines
that we have, so I cannot answer that
question. Let
me go back to the process that we are intending to use. We have full
confidence that the process will ensure that all appointments to the
commission are made fairly and in an open manner, and that candidates
are selected on merit against criteria published at the start of the
appointment process. Those criteria will be based on the provision in
paragraph 1(4) of schedule 1 that requires the Secretary of State to
aim for a commission that has knowledge and experience of child poverty
policy and research, and work with
families. The
entire process will be overseen by an independent person approved by
the Office of the Commissioner for Public Appointments to ensure that
it fully complies with its principles. That should avoid any suggestion
that the chair and other members will be beholden to
Ministers, political parties, stakeholders or special interest
groups.
Hon. Members
will have noted the principle that it is Ministers who should have
final responsibility for making the appointments. That is right because
it preserves the lines of accountability. The point about
accountability is one of the key reasons why I will be urging the hon.
Gentleman not to press his amendment. As it is the Secretary of State
who will be accountable to the House for the child poverty strategy, it
is appropriate that it is the Secretary of State who appoints the
members of the body responsible for advising her on its content. If I
might say so, I think that the hon. Member for Beverley and Holderness
is being slightly inconsistent by arguing that there is no point in
having a commission, because it will be a totally powerless body and,
at one and the same time, that it is a body over which Parliament
should have control. Those two propositions are not entirely
consistent.
Mr.
Stuart: My only point was to be helpful to those who
appear to be in the majority who wish to set up such a commission. If
such a commission is to be set up, the Minister is absolutely right to
say that it is about accountability, and what better way for an
independent advisory body to be accountable than to be accountable to
Parliament, rather than to a Secretary of
State? 6.30
pm
Helen
Goodman: The point—I thought that we had
established this in the debate on clause 7—is that the Secretary
of State is responsible for hitting the targets. The Secretary of State
is responsible for the strategy and for taking decisions, and is
answerable to Parliament. She is therefore appointing independent
advisers to facilitate the production of a strategy to enable her to
fulfil her duties as effectively as
possible.
Mr.
Stuart: Will the Minister give
way?
Helen
Goodman: I am sorry, but I am not going to give way again
at this
juncture. There
is also the question of proportionality. There are many thousands of
public appointments, and it is very rare indeed for the House to have
powers of final approval. An example of the type of post where the
House has a final say is on the appointment of people to the Electoral
Commission. That is because they must be fully independent of Ministers
and answerable only to Parliament. That is not the case with the
poverty commission.
The amendment
would also require the Secretary of State to consult the relevant
Committees of the House before appointing the chair. As set out in the
Government’s response to the Liaison Committee’s report
on pre-appointment hearings, the Government believe that it would be
impractical and disproportionate to subject all public appointments to
pre-appointment scrutiny by Select Committees. Therefore, as stated in
the 2008 White Paper, “Governance of Britain: Constitutional
Renewal”, the Government believe that pre-appointment hearings
should focus on posts in which Parliament and the public have a
particularly strong interest. Examples include posts that play a key
role in protecting the public interest or holding the Executive to
account, as well as the post of those who are responsible for the
appointments process itself.
I point out to
hon. Members who raised the issue of the Children’s Commissioner
that there is not a precise parallel. The remit of the
Children’s Commissioner is to promote the interests of children,
whereas the role of the child poverty commission is an advisory one.
The Children’s Commissioner has statutory and other powers that
the child poverty commission will not
have.
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