Mr.
Boswell: This has been a thoughtful and generally
good-natured debate which has brought to the attention of the Committee
some of the feelings on all sides about what is fair and right in these
very sensitive issues. I would not exclude from that the Minister,
although I am not wholly and entirely surprised that she did not fall
over at the first suggestion. I listened in particular to her
strictures on amendments 101 and 102, and I will obviously reflect on
those.
In relation
to the general argument, I am a little disconcerted that—though
I hold no brief for them—lawyers have been felt in some sense to
be an irritant to the inquisitorial process, as if they were
necessarily going to make things more difficult. There is an argument
on the other side that when dealing with family members who are
sometimes confused, unfamiliar or in certain cases distressed, there is
a case for good support and advocacy, both in terms of the court and of
their own experience going through the court. I hope the Minister will
continue to reflect on that.
I am
sensitive, as we should all be, to the question of public cost, what
the net cost would be and what value would be achieved in terms of
justice gained. I would say with no doubt at all that in the pursuit of
equality of arms—a phrase we have used a number of
times—we would not want to create an arms race with yet further
legal escalation. I recall that in my brief and no doubt inglorious
career as a member of a tribunal 25 years ago, I was concerned that
what I thought had been three good persons meeting together, hearing a
bit of evidence and concluding a decision after lunch, had turned into
silks coming for three or four days and developing their case in what I
caricatured as a legal arms race. Nobody wants that to happen. I
understand the constraints under which the Minister is
operating. It seems that
if we are to make progress in this area, we need to have regard to
general principles. One is access to justice, in the sense that people
should be able to get the advice that they need and feel that they have
been able to do that, that they have not been left bereft by the
process. Secondly, there is a general point. Some interesting
perspectives have come out on what is or might be the equality of arms.
If one side, in effect, takes up a weapon, others might be able to
respond to that. Returning to my remarks in praise of the right hon.
Member for Kingston upon Hull, East, the former Deputy Prime Minister,
I think that, on state killings, there is a huge issue about the
integrity of the process. I suspect that we may come on to that in the
next debate, so I shall not go on at length, but I must say that we
need to satisfy people who are quite untrusting of the state at the
moment—I make no remark about the quality of the present
Government; it is just the way people are—on the question of
whether we treat them fairly. That is the spirit of article 2 and, as
the jurisprudence develops, ultimately how article 2 will be
interpreted. Standards and practices may well have to correct
themselves over time to keep ahead of the article and the challenges
under
it. I
am always conscious, as the Minister herself has said that she is, that
the best can be the enemy of the good, and, having set out those high
principles, I must say to her in conclusion that I welcome the way in
which she has reflected on and, in effect, carried out a dialogue with
Committee members. It would not serve the interests of my case if I
were to come in all guns blazing and force a Division, but, in the
spirit of what she has said, I hope that she will continue to reflect
on practical ways in which we can make access to justice easier. If she
informs herself with that principle and has regard to all the other
factors, including the resources involved, we will move towards a
better conclusion. If we do that, many people will be grateful to us.
In that spirit, and after a constructive debate, I beg to ask leave to
withdraw the
amendment. Amendment,
by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 6
ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause
7Whether
jury
required
Mr.
Bellingham: I beg to move amendment 97, in
clause 7, page 4, line 19, leave
out from ‘if’ to end of line 24 and
insert
‘the coroner has
reason to believe— (a) that the
deceased died in custody or otherwise in state detention;
or (aa) that the deceased died
whilst serving in the armed forces;
or (ab) that the deceased died
at a centre for provision of medical treatment, and the coroner has a
duty to investigate the death within section
1,’.
The
Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss the
following: amendment 95, in clause 7, page 4, leave out
lines 22 to 24 and
insert— ‘(aa) that the
deceased died at a centre for provision of medical treatment, and the
coroner feels there are reasonable grounds for an
inquest,’. Amendment
71, in
clause 7, page 4, line 27, at
end insert ‘or (iii) any other
state
official,’. Amendment
94, in
clause 7, page 4, line 29, at
end insert— ‘(2A)
Any person falling within section 36(2)(a) or (b) may make a request to
the senior coroner that a jury be assembled for the purposes of an
inquest.’. Clause
stand
part. Amendment
96, in
clause 30, page 16, line 13, at
end
insert— ‘(including
a decision under section
7(2A)’.
Mr.
Bellingham: The clause is all about whether a jury is
required, and I entirely accept that having a jury sit with a coroner
will be the exception rather than the rule. The overwhelming majority
of inquests take place without a jury, and it would be completely
impractical if that were not the case, because the costs and
logistical implications of having a jury are significant. On
the other hand, however, having a jury in place in an inquest is a
comforting factor for the bereaved, and we should not ignore it,
because we are discussing families who will be going through
an appalling period in their lives. They will have lost
someone, often in tragic, unexplained or violent circumstances, and
having a jury in place can provide a great deal of comfort.
They feel that because a jury is made up of ordinary people
like them, it is more likely to be sympathetic and understanding. We
are not talking about the adversarial characteristics of a Crown court,
but about a completely different system altogether. In that respect,
the clause—in particular, subsection (2)—is too
restrictive. I entirely accept, however, that we have what
we might call an escape provision in subsection (3), which
states:
“An
inquest into a death may be held with a jury if the senior coroner
thinks that there is sufficient reason for doing
so.” So,
there is a fall-back
position. Amendment
94 would enable any person falling within clause 36(2)(a) or (b) to
make a request for a jury to be empanelled, and it would be for the
coroner to decide. Amendment 95 would extend the grounds on which a
jury could be used and empanelled and add to the existing list private
hospitals, so the situation could involve not only someone dying of
unnatural causes in a state hospital, but someone doing so in a private
hospital.
Mr.
Boswell: Would my hon. Friend like to reflect on the fact
that in many cases, with the developments in the health service,
persons receiving treatment in a private sector establishment will be
funded by the public authorities through the NHS? If we do not move
forward, we might have the same problem that we have had with
state-financed persons in care homes where, if it is a private home,
some provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998 are said not to
apply.
Mr.
Bellingham: My hon. Friend is quite right on that point.
We should look at clause 7(2)(c), which contains the
words “that
the death was caused by a notifiable accident, poisoning or
disease.” That
will obviously cover private hospitals or establishments as well. It is
important that we get that in the
Bill. Amendment
96 is consequential on amendment 94. Amendment 97 would extend the
grounds for an inquest with a jury and remove some restrictions that
are in the Bill, which refers to the
fact “that
the deceased died while in custody or otherwise in state detention and
that either the death was a violent or unnatural one, or the cause of
death is
unknown”. Amendment
97 would effectively take out that
restriction. I
would like to pick up on a briefing sent to us the other day by
Inquest—an organisation working for “truth, justice and
accountability”—which I submit the Government should
listen to more often. Its briefing note
reads: “However,
we raise a note of caution in that new clause 7(2) differs from the
current Coroners Act 1988 clause 8(3) in that it does not specify that
an inquest must be held with a jury if the death occurred in prison and
was neither violent nor unnatural, or where the cause of death was
unknown, or does not fall within the other criteria set out in 7(2) a
— c. The intention here is to allow coroners discretion not to
have a jury in cases of deaths of detainees where there is clearly no
reason to do
so.” My
concern is that we will see fewer such inquests taking place with
juries. That which is meant to be the exception to the rule could
become the default
position. I
am concerned about what the Government are doing here. Obviously, we
want to see a system that is as efficient as possible, but we also want
a system that is fair. As I said at the start of my brief remarks, it
is important that the public have complete confidence in the system.
When we are talking about deaths that are at the most violent end of
the spectrum and deaths where there are important questions about what
happened—because, for example, we are looking at something that
took place in state custody or in another part of the state
system—having the security and comfort of a jury is
important.
Mrs.
Moon: In looking at these proposals, I am a little
concerned that what is being is suggested is an extension on an
extension. Where do we draw the line? For example, why would we not
include the death of a child in local authority care? Why would we not
include the death of someone in a nursing home where medical treatment
of a sort is being provided? At what point do we stop extending the
number of people who require a jury to be
called?
Mr.
Bellingham: I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her
intervention. All the examples that she gave could be covered by clause
7(3), which
states: “An
inquest into a death may be held with a jury if the senior coroner
thinks that there is sufficient reason for doing
so.” I
hope that, in the circumstances to which the hon. Lady alluded, the
coroner would take the view that a jury should be
appointed. The
Minister could well argue—perhaps she will—that we
already have plenty of cover in the Bill, but the concerns that have
been put forward by, for example,
Inquest and the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers should be looked
at. I hope she can respond positively to our
proposals. 5.45
pm
Jenny
Willott: I wish to speak to amendment 71, which is in my
name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge. It picks up
on the point just mentioned by the hon. Member for Bridgend about the
circumstances in which a jury should automatically be considered for an
inquest. Clause 7(2) states:
“An
inquest into a death must be held with a jury if the senior coroner has
reason to suspect...that the death resulted from an act or
omission of...a police officer, or...a member of the service
police
force”. It
is not clear to me why the list of responsible state officials is
restricted to only those two classes of people. Amendment 71 would
insert the words “any other state official”, meaning that
it would be clear, under subsection (2), that someone who
had died at the hands of, or in the care or custody of, the state would
be eligible for a jury inquest. Will the Minister comment on why the
requirement is limited to a police officer or a member of a service
police force? It is not clear why the measure is quite so
restricted.
Mrs.
Moon: Does the hon. Lady agree with me about what is of
most concern? Clause 7(3) states that a jury may be required for an
inquest when a senior coroner thinks that there is sufficient reason
for doing so. There is almost the creation of a second class of citizen
when one compares people who have been in the care of a local
authority, or in a residential care or nursing home, with those covered
by the items listed in amendment 97. We must look towards giving parity
of esteem to all individuals who have any involvement with the
state.
Jenny
Willott: I completely agree. The main purpose behind the
amendments is to clarify the
situation. The
other category that is missing, in addition to the example that has
just been so clearly given, is, amazingly, the security services. There
would be a lot of public concern if someone who died in a hands of the
security services was excluded from the provision when, if the death
had happened at the hands of the police, they would not be. Adding the
words “any other state official” would clarify the
situation, as would dealing with the issue raised by the hon. Member
for Bridgend.
The hon.
Member for North-West Norfolk made many valid comments. I will be
grateful if the Minister responds to the point that, aside from the
point about parity of treatment if a person dies in the care of a state
body, subsection (3) gives a coroner quite broad discretion on the
cases for which they would summon a jury.
Does the
Minister have any figures on the number of inquests that take place
under the coroners’ existing discretionary power? What
proportion of jury inquests take place because they are prescribed by
law, and how many are held because the coroner has chosen to use their
discretion? If a large proportion of jury inquests are called at the
discretion of the coroner, we might be a bit more relaxed about the use
of such a power. If few are ever called, however, I would be concerned
about relying too heavily on subsection (3) as a clear-up
measure.
Clause 7(2)
removes one of the existing reasons why juries have to be called: when
a death occurs in circumstances that, if continued, could be
prejudicial to the health and safety of the public. We heard about many
such cases during our evidence sessions, and members of the Committee
have mentioned such inquests during our deliberations. Clearly, one
would expect that the Minister would intend for those types of cases to
be picked up under subsection (3), if necessary. There has not been any
policy justification as to why health and safety cases have been
removed from the list of those that require a jury hearing, although
other cases that require a jury have been left as they are. Will the
Minister clarify why that has
happened? As
we have already discussed, the right of people to have a jury at an
inquest does not need to be too broad because coroners are extremely
experienced in undertaking inquests. They can tease out the truth of
different circumstances. However, it is a fundamental part of justice
being seen to be done that juries are called in inquests, especially
those involving the state. If we limit too greatly the circumstances in
which juries are called when the state is involved, people’s
view on the success of the whole system will be clouded.
We know that
only a very small proportion of inquests have juries. A small increase
in the number of cases that automatically need juries would involve
small and limited costs, but it could have an impact on public opinion.
It is important to ensure that we are seen to be fair and not
over-restricting the cases for which juries may be
called.
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